The urge to verify is evident throughout human history. In the Bible, one finds the example of St. Thomas whose disbelief in the Resurrection was only assuaged by examining Christ's wounds. The checks and audits of today's commercial world can be traced back to the Tolomei and Medici banks of the fifteenth century. And in military history, Xenephon records show an example of verification that occurred nearly 2400 years ago as the Greek army left Persia:
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“The more carefully the two armies observed one another the more mutual distrust mounted and the more palpable tensions grew. The Greek commander fearing a new outbreak of hostilities and bloodshed called upon his Persian counterpart 'to put a stop to these suspicions.” |
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“I observe that you are watching our moves as though we were enemies, and we, noticing this, are watching yours too. On looking into things, I am unable to find evidence that you are trying to do us any harm, and I am perfectly sure that, as far as we're concerned, we do not even contemplate such a thing; and so I decided to discuss matters with you, to see if we could put an end to this mistrust. I know, too, of cases that have occurred in the past when people, sometimes as a result of slanderous information and sometimes merely on the strength of suspicion, have become frightened of each other and then, in their anxiety to strike first before anything is done to them, have done irreparable harm to those who neither intended nor even wanted to do them any harm at all.”1 |
Xenophon goes on to describe the Greek General approaching his Persian counterpart in the hope of clarifying mutual intentions, thereby impeding the other side from striking first out of fear or ignorance. Unhappily during the banquet, which had been arranged to discuss the matter, the Persian's slaughtered the Greek commanders.
Thomas Schelling, commenting on Xenophon's account, writes: “It is the other side's confidence that each side is primarily concerned to build. Facing a potentially hostile enemy what one wants is not to be confident, but to be as confident as the true state of affairs justifies.”2 The fatal flaw in the Greek general's strategy was not that he had been lacking information about his Persian escorts but that his confidence had lain in the wrong assumptions as to their intentions.
In the twenty-first century, one sees that the principles of military verification3, which were in place earlier, are much the same today. The history of the first half of the twentieth century offers only two practical experiences of verification, both were as a result of wars in Europe. After Versailles, the Allies established an Inter-Allied Control Commission to verify that rearmament do not take place on the territory of vanquished Germany (1920-26) and after the French defeat of 1940, both the Germans and Italians established commissions (1940-42) to oversee French disarmament according to the Armistice.4 It is interesting to note a few points that these two experiences have in common:
The lesson is evident – verification is powerless against an organized will to cheat.
World War II reawakened the concern about verification of compliance concerning agreements to limit armaments. After the rejection of the Baruch plan to place all nuclear material under international control, discussion was renewed mainly towards plan for general and complete disarmament (GCD) under United Nations (UN) auspices, and separate negotiation for a complete ban on nuclear testing took place in the early 60's. However, the East-West confrontation proved a formidable barrier to the conclusion of any meaningful arms control agreements with acceptable verification measures.
The progress recently made in clarifying verification's role within the arms control and disarmament process needs consolidation, dissemination, and institutionalisation. With the rejuvenation of East-West arms control in the second half of the last decade has come a series of publications on the process, and on treaty compliance. At the same time each country and international organizations concerned have stated their own views.
States have taken a fragmented course, dealing with verification in a variety of ad-hoc manner and building verification regimes, sometimes in the final months of rushed, politically motivated timetables. Academic and government writings have elaborated upon the spectrum of means available to states and organizations; they have created elaborate mathematical models quantifying concepts such as “certainty” and “intrusiveness” and a library of theories and terminology.
Studies of state negotiating practices and treaty verification provisions would seem to indicate that administrations have rather muddled through according to a very politicized process. However, recently there has been a remarkable convergence on the concept of “adequacy” of verification, as is demonstrable in on-going arms-control and disarmament negotiations. “Adequacy” is defined here as a level of verification intrusiveness sufficient to convince treaty signatories that other signatories cannot cheat in a militarily significant manner without such non-compliance being detected in sufficient time to negate any advantage gained by the violator.
The discussion of verification during the period of 1945-1993 was too often an abstraction: how to go about detecting and determine cases of non-compliance. But the reality is not so clear-cut and is more political.6 The centrality of politics to verification has been represented most obviously in its frequent usage in the past as an obstacle to the whole arms control process. As stated above, decisions as to the degree of verification and intrusiveness necessary are never apolitical. Nevertheless, states have frequently made impossible verification demands as a means of stalling or killing arms control negotiations that they feel detrimental to their security or other interests.
The reason is evident: it is more acceptable to public and international opinion to debate minutiae of a verification regime endlessly than to pronounce oneself against the entire negotiations. In cases such as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, the USSR had to sit at the table to secure the Helsinki Accords, but perceived no interest in negotiating away its massive conventional preponderance in Central Europe. Rather than state this and endanger relations with Western Europe it simply insisted on the then seemingly impossible demand that manpower and equipment ceilings be verified through national technical means (NTMs) alone, thus ensuring non-productive talks for thirteen years. “The degree of verification required by the United States was based upon its perception of the threat posed to national security by the arms in question and the likelihood of undetected violations. For example, the United States accepted the limited (and in U.S. opinion largely symbolic) verification provisions contained in the Biological Weapons Convention and the Environmental Weapons Convention, because it did not think it was likely that weapons of this nature would be developed for modern arsenals. Verification in these conventions consisted of procedures for cooperation and consultation between parties and recourse to the Security Council in case of unresolved complaints. The United States rejected similar proposals for verification of a chemical weapons accord, noting that the threat posed by these weapons, already in the arsenals of some states, demanded stricter, more assuring verification measures, including on-site inspection.”7
The MBFR talks are a classic example of how demands for obviously inadequate levels of verification intrusiveness can obstruct arms control. At the other end of the spectrum, demands for excessive levels of verifiability can be used equally well as instruments to prevent agreement. By requiring absolute certainty of treaty compliance or “iron-clad” verification, US President Ronald Reagan ensured that no superpower arms control was finalized for six years. By proclaiming any violation, no matter how minor, to be militarily significant and demanding the absolute right to inspect “anytime, anywhere”, a state can make the costs of intrusion outweigh the benefit of any conceivable treaty. The Reagan Administration dropped its rigid verification requirements during the INF negotiations, but the same political posturing has plagued many other negotiations, such as those for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The success of a verification regime in deterring treaty violations not only imports upon that treaty and related security issues, but on the whole arms control process. This is observable in the role that questions about verification and Soviet non-compliance played in preventing US ratification of SALT II. During the Presidential campaign of 1979-80, the Republicans were able to cast doubt upon the Carter Administration's ability and willingness to detect and respond to non-compliance and succeeded in convincing many that anything less than absolute verifiability implied “trusting the Russians”. To the extent that “trusting the Russians” thesis was believed in and not simply a conscious strategy to obstruct a policy line, the verification issue succeeded in altering US positions on arms control at the policy-making levels.
In reality, verification in no way involves trust. Rather, it involves accepting a certain degree of uncertainty with regards to compliance in exchange for increased openness and predictability in the other sides' activities, limitations or cuts in their activities and forces, and the knowledge that the costs of concealing these systems or activities under the verification regime will be sufficiently high to dissuade non-compliance. The accompanying verification regime together with clear policies for dealing with violations can thus enhance security regardless of the international climate or perception of the others' trustworthiness.
The problem with SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was not so much with verification. NTMs succeeded very well in detecting each significant violation and circumvention. The problem lay rather in the loose wording of the treaties, the lack of an agreed database, the lack of clarity in counting rules, definitions and a variety of other clauses.
A hurry to conclude arms control agreements as a sign of detente, together with deliberate vagueness to circumvent severe disagreements backlashed against arms control in the late 1970's. In this backlash inadequate verification, poorly defined and all-inclusive was unfairly diagnosed as a cause of the perceived decline in US security. All of which leads us to the first lesson of early arms control experience: even an adequate, functioning verification regime cannot protect the principles of arms control and international law against weakly defined treaties and the damage caused by governments unwilling or unable to react effectively and responsibly to non-compliance.
It is the aim of this work to give an overview and summarize the role of verification in international relations. Attention will be focused on the evolution of this role in light of political circumstances and technological progress. Several different approaches to verification can be identified – bilateral, regional cooperation, global arrangements, and individual national efforts. Moreover, several themes characterize the existing verification regimes. These issues – namely the sharing of intelligence, managing compliance questions, and the integration of different regimes – present themselves as the negotiating ground for future years. Yet, one conclusion cannot be denied: the concept of verification, once a contentious political instrument, is growing to encompass new actors, new frameworks, new technologies, and new fields.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a solid intellectual framework for understanding the theoretical questions of verification: what are the standards and strategies involved in establishing and implementing verification regime? How do the ongoing technology developments affect verification regime?
First, it provides a basic historical development of the concepts: arms control, disarmament and verification. It will define a broad conceptual framework for understanding the verification process. An understanding of the basic terminology that is used throughout the work will provide a context for examining the policies of verification during the period of 1945-1993.
Secondly, it briefly describes and analyses international relations theory and their respective applications in verification regime. The purpose here is not to provide a detailed, authoritative account of international relations theory but rather to explain the strategic drives of building a verification regime during the period of 1945-1993.
Third, this chapter outlines the complex relations between verification and technology. Because of their close connection, understanding this relation is fundamental to understanding the role of verification in international relations.
The term disarmament is often used interchangeably with that of arms control, but the two terms should be considered as separate concepts. Disarmament is both a process and an end state. As a process it involves the reduction, removal or elimination of identified weapon systems. As an end state it involves the establishment of a disarmed world and the prevention of rearmament thereafter. Arms control, on the other hand, restrains the acquisitions, deployment and use of military capabilities.
Arms control analysts of the early 1960s were in agreement that the objectives of arms control were threefold: reducing the likelihood of war, reducing the political and economic costs of preparing for war, and minimizing the scope and violence of war if it occurred.8 Even though disarmament and arms control are not the same they nevertheless intersect.9
Disarmament has a longer legacy10 than arms control and was a common theme in international relations literature during the 1950s. The advent of atomic weapons during World War II gave further impetus to advocates of disarmament. Many prominent writers, intellectuals, and policy activists supported efforts to “ban the bomb”, even if this entailed unilateral disarmament. Nuclear disarmament became for many a moral imperative, for the stakes at risk seemed nothing less than the extinction of the human species. Consequently, the leaders of the superpowers gave considerable attention to arms control during the Cold War.
During the Cold War the core goal of security policy was enhancement of stability. The alternatives were presented as either nuclear Armageddon or appeasement. This reinforces the case for focusing on deterrence theory. The logic of deterrence suggested that if either side pushed the other too far, they would set for a trail of nuclear escalation leading to universal ruin11. In the early 1960s international security specialists began using the term arms control in place of the term disarmament.
However, by the late 1970s, this tapestry was becoming a little frayed at the edges. Public opinion was uneasy about endorsing a never-ending arms race to an exponential expansion of the Peace Movement in Europe. It was within this setting that a seminal document in the evolution of the concept of security was published in 1982 “Report of The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, titled Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival” (normally referred to as the Palme Commission Report, after its chairman, Olof Palme).12
The report was driven by the idea that arms racing were wasteful, harmful to the prospects for development in the Third World, and – above all else – dangerous. According to the Palme Commission, there was a 'drift towards war'; the world seemed to be 'marching towards the brink of a new abyss'.13 The Report noted that:
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“nations must strive for objectives more ambitious than stability, the goal of the present system in which security is based on armaments. For stability based on armaments cannot be sustained indefinitely. There is always the danger that the fragile stability of an international system based on armaments will suddenly crumble, and that nuclear confrontation will take its place. A more effective way to ensure security is to create positive processes that can lead to peace and disarmament. It is essential to create an irreversible process, with a momentum such that all nations cooperate for their common survival.“14 |
A relaxation of tensions in superpower relations, or détente, was widely viewed to coincide with arms control agreements, such as the conclusion of the first round of SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) in 1972, the INF (intermediate nuclear forces) agreement in 1987, and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) in 1991.
As states do not wish to rely blindly on each other’s compliance with an international agreement15 and as modifying one's behaviour according to treaty affects security, compliance needed to be ensured by standards and technologies. Verification regime is required to ensure that the treaty is not being abused in order to diminish security, to avoid varying interpretations as to a regime's effectiveness and to covert cheating and undetected significant military activities.
Verification is thus central to any agreement affecting a state's security. Verification and monitoring may be applied to the whole range of elements that constitute a peace implementation process, ranging from the military aspects, through electoral monitoring and human rights monitoring, to the monitoring of local police using international civilian police. The monitoring and verification of the military aspects of peace agreements has the longest lineage historically: ceasefire agreements have often called for monitoring by impartial international observers. In comparing the main fields of international cooperation16 one can observe that the verification problem appears to be most pronounced in arms control and disarmament international treaties.17
“Verification” is, according to the Webster’s dictionary, “the act or process of verifying or the state of being verified; the authentication of truth or accuracy by such means as facts, statement, citations, measurements, or attendant circumstances, confirmation by evidence in law.”18 Although this definition does not seem very applicable to arms control and disarmament treaties, we can apply to it the idea of positive and negative verification.
SIPRI defines verification as a process, specifically established or approved by a disarmament agreement, carried out by individual state parties to the agreement, either reciprocally or not, or by an international body established or empowered to carry out the process, by personnel or by technical means, in order to determine the degree to which the parties to the agreement have implemented its provisions and thereby observed or discharged their obligations under the treaty.19
A Group of Qualified Governmental Experts that have been appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General20 added in 1995 emphasising that verification can be generically defined as a process in which data are collected, collated and analysed in order to make an informed judgement as to whether a party is complying with its obligations: Verification as “the action of demonstrating or proving to be true or legitimate by means of evidence or testimony”.
This definition, although focused on the function of verification as a provider of evidence, already hints at the complexity inherent in verification. While it is most frequently associated with proving the compliance or non-compliance of a state, verification also provides an opportunity for a state to demonstrate its compliance when suspicions are raised, thus also serving a reassurance function. MacEachin identifies the “defining objective” of on-site verification as denying “a potential treaty violator the means for concealing proscribed programmes under the cover of legitimate activities” thus highlighting a third function of verification, namely deterrence.21 This definition introduces the concept of verification as a process, ideally a cooperative one.22
For the purpose of this work, it is necessary to add the definition of verification by Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham that “Verification is the inverse of trust. In a system based upon mutual trust and understanding, verification of compliance would be both necessary and contrary to the spirit of the relationship. Indeed, in such circumstances requiring verification would be a contradiction in terms”.23
Four conclusions can be drawn from this discussion.
Verification is a process.
Verification consists of two elements, which are closely interrelated: monitoring and verification.
Verification targets two actions: positive verification (verifications on actions that the subject perform) or negative verification (verifications on actions the subject is forbidden to perform).24
A fourth element, sanction, even though it does not form an integral part of verification but is closely related25 and an important aspect of effective implementation of verification.
Verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament and should promote the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament measures build confidence among States and ensure that all parties are observing agreements.
Considering these facts verification implies two functions:
to deter cheating on an arms control agreement and
to build confidence between the parties to an agreement.
Verification measures include:
Verification “system” comprises institutions, arrangements, techniques and technologies. In the case of agreements between two states, it may be enough for each to verify the other’s compliance, using what are known as “national technical means”, such as satellites. When agreements involve multiple parties or aim at global membership, a more elaborate international organisation may be required to establish and manage a verification system. It will usually include a technical secretariat to handle the monitoring technologies and inspection arrangements, an executive council of selected member states to oversee the system and a conference of all states parties to set policy and review the operation of the treaty. Verification systems use a variety of techniques and technologies. Some of the most common elements are as follows.
Declarations and data exchanges are often the first step in implementing a treaty. Typically, parties declare the numbers, location and characteristics of the weapons they possess that are to be banned or limited. Verification will seek to confirm such “baseline” data. Most treaties like NPT provide for periodic updating or even continuous provision of data.
Remote monitoring by satellites, aircraft and other off-site technologies and techniques are used to detect treaty violations.
Inspections are one of the most valuable verification tools, as they permit direct human observation. They may be used to witness a specific event, such as a military exercise, or to monitor a site continuously, such as a chemical weapon destruction plant. On-site inspectors have a balance of rights and responsibilities. While inspected states are required to co-operate with them as fully as possible, inspectors have, until now, never been permitted literally to roam anytime. Since the verification agency may have to adjudicate competing claims, impartiality and good intelligences are an advantage and requires the capability to monitor what the parties are actually doing, as opposed to what they are saying. Since the verification agency may have to respond to non-compliance, a repertoire of sanctions is also an advantage.27
This sub-section provides simplified analyses of basic international relations theories and their contribution to the explanation of the role of verification regime in international relations. The purpose here is not to design a theory of verification regime but rather to identify the factors that are relevant in the different theories of international regimes and to explain the process and the purpose of verification regime in international relations. This work consists mainly of empirical arguments, and is thus not a theoretical exposition of the role of verification in international relations.
Until the Second World War, the most influence book on strategic studies is the Carl von Clausewitz's legacy’s unfinished book:28 that war is a continuation of political activity by other means, remains the basis for the study of war as a potentially rational pursuit. This assertion was the starting point for investigation into the strategic implications of nuclear weapons. Bernard Brodie was the first to popularise the notion that these weapons were so fearful that they might actually serve to prevent another total war through the workings of deterrence. The experience of the Korean War suggested that wars could be kept limited in their means (non-nuclear), so long as their ends were also limited, a theme picked up by Robert Osgood and Henry Kissinger in the mid-1950s.29
During the Cold War, the central question was how to avoid both war and appeasement. The mainstream agenda for international security studies were formulated in a sense of order – “deterrence”, “containment,” “flexible response,” and “detente”. Soon the Cold War became both less dangerous, in the aftermath of the crises in Berlin and Cuba of the early 1960s, and more aggravating, as the United States followed the imperatives of anti-communism into the quagmire of Vietnam. The former development left strategic studies less vital; the latter tended to discredit it. Consequently, research during this era was characterized by a heightened degree of skepticism, with analysts warning of the limits of deterrence and coercion (Alexander George), the distorting effects of bureaucratic politics (Graham Allison), and the perils of misperception (Robert Jervis).30
Early theorists studied arms control and disarmament treaties in the broadest sense to refer to all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of ensuring international stability. As Hedley Bull put it, arms control is “cooperation between antagonistic pairs of states in the military field, whether this cooperation is founded upon interests that are exclusively those of the cooperating states themselves or on interests that are more widely shared.”31
The new theoretical approach for arms control and disarmament discussion is cooperative security, a concept that has grown in popularity and use since the end of the Cold War. One commonly accepted definition of cooperative security is “a commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit.”32
Thus, the term collective security is slightly different in meaning than the terms cooperative security or collective defence. Collective security is “a political and legal obligation of member states to defend the integrity of individual states within a group of treaty signatories.” Collective defence is more narrowly defined: “the commitment of all states to defend each other from outside aggression.” By contrast, cooperative security can include the introduction of measures that reduce the risk of war, measures that are not necessarily directed against any specific state or coalition.33
The greatest policy interest lay in efforts devised to get out of the Cold War, or at least to mitigate its most dangerous aspects, through arms control. Studies in this field tended to have a technical bias, although these widened as academics and policymakers gained an increased appreciation of the political role that arms control negotiations were playing in East-West relations. The debate over SALT II negotiations in the late 1970s was not so much about the arcane of the military balance, though it was often conducted in those terms, than the prospects for detente with the Soviet.
For the purpose of this work, it seems appropriate to keep in mind the recent publication on: “Theories of International Regimes”34. In this book, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger divide the theories of international regimes into three schools, power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based theories. Power-based theories of international regimes can be described as “neo-realist theories of cooperation”. Not only conflict but also cooperation is explained by power and the distribution of capabilities among states. The interest-based theories are the mainstream of regime theories. It “emphasizes the role of international regimes in helping states to realize common interests”.35 The focus is on situations where the constellation of actors' interests is such that they can only achieve beneficial outcomes through institutionalized cooperation. The knowledge-based theories stress ideas and knowledge as explanatory variables. The focus is partly on how “causal and normative beliefs form perceptions of international problems and thus demand for regimes”.36
Stephen Krasner’s definition of international regimes in a special issue of the journal “International Organization” in 1982 indicate that: “International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”.37 “Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or postscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”.38
There is also a difference in the literature on whether the research is focused on explaining the existence of regimes, or on the effects of regimes. The emphasis of the regime literature has moved from the first to the latter question.39 The empirical discussion in this paper will primarily be related to the effects of regimes. It then seems important to distinguish how the regime improves conditions for cooperation and the “degree to which a regime ameliorates the problem that prompted its creation”.40 In the case of verification this would be the difference between how the discussion on the standards of verification on arms control and disarmament facilitated the creation of effective arms control and disarmament regimes and the extent to which this rule-based cooperation leads to international cooperation.
Two aspects of the concept have to be clarified. First, verification is a part of sub-group of international institutions dealing mainly with arms control and disarmament.
The second aspect of the concept of the verification regimes that is mentioned is its underlying normative core. Levy, Young and Zürn41 (1995:271) expresses this when they write: “given the basic thrust of regime analysis as a tool for understanding international cooperation and the role of norms in the pursuit of cooperation, there is a need to go beyond merely reutilized or patterned behavior. The principal claim of regime analysis is that states may generate institutions in identifiable issue areas that affect their behavior and foster cooperation, even if short-term interests would dictate deviation”. If the observed cooperation is explained by patterns of complementary interests and underlying distribution of power, regimes have no effect and thus, in such cases, theories of international regimes does not contribute to the explanation of cooperation.42
Even then, turning to traditional regime theories offers no immediate or plausible account for the understanding of the drive and dynamism of verification regime. All three classes of theories – power-, interest-, and knowledge-based – have some potential to contribute in constructing a comprehensive realistic explanation on the discussion of the role of verification in international relations.
This paper claim that the explanatory factors discussed so far have had an impact regarding the behaviours and drives of states in the negotiation process of the verification regimes but have limited impact to factors related to the structure of the regime, and factors related to the effective implementation of the regime: standards and technologies and constellation of interests among states. Verification standard and technologies are important for the success or failure of arms control and disarmament treaties, or more precise the probability of success or failure of arms control and disarmament treaties.
One of the major verification issues during the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral treaties of arms control and disarmament is the question of standards of verification. Standards of verification: “absolute”, “adequate,” or “effective,” play a major role throughout the verification process. Standards of verification are not pure, well-defined theoretical concepts but represent a range of purely subjective, conflicting assessments of how much uncertainty in verifying is acceptable.43 For the purpose of this work, table 2 describes the different standards that have been developed by Canadians F.R. Cleminson and E. Gilman44 and discusses the most accepted standard of verification “adequate verification”.
Table 1: Standards of verification
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Standards of verification |
Description |
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Absolute verification |
A regime under which no doubt is left in determining treaty compliance. In practical terms, however, the achievement of 100 % verification is unlikely. |
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Adequate verification |
A level of verification intrusiveness sufficient to convince treaty signatories that other signatories cannot cheat in a militarily significant manner without such non-compliance being detected in sufficient time to negate any advantage gained by the violator. In this regime, adequacy would include the ability to respond to possible violation. |
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Limited verification |
In this regime, the limitation in verification capability is defined in real terms and is created by the inadequacy of technology available to contracting parties. |
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Symbolic verification |
A regime in which the verification capability is known in advance to be inadequate through a combination of lack of technology and/or of low probability of compliance. |
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No verification |
A regime in which the treaty or agreement is signed with no provision for verification. |
While the concept of adequacy as the logical and attainable verification standard may have obtained multinational support within the United Nations at an earlier date in 1978,45 it only won a large consensus with the successful implementation of the INF Treaty. Until President Mikhail Gorbachev led a redefinition of the Soviet conception of their national interest and security,46 the USSR refused adequate verification where it included on-site inspection (OSI) 47 of Warsaw Pact countries on the ground that this constituted “legalized espionage”.
Once the Soviet Union's leadership came to realize the need for reduced defense spending, its attitude toward arms control and verification changed. With arms control set to play a larger role in Soviet security, the desirability of increasing certainty about compliance became increasingly obvious. Consequently, in both the Stockholm Agreement of 1986, which reinforced the importance of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and the INF Treaty of 1987, verification regimes including on-site inspections (OSI) were established and operated to the satisfaction of everyone concerned.
The choice of verification standard depends more or less directly on the degree of strategic importance of the agreement proportional to the technical capabilities of the verifying countries – the military cost of inadequate verification and the political costs of cheating.48 Assessments of these three elements vary according to perceptions of each party about the other, assumptions about the state of relations between the parties and perceptions of the domestic political elements within each party. On these criteria then, verification can be said to be a process of determining compliance with the terms of an arms control agreement to the extent deemed adequate to safeguard 'national security'.49
The term, as defined by Richard Nixon relates to the ability to “identify attempted evasion if it occurs on a large enough scale to pose a significant risk, and whether we can do so in time to mount a sufficient response.”50 The term also appears in the Basic Principles of Negotiations in 1973.51
Today there is a general appreciation of the fact that less than adequate verification discredits the arms control process. The Geneva Convention of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical agents in war contains no measures to aid verifiability and no procedures for dealing with allegations of such usages. There is little doubt in anyone's mind that chemical agents and toxins have been used in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, in the Iran-Iraq war and elsewhere. Any number of rationale for avoiding the Convention have been found, with the result that it has lost what little influence it had as a statement of international norms. With only usage in war prohibited – but not testing, manufacturing, or stockpiling – the Convention has basically no validity. It merely acts to encourage creative treaty interpretations and foster disrespect for arms control. The example this may have served should be distinct from mere political statements. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I) there is a clear division between the treaty, with every measure verifiable and the attached political commitment to adhere to ceilings on air- and sea- launched cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs) with no verification provisions. The benefit of this approach is that no future suspicion as to violations of these ceilings can be aired without necessarily calling into question the whole START package. When one considers the importance of START's cuts to superpower relations and curbing the arms race, it is of course highly desirable that non-verifiable provisions not be allowed to destroy the remainder.
In arms control or partial disarmament discussions involving the retention of treaty-limited items (TLI), adequacy is now the guiding principle in verification regime-building. From the Contadora Peace Process, through START, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, and discussion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, acceptance of the adequacy concept is allowing arms control to progress.
This acceptance makes the determination of verification provisions more of a practical exercise, rather than simply an item to control the scope and content of negotiations. Adequacy as a principle in no way ensures smooth or simple negotiations of verification provisions; only that the range of debate is considerably narrowed from that of the early 1980's: the “legalized espionage” vs. “iron clad” verification impasse has been replaced by the determination of what adequacy means in real terms.
In 1988 the United Nation Assembly in its Resolution A/RES/43/81 (B) endorsed sixteen Verification Principles:52
Arms control and success in verification are too often assumed to be dependent upon goodwill. Decision-makers and publics alike need to know that good arms control agreements with functional verification regimes are possible and maintainable regardless of how much atmospherics vary. The ability of the US and USSR to conclude acceptable and effective verification regimes under the hostile conditions of the Cold War is an example to all. No goodwill existed between Egypt and Israel when the Sinai agreements were signed and implemented. The verification regime was able to cope with each minor violation that occurred so that the demilitarized zone contributed visibly to each country's security. This in turn provided the time and inclination to pursue further improvements in the bilateral relationship, ultimately resulting in a peace treaty.
Verification is thus clearly not only dependent upon goodwill, although successful regime operation can have the effect of building goodwill and trust. Should relations deteriorate as a result of other matters the arms control process itself might slow or stop. The proven verification regimes in place, however, serve to deter states from allowing the deterioration to spill over into a regularized part of the relationship. Unless the deterioration is so severe as to result in treaty abrogation, areas covered by the treaty could remain verifiably unaffected.
Verified treaties can thus serve to limit military competition even in time of poisoned relations, limiting the damage to mutual security and making it easier to steer the relationship back into a positive direction. The 'tolerated costs' of arms control and intrusive measures should thus not be weighed simply against the expected gains at the time of the ratification, but also against the benefits of having the relevant area of the relationship under verified constraint in any future period of ill will.
Technological development, itself responsible for the greater availability and affordability of weapons themselves, is also a critical element in verifying their control. Before examining existing verification regimes, a brief overview of the technological possibilities and their respective qualities and drawbacks is warranted. This section will look at the role of national technical means (NTM) and other cooperative measures of verification. It will examine their strengths and the weakness with respect to the purpose and role of verification regime.
National technical means (NTM) represent the method of verification most commonly used in international agreements thus far. One state verifies that another state is complying without entering the other states territory.54 NTM incorporates non-intrusive types of technological ability to observe the activities of another state, including image- and signal- collecting satellites, submarine and air platform observation and signal-collecting abilities. Technical means include seismic detectors, nuclear radiation detectors, radio waves, radar, and visible infrared light.55
However, as their name implies, NTM are those of individual states and while this trait may have offered more credibility to their inclusion in bilateral regimes, their unilateral ownership is a contentious – or potentially so – issue within multilateral regimes.
NTM can be roughly divided into two forms of intelligence gathering: IMINT (image intelligence) and SIGINT (signals intelligence).
IMINT primarily refers to observation satellites56 that transmit collected data to ground-based receiving stations and to the abilities of national intelligence agencies to process and interpret this data. The spacecraft may carry a variety of sensors and in some cases carry equipment to record data, but in general this information is passed on in digital form to the receiving station where it is converted, interpreted, and even enhanced through the use of other information sources and previously recorded images.
Satellites can collect useful images of the Earth's surface through many means, active and passive, and in much of the electromagnetic spectrum, from shorter-than-ultraviolet wavelengths through thermal infrared and reflected radar waves. Many features may be considered in characterizing the usefulness of a satellite imaging system (inclination, revisit time, spectral sensitivity, and imaging capacity, for instance), but resolution is one of the most commonly invoked. Discussions of resolution can quickly become highly complex; for present purposes, however, it can be understood as the minimum separation between two similar objects needed for an imaging system to distinguish the objects as two rather than one.57
Generally, optical and radar sensors are carried on separate observation satellites. For example, the French SPOT, the Indian IRS-1C and the US Landsat have optical sensors only while the European ERS and the Japanese JERS series of satellites and the Canadian Radarsat carry only a radar sensor. While the SPOT satellites carry both panchromatic and multispectral sensors, the range and the spectral resolutions are not as good as those of the US Landsat satellites. However, the latter does not have a panchromatic sensor on board. On the other hand the Indian IRS-1C carries both panchromatic and multispectral sensors, the latter being as good as the Landsat TM sensor with the exception of the thermal IR sensor. The IRS-1C has no thermal sensor. Consider first optical multispectral images only.58 The American U-2 flights will increase the speed of the inspections in two ways. First, data will be available sooner. The UN does not have real-time access to satellite data, but the U-2's have large, steerable satellite dishes on top, meaning images could be beamed back live.59 The U-2's camera will provide 15 cm resolution – about the size of a petri dish – and can sweep up swathes of imagery, 120 km wide and many hundreds of kilometers long. The commercial imagery that commentators believe UN weapons inspectors are using at present, has 100 cm resolution – if they can afford it. A single set of commercial images covering Iraq costs about $10 million.
The value of these images in interpreting data is primarily contingent on the resolution of the image, defined as the distance two objects must be from one another to appear distinctly in the image.60 Depending on the type of sensor used, the resolution of an image can be contingent on the level of technology, the height of the platform, and environmental conditions.
The idea of the use of commercial observation satellites is becoming very attractive because the quality of such satellites has improved by a factor of at least 80 and it continues to improve. In 1998 of the over 2,400 satellites in Earth orbit, only about one hundred are operated by nongovernmental organizations or private companies.61 That situation is changing: in 2008 as many as a thousand more commercial communication satellites will be placed into orbit.62 Commercially available images are intent on providing the highest-resolution images that money and technology could allow.63 They are rapidly driving their systems to one-meter resolution and while US military satellite capabilities are not public, it is certain that resolution capabilities are well below one meter.
According to Miasnikov,64 due to modern commercial satellites capability of taking pictures of any place on the globe with a resolution sufficient the NTM capabilities have grown in the meantime. 65
Remote-sensing satellites66 offer the possibility of collecting images in many parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, each of which may have a particular attraction or weakness depending on the verification task. Within the range of visible and reflected infrared light, one can “photograph” a greater range of spectral light than that observed by the human eye. One particularly useful capability is that of distinguishing between healthy vegetation (which greatly reflects infra-red energy) and what might be simply green-coloured camouflage material.67
However, because these images are dependent on the use of light already present at the scene, they are of little use for observation at night and are unable to penetrate heavy cloud cover.
Another limitation to images in this range is that the sensitivity of photographic film lessens significantly for longer wavelengths. Very small electro-optical detectors called charge-coupled devices (CCDs) can overcome this problem to some degree. CCDs convert photons into electrical signal forming an image out of “pixels” (picture elements), which can be recorded and restored as a visual image by the data interpreters. These images have the advantage of requiring much less exposure time and because they are directly available in electronic format they are easily transmitted, processed and enhanced by computer.
The thermal infrared range offers the possibility of obtaining images when natural light is not available, at night or under cloud cover. Satellites are equipped with sensors that record amounts of heat energy given off within a given band of wavelengths that is not absorbed by the earth's atmosphere and ozone layer. Thus, images will portray sources of heat that are substantially above ground temperature, including operating vehicles and heated buildings.
Radar measurements can also be made from remote platforms. By artificially illuminating a target with electromagnetic waves, radar can “see” in the dark of night and by employing relatively long wavelengths, it is not seriously impeded by cloud cover. One drawback is that radar would require an antenna several kilometers long in order to collect images of any useful resolution. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is able to overcome this obstacle by using the movement of the satellite to mimic the effect of a long antenna.
SAR has the added advantage in the sense that, the resolution of collected images are not necessarily hindered by higher altitudes.68 However, the power requirements for necessary computer functions and for the emission of sufficiently strong radar signals have often been considered prohibitive to conventionally-powered satellites.69
A number of SAR sensors are now in orbit operated by various countries. A multi-channel radar exploits the fact that the interaction of microwave beam with matter is influenced by frequency and polarization of a radar beam. The response of the latter to different shapes or scattering elements of an object will depend on the selection of horizontal or vertical polarization. The US SIR-C/X-SAR experiments during April and October 1994 generated such multi-parameter SAR data from space. The greatest advantage of a SAR sensor is its ability to provide all-weather day and night information. 70
Signals intelligence satellites (SIGINT) are designed to detect transmissions from broadcast communications systems such as radios, as well as radars and other electronic systems. The interception of such transmissions can provide information on the type and location of even low power transmitters, such as hand-held radios. However, these satellites are not capable of intercepting communications carried over land lines, such as under-sea fibre optic cables (nor can they detect non-electronic communications, such as the spoken word).
SIGINT is a second category of NTM, and consists of several categories. Communications intelligence (COMINT) is directed at the analysis of the source and content of message traffic. While most military communications are protected by encryption techniques, computer processing can be used to decrypt some traffic, and additional intelligence can be derived from analysis of patterns of transmissions over time. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is devoted analysis of non-communications electronic transmissions. This would include telemetry from missile tests (TELINT), or radar transmitters (RADINT).
Commonly known for its reconnaissance uses during World War I and II, SIGINT can be a valuable tool for the verification of arms control agreements because access to both communications and electronic signals would provide clear signals in the case of any covert weapons development or testing.71
SIGINT can be evaded by encrypting transmitted signals or by recording them and dropping them to designated receivers without transmitting through the air. However, the SALT agreements set a precedent that included a facilitating agreement not to evade SIGINT in these ways. It has become a general standard that encrypted signals, if proven to pertain to a treaty-limited arms system, are a sure sign of illegal activities.
This description of NTM capabilities in the verification context is not comprehensive, but it does suggest some unique assets to this means of verification.
First, they offer global coverage, as well as the possibility of focusing on particular areas through the use of satellites in geostationary orbits.
Second, “downlinking” satellites makes the collected data available for analysis in near-real time.
Third, the use of satellites for verification purposes is an accepted principle that is not considered a violation of national sovereignty.
Thus data collection can take place wherever and as often as desired without the sensitive process of requesting access. Lastly, the secrecy in which the information are held, the exact capabilities and specific operating procedures for satellites means that “inspected” states are unaware of how they are being observed and thus less likely to be able to avert detection of any particular activity.72
Less intrusive than on-site inspections and less expensive than NTM,73 “aerial overflights can be used where resources or circumstances prohibit the use of ground inspections or ATM, but they work most effectively in conjunction with other methods.”74
The signature of the Open Skies Agreement has highlighted the possible uses of airborne verification technology, in particular the cameras and sensors permissible under an agreement and the freedom to fly over land at a given altitude.
Political factors emerging during negotiation of this type of verification regime determine the constraints on the technology. For example in Open Skies treaty negotiations, fears regarding the collection of data unrelated to arms control treaties dictated the amount of time an airplane may spend over a given piece of ground and common level of technological development and budget constraints determined the selection of equipment mentioned in the treaty. However, a broad array of aerial overflight technologies exists and suggests the flexibility of this method.
Several types of cameras exist for this purpose. Optical cameras can be bought “off-the-shelf”, providing a simple and inexpensive means of collecting high resolution images, subject only to the constraints of altitude from which the photos are taken,75 atmospheric and light conditions, and film processing quality. Framing cameras take pictures vertically, limited area coverage being compensated by flying back and forth in a grid-like pattern to cover every piece of ground.
Three-dimensional stereoscopic images can be produced by combining the first vertical photo with one taken from a different angle, allowing accurate height measurements of objects on the ground. Oblique cameras are pointed at a non-vertical angle allowing greater area coverage, but producing different scales and levels of resolution for different parts of the image. Panoramic and multi-lens cameras produce images for a 180 degree area below the plane.
Multispectral cameras, infrared sensors, and radar sensors are more expensive than their optical counterparts but offer the same advantages during overflights that they do for NTM images but with the added bonus of a much lower altitude and thus much higher resolution.
Remote air monitoring is possible by sampling and analyzing air from different points above the ground. Air samplers allow particle collection or “precipitation scavenging” – the collection of cloud droplets, rain or snow. New cryogenic samplers, for example, allow the collection of whole air samplers without concentration. Then with various analysis techniques, it is possible to determine the presence or level of toxins in the sample and weather patterns are analyzed to track the location of any toxin's source.
To describe all of the instruments useful for the conduct of an on-site inspection would be an overly ambitious project. First, on-site inspections vary significantly in technical difficulty. In many cases, the task is only to observe the destruction of an item, something that may require only a set of binoculars and a clipboard, such as in some inspections within the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). In contrast, an on-site inspection to verify the absence of a small, mobile item or small amounts of a banned substance in a certain area may suggest the need for a more sophisticated array of instruments.
However, the choice of verification technology made within each regime is contingent not only on technical qualifications but also on the political and financial perspectives of the parties. In many cases, the parties' perceptions of adequate verification stops short of the technological possibilities available. The added cost-be it monetary cost or the loss of privacy incurred by further intrusiveness- involved in the use of high tech instruments is deemed higher than the value of the additional confidence in the verification task. For this reason, several designs which exist for verification instruments have never been implemented in an actual regime.
The most common technologies used for inspections are, thus, simple instruments whose uses need no explanation: cameras, tape recorders, rulers, flashlights, binoculars, X-ray devices, etc. In some cases, the manner in which these may be used is limited by prior agreement. Locks and seals are also common items which are valuable because they can be examined for tampering or any other signs of illegal access.
Tags are another type of technology that can prove very useful to verification projects, but have not as yet been included in any agreements. A tag marks an object uniquely. A seal or a lock links two objects. Both indicate whether an object has been tampered with. There are many different forms of tags, seals, and locks.76 Tags and seals are currently being considered for use in securing key elements associated with the Chemical Weapon Convention, weapon dismantlement, and the containers designated to transport and store U.S. and Russian special nuclear material.77 In general, suggested tagging systems would include some kind of label for each treaty-limited item (TLI), along the lines of the serial numbers that are now used to identify the different items in CFE dismantlement projects. Once a tagging system is implemented, any untagged or improperly tagged item that is discovered is clearly a treaty violation.
Even small random samples chosen for inspection would statistically offer high chances for detecting a violation.78The advantage of more sophisticated tagging technologies is that, unlike most painted-on numbers, they can be designed to prevent counterfeiting, “spoofing”, or unobserved tampering. “Fingerprint” tags, such as those developed by the Argonne National Laboratory and Sandia National Labs would create a unique signature for each TLI, so that chances of detection would reach 98% for even a minor violation at a single site.79 Electronic tags could even be given the capability to emit signals so that they might be read by inspectors from a distance of several meters or even by airborne sensors, decreasing the intrusiveness of inspections. The possibilities are endless80 and vary in price according to their level of sophistication. While not yet implemented in an active verification regime, these products are being marketed and will continue to emerge as choices in future verification efforts.
Ground sensors placed at strategic points, such as entry and exit points to a facility; offer an efficient and non-intrusive method of verification. Perimeter monitoring scouts prohibits traffic at a given installation and can be verified by simply sealing unguarded entrances and checking soil for vehicle traces or it can be monitored with more costly, yet still simple technology such as infrared detectors, television cameras, pressure-sensitive cables, seismic sensors, short-range radar or light/microwave beam interruption devices – all of which are commonly used in civilian security systems.
Point controls can regulate the traffic through a certain point, for example to insure that treaty-limited items are not being covertly transported.81 Objects can be monitored to ensure that all traffic passes through given points and then various techniques are available to verify the contents of that traffic. Simple weighing stations can be used to indicate vehicles that contain items of a suspicious size and weight. Geophones, or ground vibration sensors, can be installed to insure that this type of sensor is not circumvented. An induction loop built into a road surface can detect the type and length of a vehicle, which will cause changes in loop inductivity as the metal axles pass above.
Likewise, pressure-sensitive cables can measure axle weight as a vehicle passes. Light-beam interruption devices can sense the profile of a vehicle and closed-circuit TV cameras can be used to record an image of any passing vehicles.
If any suspicious vehicles are discovered, verification would have to become more intrusive. Either the vehicle could be opened to authorized inspection, which would generally involve further measurements of the items being transported or X-raying devices can be used to gather further information about the contents.82
Various types of underground sensors possess specific relevance to the verification of nuclear test bans or limitations. Based on the same equipment used to evaluate the severity of earthquakes, this technology can be used to verify the size or occurrence of nuclear test explosions by placing sensors within strategic distances of suspected or known test sights. These sensors measure the seismic waves that radiate from underground explosions, using either seismic or hydrodynamic methods to determine the size of a given explosion.
Seismic monitoring involves the measurement of underground waves at seismic stations (observatories) and the comparison of recorded data with known geological conditions at the estimated site of explosion to determine the source and size of an explosion. “Teleseismic surface waves” travel along the Earth's surface and can be recorded from over 2,000 kilometers away while higher-frequency “body waves” travel within the Earth's crust and outer layers are observable over shorter distances such as from “in-country” seismic stations.
Hydrodynamic measurements, known by the acronym CORRTEX83 can estimate the source and size by observing the velocity of a seismic shock wave in the rock in the immediate vicinity of an explosion. CORRTEX measurements require the placement of a cable in a “satellite” hole very close84 to the actual emplacement of the nuclear explosive. This type of measurement is far more intrusive because it requires the presence of observers and equipment so near to the test site and can reveal sensitive data about the explosive device itself. Meanwhile CORRTEX is unable to detect the occurrence of an undeclared explosion because the site must be known ahead of time. However, CORRTEX may be more precise than seismic monitoring in verifying accurately very low yield explosions.
Not every one of the technologies described above is applicable to every regime, nor is any single method necessarily a sufficient means of verification. However, as will be seen in the description of existing verification regimes, combinations of verification methods, legal provisions and institutional frameworks seek to reinforce the accurate interpretation of collected data. This layering of technological means and supporting treaty provisions is known as synergism and is a critical element to the success of any verification regime.
1 An Athenian-born writer, student of Socrates, and mercenary soldier, Xenophon left a rich legacy of military and political history based largely on his own experiences. After his exile from Athens in 401 b.c., he joined an expedition of some ten thousand Greek mercenaries involved in a Persian civil war. After the betrayal and execution of his officers, Xenophon was one of those elected to lead the Greeks out of Asia Minor, a trek detailed in his Anabasis. Although this memoir lacks the grand themes of most Greek historical narrative, it provides an unusual and detailed account of the rigors of the march as experienced by the common foot soldier. Following his return to Greece, Xenophon settled on an estate near the Spartan frontier. He spent the rest of his life in the service of the Spartans, whom he admired, and in writing several works on the history (including the wars) of his own time. Xenophon wrote his Anabasis, his account of the Greek expedition into Persia, in the fourth century b.c. Anabasis (Greece, third century b.c.) by Xenophon.
2 T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge 1960.
3 The Oxford English Dictionary defines verification as “the action of demonstrating or proving to be true or legitimate by means of evidence or testimony”. This definition, although focused on the function of verification as a provider of evidence, already hints at the complexity inherent in verification. While it is most frequently associated with proving the compliance or non-compliance of a state, verification also provides an opportunity for a state to demonstrate its compliance when suspicions are raised, thus also serving a reassurance function.
4 A.J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919, New York 1967. (a detailed and authoritative account of the Versailles Treaty negotiations).
5 J. Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, 2. ed., Thousand Oaks/London/New Delhi 2002, p. 20.
6 “Verification is not just a question of technical capacity but of the political will to reach agreement on the application of technologies and techniques.”
7 E. Morris, The Superpowers and Verification in the United Nations Committee on Disarmament, paper written for Government of Canada, DSS File No. 21T.080-4-003, Serial OST84-00123, October 1984, pp. 43 ff.
8 T. Schelling, comments at the authors’ conference for this book, McLean, VA, 12 July 2001; also remarks made by Schelling in a “Roundtable in Honor of Thomas Schelling” at the 97th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 31 August 2001.
9 H. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age, New York 1961, pp. 4-5.
10 One of the best examples of disarmament before the twentieth century occurred in Japan. For almost two hundred years, beginning in the middle of the 1600s, the Japanese eschewed the use of firearms as weapons for combat. Throughout this period of self-imposed disarmament, the sword remained the dominant weapon. This changed in the middle of the nineteenth century, when outside great powers threatened intervention in Japanese affairs. With the end of Japan's isolation within the international political system, disarmament also came to an end.
11 A. Butfoy, Strategic Studies and Common Security: A Critical Analysis, London 1997, chapter five; and A. Butfoy, Is Arms Control approaching a Dead-End?, in: Australian Journal of International Affairs 52/3 (November 1998).
12 The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival, New York 1982; hereafter referred to as the Palme Commission.
13 Palme Commission, p. 1.
14 Palme Commission, p. 7.
15 T. Bernauer, The Chemistry of Regime Formation, Dartmouth 1993, p. 219.
16 See D. Ruloff, Weltstaat oder Staatenwelt? Über die Chancen globaler Zusammenarbeit, München 1988.
17 T. Bernauer, op. cit., 1993, p. 219.
18 P.B. Gove, Merriam-Webster (ed.), Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Springfield, Mass. 1966, p. 2543.
19 A. Karkoszka, Strategic Disarmament, Verification and National Security, London/New York 1977, p. 13.
20 UN Resolution A/51/182 (See Annex I).
21 D. MacEachin, Routine and challenge: two pillars of verification, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 39 (March 1998), pp. 1-3, available at www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb55.pdf
22 Idem.
23 G. Evans, J. Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics. A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, London 1992.
24 For instance, in the field of nuclear weapons, negative verification would implay providing assurance that subject is not producing fissile material for use in nuclear explosive.
25 T. Bernauer, op. cit., 1993, p. 220.
26 G. Duffy, Compliance and the Future of Arms Control, Report of a Project Sponsored by the Center of International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, and Global Outlook, Cambridge, Mass. 1988, p. 4.
27 See J.B. Wiesner, Arms Control Verification. The Technologies That Make It Possible on the comparismes of national systems and international systems of inspection and verification, 1997, available at ic.media.mit.edu/projects/JBW/articles/arms/arms.htm.
28 The most accessible version of Clausewitz's On War remains that of Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie, Princeton, NJ 1976. Martin van Creveld discusses the inadequacy of the Clausewitzian legacy in The Transformation of War, New York, NY 1991.
29 L. Freedman, International security: changing targets (includes related article on US international security concerns)(The Frontiers of Knowledge), in: Foreign Policy (Spring 1998). The first classic of the nuclear age was Brodie's, The Absolute Weapon, New York, NY 1946. H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York, NY 1957 was the first “bestseller”. Among works of the golden age, H. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, NJ 1960 is still worth looking at as a period piece, but T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, New York, NY 1960 has remained the most durable. The nuclear debates are discussed in L. Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2. ed., London 1989.
30 Alexander George was responsible for two of the more important critical works on American strategy. He and a number of co-authors produced The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, Boston, MA 1971 of which a new version was published in 1994, and co-wrote with Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, New York, NY 1974. Graham Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston, MA 1971 established the importance of bureaucratic factors in policymaking and Robert Jervis' Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ 1976 drew attention to the dangers of assuming that states understand each other. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein provide a sustained, though somewhat overstated, critique of deterrence in We All Lost the Cold War, Princeton, NJ 1994.
31 H. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age, New York 1961, p. xxxv.
32 A.B. Carter, W.J. Perry, and J.D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, Washington, DC 1992, p. 6. Other good works on this subject include J. Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Washington, DC 1994; A.B. Carter and W.J. Perry, Preventive Defence: A New Security Strategy for America, Washington, DC 1999; J.D. Steinbruner, Principles of Global Security, Washington, DC 2000; and D. Caldwell, Cooperative Security and Terrorism, paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association, Whittier, CA, 27 October 2001.
33 One can envision four rings of security that make up collective security writ large: individual security, collective security, collective defense, and promoting stability. For more on this argument, see R. Cohen and M. Mihalka, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order, Marshall Center Papers No. 3, Garmisch, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, April 2001.
34 A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge 1997.
35 Idem, p. 4
36 Idem, p. 137.
37 S.D. Krasner, Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variable, in: International organization, 36/3 (1982), pp. 185-205.
38 Idem, p. 186.
39 D.H. Claes, What Do Theories of International Regimes Contribute to the Explanation of Cooperation (and Failure of Cooperation) among Oil-Producing Countries?, ARENA Working Papers WP 1999/12.
40 M.A. Levy, O.R. Young and M. Zürn, The study of international regimes, in: European Journal of International Relations 1/3 (1995), pp. 267-331.
41 O.R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, Ithaca 1994.
42 D.H. Claes, op. cit., 1999, p. 3.
43 W.F. Rowell, Arms Control Verification, Cambridge, Mass. 1986, pp. 73-100.
44 F.R. Cleminson and E. Gilman, A Conceptual Working paper on Arms Control Verification, Department of National Defence, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment Report No. R 79, Ottawa, Canada Aug. 1981, pp. 9-11.
45 See First UN Special Session on disarmament (UNSSODI) paras 31-91-92 of final document, May-July 1978.
46 For a historical view of USSR policy on Verification see R. Timerbayev, Control of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, Moscow 1983.
47 MacEachin identifies the “defining objective” of on-site verification as denying “a potential treaty violator the means for concealing proscribed programmes under the cover of legitimate activities” thus highlighting a third function of verification, namely deterrence. D. MacEachin, Routine and challenge: two pillars of verification, in: The CBW Conventions Bulletin 39 (March 1998), pp. 1-3, available at www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb55.pdf.
48 I. Bellany, How Much Verification? Unpublished manuscript (1990) and author's interview at the University of Lancaster May 1990.
49 Idem.
50 Richard Nixon's instructions to the SALT I negotiating team quoted in M. Krepon, Arms Control: Verification and Compliance, New York, NY 1984, p. 38.
51 Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation, 21 June 1973 signed by Nixon and Brezhnev Article 4.
52 These Principles were prepared by a Working Group at the 1987 and 1988 sessions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and endorsed by United Nations General Assembly in Resolution A/RES/43/81 (B), 7 December 1988.
53 UN publications Verification in All Its Aspects, Including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification (A/50/377, 22 September 1995).
54 S. Lubensky, Verification of Transparency Treaties, University of Pennsylvania Model United Nations Conference, Philadelphia 2000 and A.S. Krass, Arms Control Treaty Verification, in: R.D. Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Vol. 1, New York, NY 1993.
55 Radar is based on radio waves, infrared light is not visible, I would suggest the following technical means: seismic detectors, nuclear radiation detectors, optical surveillance, radar, radio surveillance.
56 Only six countries – France, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, Russia and the United States – currently operate remote – sensing satellite systems.
57 Presidential Directive 23 (PDD 23), issued in 1994, states that dissemination of imagery with resolution of one meter or less might be harmful to U.S. national security. J.T. Black, Commercial Satellites: Future Threats or Allies?, in: Naval War College Review 52/1 (Winter 1999). For a more detailed discussion on satellite imagery and the technical aspects of resolution measurement, see A.M. Florini, The Opening Skies: Third-Party Imaging Satellites and U.S. Security, in: International Security (Fall 1998), pp. 103-23, and Gupta, pp. 94-125. PDD 23 has never been published in its entirety, but a press release discussing policy based on it is available at www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uries/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/3/11/3.text.1. For a discussion of PDD 23, see B. Sweetman, Spy Satellites: The Next Leap Forward, in: Jane's International Defence Review (January 1997), p. 30.
58 B. Jasani, Role of Satellites in Arms Control Monitoring by Year 2000 and Beyond, Paper presented at the ESARDA (European Safeguards R&D Association) Symposium, Montpellier, France, 13-15 May 1997.
59 D. Carrington, Spy planes “significant” boost to weapons inspections, in: New Scientist (February 17, 2003).
60 Technically speaking, spatial resolution is the ground area displayed in a single pixel (picture element).
61 U.S. Space Command, “Satellite Boxscore”, 14 January 1998, avaible at www.spacecom.af.mil/ usspace/boxscore.htm (18 January 1998).
62 R. Ropelewski, Satellite Services Soar, in: Aerospace America (November 1996), p. 26.
63 J.T. Black, Commercial Satellites: Future Threats or Allies?, in: Naval War College Review 52/1 (Winter 1999).
64 Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Russia. Bulletin 21 – Lessons from Control Regimes: U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control. Lessons for a Future Multilateral Verification System, available at www.inesap.org/bulletin21/bul21art25.htm.
65 International Arms Control, Transparency and Verification in a European-Russian Framework of Cooperative Security Berlin (Germany), January 24-26, 2003.
66 B. Jasani, Role of Satellites in Arms Control Monitoring by Year 2000 and Beyond, Paper presented at the ESARDA (European Safeguards R&D Association) Symposium, Montpellier, France, 13-15 May 1997: Information derived from imaging radar, such as a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), is very different from that obtained from optical sensors. This is because a SAR is particularly sensitive to the geometrical characteristics of the surface and the object being monitored as well as to their dielectric properties.
67 T.M. Lillesand and R.W. Kiefer, Remote Sensing and Image Interpretation, 2. ed., Wiley 1987, p. 55.
68 When images are made from a position directly vertically above a target, resolution actually increases with distance above the ground.
69 The US Lacrosse radar satellite, launched in December 1988, has perhaps disproved the accepted conclusions that SAR would require a nuclear power sources. Lacrosse is suspected to collect images below 1 meter in resolution. See R. Kokowski, National Technical Means, in: R. Kokoski and S. Koulik (eds.), Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Technological Constraints and Opportunities, Westview Press 1990, p. 20-23 and J.T. Richelson, America's Secret Eyes in Space, New York 1990, p. 218-228.
70 Jasani, op. cit., 1997.
71 Data from a weapons test is normally transmitted via radio waves.
72 F. Partlow, Jr., The Verification Triad, in: M. Krepon and A.E. Smithson (eds.), Open Skies, Arms Control, and Cooperative Security, New York 1992, pp. 55-56.
73 To be clear, the aerial platforms are less expensive to build and operate than artificial satellites, although it is likely that satellite imagery can be offered at a price competitive with that of aerial imagery.
74 J.P. Tracey and A.E. Smithson, Sensors and Platforms for Aerial Overflights, in: Krepon and Smithson, (eds.), opt. cit., 1992. See also J. Altmann, The Potential of Technology for the Control of Small Weapons: Applications in Developing Countries, in: SAND98-0505/16, July 2000, p. 13.
75 Resolutions from a few inches to one foot are possible from a height of 1000 to 3000 feet, Ibid., p. 74.
76 See, for example U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Verification Technologies, Washington, DC 1992.
77 Sandia's Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Programs, FactSheet 13.
78 For example, according to one calculation the probability of detecting a single violation in a sample of 20,000 tanks at 50 different sites within one year would be 50%. See S. Fetter and T. Garwin, Tagging, in: Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, op. cit., p. 143.
79 Ibid.
80 For a more detailed description of existing tag designs, see P.M. Lewis, Technological aids for on-site inspection and monitoring, in: J. Grinn and H.v.d. Graaf (eds.), Unconventional Approaches to Conventional Arms Control Verification, New York 1990, pp. 223-241.
81 For example, the INF Treaty employs portal monitoring at production plants to ensure that given categories of missiles are being transported from the facility.
82 Such as the Cargoscan X-ray at the Votkinsk missile production facility within the INF regime.
83 Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiments.
84 Within 25 meters of the site of a 150 kiloton explosion.
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