Falling in between the Lines: The Experience of Individuals with Multiple Identities

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Summary

The current dissertation aims to shed light on in-between groups. The term "in-between groups" is used in the present thesis to denote a particular social category that can emerge in contexts where individuals straddle membership in two (or more) social groups simultaneously (e.g., immigrant communities, dual-gender identifiers). In three chapters, I aimed to understand how in-between group members navigate their relations with relevant others (i.e., members of the groups they belong to) and how relevant others perceive them. All chapters drew theoretical arguments and predictions based on the social identity approach, that is, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987).

Chapter 2 examines the ways in which the Druze in Israel, taken as an example of an in-between group, navigate their relations with relevant others (i.e., Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Israelis) amid an intergroup conflict. Relying on the social identity approach, I argued that the in-between group's investment in membership in the rival groups would be linked to acting in each group's interest. Specifically, I hypothesized that Druze individuals' identification with Israel would predict a pro-Israeli orientation, while identification with Palestinians would predict a pro-Palestinian orientation on conflict-related matters. In examining individuals' endorsement of the conflicting national narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the hypotheses were borne out in the results. Study 2 found that identification with Palestinian-Israelis was linked to allying with them against the Israeli nation-state law that discriminates against all non-Jewish citizens, whereas identification with Israelis (and the Druze community) was negatively linked to such an alliance.

Because in-between groups are situated at the overlap between social categories that are often perceived as incompatible, they may come to challenge the motivation of relevant others to create distinctions between their ingroup and a relevant outgroup. Therefore, the ability of in-between group members to travel between the different groups and to pass (i.e., to be perceived) as ingroup members in the absence of cues revealing their simultaneous membership of the outgroup was predicted to be perceived as threatening to the valued intergroup distinctiveness. Moreover, passers might be perceived as a threat to the receiving group because they might be perceived to bring with them divergent group norms which may induce fear of transforming the essence of the group. Across six experiments, Chapter 3

examined these predictions among German and Israeli majority group members in response to passing Turkish-German and Palestinian-Israeli targets, respectively. The findings supported these predictions and showed that passing in-between group members threatened to identify "real" group members. Under conditions in which a potential threat to the group was indicated (i.e., via ingroup criticism or expression of disloyalty to the group), passers were perceived to be more damaging to the group than in-between group members whose outgroup membership was detectable (i.e., via name or an accented-speech). In such conditions, accusing passers of being impostors also emerged and mediated the participant's negative evaluations.

Besides the majority's perception of passing in-between group members, Chapter 4 explored the reactions of minority group members, Palestinian citizens of Israel, to passing into the majority outgroup, the Jewish majority. Two competitive hypotheses were tested. Passing into the majority would threaten intergroup distinctiveness and might indicate defecting from the minority to the majority, thus being negatively perceived by minority group members. Alternatively, individuals who pass as outgroup members and engage other outgroup members to support the minority can be perceived as strategic and therefore can be seen positively by the minority. Here, passing was manipulated through accommodation to the Israeli-Jewish speech style (i.e., unaccented Hebrew) and was crossed with message content that was critical or non-critical of the majority. Findings of two experiments in which participants heard an audio recording of a fellow ingroup speaker did not provide clear evidence speaking for either hypothesis. However, in Study 2, when the passing (unaccented) speaker was non-critical and spoke to the hostile outgroup audience, he was perceived more negatively the more participants identified with the ingroup. This may indicate that passing that signals defection from the group through complete assimilation into a hostile outgroup can come to be seen negatively by the minority group members.

Collectively, these studies expanded the study of intergroup relations complicated by in-between groups. Relying on social identity motives, these studies tackled the multiple groups' perspectives on in-betweenness. Implications of these studies and their contribution to the current literature were discussed, and suggestions for future studies were laid out.

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Dissertation soll zu neuen Erkenntnissen über Zwischengruppen oder *in-between groups* kommen. Der Begriff *in-between groups* bezeichnet nach dem Verständnis, das dieser Arbeit zugrunde liegt, Individuen, die zwei oder mehreren sozialen Gruppen angehören (z.B. Migranten oder Menschen, die sich nicht ausschließlich als männlich oder weiblich identifizieren). In drei Kapiteln habe ich untersucht, wie Mitglieder von *in-between groups* Beziehungen zu relevanten Anderen (d. h. Mitgliedern der Gruppen, denen sie angehören) gestalten und wie sie von diesen Anderen wahrgenommen werden. Den Kapiteln liegen theoretische Argumente und Vorhersagen zugrunde, die auf dem *social identity approach* basieren, also auf der Theorie der sozialen Identität (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) und der Selbstkategorisierungstheorie (Turner et al., 1987).

In Kapitel 2 wird untersucht, wie Drusen in Israel, die hier als Beispiel für eine *in-between group* dienen, inmitten eines Gruppenkonflikts Beziehungen zu relevanten Anderen (d. h. israelischen Juden und palästinensischen Israelis) gestalten. Bezugnehmend auf den *social identity approach* bin ich davon ausgegangen, dass die innere Verbundenheit der *in-between group* mit den rivalisierenden Gruppen, denen sie angehören, mit dem Handeln im Interesse der jeweiligen Gruppe in Beziehung steht. Konkret habe ich die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass die Identifikation der Drusen mit Israel eine pro-israelische Orientierung vorhersagen ließe, während die Identifikation mit Palästinensern eine pro-palästinensische Orientierung im Zusammenhang mit dem israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt vorhersagen ließe. Ich habe die Zustimmung der Individuen zu den sich entgegenstehenden nationalen Narrativen dieses Konflikts untersucht und meine Hypothesen dadurch bestätigen können. In Studie 2 untersuche ich die Allianzbildung von Drusen mit palästinensischen Israelis gegen das israelische Nationalstaatsgesetz, das nicht-jüdische Israelis gegenüber jüdischen Israelis schlechterstellt. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die Identifikation mit palästinensischen Israelis mit einer Allianzbildung mit diesen gegen das Gesetz verbunden war, während die Identifikation mit Israel (und der drusischen Gemeinschaft) negativ mit einer solchen Allianzbildung verbunden war.

Da *in-between groups* sich an der Schnittstelle solcher sozialen Kategorien befinden, die oft als unvereinbar angesehen werden, können sie die Motivation der relevanten Anderen zur Schaffung von Unterschieden zwischen Eigen- und Fremdgruppen in Frage stellen. Daher wurde angenommen, dass die Fähigkeit der Mitglieder von *in-between groups*, sich zwischen

den verschiedenen Gruppen zu bewegen und als Mitglieder der Eigengruppe kategorisiert zu werden (d.h. wahrgenommen zu werden; engl. *passing*), wenn es keine Hinweise auf ihre gleichzeitige Zugehörigkeit zur Fremdgruppe gibt, als Bedrohung für die Unterscheidbarkeit zwischen den Gruppen wahrgenommen wird. Darüber hinaus könnten *passer*, also Personen, die als Eigengruppenmitglieder durchgehen, als Bedrohung für die jeweils aufnehmende Gruppe wahrgenommen werden, da sie abweichende Gruppennormen mit sich bringen könnten, was wiederum Angst vor Veränderung des zugrundeliegenden Wesens der Gruppe hervorrufen könnte. In Kapitel 3 habe ich in sechs Experimenten diese Vorhersagen unter deutschen und israelischen Mehrheitsgruppenmitgliedern als Reaktion auf das *passing* türkisch-deutscher bzw. palästinensisch-israelischer Personen untersucht. Die Ergebnisse stützten diese Vorhersagen und zeigten, dass das *passing* von *in-between-group*-Mitgliedern die Identifizierung "echter" Gruppenmitglieder gefährdet. Unter Bedingungen, in denen eine potenzielle Bedrohung für die Gruppe angedeutet wurde (z. B. durch Kritik an der eigenen Gruppe oder Ausdruck von Illoyalität gegenüber der Gruppe), wurden *passer* als schädlicher für die Gruppe wahrgenommen als *in-between-group*-Mitglieder, deren Zugehörigkeit zur Fremdgruppe erkennbar war (z. B. durch den Namen oder einen Akzent beim Sprechen). In solchen Situationen kam auch der Vorwurf auf, die *passer* seien Hochstapler. Dieser Vorwurf mediierte die negativen Bewertungen der Teilnehmenden.

Neben der Wahrnehmung von *passing* durch eine Mehrheitsgruppe untersucht Kapitel 4 die Reaktionen von Mitgliedern einer Minderheitsgruppe, genauer von palästinensischen Israelis, auf *passing* in der Mehrheits-Fremdgruppe, also der jüdischen Mehrheit. Es wurden zwei verschiedene Hypothesen getestet: Ein Übertritt in die Mehrheitsgruppe würde die Unterscheidbarkeit zwischen den Gruppen bedrohen und könnte ein Zeichen dafür sein, dass man von der Minderheit zur Mehrheit überläuft, was von den Mitgliedern der Minderheitsgruppe negativ wahrgenommen würde. Andererseits können Personen, die als Mitglied einer Fremdgruppe durchgehen und ihrerseits andere Mitglieder der Fremdgruppe dazu bringen, die Minderheit zu unterstützen, als strategisch wahrgenommen und daher von der Minderheit positiv bewertet werden. In diesem Experiment wurde das *passing* durch die Anpassung an ein akzentfreies Hebräisch manipuliert und mit einem mehrheitskritischen oder nicht-mehrheitskritischen Nachrichteninhalt kombiniert. Die Ergebnisse von zwei Experimenten, in denen die Teilnehmenden eine Audioaufnahme eines anderen Eigengruppen-Sprechers hörten, lieferten keine eindeutigen Beweise für eine der beiden Hypothesen. In Studie 2 wurde jedoch der akzentfreie Sprecher, der sich an die feindliche

Fremdgruppe (jüdische Mehrheitsgruppe) wandte, umso negativer wahrgenommen, je mehr sich die Teilnehmenden mit der Eigengruppe (palästinensische Israelis) identifizierten. Dies könnte darauf hindeuten, dass ein *passing*, das eine Abkehr von der Gruppe durch vollständige Assimilation in eine feindliche Fremdgruppe signalisiert, von den Mitgliedern der Minderheitengruppe negativ wahrgenommen werden kann.

Die vorgelegten Studien bereichern durch den Einbezug von *in-between groups* in die Untersuchung von Intergruppenbeziehungen den Wissensstand zu diesem komplexen Forschungsbereich. Auf der Grundlage von Motiven der sozialen Identität befassten sich die Studien mit den Perspektiven der verschiedenen Gruppen auf *in-betweenness*, also auf das Leben an der Schnittstelle mit und zwischen verschiedenen sozialen Gruppen. Implikationen dieser Studien sowie ihr Beitrag zur aktuellen Forschungsliteratur wurden besprochen und Vorschläge für zukünftige Forschungen vorgestellt.

1. Introduction

> How many times, since I left Lebanon in 1976 to live in France, have people asked me, with the best intentions in the wor1d, whether I felt "more French" or "more Lebanese"? And I always give the same answer: "Both!" I say that not in the interests of fairness or balance, but because any other answer would be a lie. What makes me myself rather than anyone else is the very fact that I am poised between two countries, two or three languages and several cultural traditions. It is precisely this that defines my identity. Would I exist more authentically if I cut off a part of myself?
>
> — Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity, Violence and the Need to Belong

The mosaic of modern societies comprises various social groups that many understand to be divided by distinct intergroup boundaries which determine who belongs to a group and who does not. Despite these being thought to be exclusive groups, some group members may come to challenge this perception because they fall *in between* the boundaries of these groups. Amin Maalouf's quote (above) illustrates the experience of being in between different social identities against demands from others for clearer self-categorization and clear allegiance to one group more than the other.

The notion of *In-between group*s is used in the present thesis to denote a particular social category that can emerge in contexts where individuals straddle membership in two (or more) social groups simultaneously. For instance, Turkish-Germans belong simultaneously to the Turkish category defined as the Turkish nation and to the German category defined as the German nation. They also belong to a third group, the Turkish-Germans, the in-between group which makes up the largest ethnic minority in Germany (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Zick et al., 2001).

While some in-between groups primarily exist as the product of the overlap between two or more social categories, for example, students who study both law and psychology (or Turkish-Germans), other in-between groups may possess their own meaningful social category but also happen to belong to two or more social categories that are perceived to be exclusive. For example, medical doctors who are also law and psychology students make the

overlap between the latter two categories possible. In either of these cases, it is that overlap that makes such individuals belong to in-between groups.

With the profound changes that the world is facing, including globalization and increased mobility, the population of in-between groups has become omnipresent (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Hopkins, 2011; Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015). Perhaps the most commonly known and studied in-between group membership is that of various immigrant communities worldwide. However, in-between group membership should not be confined to that. In-between groups also exist in "post-colonial" contexts and complexly stratified societies (Dixon et al., 2020). In such contexts, the powerful group commonly used the "divide and conquer" strategy to preempt possible solidarity among the disadvantaged by artificially sectarianizing it into subgroups along with racial, religious or linguistic criteria (Christopher, 1988; Dixon et al., 2015; Firro, 2001). Such practices created new in-between social categories such as the "Coloureds" in South Africa, who are mixed-race people from different ethnic and racial groups (K. Brown, 2000; Dixon et al., 2015), or the Druze in Israel (Firro, 2001; see Chapter 2). In the gender arena, individuals who defy a sex assigned to them at birth and do not wish to conform to socially prescribed gender roles may also fall under the umbrella of in-between groups if they identify with both male and female genders (Broussard & Warner, 2019; Dentice & Dietert, 2015). Similarly, mixed-race individuals can also be considered an in-between group situated as the overlap between, for instance, the White and Black categories (Ho et al., 2013).

In the current thesis, I endeavored to find answers to two main research questions concerning in-between groups. First, how do in-between group members navigate their relations with relevant groups to which they belong in the context of intergroup conflict, and what role do multiple social identifications, as well as status hierarchy, play in this? Second, how do relevant others (i.e., dominant and minority group members) perceive in-between group members? Specifically, under which conditions are in-between group members perceived as a threat versus an asset to the group? To answer these questions, three projects were carried out in Germany and Israel. Experiences of in-between group members themselves were studies among an in-between group in Israel: the Druze (see Chapter 2). Relevant others' experiences and perceptions of in-between groups were studied among German participants vis-à-vis Turkish-Germans, and Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Israeli participants vis-à-vis Palestinian-Israelis (see Chapter 3 and 4). Because these research questions are deeply embedded in social identity processes and intergroup relations, I shall

next outline the theoretical framework employed in this thesis, which is the social identity approach (i.e., social identity theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; and self-categorization theory, Turner et al., 1987) that guided the studies conducted in this thesis.

1.1. The theoretical background: the social identity approach

Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) came at a time when social scientists tried to make sense of the holocaust and find answers to how a mass murder of minorities could be carried out in the name of the ingroup (Hornsey, 2008; Reicher et al., 2010). Henri Tajfel, who himself survived the persecution of Jews during the holocaust, embarked on this journey by trying to find the minimal conditions that would be sufficient to create hostility towards outgroup members (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel et al., 1971). Participants in the so-called *minimal group paradigm* were randomly categorized into two groups based on arbitrary criteria, such as a preference for paintings from Klee or Kandinsky. Tajfel and colleagues found that while these participants had no knowledge of or relations with the assigned fellow group members, the mere categorization into two groups led participants to favor their ingroup and discriminate against the outgroup, which was demonstrated in the tendency to allocate more rewards to unknown ingroup members than to unknown outgroup members (Reicher et al., 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Importantly, participants not only discriminated against the outgroup, but they also tried to maximize the difference in allocations between the two groups, even at their own expense (Brewer, 1979; Turner & Reynolds, 2011).

These categorization effects found in minimal group experiments paved the way for the introduction of SIT. The theory posits that group members are motivated to achieve *positive distinctiveness* between their group and the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Embedded in cognitive processes of differentiation that were later laid out by self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987), experiments found that once individuals are categorized into groups, they maximize the similarity between ingroup members and accentuate the difference between them and relevant outgroup members (Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963).

SCT (Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987) followed SIT to explain the cognitive processes that underpin intergroup behavior. The central tenet of SCT is the process of *depersonalization.* The theory argues that when social categories are made salient (e.g., depending on the context to which they become relevant), we tend to see ourselves and other category members as interchangeable members of a shared social category. In other words, depersonalization is the process of perceiving the self and others not as distinct individuals but as group members.

Importantly, social identities do not exist in a vacuum (Tajfel, 1978b). Therefore, gaining a sense of positive group image emerges through comparison with an outgroup on a relevant dimension. Because society comprises groups that vary in terms of status, power and prestige, subordinate groups may struggle to achieve positive distinctiveness. The theory suggests that since group members are motivated to achieve positive distinctiveness, low-status groups may use different identity management strategies. The choice of a strategy depends on their subjective belief structure, that is, group members' beliefs about the nature and the structure of relations between social groups in a given society (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The theory identifies two types of subjective beliefs systems: *social mobility* and *social change*, which have different implications for how lower-status group members may achieve positive distinctiveness.

Social mobility refers to the belief that group boundaries are permeable, and therefore individuals can move upward the status ladder when their subordinate group membership is deemed unsatisfactory – and so passing into the higher-status group is possible. This strategy is typically individualistic and is taken up by those who seek a way out of their sub-ordinate group membership to achieve a better status. The social change belief system, on the other hand, implies that group boundaries are impermeable, such that passing is not an option. Group members would be left with a negatively connoted social identity. The way out of this would be to undertake strategies that seek to improve the group's status and are thus not individualistic, but rather group-related strategies. One way to do so involves thinking of creative alternatives to gain a sense of positive distinctiveness when there is no other alternative for change. Group members may then engage in comparing their group with a more disadvantaged group instead of the higher-status group or redefine the meaning of the group (e.g., "Black is beautiful"; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 43).

While these creative ideas enable a social identity to be perceived more positively, they may not always materialize in changing the status quo (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Reicher et al., 2010), especially when the powerful group continuously works at preserving its superiority (Tajfel, 1974). When lower-status group members perceive the status hierarchy as illegitimate and no longer see it as stable and immutable, they may then mobilize to directly confront or challenge the dominant group in means of, for example, collective action that would create a positive social change (Blanz et al., 1998; Ellemers, 1993; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SIT is thus viewed by some as a theory of social change more than a theory of discrimination (Reicher et al., 2010).

To summarize, the social identity approach helps to understand social identification processes and (inter) group behavior. The approach has a strong influence on contemporary social psychology. It has been extended to explain various phenomena such as crowd behavior, collective action, identity performance, and intragroup behavior. It has also been applied to multiple research fields beyond the initial theorizing around intergroup behavior (see Brown, 2020, for a review).

1.2. In-betweenness

Perhaps because of its applicability to various intergroup conflicts, the social identity tradition has long focused on binary relations that typically identified relations between two sets of groups or identities, such as Black and White, oppressor and oppressed, high- and low-status groups (Dixon et al., 2020; Kerr et al., 2017; Subašić et al., 2008). Although members of such groups are often assigned to one group but not to the other, a closer inspection of social groups reveals that some members may share a group membership with the outgroup (Barreto & Ellemers, 2009; Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015). The current dissertation tries to expand the analysis of intergroup relations beyond the ingroup versus outgroup tradition to look at relations that are complicated by the very existence of in-between group members.

Studying in-between groups and their relations with multiple ingroups also necessitates examining relations between at least three groups to which in-between individuals may belong: the in-between group and the (two) groups with which they share membership. To use the example of Coloureds in South Africa, a complete understanding of how they navigate their relations with White and Black South Africans requires considering

the Coloureds' subjective experience of their social identities and relative status within the societal power relations, but also how Whites and Blacks perceive them. Resonating with this, recent accounts of social psychologists have criticized the social identity tradition for its focus on two-group (binary) analysis of intergroup relation, suggesting that this obscures more complex multi-group processes and their potential for conflict and its resolution (Caricati, 2018; Dixon et al., 2020; Kerr et al., 2017; Subašić et al., 2008; Zagefka, 2019). Thus, a multi-group approach that considers triadic relations between in-between and their respective group members may afford a more comprehensive understanding of these complex intergroup relations (see Dixon et al., 2020, for a review).

1.2.1. In-between groups' subjective experiences

The specific ways in which in-between group members navigate their relations with common ingroups may vary from one context to another. Nonetheless, these relations are likely to be influenced by in-between group members' identification with the multiple groups they belong to and the extent to which they perceive these identities to clash or harmonize (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). There are important research questions that concern the subjective views of in-between groups that are relevant to our social identity approach: How does social identification with multiple groups affect their relations with these groups? When the groups they belong to are immersed in an intergroup conflict, how do in-between group members view the conflict and conceive who is right and wrong? How do they form alliances, and with which group?

The social identity approach argues that group members vary in the extent to which they are invested in their group members (Jetten et al., 2004). The more individuals identify with the group and perceive it as a central part of their self-concept, the more likely they are to adhere to its norms (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001) and act in the interest of fellow ingroup members for having a sense of a "common fate" (Branscombe, Doosje, et al., 2002; Drury et al., 2009; Turner & Reynolds, 2011). Therefore, it is plausible to argue that in-between group member's identification with either group is likely to influence the endorsement of its norms and support for its goals.

Beyond these social identification processes, in-between group's relative status within a given status-hierarchy should also influence their intergroup attitudes. Again, in complexly stratified societies, in-between groups may have emerged due to the "divide and rule" policy

(Caricati, 2018; Dixon et al., 2020). Because policymakers sought to undermine possible solidarity among the disadvantaged, special privileges were given to some groups but not to others, creating groups with diverging social statuses, which would eventually cause tensions among them (Christopher, 1988; Dixon et al., 2015; Firro, 2001). In such contexts, in-between group membership could be theorized around possessing an intermediate social status compared to higher- and lower-status groups within a societal power hierarchy (Caricati, 2018). The social identity approach did not directly account for this type of in-betweenness nor conceptualized intergroup behavior of in-between groups vis-à-vis other low- and high-status outgroups. Nevertheless, a recent triadic social stratification theory (TSST) came to provide answers to how these triadic relations transpire (Caricati, 2018).

The theory relies on SIT's premise that group members are motivated to achieve and maintain positive distinctiveness. For in-between groups that occupy an intermediate status, upward comparison with the higher-status group is likely to prevent the achievement of positive distinctiveness and may thus elicit an identity threat because of their relatively lower status. Downward comparison with the lower-status group may facilitate a sense of positive distinctiveness because of their somewhat higher status. Since downward comparison permits that, the theory argues that intermediate status groups may be motivated to maintain the status quo of this triadic power hierarchy and resent status changes that would risk falling down the status ladder (Caricati, 2018; Sollami & Caricati, 2015). This motivation is of particular importance because it can guide in-between group members in navigating their relations with the lower- and higher-status outgroups and defines the ways in which they form alliances with them (Caricati et al., 2020b).

1.2.2. Relevant others' perception of in-betweenness

I began the introduction with Amin Maalouf's quote stating how he is often asked about which one of two identities he feels closer to. The degrees of conflict and harmony between the different sets of identities that in-between groups experience may vary from one individual and group to another (see Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005). Even when multiple social identities subjectively co-exist in harmony, relevant others may still perceive these identities as conflicting, which influences their treatment of in-between group members (Amer, 2020b; Barreto & Ellemers, 2009; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Hopkins, 2011). Therefore, it is important to underpin the mechanisms that underlie the perception of the in-between groups.

On the optimistic side, in a recent attempt to understand the full potential of in-between groups in building bridges between conflicting groups, Levy and colleagues (2017) proposed that the mere presence of in-between groups that represent an overlap between the ingroup and the outgroup has the potential to foster positive attitudes towards the outgroup (Levy, Saguy, Halperin, et al., 2017). For example, the presence of Palestinian-Israeli citizens who identify with Israel and Palestine led Jewish-Israeli participants to see the Palestinian outgroup more positively (Levy, Saguy, van Zomeren, et al., 2017). However, this idea that an in-between group can act as a gateway community tells us more about the cognitively perceived functions of in-between groups rather than how relevant others directly perceive in-between group members.

There is considerable evidence in the literature suggesting that in-between group members are occasionally denied some identities they possess, especially when these are perceived to be incompatible identities (Amer, 2020b; Barreto & Ellemers, 2009; Blackwood et al., 2015; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011; Petsko & Bodenhausen, 2020; Townsend et al., 2009). Because we generally seek to achieve recognition and validation of our valued social identities (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011; Swann & Read, 1981), identity denial appears to have an adverse effect on in-between group member's well-being (Albuja, Gaither, et al., 2019; Albuja, Sanchez, et al., 2019). This denial highlights the importance of studying how others perceive in-between groups and under which conditions they become a threat to their social identity and intergroup boundaries.

One of the remarkable features of possessing multiple identities is that they enable a flexible self-definition (Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015). By switching between different identities, in-between group members can downplay or emphasize identity markers to increase the likelihood of being accepted by others and avoid stigmatization (see Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015, for a review). For example, it is perhaps more beneficial for Turkish-Germans to adhere to German norms of speaking German (i.e., without a foreign accent) to be recognized as a majority members. Thus, downplaying minority identity markers, whether consciously or unintentionally, can increase the odds for one to "pass" as a member of the majority – that is, to be categorized and perceived as an ingroup member by the receiving group (Goffman, 1963; Piller, 2002; Renfrow, 2004).

However, the downside of this movement between different (minority and majority) identities is that it can blur the perceived boundaries between the ingroup and the outgroup.

Again, the social identity approach denotes the significance of intergroup distinctiveness in creating a sense of a meaningful social identity and providing group members with clarity about who belongs to the group and which norms to follow (Barreto & Ellemers, 2009; Branscombe et al., 1999; Jetten et al., 2001; Scheepers et al., 2002; Spears et al., 1997; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Accordingly, in-between group members who can pass as ingroup members (i.e., being perceived as an ingroup member – being taken for a "native") while simultaneously holding an outgroup identity can elicit a threat to intergroup distinctiveness. However, members of the group from which the passer originates (i.e., the minority) and that they pass into (i.e., the majority) may slightly diverge in their identity concerns in response to passing.

For the majority group, a passing minority member can undermine the motivation to create clear distinctions between their ingroup and the minority outgroup (Barreto & Ellemers, 2009; Castano et al., 2002; Hornsey & Jetten, 2003; Jetten et al., 2005; Warner et al., 2007). Moreover, such passers, especially originating from devalued minority groups, can be seen as even more threatening because they might be feared to corrupt the group from within with divergent group norms that accompany them. This fear of group "contamination" is likely to cause the rejection of passers and elicit suspicions about their "true" identity and authenticity. In the same vein, metaphors such as "Trojan Horses" and "fifth columns" have become very popular in describing devalued minority group members such as Jews and Muslims in western countries (see Chernobrov, 2019).

Similarly, minority group members who pass into the majority because of their phenotype, accent or other identity markers can also undermine the valued intergroup distinctiveness among fellow minority group members. Moreover, passers might risk conveying the impression of concealing the minority identity to defect from the group individually. Thus, they can signal betrayal of the group and evoke a sense of disloyalty to the group (Hogg et al., 1989; Klar et al., 2020; Levine & Moreland, 2002; Piller, 2002; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). These identity concerns can elicit various negative reactions towards passing minority members, ranging from treating them as "black sheep" (Marques et al., 2001; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988) to questioning their true membership in the minority (Hogg et al., 1989; Jetten & Hornsey, 2011). Echoing this, demeaning accusations such as "whitewashed", "coconut" (Black on the outside, White on the inside) are used in popular culture among African Americans to refer to fellow ingroup members whose group loyalty and authenticity are called into question (see Jetten & Hornsey, 2011)

Nevertheless, there could be opportunities where such individuals become strategic for the minority. Minority group members may take advantage of ingroup members who pass into the majority if passers can strategically cultivate different images of their group. Passers can then be seen as representatives of the group, and their passing as an *act of performance*. That is, a shifting expression of group identity (e.g., Barreto et al., 2003, 2006; Hopkins et al., 2007; Klein & Azzi, 2001; Klein & Licata, 2003; Rabinovich & Morton, 2010), and associated group norms (e.g., Reicher & Levine, 1994a, 1994b) to facilitate ingroup goals (see Klein et al., 2007, for a review). For example, accommodating one's speech style by softening the minority group's accent and adhering to majority speech norms, which can be seen as a form of passing into the majority if done successfully, can perhaps be appreciated by the minority if it is believed to influence the majorities views of them positively.

To summarise, the notion of in-between groups permits examining complex intergroup relations and negotiations that involve more than two groups and two distinct social identities. In essence, the concept of in-betweenness is not novel to social psychology research. However, the current conceptualization of in-betweenness allows exploring the social identity threats associated with crossing different social categories among in-between groups and deepens our understanding of how group members define membership in their group and "police" group boundaries against those they perceive as outsiders.

1.3. Overview of the present chapters

To examine the research questions posited in this dissertation, Chapter 2 employs two survey studies conducted among members of an in-between group, the Druze in Israel, who hold an intermediate status compared to Israel-Jews (higher-status group) and Palestinian-Israelis (lower-status group). This project specifically explored the interplay between Druze's multiple identities (i.e., Druze, Israeli and Palestinian) and their effects on conflict-related issues. The chapter reviews the emerging literature on in-between groups and the impact of occupying intermediatory status on relations with the higher- and lower-status groups. Study 1 aimed to understand how the Druze in Israel, as an in-between group, construe the existing national narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in comparison to Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli participants who typically view their ingroup narrative as the right and truthful narrative. Study 2 was carried out to explore alliance formation of Druze with the lower-status group (i.e., Palestinian-Israelis) in response to the discriminatory *Jewish Nation-*

State Law that was passed in 2018, which stipulates that Israel is the state of the Jewish people alone. Social identification with Druze, Israel and Palestinians and the perceived conflict between identities of these group were measured in both studies. These studies were conducted in close collaboration with Yechiel Klar (Tel Aviv University). Data collection for Study 1 was also helped by Hadas Baram (College of Management Academic Studies, Israel). Katja Hanke (University of Applied Management Studies, Mannheim) assisted me with conducting the preliminary analyses for Study 1. Additionally, Thomas Kessler (Friedrich Schiller University, Jena) contributed with critical theoretical questions that needed to be addressed in the chapter. Finally, Thomas A. Morton (University of Copenhagen) has volunteered to review the chapter after I wrote it.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus on the minority and majority perception of in-between group members who can pass off as majority group members. In Chapter 3, across six experimental studies, the reactions of majority group members to passers from the minority were examined. I tested the hypothesis that passing would be perceived as a threat to the group because passers undermine intergroup distinctiveness, but also because of perceived attempts to damage the group from within. To begin with, Study 1 looked at how a Turkish passer, who changed his name from a Turkish to a German (versus not), was perceived by German participants and whether this perception was influenced by intergroup distinctiveness threat. Echoing the idea of Trojan Horses and fifth columns, Study 2 and Study 3 tested the hypothesis that minority (Turkish-German) passers might come to be treated with suspicion or distrust by members of the receiving group when they attempt to challenge established (German) group norms. Study 4 looked at passing through accent-free speech in Israel. A passing Palestinian-Israeli speaker who spoke unaccented Hebrew was evaluated by Jewish-Israeli participants in the context of (dis)loyalty expression towards Israel. Study 5 and Study 6 manipulated passing through cues about assimilation into the German majority in the context of the "fifth column" discourse. Specifically, we examined the reactions of German participants to an assimilated (i.e., passing) Turkish target who supported president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the Turkish elections or in the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum. In all studies, identification with the ingroup was measured. Studies that we conducted in Germany were developed and conducted together with Thomas Kessler, who also supported me with constructing the theoretical arguments of the chapter and refining the study designs. Thomas Morton also helped with designing the last two studies and reviewing the

manuscript. Study 4 was conducted in Israel with the help of Yechiel Klar. Stephanie Hechler (Friedrich Schiller University) also helped with the data analysis of Study 3.

Chapter 4 delved into exploring passing that occurs when accommodating to majority norms of speech style – speaking without a detectable minority accent. I tested how minority group perceivers respond to passing into the majority in the context of attempts to bring about social change. Two different influence strategies were evaluated: Maintaining minority communicative norms (i.e., accent) while engaging in intergroup communication and thus not passing versus passing by accommodating to majority's communicative norms when delivering the same messages. In Study 1, Palestinian participants listened to audio recordings made by an ingroup target who spoke with Arabic-accented or unaccented Hebrew while delivering a message that was critical or non-critical of the Jewish majority. In Study 2, we used a similar design but also tested how these evaluations are affected by implicit theories about the outgroup audience. We thus manipulated whether the speaker's audience was portrayed as malleable or fixed in their opinions. Study 1 was conducted with Yechiel Klar. Study 2 was conducted with Thomas Morton and Anna Rabinovich (Exeter University).

Collectively then, all three chapters of this thesis, while self-contained, speak to in-betweenness either directly experienced or as understood by relevant others. With the growing relevance of this phenomenon, in writing the following chapters, I hope to shed light on the various social perceptions of in-betweenness that affects the lives of many individuals around the globe.

2. In-between group membership within intergroup conflicts: the case of Druze in Israel

2.1. Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which includes both armed struggle and wider societal divides, has proven hard to solve despite frequent national and international interventions (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). As an example of intergroup conflict, it has also attracted considerable attention from various perspectives across the social sciences. Yet, like many conflicts, the pattern of social relations in Israel-Palestine is more complex than a binary opposition between majority versus minority, settler versus occupied, or colonizer versus colonized. Said simply: there are other groups implicated in this conflict than Palestinians and (Jewish) Israelis. In Israel, for example, there are communities that do not fall easily into either side of the conflict, such as the Druze and the Circassian minorities.

More recent accounts by social psychologists have problematized the analysis of intergroup relations from a binary (two-group) perspective and have suggested that an exclusive focus on this obscures the more complex multi-group processes that might contribute both to conflict and its resolution (Dixon et al., 2020). Illustrative of this, while classic research shows that categorization into minimal groups can lead to intergroup competition and discrimination (Tajfel et al., 1971), studies repeating this paradigm have found that patterns of intergroup discrimination are replicated only when participants are divided into two, but not three, groups (Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995). The latter authors suggested that dichotomous categorization of the social world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ primes competitive orientations more than when the world is perceived to contain multiple groups. Discursively portraying conflicts in terms of binary oppositions can also mask the true workings of intergroup power – for example when powerful third groups incite conflict between others to “divide and rule” (e.g., Kerr et al., 2017). Attending to multi-group dynamics “bring[s] into view complex patterns of allegiance, collusion, solidarity, and resistance that seldom feature in social psychological work” (Kerr et al., 2017, p. 61).

A multi-group focus also makes clear that even in a world dominated by battles between low- and high-status groups, there are often intermediate groups (Caricati, 2018) that

fall somewhere in between those in conflict. The current chapter explores how members of such groups navigate their position within the intergroup conflict and their relations to each of the other groups involved. We study this by looking at Druze in Israel, an example of an in-between group. The Druze are defined here as an in-between group because they straddle both the Arab identity (associated with Palestinians) and the Israeli identity (associated with Israel). Notably, the Druze in Israel also occupy an intermediate status within the power hierarchy of Jewish-Israeli versus Palestinian-Israeli citizens. This dimension led us in drawing part of our theorizing, as will be outlined in the following. Before describing the context in which our studies were conducted, we outline the theoretical foundations and empirical findings relevant to in-between group membership and the historical context in which they may have emerged.

2.1.1. In-between groups

To begin appreciating the context in which in-between groups have emerged, it is important to recognize the role that segregation and other division policies have historically played in shaping the status of such groups. Policymakers in colonial contexts (Christopher, 1988; Firro, 2001) and other complexly stratified societies (Dixon et al., 2020) often implemented a strategy of "divide and rule". The policy aimed to sectarianize the minority group by artificially dividing it into different subgroups along racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic criteria. Such divisions were useful for the dominant group because it mitigated against feared solidarity among and collective organization by disadvantaged groups who might question the legitimacy of its rule (Dixon et al., 2020). One effective way to undermine solidarity among the disadvantaged was to give some groups specific privileges and to deprive others thereof, something that would eventually cause animosity between and distract them from the true source of their shared oppression (Brown, 2000; Firro, 2001). In this way, *in-between group status* was often actively created something that complicates simpler understandings of intergroup dynamics.

Perhaps the most prominent example of groups with this in-betweenness is of South African "Coloureds". Unlike in the USA's 'one-drop rule', South African apartheid laws did not define mixed-race individuals as Black but instead classified them according to an additional racial category – the Coloured. Coloureds are thus mixed-race people from different ethnic and racial groups (e.g., White/Black, Black/Asian; (K. Brown, 2000). Laws that ensured Coloured people get access to benefits that Blacks were deprived of, together

with some being able to "pass" as White (i.e., to be perceived by others as White), positioned Coloured people as higher in status than blacks. Yet belonging to the White category was not entirely possible because of laws that maintained the racial divide and secured the "purity" of the White group (K. Brown, 2000). In terms of power relations, the Coloured group was thus higher than Black people yet lower than White people, which positioned them as an intermediate-status group.

Divide and rule strategies are not a thing of the past and still impact the lives of some groups in multi-group conflicts (see Dixon et al., 2020, for a review). A recent review by Caricati (2018) proposed a triadic social stratification theory (TSST) that offered theoretical and empirical arguments about the intergroup behavior of intermediate-status groups. The theory derives from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) in that group members seek to achieve and maintain a positively distinct social identity when comparing themselves with other relevant groups. For intermediate group members, upward comparison with a higher-status group obstructs the achievement of positive distinctiveness because of their relatively lower status and may thus elicit an identity threat. Nevertheless, downward comparison with the lower-status group facilitates positive distinctiveness because of the relatively higher status. Because the latter opportunity allows them to maintain a positive sense of self, intermediate group members may be motivated to also maintain status quo of this hierarchy, and changes to this hierarchy might elicit feelings of threat connected to status loss. This identity motive may explain their intergroup attitudes and their orientations toward the lower-status group.

Providing empirical support for this suggestion, Sollami and Caricati (2015) examined the impact of experimentally-manipulated stability in the status hierarchy on nurses. In health care systems, nurses typically occupy a position lower than physicians but higher than health care operators. Compared to conditions in which the hierarchy was portrayed as stable or when instability was connected as an opportunity to move up the hierarchy, nurses experienced greater identity threat when instability was connected to the possibility of moving down in the hierarchy. Similar findings were observed in a study using minimal rather than natural groups (see Caricati, 2012). Together these studies suggest that stability in the social system is not specifically threatening to intermediate status groups – rather, it is only the explicit possibility of falling down the status ladder that triggers identity threat among members of in-between groups. It seems quite plausible that the distinct nature

of threats to in-between groups' identity would, in turn, guide in-between members' social change orientations and patterns of alliance with outgroup members.

2.1.2. Alliance with the lower-status group

Following TSST, Caricati and colleagues (2020) found that alliance with the lower-status group is more likely to emerge when the status of the in-between group is detrimentally unstable (with risk of falling down the social hierarchy). The authors argue that provided that in-between groups desire to maintain positive distinctiveness through holding a relatively higher-status, they strategically ally with the lower status group to create a dependency that secures them a more powerful position and thus confirms their higher status. Across three experiments, the authors found that members of EU countries that share a relatively intermediate economic status (e.g., Italy & Spain) in comparison to others were more willing to ally with countries that occupy a lower economic status (e.g., Greece) when participants were led to believe that their own status position was downwardly unstable.

However, alliances with lower status groups might not be purely strategic, and additional categorical processes might affect patterns of intergroup alliances. Self-categorization theory holds that once individuals define the self in terms of collective group membership, they come to see other members of the group as part of self, even when they do not personally know them (Turner et al., 1987). This, in turn, motivates them to act in the interest of fellow ingroup members for having a sense of 'common fate' that may also motivate helping other ingroup members in need (Drury et al., 2009). In line with these assumptions, the political solidarity model of social change (Subašić et al., 2008) sought to theorize conditions under which the advantaged group would ally with the historically disadvantaged group. The model maintains that when authorities violate shared norms and values in their treatment of disadvantaged groups, advantaged group members are likely to redefine the boundaries of their group in ways that exclude the (illegitimate) authority but include the disadvantaged. In effect, salient examples of immoral behavior trigger shifts in previous patterns of categorization. In response to these shifts, advantaged group members may align themselves with lower-status groups and experience a sense of 'we' in solidarity with them rather than the previous sense of 'us' and 'them'.

The role of common fate in creating shared identity is also relevant to our conceptualization of in-between groups. In line with Subašić and colleagues' (2008) model of

social change, we argue that turbulent social changes that emphasize shared experiences between in-between groups and lower-status groups may lead to shifts in categorization that result in the lower-status group being included in a common category with the in-between group. The alliances that flow from this shared categorization should, in turn, support efforts to bring about social changes that improve the status of both these groups – the lower status as well as the in-between. However, it is arguable that because in-between group members may "share some qualities with both higher- and lower-status groups, but simultaneously are different from both groups" (Caricati, 2018; p. 60), pre-existing identification with the lower-status would likely influence feelings of solidarity with its members. In either case, in-between groups may form alliances with the lower-status group the more they routinely or situationally experience a sense of shared ingroup membership with them.

2.1.3. Conflict historical narratives

Although in-betweenness is present across multiple social hierarchies (e.g., academic degrees, social class, interracial relations; Caricati, 2018), it is perhaps most prominent in historically divided societies immersed in intergroup conflict. Such societies tend to have widely-shared conflict narratives. These are stories that group members tell about how the conflict erupted and its causes, point to the responsible perpetrators, and justify acts of violence against them (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). Conflict narratives typically reflect sharply contrasting ways in which the two opposing sides construct the reality of the conflict (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Ross & Ward, 1995). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a prime example of the "narrative double helix" (Rotberg, 2006). Motivated to maintain a positive collective image (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), members of the two opposing groups adhere to their own conflict narrative that is transmitted to them in a variety of societal ways, and they reject the opposing narrative and perceive it as false and propagandist (Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Klar & Baram, 2016; Klar & Bilewicz, 2017; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Narratives portray the ingroup as positive, rightful and just (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Kelman, 1999; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Counter-national narratives are incompatible and contradictory, what is white for the one group is black for the other, and they become lenses through which groups see the world to the extent these may become an obstacle to resolve the conflict (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Klar & Baram, 2014). Because the construal of these narratives is highly motivated by identity concerns, the more people invest in their group membership, the more they should see their ingroup narrative as the true and only true narrative (e.g., Bilali, 2014;

Uluğ & Uysal, 2021). This raises an interesting question about how members of in-between groups in such societies position themselves vis-à-vis the dominant conflict narratives.

Compared with members of the directly conflicting parties, who generally construe their respective narratives as absolute and correct, it is unclear how members of in-between groups should construe such narratives. Whether in-between group members overall favor the higher or the lower-status group's version of 'the conflict' could possibly be attributed to the pressure the higher- and lower-status groups apply on in-between groups to be loyal to them. Because in-between groups are targets for persuasion within the conflict, they are likely to be quite well-exposed to the narratives of both sides. This exposure to conflicting elements of these narratives might lead in-between group members to acknowledge that both reflect some truth in them and thus endorse them to a similar extent. However, here too, we argue that the ingroup bias displayed by the conflicting parties, manifested in their perception of their national narrative as more truthful than the outgroup's narrative, should also appear among in-between group members as a function of the degree of their identification with each alternative group. We thus predict that the more in-between group members routinely of situationally identify with either group, the more they will endorse its narrative.

2.1.4. The research context

The current chapter examined the endorsement of conflicting narratives among in-between group members compared to the rival groups. We also examined how their identification with multiple status groups predicts this endorsement and alliance with the lower-status group. In two surveys, we examined these questions in the realm of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict looking at an in-between group: The Druze in Israel.

2.1.4.1. The Druze community in the Middle East and Israel

Druze are members of a relatively small religious Arab minority (about 1.5 million people in total) who reside in the Middle East, mainly in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel (about 147,000; Central Bureau of Statistics [Israel], 2021; Swayd, 2015). Historically, Druze split from Shiite Islam (although many Druze consider themselves part of the mosaic of Islam; see Hazran, 2018) in the eleventh century, and they have since ethnically closed ranks and marry typically within their group. With the rise of Arab nationalism at the turn of the 20th century, Druze intellectuals and community leaders in Lebanon and Syria were quick to adopt Arab nationalistic sentiments (Firro, 2001). In 1925, Druze in Syria were at the

forefront of the Druze Revolt against the French rule in Syria which became the Great Syrian Revolt and is considered by many as the watershed event in the emergence of Arab nationalism (see Provence, 2005). In Palestine, during the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate periods (until 1948), Druze were a tiny rural traditional community (living mainly in villages in the Galilee) and largely unaffected by the tide of Arab nationalism affecting their Syrian and Lebanese co-religionists. They were also almost entirely uninvolved in the evolving conflict between the Jews and the Palestinians with the entire Arab world over the future of the land (Firro, 1999, 2001; Parsons, 2000).

2.1.4.2. The Druze as an in-between group

After the foundation of the State of Israel, Israeli authorities took a series of steps to strengthen the Druze's distinct religious and "national" identity and to drive a wedge between them and the other Arab-Palestinian groups in Israel (i.e., Muslims and Christians). As described in greater detail by several historians and political scientists (see Cohen, 2010; Firro, 1999, 2001; Halabi, 2014; Kaufman, 2004; Lustick, 1985; Oppenheimer, 1979; Parsons, 2000), authorities undertook several steps to achieve this distinction in the process what they referred to as the "integration" of Arabs in Israel. Druze males were first encouraged to serve in a minority unit of the Israeli army, and in 1956, conscription into the Israeli army was made compulsory. The presence of the Druze in the military and the other security forces became gradually more pronounced which also opened doors for Druze veterans to find permanent employment in the security forces. Records show that around 40% of Druze males occupied these working positions (The Knesset, 2008). Importantly, from 1948, the term Druze and Druze community (instead of Arab) were used by the Israeli media (Firro, 2001). In 1962, the term "Druze" also replaced the term "Arab" on their identity cards, and in 1979 a separate education system for the Druze was created. All of that emphasized the distinction between Druze and Arabs (Halabi, 2014).

These actions of state policymakers were "successful" in that the (non-Druze) Palestinian minority viewed Druze as traitors because of their conscription in the Israeli military (Halabi, 2014). That is not to say that Druze passively received these actions without resistance. In fact, in the 1950s, Druze teachers, scholars and even soldiers protested against attempts to separate them from other Arab communities, and the Druze Initiative Committee was established that sought to challenge these attempts and affirm their Palestinian identity (Firro, 2001). Additionally, many Druze in Israel became distrustful of the Jewish majority's motivations, and some became aware of their discrimination vis-à-vis the Jewish group

(Yiftachel & Segal, 1998). Yet the process of making Druze isomorphic to the Jewish majority was robust because of the economic dependency of Druze on the Israeli military against the backdrop of the state confiscation of their agricultural lands (Firro, 2001). Given these processes of identity "invention" (Halabi, 2014) and the attempts to create common destiny among Jews and Druze in contrast to Druze and Arabs (Firro, 2001), we expected that Druze identity would be positively linked with the Israeli identity and both negatively linked with identification with Palestinians.

2.1.5. Studies overview

The studies reported next had two purposes. Study 1 sought to understand how the Druze as an in-between group navigates its endorsement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict narratives. We tested the extent to which Druze viewed these conflicting narratives as truthful and representative of actual events. We compared their endorsement of these narratives with those of Palestinian-Israelis and Jewish-Israeli participants. We predicted that Druze participants would take a neutral stance in their acceptance of these narratives and that identification with Israel and with Palestinians would predict endorsement of each group's narrative, respectively.

Study 2 examined the reactions of Druze to the "nation-state law" that stipulates that the State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people alone. As the law essentially discriminated against all non-Jewish citizens, Druze's reaction became relevant for our theorizing about alliance with lower-status group, Palestinian citizens of Israel, in this case. This allowed us to test our hypothesis that the salience of shared grievances should shift categorizations and increase the odds for allying with the lower-status group.

In both studies, we measured identification with three groups: Druze, Israeli and Palestinian. We also measured the experience of conflict between Druze and Israeli as well as Druze and Arab identities. We expected identification with Israel and Druze would be positively correlated (reflecting low identity conflict) and that both would negatively correlate with identification with Palestinians (reflecting the conflict between these identities).

It is noteworthy that across the two studies and the chapter in general, we referred to three social groups: Druze, Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Israelis, and three identities: Druze, Israeli, Palestinian. To clarify, by using the term Israeli-Jews, we refer to the Israeli Jewish

majority, and thus the term Israeli identity refers to identifying with being Israeli. The interchangeable use of Palestinian citizens of Israel or Palestinian-Israeli or simply Palestinians refers to the largest non-Jewish minority that consists of 20% of the Israeli population all of whom are Israeli citizens. Similarly, we use the term Palestinian identity/identification to refer to identifying with this minority. We used the term Druze to refer to the Druze minority in Israel despite that some Druze might prefer to be referred to otherwise, such as Palestinian or Arab-Israeli (Halabi, 2014). We do that only to make the distinction among the in-between group we studied in comparison to Israeli-Jews and the rest of the Palestinian minority in Israel, and not to further perpetuate the divide between Druze and the Palestinians and the simplistic view of the complex identities Druze possess.

2.2. Study 1

Study 1 compared Druze university students to two other university samples: Jewish and Palestinian-Israeli, all Israeli citizens. Participants watched two short films expressing either the Jewish-Israeli or Palestinian national narrative and judged the truthfulness of each narrative immediately afterwards.

2.2.1. Method

Participants

Three samples comprised of $N = 57$ Druze participants (31 females, 26 males) ranging in age from 18 to 32 ($M = 21.7$, $SD = 2.2$), $N = 88$ Palestinian-Israeli participants (58 females, 30 males) between the ages of 18 and 30 ($M = 21.1$, $SD = 1.97$; Sixty-eight were Muslims and 20 were Christians, which somewhat reflects the distribution of the Arab student population in Israel), and $N = 126$ Jewish-Israeli participants (76 females, 49 males, 1 did not report) between the ages of 19 and 31 ($M = 23.42$, $SD = 1.70$). All participants were citizens of Israel. They were recruited via academic platforms online and advertisements at their local campuses. Druze and Palestinian participants filled in questionnaires in Arabic, and Jewish participants completed them in Hebrew.

Materials and procedure

Participants completed the computerized study in individual cubicles after they consented to participate in the study. Druze and the Palestinian participants filled

identification and identity-conflict scales (details about Palestinian participants are reported in Appendix A). Jewish-Israeli participants did not complete identification scales. All participants watched two short films depicting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict either from a Jewish-Israeli or Arab-Palestinian perspective. These were shown in counterbalanced order. Immediately after viewing each film, participants completed a questionnaire that measured the perceived accuracy of the narrative expressed in the film. Then, participants were debriefed and paid 25 ILS (approximately 7 €) for their participation.

The two short films. Participants watched two six-minute-long films in counterbalanced order that were ostensibly made by a single American graduate who was an expert on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (these films were prepared by the second co-author and were used in other studies); This expert narrated his "well studied" view on the matter using English. Subtitles were provided. Each of the films depicted the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from either a Jewish-Israeli or a Palestinian standpoint. The Israeli-Jewish narrative, for example, portrayed Israel as a victim in the face of Palestinians and other neighboring Arab counties who want Israel to be destroyed. On the other hand, the Palestinian narrative depicted Palestinians as victims of Israeli expulsion and the destruction of their towns and villages. The two videos maintained the equivalence of length, types of visual material, number of arguments, rhetorical intensity, and paralinguistic features.

Measurements

Unless mentioned otherwise, all measures were 7-point Likert scales (1 = *totally disagree*, 7 = *totally agree*). All measurements were translated into Arabic using a translation-back-translation method (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997).

Narratives' endorsement. Eight items assessed the perceived accuracy of each of the conflict narratives expressed in the short films (e.g., "the video shows the whole picture of the conflict"). Internal consistency for the Israeli-Jewish film endorsement was $\alpha = .96$ among Druze, $\alpha=.96$ among Palestinians and $\alpha = .94$ among Israeli-Jewish Participants, and the Palestinian video was $\alpha=.95$ among Druze, $\alpha = .94$ among Palestinians and $\alpha = .84$ among Jewish Participants.

Group identification. A shortened version of 8 items of the Roccas and colleagues' (2008) identification scale was completed by Druze participants with respect to three identities: Israeli, Druze and Palestinian (e.g., "being Druze is an important part of my identity"; "I feel strongly affiliated with this the Palestinian nation"; "When I talk about Israelis, I usually say

"we" rather than "they") Cronbach alphas were for Druze identity α = .86, Israeli identity α = .89 and Arab-Palestinian identity α = .89. Palestinian participants were asked only about the extent to which they identify with being Palestinian (e.g., "being Palestinian is an important part of my identity"; α = .85). Based on previous pilots we conducted among Palestinian citizens of Israel, answering questions about identification with Israel was often met with antagonism and eventually cancelled their participation. Thus, we adopted a culturally sensitive approach and refrained from asking about this.

*Identity Conflict*s. Four items were taken from the Bicultural Identity Integration Scale (Huynh, 2009) and used to measure the conflict between the two sets of identities on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. Higher values indicate higher levels of identity conflict. Druze participants were asked to rate their perceived conflict between being a Druze and being an Israeli (e.g., "I feel conflicted between the being Druze and Israeli"; α = .90), and between being a Druze and being an Arab ("I feel caught between my Druze and Arab identities", α = .89). Palestinian participants were only asked about their perceived conflict between being Arab and being Israeli ("I feel conflicted between being Arab and Israeli"; α = .86). As this scale originally tested conflict between cultural identities such as Asian and American among bicultural Asian-Americans, we used the term Arab instead of Palestinian to capture the cultural Arab identity instead of the politicized Palestinian identity. Having said that, the term "Arab" often refers interchangeably to Palestinians in Israel, and as such, the term might have held a political sentiment.

All study materials and additional scales that were added for exploratory purposes are available in Appendix A.

2.2.2. Results

Narrative endorsement. To test the endorsement of the conflicting narratives that were represented in the film, a 3 (sample: Druze vs Palestinian vs Israeli-Jewish) X 2 (narrative: Israeli-Jewish vs Palestinian) mixed-design ANOVA was conducted in which the narrative factor was within-subjects. An interaction between sample and narrative was found, $F(2, 268) = 154.86$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .536$, 95% CI [.46, .60]. As can be seen in Figure 1, while Palestinian, $F(1, 268) = 236.69$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .469$, 95% CI [.39, .54], and the Israeli-Jewish participants, $F(1, 268) = 81.54$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .233$, 95% CI [.15, .32], clearly judged their ingroup narrative as more accurate and representative over the outgroup narrative, Druze

participants did not endorse one narrative over the other, $F(1, 268) = 3.58$, $p = .059$, $\eta_p^2 = .013$, 95% CI [.00, .05].

Figure 1.

Endorsements of conflicting narratives among Druze, Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish participants in Study 1



Note. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.

Hierarchy of social identifications among the Druze participants. As shown in Table 1, Druze participants identified most strongly as Druze, followed by Israeli, and Palestinian was last. All bases of identification were significantly different from one another, $F(1.33, 74.65) = 79.53$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .587$ (Greenhouse-Geisser correction). Measures of Israeli and Palestinian identification were negatively inter-correlated ($r = -.55$, $p < .001$). Identification as Druze was positively correlated with Israel identification ($r = .66$, $p < .001$) and negatively with Palestinian identification ($r = -.57$, $p < .001$).

Identity conflicts. The two potential identity conflicts between being Druze and also being Israeli or Arab were both relatively low and under midpoint of the scale, $t(56) = 2.62$, $p = .011$; $t(56) = 2.34$, $p = .023$, respectively. Thesse levels of identity conflict did not significantly differ, $t(56) = .10$, $p = .919$. However, the more participants identified as Druze the less conflict they experienced with the Israeli identity ($r = -.49$, $p < .001$), and the more conflict they experienced with the Arab identity, although only marginally so in the latter case ($r = .24$, $p = .07$).

Identifications, identity conflicts and the narrative gap among Druze participants. To address our hypothesis that identification with each Israelis and Palestinians

would be linked to the endorsement of their respective national narrative, we calculated a difference score of the acceptance of the two narratives by subtracting the acceptance of the Palestinian narrative from the acceptance of the Israeli narrative. Positive scores in this measure indicate a pro-Israeli narrative gap, whereas negative scores represent a pro-Palestinian gap.

Identification as Israeli correlated with a pro-Israeli gap ($r = .48$, $p < .001$), whereas identification as Palestinian correlated with a pro-Palestinian gap ($r = -.43$, $p < .001$). Interestingly, identification with their in-between group, the Druze, was correlated with a pro-Israeli gap ($r = .42$, $p < .001$), probably because of the experienced alignment between these identities. Indeed, we found that a perceived conflict between Druze and Israeli identities was associated with a pro-Palestinian gap ($r = -.50$, $p < .001$). Perceived conflict between Druze and Arab identities was not associated with the narrative gap.

A multiple regression model with all identifications and identity conflicts as predictors was tested among Druze and Palestinian participants. Further details and a regression table can be found in Appendix A (see Table 10 and Table 11).

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics, zero-order correlations and their associated 95% confidence intervals for variables used in Study 1 in the Druze sample

Measures	*M* (*SD*)	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Identification with Druze	5.51 (1.16)					
2. Identification with Israel	4.42 (1.36)	.66* [.49, .79]				
3. Identification with Palestinian	2.37 (1.25)	-.57* [-.72, -.36]	-.55* [-.71, -.34]			
4. Conflict- Druze-Israeli	2.14 (1.04)	-.49* [-.65, -.26]	-.56* [-.72, -35]	.44* [.20, .63]		
5. Conflict- Druze-Arab	2.16 (1.10)	.24 [-.02, .47]	.01 [-.17, .35]	-.30* [-.52, -.05]	.26 [.00, .49]	
6. Narrative gap	-0.04 (1.99)	.42* [.17, .61]	.48* [.25, .66]	-.43* [-.62, -.19]	-.50* [-.68, -.27]	.20 [-.06, .44]

Note. Narrative gap was calculated by subtracting the Palestinian narrative endorsement from Israeli narrative endorsement. * $p < .05$

2.2.3. Discussion

The aim of Study 1 was to examine the attitudes of in-between group members vis-à-vis the dominant historical national narratives in an intergroup conflict. We also sought to investigate the relationship between identification with the higher- and lower-status groups and the construal of these narratives. We attempted to answer these questions by looking at a group that fits the definition of an in-between-status position within the Israeli-Palestinian power and status relations (within Israeli borders): The Druze in Israel. Compared to the rival groups directly involved in the conflict who were expected to endorse their ingroup narratives more than the rival group's narrative, we hypothesized that in-between group members would take a neutral stance on these contradictory narratives because of their ability to see the truth in both narratives as an in-between group. Yet we also expected that individual differences in identification with each group would positively predict endorsement of their respective narrative.

Our hypotheses were confirmed such that Druze participants did not collectively endorse one national narrative over the other. Individual differences in identification did, however, link to narrative endorsement: Israeli identification was associated with endorsing the narrative of the dominant Jewish group in Israel, whereas Palestinian identification was associated with endorsing the Palestinian national narrative. Importantly, we found that the in-between identity, that is, identification as Druze, was positively aligned with Israeli identification and negatively with Palestinian identification. These findings corroborate historical accounts suggesting that the construction of the particularistic Druze identity was intimately tied to Israeli patriotism (Cohen, 2011; Firro, 1999; 2001; Halabi, 2014; Kaufman, 2004; Lustick, 1985; Oppenheimer, 1979; Parsons, 2000). Whether this is generalizable to other in-between groups remains however unclear from the current study

This study provides a first insight into how in-between groups navigate their place in conflict narratives. Their somewhat neutral perception of the truthfulness of these narratives is rather intriguing given that these narratives are highly disputed by the conflicting parties and are omnipresent in various forms of input such as the media and education (Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Klar & Baram, 2016; Klar & Bilewicz, 2017; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Again, because of their complex status position (i.e., between high- and low-status groups), taking a neutral position might be seen as a useful strategy by in-between groups that permits maintaining secure relations with the two rival groups. It could be though that this neutral

position is driven by exposure to both narratives, and as they do not concern the in-between in terms of content, in-between group members can recognize some truth in each narrative. Based on the current study, we are unable to disentangle the real motivation(s) driving this. However, the one thing we can observe is that variance in participants' endorsement of each narrative was guided by their identification with each alternative group in the conflict. A shared sense of identity with the higher-status group predicted endorsement of its narrative whereas shared identity with the lower-status group predicted endorsement of its narrative.

2.3. Study 2

Because status within intergroup conflicts is not always stable, in-between groups may be faced situations in which their relatively higher status is at risk of being lost (K. Brown, 2000; Caricati, 2018). When this threat emanates from discrimination by the higher-status group, in-between group members may come to recognize shared grievances with the lower-status group, which could in turn increase the likelihood of allying with it. Thus, in addition to individual differences in identification, new situations can shift categorizations in ways that create different patterns of solidarity (Subašić et al., 2008). In Israel, the passing of the nation-state law provided an ample opportunity to test the effects of such situational forces among Druze as in-between group members.

In July 2018, the Israeli parliament passed a Basic Law "Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People" that defines Israel entirely as the state of the Jewish people and declares, among other things, that the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people (The Knesset, 2018). The law also abolished the co-official status of the Arabic language alongside Hebrew and degraded it to a language with a vaguely defined "special status". The law was thus met with much condemnation and protest by Palestinian and Druze citizens. As the law was intended to reassert the Jewish identity of the state and the full Jewish sovereignty, it essentially meant that all non-Jewish citizens would be affected by the law in one way or another. The enactment of the law was, of course, concerning to Druze citizens because this discriminatory law not only affected Palestinian citizens but their group as well. In particular, many Druze felt that the Jewish majority and state had betrayed them, especially given their unique contribution to the state and its security with their military service (compared to Palestinian-Israeli who are not obliged to serve in the Israeli army; Hovel, 2018).

After the law was passed, there were some preliminary negotiations between the government and the representatives of the Druze community about possible amendments to the law. These amendments sought either to particularize the Druze's status in the law exclusively or to minimize the law's shortcomings more inclusively for all the Arab citizens in Israel: Palestinians and Druze (Lis et al., 2018). Study 2 was conducted a month after the law was passed and was designed to explore the endorsement of Druze of these two types of potential amendments.

As we argued earlier, allying with the lower-status group is likely to happen when the status of in-between group members is at risk of deterioration (Caricati et al., 2020a). Alliance then becomes a strategic way to sustain a relatively higher status by causing a dependency among lower-status group members. Additionally, however, in-between groups may recategorize the lower-status group as part of their ingroup when both groups are affected by unjust treatment from the dominant group, thereby expressing more solidarity towards the lower-status group (Subašić et al., 2008). We therefore expected that in this situation, Druze participants would endorse more inclusive amendments to the nation-state law that would seek positive social change for them and Palestinian-Israeli citizens. We also expected that this would be amplified the more they identify with Palestinians.

2.3.1. Method

Participants

The sample was composed of $N = 568$ Druze participants (328 females, 240 males) all of whom were Israeli citizens ranging in age from 14 to 70 ($M = 35.63$, $SD = 13.02$). Participants were recruited via a snowballing method over social media. Out of the whole sample, $N = 346$ participants completed the entire survey. We kept the larger sample because of our primary interest in the law amendment questions which were located in the middle of the questionnaire. Thirteen participants were under 18, and one did not report their age.

Materials and Procedure

After they agreed to participate in the study, participants were asked to complete a series of measures and questions related to the Druze minority in Israel. Unless mentioned otherwise, all measurements were 7-point Likert scales (1 = *totally disagree*, 7 = *totally agree*).

Group identification. These measures were identical to those used in Study 1. Participants completed these identification scales twice. In the first completion, participants were asked to indicate their answer according to how they felt in the recent years till now. In the second, participants completed the questionnaires by the end of the survey, after they had answered questions about the nation-state law, and were instructed to fill them according to how they felt at that very moment. This was done to capture any possible experienced identity shifts after the law was passed (Time 1: $\alpha_{Druze} = .85$, $\alpha_{Israeli} = .89$, $\alpha_{Palestinian} = .88$; Time 2 $\alpha_{Druze} = .89$, $\alpha_{Israeli} = .92$, $\alpha_{Palestinians} = .89$).

Identity conflicts. Similar to Study 1, participants were asked about the conflict between being Druze and Israeli, and Druze and Arab. These were also administered twice, one asking participants to answer according to how they felt in recent years till now, and the second was by the end of the survey in which they were asked to indicate how they felt at that moment. The conflict between being Druze and Israeli (Time 1: $\alpha = .94$; Time 2 $\alpha = .95$); the conflict between being Druze and Arab (Time 1: $\alpha = .95$; Time 2, $\alpha = .96$).

Exclusive-amendment endorsement. Six items measured the respondents' endorsement of possible amendments to the nation-state law that would exclude Druze from the discrimination implied by the law and provide them with benefits, yet would retain the discriminatory clauses against the other Arab citizens (e.g., "I would be satisfied if the amendments would grant Druze a beneficial status that would distinguish them from the other Arab citizens"; $\alpha=.83$).

Inclusive-amendment endorsement. Five items examined participants' endorsement of amendments to the law that would place the Druze together with the other Arab citizens of Israel (e.g., "Druze must object to any law or decisions that discriminate against all Arab citizens even if these do not apply to the Druze"; $\alpha=.64$).

Negative emotions following the passing of the law. Emotions included disappointment, anger, fear, disgust, and content and satisfaction (reverse items); $\alpha=.73$; and *Negative emotions towards the loss of the status of Arabic as an official language imposed by the Law*: Disappointment, anger, and content and satisfaction (reverse items); $\alpha=.75$.

All study materials and additional scales that were used for exploratory purposes are available in Appendix A.

2.3.2. Results

On average, participants showed high negative emotions towards the law (M = 5.86, SD = 1.22) and abolishing Arabic as an official language (M = 5.90, SD = 1.24), both of which were above the scale's midpoint, $t(537) = 38.44$, $p < .001$; $t(539) = 35.60$, $p < .001$, respectively. Table 2 contains means, standard deviations, and variable inter-correlation for measurements collected at Time 1. Unless mentioned otherwise, these values were not much different from means, standard deviations, and variable inter-correlation of scales collected at Time 2. The latter were therefore reported in Appendix A (Table 12).

Amendments' endorsement. As expected, on the whole, Druze participants endorsed more inclusive amendments that would positively affect all Arab minority groups in Israel (M = 4.74, SD = 1.30) than amendments that would enhance Druze's status alone (M = 3.63, SD = 1.64), $t(567) = 11.50$, $p < .001$, $d = .49$.

Hierarchy of identifications. Scores of participants' identification with Israeli, Druze and Palestinian identities reported at Time 1 and Time 2 were not significantly different ($ts \leq 1.22$, $ps \geq .23$). Similar to Study 1, identification as Druze was the strongest followed by Israeli identification and then by Palestinian identification. All of these significantly differed from one another $F(1.60, 909.13) = 950.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .626$ (Greenhouse-Geisser correction). Here again, Druze identification was positively aligned with Israeli identification ($r = .49$, $p < .001$) and negatively aligned with Palestinian identification ($r = -.28$, $p < .001$). Identifications as Israeli and Palestinian were also negatively correlated ($r = -.33$, $p < .001$).

Identity conflicts. Despite the consistent patterns of association between measures of identity, unlike in Study 1, participants reported greater Druze-Israeli conflict than Druze-Arab conflict, $t(567) = 5.17$, $p < .001$, $d = .21$. It seems plausible to assume that this shift was due to the new law. Supporting this hypothesis, conflict between being Druze and Israeli was reported as being higher at the second completion of this scale referring to how participants felt at that moment than in recent years, $t(427) = 4.18$, $p < .001$, $d = .20$ (in recent years: M = 2.66, SD = 1.41; now M = 2.93, SD = 1.44). Perceived conflict between being Druze and Arab, on the other hand, decreased at present time compared to recent years, $t(434) = 2.11$, $p = .036$, $d = .10$ (in recent years: M = 2.36, SD = 1.39; now M = 2.24, SD = 1.31). Thus, participants felt more conflict with being Israeli and less conflict with being Arab after the nation-state law was passed.

Table 2.

Descriptive statistics, zero-order correlations and their associated 95% confidence intervals for variables used in Study 2

Measures	*M* (*SD*)	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Identification with Druze	5.60 (1.22)					
2. Identification with Israel	4.49 (1.52)	.49* [.43, .55]				
3. Identification with Palestinians	2.17 (1.24)	-.28* [-.36, -.21]	-.33* [-.40, -.25]			
4. Conflict- Druze-Israeli	2.67 (1.41)	-.03 [-.11, .05]	-.17* [-.25, -.09]	.15* [.07, .22]		
5. Conflict- Druze-Arab	2.37 (1.39)	.04 [-.04, .12]	.02 [-.07, .10]	.06 [-.02, .14]	.53* [.47, .59]	
6. Amendment gap	-1.11 (2.31)	.43* [.36, .49]	.52* [.45, .57]	-.39* [-.46, -.32]	-.13* [-.21, -.05]	.04 [-.04, .12]

Note. Amendment gap was calculated by subtracting inclusive amendment options from exclusive amendment options. * $p < .05$

Identifications, identity conflicts and the amendment gap. To fully comprehend the effect of identification on the endorsement of possible amendments to the nation-state law, we calculated a difference score by subtracting endorsements of inclusive amendments from exclusive amendments. This was done to obtain a measure of the *amendment gap*. Positive scores on this measure indicate a pro-exclusivity gap whereas negative scores represent a pro-inclusivity gap. Israeli identification was positively related to a pro-exclusivity gap ($r = .52$, $p < .001$) whereas Palestinian identification correlated with a pro-inclusivity gap ($r = -.39$, $p < .001$). Druze identification was positively correlated with a pro-exclusivity gap ($r = .43$, $p < .001$), and Druze-Israeli identity conflict predicted a pro-inclusivity gap ($r = -.13$, $p < .001$). Druze-Arab identity conflict did not correlate with amendment gaps.

Integrative multiple regression analysis, including all identifications and identity conflicts, was also tested and revealed similar results to those mentioned above. Details are provided in Appendix A (see Table 13).

2.3.3. Discussion

Study 2 aimed to understand alliance formation between in-between and lower-status group members in the context of discrimination by the high-status group. This study capitalized on a naturalistic and historical event relevant to Druze's perspective on their place within the broader intergroup context. Specifically, our findings suggest that the enactment of the nation-state law, consolidating constitutional separation between Jews and non-Jews and annulling the official status of Arabic in Israel, precipitated not just negative feelings about the law itself but also a sense of conflict between their Druze identity and Israeli identity.

We hypothesized that common fate between the in-between and lower-status groups should create more inclusive categorizations and lead to more inclusive responses to the law. Indeed, Druze participants preferred amendments to the law that would inclusively benefit all members of the Arab minority rather than exclusively benefiting the Druze. We also expected that feelings of shared identity with the lower-status group would predict more endorsement of inclusive amendments. Our results showed this too as identification with Palestinians predicted stronger preferences for inclusion rather than exclusion of Palestinians in Druzes' demands.

Notwithstanding the above, similar to Study 1, we found that Druze identity was positively related to Israeli identity and negatively related to Palestinian identity. As Saguy

and colleagues have recently shown (2020), the nation-state law has induced a sense of common identity loss among Druze. However, it is plausible to assume that these identification patterns did not change because of the state's long historical construction of Druze identity and the attempts of policymakers to create strong ties with the Jewish majority. The law might have been disappointing and perhaps humiliating to some, it did not seem to remarkably deconstruct the link between Druze and Israeli, and Druze and Palestinian identities

This study shows the relevance of multiple identifications among in-between group members not only on how they construe conflicting national narratives but also in allying with the lower-status group on redressing inequality. There are however some limitations that need to be addressed. First, we did not directly measure collective action intentions of Druze participants that would be perhaps relevant to the conceptualization of solidarity and alliance. In fact, both Druze and Palestinians took the streets to protest against the law around the data collection time. These protests however were done mainly separately. It would have been thus more relatable and contextually relevant to ask about allying with Palestinians and intention to protest together instead of apart. Second, in lacking a comparison group (i.e., the Palestinian group), we cannot see the complete picture of solidarity and how their attitudes towards the nation-state law might have affected Druze inclination for inclusive amendments. Third, as the study is a field survey and capitalized on actual events, it is difficult to draw causality about the motivation of inclusive changes (i.e., the instability of social hierarchy caused by the law). Nevertheless, the study offers a novel perspective on a real in-between group and how it navigates relations with the lower-status group within an intergroup conflict.

2.4. General discussion

A view over the world map highlights the rich yet fragmented mosaic of human ethnic, religious and national groups that inhabit it. Yet there are hundreds of active intergroup conflicts at each point in time, and in many of which some groups find themselves (in) between the hammer and the anvil of the conflicting parties (see Harff, 2018). In-between groups were used in this chapter to refer to groups that straddle the identities of the rivals group simultaneously who also occupy an intermediate status that is relatively higher than a lower-status group yet lower than a higher-status group (Caricati, 2018). The specific dynamics of relations among in-between groups and other relevant groups during intergroup

conflicts can vary from one case to another but the fact that they are an integral part of these conflicts is indisputable and vital to study (Dixon et al., 2020).

Given their intermediate status within the broader social hierarchy, such in-between groups are disadvantaged compared to the higher status group but can also achieve a positively distinct identity in comparing their group to the lower-status group. As such, in-between groups may often be content within the status quo (Caricati, 2018). The current chapter sought to understand how an in-between group, the Druze in Israel, navigates its relations within an intergroup conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and how patterns of identification with multiple groups in the conflict situation might guide the specific orientations and actions of in-between group members.

In Study 1, we examined the endorsements of collective national narratives, which are contradictory in nature, among in-between group members compared to the higher- and lower-status groups. We found that in-between group members expressed a relatively neutral position towards these narratives while the disputing parties in the conflict who occupy divergent statuses endorsed their ingroup narrative more than the outgroup narrative. However, we also found that identification with each rival group predicted more endorsement of its respective narrative. These findings confirmed our hypothesis that participants would be more even-handed in viewing the contrasting narratives, probably because of their improved vantage point "above the conflict fence" and seeing both sides (e.g., Buber, 2005). However, this study did not allow testing possible mediators that would explain this effect. Also, because we tested our hypothesis among one in-between group, the Druze in Israel, it is difficult to generalize on other in-between groups without testing their endorsement of conflicting narratives in their particular context.

Another type of relations we aimed to understand is that of in-between group members vis-à-vis alliance with the lower-status groups. We theorized that under conditions in which the status of in-between groups is unstable and gravitating downwards, it would be more likely for in-between groups to ally with the lower-status group. In terms of intergroup boundaries, we also theorized that facing discrimination by the higher-status group that highlights commonalities among the lower-status and in-between groups would bring in-between groups to recategorize the lower-status group as part of the ingroup and thus ally with it. The findings of Study 2 showed that (Druze) in-between group members were indeed more in favor of amendments to a discriminatory law that would include changes that positively affect both their group and the lower-status Palestinian group. Here too, identification influenced this endorsement of inclusive versus exclusive responses to

discrimination – identification with lower-status Palestinians was related to more inclusive responses whereas identification with higher status Israelis was related to more exclusive responses.

Interesting as these patterns are, it is not possible from Study 2 to isolate the different factors that made Druze ally with Palestinians. As such, it is hard to differentiate allyship based on shared fate and associated categorical processes from allyship based on more strategic considerations about maintaining relative status within the overall hierarchy. The nation-state law involved these two factors in essence: it downwardly destabilized the status of Druze in Israel but also emphasized the shared grievances with Palestinians. To fully disentangle the exact mechanism, future research could experimentally manipulate the stability of status hierarchy versus common identity with the lower-status group and test alliance with the lower-status. Nevertheless, this study is novel in that it was conducted among members of an existing in-between group who live an ongoing intergroup conflict. The study also shed some light on the importance of considering identification which so far, to our knowledge, has not been investigated in the literature on in-between groups that occupy an intermediate status.

Across both studies, we consistently found that identification as Druze was highly correlated with identification as Israeli but negatively linked to identification as Palestinian; and we also found that Druze participants prioritized most their identity as Druze, second their identity as Israeli, and last their identity as Palestinian. The relative order of identities, and the patterns of correlation among them, could reflect more generalizable patterns within in-between groups. However, it is difficult from the current examination to infer beyond the specific context (and history) of Druze identity, and broader generalizations await further systematic study of identity within in-between groups.

While the study of in-between groups is in its infancy, the current chapter expanded the available research to examine in-between groups amidst intergroup conflicts. Yet further studies seem vital for a better grasp of the whole picture of intergroup conflicts where in-between groups are involved in and endure its costs. For example, one of the crucial questions is under which conditions status improvement is possible for in-between group members? In other words, when do in-between group members challenge the higher-status group and even join collective action? TSST (Caricati, 2018) argues, and supported by some previous findings, that challenging the higher-status groups becomes possible when the instability of social stratification does not risk falling down the status hierarchy. When in-between groups can safeguard the need for positive distinctiveness by maintaining their

relatively higher status, they can then begin to challenge the higher-status group. Yet it seems reasonable to argue that it is rather unlikely that this would be the only force that drives in-between groups when considering challenging the higher-status group. Other considerations clearly identified within social identity theory, such as legitimacy and permeability of group boundaries (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), have not been examined within this research framework. Moreover, in-between groups' perception of collective efficacy and hope to move upward the status ladder remain to be examined in future research.

3. The Trojan Horse effect: reactions to passing as an ingroup member

3.1. Introduction

The bravely-defended city of Troy was defeated by the Greeks when they smuggled a "Trojan Horse" hiding several fighters past the city walls (Homer). Similar to the Trojan Horse, the nationalist General Mola defeated Madrid during the Spanish civil war with the help of what he called a "fifth column" of citizens sympathizing with Franco. In Rwanda, Hutu propaganda attributed this term to allegedly seductive Tutsi women in cahoots with Hutu enemies (Hudson, 2014). Trojan horses and fifth columns have become popular metaphors for speaking about the fear of invisible "enemies within", whose presence threatens to undermine, or more actively sabotage, the integrity of the group they have infiltrated (Chernobrov, 2019).

More subtly echoing the idea of Trojan horses and fifth columns, individuals who "pass" from one group to another also might come to be viewed with suspicion or distrust. For example, in times of US racial segregation, "passing" was defined as "a deception that enables a person to adopt certain roles or identifies from which he would be barred by prevailing social standards in the absence of his misleading conduct" (Kennedy, 2001, p. 1145). In those days, concealing a Black identity would have had severe consequences, as illustrated by the case of James Parker Barnett, who was admitted to Colombia University in the 1850s while not disclosing his Black ancestry. After his professor gained knowledge of Barnett's ancestry, Barnett was expelled from the university. Records suggest however that Barnett was not aware of his Black ancestry in the first place, and accusing him of passing was unjustified (see Keane, Columbia University and Slavery).

3.1.1. Passing

Passing has been traditionally viewed as an act of identity performance in which markers of social identity are accentuated or attenuated in ways that allow the performer to be perceived as a member of a group that is different from their "true" identity (Alexander, 2004; Spears et al., 2002; see also social identity performance in (Klein et al., 2007; Renfrow,

2004). Typically, though not always, passing involves members of disadvantaged and stigmatized groups investing efforts to conceal their stigmatized identity in ways that grant them access to a higher-status group, and through this, to benefits that they are otherwise deprived of (Goffman, 1963; Khanna & Johnson, 2010). Along these lines, social identity theory would conceptualize passing as an example of "individual mobility", the identity management strategy used by individuals seeking to escape devalued group membership by psychologically or physically realigning their sense of self with the advantaged group (Tajfel, 1978a; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Passing as an identity performance implies that it is a conscious and purposeful act (Klein et al., 2007). But this may not always be the case, and there are situations in which individuals might pass into a group without intentionally wanting to deceive others or indeed without being aware of their having crossed group boundaries (cf. Barnett above). Gender and linguistic studies make a similar distinction between passing and concealment (e.g., Piller, 2002; Rood et al., 2017), with the latter being a performative and intentional act, whereas the former is the product of others' perceptions independent of the target's intentions. For example, this could occur when others categorize the individual based on identity markers such as their phenotype, clothing, accent, name, hairstyle or other cues that typically demarcate that social category (e.g., Bosson et al., 2005; DeJordy, 2008; Khanna & Johnson, 2010; Renfrow, 2004).

Movement between different groups is perhaps most common among in-between group members, individuals who straddle multiple social identities and can switch between these identities, something that may allow them at times to pass as full and exclusive members of any one of the groups whose identities they straddle (Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015). For example, a Turkish-German can pass as a German in phone call conversation if they speak flawless and unaccented German; they are taken for a "native" and not thought of as being both Turkish and German, and the existence of a Turkish dimension to their identity is not perceived. That is, without identity markers indicating outgroup membership, multiple identity holders can at times be categorized as genuine members of the receiving group in the sense that they are seen as full members of that group and that their own identity is fully contained within that group's identity.

Passing is not a foreign concept to social psychologists. It has been well-documented in the misclassification (i.e., miscategorization) literature, in which assumptions about a

person's social identity have been found to lead to the denial of other identities they possess (e.g., Barreto et al., 2003; Barreto & Ellemers, 2009; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Townsend et al., 2009) or the imposition of group memberships to which they do not belong (e.g., Bosson et al., 2005; Trujillo et al., 2015). Passing can thus be treated as the outcome of being perceived as an ingroup member in a given social interaction regardless of whether it is intentional or unintentional.

To date, research has mainly focused on the experiences of passers, especially minority group members, and how they negotiate their identities in the face of miscategorization and identity denial (e.g., Barreto & Ellemers, 2009; Bosson et al., 2005; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Renfrow, 2004). However, little is known about how the receiving group responds to passing members who straddle the outgroup identity. Our goal in the current chapter is to explore the receiving group's response and to investigate conditions under which group members perceive passers as a potential threat to the group. We examine this question in a series of experiments that explore the different ways in which the conduct or social markers of a target might allow passing. We investigate this phenomenon among German participants who respond to a relevant in-between group member, a Turkish-German passing as German, and Israeli-Jewish participants who respond to a Palestinian passing as Israeli.

3.1.2. Identity threats and the enemy within

There are at least three grounds for which passing into a given group is likely to be perceived as a threat to members of that group. First, from a rational perspective, outgroup passers gain access to benefits or other resources reserved for the ingroup. Benefits can be realistic (e.g., access to social events, positions) but also symbolic (e.g., identity, reputation). In cases of intergroup conflicts, benefits gained by passing can signal an act of spying to get hold of information valuable to the ingroup (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011; Täuber & van Leeuwen, 2012), and thereby undermine the group from within. Group members are likely to be motivated to protect their own group's benefits, knowledge, and status co-opted by outgroup members. Second, drawing on the social identity perspective, passers may blur the intergroup boundaries. By their ability to pass as ingroup members, passers are likely to elicit ambiguity around who is an ingroup member and who is not. This, as will be delineated later, may come to cause a threat to the valued intergroup distinctiveness that provides group members with clarity about group belonging and which norms they should follow (Barreto &

Ellemers, 2009; Branscombe et al., 1999; Tajfel, 1974; Turner et al., 1987). Third, especially when passers originate from devalued groups, with different norms and values to the ingroup, their presence within the group boundaries might be perceived as threatening to bring about unwanted transformations of the ingroup, for example, by challenging the group's convictions (e.g., ingroup criticism, see Hornsey & Imani, 2004). Akin to Trojan horses, the perceived potential for outsiders to corrupt the essence of the ingroup from within is again something that should be threatening and trigger protective responses from group members.

In the current chapter, we are most concerned with the latter grounds for which passing might be perceived as posing a threat to the receiving group: blurring intergroup distinctiveness and the threat of inflicting change or damage upon the group from within. We thus examine how these social identity threats can motivate protective responses in the face of passers, and are less concerned with the material benefits of passing and the utilitarian calculations that might guide responses to this. Given this focus, we suggest that the social identity approach (social identity theory; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; self-categorization theory; Turner et al., 1987) is a well-suited theoretical framework for understanding reactions to passing. We next review relevant psychological mechanisms that are theoretically associated with passing.

3.1.2.1 Intergroup distinctiveness

Intergroup distinctiveness lies at the core definition of a social group, which "makes no sense unless there are other groups around" (Tajfel, 1974, p. 09). Thus, it is one of the founding elements of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), a process through which group members will strive to differentiate their group from a relevant comparison group and thus obtain a meaningful sense of their group membership and belongingness therein (see also Jetten et al., 2001, 2004; Scheepers et al., 2002). Intergroup distinctiveness derives partly from the cognitive accentuation of intergroup differences (Krueger & Rothbart, 1990; Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). That is, once category membership becomes salient, group members will tend to exaggerate intergroup differences on a relevant dimension, forming distinct categories with minimum differences within each (Turner, 1982; also "meta-contrast" in Turner et al., 1987). Intergroup distinctiveness is thus the perceived similarity or dissimilarity between the "us" and "them" on a relevant dimension (Jetten et al., 2001, 2004). Group members will even maximize intergroup differences on negative dimensions (see Branscombe et al., 1999; Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996), suggesting that the motivation to

perceive one's group as distinct in the world is as important as, if not more important than, the motivation to simply see one's group positively.

Undermining intergroup distinctiveness should therefore challenge this identity motive and pose a threat to one's social identity. Threatened responses should be especially apparent among those who strongly derive a sense of identity from group membership, that is, among those higher on group identification (Branscombe et al., 1999; R. Brown & Abrams, 1986; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Jetten et al., 2004; Spears, Jetten, et al., 2002). Because they travel between groups, passers have the capacity to blur intergroup boundaries and threaten group distinctiveness. Once intergroup distinctiveness is undermined, we would expect highly identified group members in particular to seek various ways of restoring their threatened sense of identity. One way they might do this is through perceiving oneself as a typical group member, for example, through self-stereotyping (e.g., Spears et al., 1997), another might be to more strongly marking intergroup distinctions, for example by enhancing ingroup homogeneity (e.g., Wilson & Hugenberg, 2010) or increasing ingroup favoritism (see Jetten et al., 2004).

Some of these predictions are substantiated by research on the related phenomenon of impostorism (Hornsey & Jetten, 2003; Jetten et al., 2005; Schoemann & Branscombe, 2011; Warner et al., 2007). An impostor is defined as a person "who publicly lays claims to identity while simultaneously disguising [their] failure to fulfil key criteria for group membership" (Jetten et al., 2005; p. 01). Previous studies have shown that such impostors are treated harshly by members of the group they infiltrate mainly because they blur the distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup (Jetten et al., 2005; Warner et al., 2007).

It is crucial here to make the distinction between impostorism and passing. The notion of passing we took in this chapter refers to the outcome of being perceived as an ingroup member in a given social interaction regardless of whether it is intentional or unintentional on the part of the passer. Impostors can then be considered as passers because they can be perceived as part of the receiving group as long as their lie is not revealed. However, the critical distinction here is that impostors make illegitimate claims for an identity while lacking the credentials qualifying them for such claims. Examples of these include individuals who claim to be vegetarian, yet eat meat from time to time (see Hornsey & Jetten, 2003); or people who claim to be academics, despite not having studied for nor acquired an academic degree (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011). Therefore, passing offers a broader concept that

allows looking at different ways in which people come to be categorized as ingroup members by the group they pass into while sharing an identity with an outgroup, instead of looking only at people who lie about their identity. Nonetheless, it is important to note that accusing others of being impostors can emerge as a way to negate the right of some legitimate members to belong to the group. Such accusation could, as will be pointed out later, emerge in reaction to the passing of members who straddle the receiving group's identity and a relevant outgroup.

3.1.2.2. Fear of damage from within

The impostor phenomenon also speaks to earlier findings showing a tendency among high identifiers (but not low identifiers) to categorize fewer ingroup/outgroup pictures as ingroup members in a face categorization task, a pattern that suggests a motivation to protect the group from being "contaminated" by miscategorized outgroup members (see Castano et al., 2002; Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992; Yzerbyt et al., 1995). This suggests that beyond the threat to distinctiveness that passers might pose, there might be an additional concern that might guide the rejection of passers: the fear of damage caused by outgroup members. For example, research on ingroup criticism shows that criticism by outgroup members is treated with higher sensitivity than by ingroup members. This sensitivity is mediated by the lack of trust in outgroup critics to be constructive and to care for the group's interest (see Hornsey & Esposo, 2009, for a review). Again, because passing allows others to be perceived as ingroup members, passers who challenge established group norms, such as by criticizing the group, might be perceived as trying to deceive the group by passing as an ingroup member while simultaneously working to inflict damage on the group. One way to rid these members would be to accuse them of camouflaging their "real" identity and to assign them attributions as impostors, fifth column and Trojan horses. To our knowledge, little is known about the interplay between undermining intergroup distinctiveness and the perceived damage associated with passing and how these together guide responses to passing as ingroup members.

Despite its relevance to the current focus on passing, there are a number of issues that remain unaddressed by the research on impostorism. First, previous studies have been conducted on relatively small and often ideologically defined groups (e.g., vegetarians). For these groups, the definition of group membership is contained in one single criterion, and violating this criterion would necessarily result in no longer being a group member. Intergroup boundaries in these situations are very clear and distinct – and therefore, reactions

to boundary-crossing or impostorism are likely to be exaggerated. In more complexly defined groups such as nations, boundaries are not always so clear, and they are routinely contested (Bauman, 1992; Billig, 1995; Huddy, 2001; Reicher & Hopkins, 2000; Schildkraut, 2007). This ambiguity suggests that passing is perhaps more feasible, implied by different social identity markers such as name, appearance, accent and behavior. Moreover, in such contexts, the existence of in-between group members (e.g., binational or bicultural individuals), that is, those who straddle the ingroup identity and outgroup identity simultaneously, raises important theoretical questions about group membership. Studying responses to the passing of in-between group members in the ingroup may shed light on how group members define their group boundaries and membership in their group.

Second, in some impostor studies, the target was described as someone who claims, for example, to be homosexual despite having heterosexual relations. Despite the window that such a research setup allows into the responses people give to others who are intentionally masquerading their identity, this setup overlooks situations in which the target makes no claims about membership. As noted earlier, passing is perhaps more often achieved when some prototypical social markers give the impression that one is an ingroup member (e.g., *accent*, Dragojevic et al., 2015; Piller, 2002; Rakić et al., 2011; *names*, Bursell, 2013; Klink & Wagner, 1999; *behavior*, Renfrow, 2004), and when identity is conferred on the target by others rather than explicitly claimed by the target themselves (Barreto & Ellemers, 2003). Again, in these more subtle settings where identity membership is not explicitly declared, it is important to examine the multiple and subtle reactions that people might display to non-intentional passing.

To summarize, taking social identity approach, passing can elicit an identity threat to the group because it poses a challenge to the viability of distinguishing between those who qualify as "real" ingroup members and those who do not. In addition to the violation of intergroup distinctiveness, passing is likely to be perceived as threatening when the passer attempts to challenge the group in ways that are perceived to be harmful, such as criticizing the group. Passers might then come to be seen by the receiving group as trying to camouflage their "real" identity to harm the group. The accusation of impostorship is a likely consequence of this. On the other hand, passers who affirm group norms are not likely to be perceived as impostors as they do not seem to intend to harm the group and thus fear of them camouflaging their identity to harm the group is not relevant. Therefore, the attribution of

impostorism is a possible consequence of passing, dependent on how the target's behavior is judged by the ingroup subject.

Before laying out the studies conducted in this chapter, it is important to note that this chapter was mainly concerned with passers who belong to in-between groups. Again, these are individuals who straddle the identity of the ingroup but also the outgroup and are thus situated at the overlap between these identities, such as, Turkish-Germans or Palestinian-Israelis. In the studies reported below, we studied the reactions of dominant group members to in-between group members who belong to the majority group and the minority group. In focusing on passing that happens in everyday interactions between majority and minority groups, we shed light on the negotiation of group boundaries and the inclusion of minority groups within the national identity. Across this chapter, we may have used the term outgroup passers to refer to passing in-between group members. That is not to say that these members are objectively not members of the majority but rather to refer to how they are might be perceived by majority group members.

3.1.3. Overview of the studies in this chapter

In the current chapter, we examined conditions under which passing comes to be perceived as threatening to the receiving group. To begin with, in Study 1, we examined the relationship between passing and intergroup distinctiveness threat. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that passing is particularly threatening to the group when intergroup boundaries are less clear, and the distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup is blurred. In this study, German participants evaluated a passing Turkish target who passed via changing his name from a Turkish to a German name. Studies 2 and 3 that were also conducted in Germany examined our second assumption that passing can be perceived as threatening when the passer attempts to challenge ingroup convections. To manipulate this potential harm, the passing target expressed criticism against Germans. To generalize our findings to other social and political contexts, Study 4 was conducted among Jewish-Israeli participants who evaluated a passing Palestinian-Israeli citizen. Passing here occurred through unaccent-Hebrew speech, and potential harm to the group was manipulated through expressions of disloyalty to the ingroup. Here too, we expected that a passing Palestinian-Israeli would be perceived as more threatening to the Jewish majority when they undermine loyalty to Israel. Finally, in Studies 5 and 6, we employed assimilation as a form of passing in the context of German-Turkish relations. We tested the hypothesis that an assimilated target who violates

ingroup norms would be perceived more negatively than a non-assimilated deviant. Identification with the group was taken as a core variable and used across our analyses as a moderator.

3.2. Study 1

The current study aimed to examine reactions to an outgroup member who passes into the ingroup and the role of intergroup distinctiveness plays in these reactions. In this study, we used the target's name to manipulate passing as a national (i.e., German) ingroup member. Names of others around us are indispensable cues for social categorization and performing a national identity (e.g., Wallem, 2017). Names have also been commonly employed for research on name-based discrimination, showing that perceivers attend to names when evaluating others because of their assumed group membership (e.g., Carpusor & Loges, 2006; Klink & Wagner, 1999). In this study, German participants evaluated a Turkish immigrant who changed his name from Turkish to German. Note, this target does not make claims about being German but presents himself in a way that might lead others to assume he is German, but not Turkish-German.

To fully understand the extent to which passing is influenced by the intergroup distinctiveness motive, name change was crossed with manipulating intergroup distinctiveness. This involved reading a bogus scientific finding that was about the similarities or differences between Germans and Turkish-Germans. When intergroup similarities are highlighted, distinctiveness between groups is threatened. Following our theorizing that passing blurs the intergroup boundaries, we expected that an immigrant who changed his name would be treated more harshly than an immigrant who did not change his name (i.e., who was "authentic"). We expected that these reactions would be particularly amplified when intergroup distinctiveness is threatened, and that these effects would be most pronounced among participants who identified highly with their German nationality.

3.2.1. Method

Participants

A total of 707 participants were recruited for this study at the Friedrich Schiller University and the Applied Science University in Jena. We excluded 43 participants prior to

the analysis for spending less than fifteen years in Germany or having a migration background outside the EU and 12 additional participants who failed the manipulation check (reported below). The total sample in the study was 652, of which 397 were female, 245 were male, 7 participants self-identified as other, and three did not report their gender. Participants' age (M = 22.11, SD = 3.69; five participants did not report their age) ranged between 18 and 59. A sensitivity analysis (using G*power; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that the final sample size provides a power of 1- β = .80 and α = .05 to detect an effect size as small as f^2 = .017.

Materials and procedure

Participants were told that the study was about examining the perception of different personality types. After signing a consent form, participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (name change: yes vs no) X 2 (intergroup distinctiveness: high vs low) between-subjects design. Participants first reported their identification with being German before being exposed to the manipulations. To minimize the potential effect of priming national identity via national identification, participants were given a filler task in which they had to answer random questions about their usual day-night time planning. Participants then read the intergroup distinctiveness manipulation, followed by manipulation-check questions and a self-stereotyping scale intended to measure identity-related reactions to distinctiveness threat caused by the manipulation. Afterwards, they read about the Turkish-German target that was followed by questions about and behavioral intentions towards the target. Finally, participants were rewarded with a chocolate bar and were debriefed about the manipulations and the study's goal.

Manipulation of Intergroup distinctiveness. This manipulation was adapted from Jetten et al. (2005). Participants were led to believe that the study also included a reading comprehension task for which they would need to read a short extract from an academic study article and answer questions about it. The extract described a study that was ostensibly conducted at the University of Jena and which examined endorsement of specific values, such as family, success and career, among Germans and Turkish-Germans. In the low intergroup distinctiveness condition, the result of the study showed Germans and Turkish-German were very similar in their attachment to these values. In the high intergroup distinctiveness condition, the study reported that the two groups differed in their attachment to the values. To visualize the results, we provided participants with a graph that described a high similarity

with an overlap between the distributions of the two groups (i.e., low condition) or a distinct difference between them (i.e., high condition).

Name change manipulation. Participants read about the Turkish target who was "22 years old, finished high school and went to study at a German university. His mother tongue was German, and he has Turkish origins and his family came to Germany in the 70s". In the name change condition, participants were told that the target had changed his name from Mehmet (a Turkish name) to Michael (a German name) without violating any legal norms:

> "*When Michael was born, he was called Mehmet. Yet when Michael grew up, he decided to change his name to Michael. Since then, every time he meets new people, he introduces himself as Michael. He never reveals his original name to anyone unless he needs to, for example, when he meets official authority personnel. At work, everyone knows him as Michael. However, his boss knows his original name, and all his official documents are associated with his official name (Mehmet)*".

In the control (authentic) condition, this information was omitted from Mehmet's profile. See Appendix B for the entire study materials.

Measurements

All measures were Likert-scales anchored from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much* unless we indicated otherwise. Additional measures used for exploratory purposes can be found together with the rest of the questionnaire used in this study in Appendix B.

Manipulation check of intergroup distinctiveness. Three questions were asked about the similarity between Germans and Turkish-Germans (e.g., "Turkish-Germans and Germans are very similar in their attachment to these values"). Participants in the high intergroup distinctiveness condition reported that German and Turkish-Germans were less similar (M = 2.67, SD = 1.32) than in the low intergroup distinctiveness condition (M = 4.42, SD = 1.12), $t(636.86) = 18.11$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.42$. We used three items that constitute the *self-stereotyping and prototypicality* component of group identification to test the intergroup distinctiveness manipulation (i.e., "I have many things in common with a typical German", "I resemble a typical German very much" and "I am a typical German"; adapted from Leach et al., 2008; Spears et al., 1997; $\alpha = .92$).

Manipulation check of the name change. To avoid confusion, only participants in the condition in which the target changed their name were asked to indicate whether the target

changed his name or not. Twelve participants did not pass this manipulation check and were excluded before the analysis.

Group identification. A German validated version (Roth & Mazziotta, 2015) of the 14 item-scale created by Leach et al. (2008) was used in this study: "The fact that I am German is an important part of my identity" (α = .93).

Friendly intentions before. Before reading about the name change, a three items scale was used to assess friendly intentions towards the target (i.e., "I would like to meet Michael", "Michael is someone I'm likely to be friends with", and "I like Michael's character"; items were adapted from Hornsey et al., (2002) and Warner et al., (2007); α = .89).

Friendly intentions after. After participants read about the name change, a 3 item scale was used to assess friendly intentions towards the target. To avoid pressures towards consistency, we used items that were similar to the previous measure but differently phrased: "I like Michael", "I want to be friends with Michael", and "Michael leaves a positive impression on me" (α = .85).

Personality evaluation. Participants were then asked the extent to which they disagreed or agreed that 12 traits (adapted from Hornsey et al., 2002) described the target: intelligent, trustworthy, friendly, open-minded, likeable, nice, respected, interesting, deceitful (reversed), devious (reversed), lying (reversed) and truthful (α = .92).

Negative affect. Participants indicated the extent to which they felt a range of emotions about the target "annoyed, irritated, offended, contempt, disgust, antipathy, anxiety, disgusted" (α = .80); these were adapted from the scale used by Hornsey & Jetten (2003).

Damage. Eight items adapted from Hornsey and Jetten (2003) and Werner et al. (2007) measured the extent to which participants felt that the target causes damage to Germans (e.g., "People like Michael give other Germans a bad name", "People like Michael are bad for Germany") α = .96.

Impostorship. Participants rated the extent to which "Michael pretends to be someone who is not", "people like Michael are impostors" (was adapted from Hornsey and Jetten, 2003), (r = .61, p < .001).

The inability to identify real Germans. We used a one-item measure: "people like Michael make it difficult to identify real Germans".

Categorizing the target. Two items were used to measure the extent to which participants would be able to identify the target's ethnic background in case they would meet him "had I met Michael, I would not be able to tell if he is Turkish or German", "had I met Michael, I would not be sure of his background" ($r = .43$, $p < .001$).

Demographic questions. Finally, participants answered demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, country of birth).

3.2.2. Results

Unless otherwise indicated, the results were analyzed using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013; Model 3) to test the main and interactive effects of the manipulated variables and the measure of identification on the dependent variables. Identification was mean-centered prior to analysis, and manipulated factors were coded as -1 (target did not change his name; high intergroup distinctiveness) and 1 (target changed his name; low intergroup distinctiveness).

Manipulation checks

Consistent with our hypothesis that when intergroup distinctiveness is undermined, group members would attempt to restore it by perceiving themselves as typical group members, there was a main effect of the distinctiveness manipulation on participant's self-stereotyping, $B = .26$, $SE = .07$, $t = 3.45$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.11, .41]. Participants exposed to a distinctiveness threat (high intergroup similarity) stereotyped themselves as more prototypically German. There was also a main effect of identification on self-stereotyping, $B = .82$, $SE = .03$, $t = 23.96$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.75, .89]. Participants in the low intergroup distinctiveness condition felt more typically German than in the high intergroup distinctiveness condition. Also, the more participants identified as Germans, the more they self-stereotyped themselves as such. There was no significant interaction between the manipulation and identification, $B = -.04$, $p = .49$. This indicates that our distinctiveness manipulation was successful.

Dependent variables

As expected, after participants were exposed to name change manipulation, they showed less friendly intentions, $t(326) = 3.18$, $p < .01$, $d = 0.17$ towards the target ($M = 4.59$, $SD = 1.01$) than before ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.11$).

As can be seen in Table 3, participants in the name change condition, although marginally significant, showed less friendly intentions towards and attributed less positive personality traits to the target than in the authentic condition. They also significantly felt more negative emotions, were more inclined to perceive the target as an impostor and felt less confident about categorizing him as German or Turkish than in the authentic condition. Intergroup distinctiveness did not have significant main effects on any of the dependent variables.

Table 3.

Main effect of name change on the dependent variables in Study 1

	B	*SE*	*t*	*p*	*CI*
Friendly intentions after	-.13	.07	-1.73	.083	[-.28, .01]
Personality evaluation	-.12	.06	-1.90	.058	[-.26, .004]
Negative affect	.33	.08	4.10	<.001	[.17, .48]
Impostorship	.71	.08	8.32	<.001	[.54, .88]
Categorizing the target	.24	.11	2.07	.038	[.01, .47]
Damage	.06	.05	1.21	.224	[-.04, .17]
The inability to identify real Germans	.07	.12	0.62	.534	[-.16, .31]

Note. Name change was coded as: no name change = -1 and name change = 1. Higher numbers indicate more endorsement of each construct on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = strongly *agree*).

Identification was marginally positively associated with more negative affect, $B = .07$, $SE = .03$, $t = 1.88$, $p = .060$, 95% CI [-.003, .143], significantly associated with more perceived damage, $B = .09$, $SE = .02$, $t = 3.28$, $p = .001$, 95% CI [.03, .14] and feeling less able to identify real Germans, $B = .14$, $SE = .05$, $t = 2.63$, $p = .008$, 95% CI [.03, .24]. There was an interaction between identification and name change on friendly intentions, $B = .23$, $SE = .07$, $t = 3.27$, $p = .001$, 95% CI [.09, .37], personality evaluation, $B = .16$, $SE = .05$, $t =$

2.81, p = .005, 95% CI [.05, .28]. Simple slope analysis (using Jamovi to probe these interactions; Jamovie project; https://www.jamovi.org/) revealed, in the name-changed condition, identification was associated with more friendly intentions, B = .10, SE = .04, t = 2.62, p < .001, 95% CI [.03, .19] and attribution of positive traits, B = .15, SE = .05, t = 3.35, p < .001, 95% CI [.07, .25] towards the target but not in the authentic condition: friendly intentions, B = -.07, p = .134; personality evaluation, B = -.06, p = .178.

Three-way interaction

An interaction between name change and identification was found on the inability to identify real Germans, B = .22, SE = .10, t = 2.06, p = .039, 95% CI [.01, .43]. Three-way interaction between name change, identification and distinctiveness was found on impostorship, B = .31, SE = .15, t = 1.96, p = .049, 95% CI [.00001, .62], r^2 = .006, and marginally significant interaction on the inability to identify real Germans, B = .42, SE = .21, t = 1.95, p = .051, 95% CI [-.002, .846], r^2 = .006. Simple-slopes analysis revealed that, as illustrated in Figure 2, in the low distinctiveness condition, the higher participants identified with being German, the more they perceived the name-changed target as an impostor, B = .19, SE = .08, t = 2.36, p = .018, 95% CI [.03, .35] and the more they felt it was difficult to identify real Germans, B = .31, SE = .11, t = 2.65, p = .008, 95% CI [.08, .54], but not in the authentic condition, $B_{impostorship}$ = .003, p = .970; $B_{identifying\ real\ Germans}$ = -.12, p = .248. In the high distinctiveness condition, interactions between identification and name change were not significant; $B_{impostorship}$ = -.11, p = .294; $B_{identifying\ real\ Germans}$ = .01, p = .935.

Figure 2.

Interaction between name change, intergroup distinctiveness and identification on the inability to identify real Germans and impostorship in Study 1



Note. The dependent variables were measured on a Likert scale with 1 - *not at all* to 7 - *very much*. Points are displayed at -1 *SD* and +1 *SD* the mean of identification with Germany. Error bars represent standard errors.

3.2.3. Discussion

Study 1 lays the ground for a new phenomenon: Passing in-between group members, such as immigrants who adjust certain visible features of their identity to those relevant to hosting society's group membership can be met with suspicion by ingroup hosting members. We found that a passing immigrant mainly aroused negative emotions, confusion about categorizing him as an ingroup (versus outgroup) member and accusation of being an impostor. However, we found that high identifiers expressed more friendly intentions and attributed more positive traits to the passing outgroup member than low identifiers. This may suggest that among high identifiers, passing was not necessarily seen as a negative act.

Our hypothesis that intergroup distinctiveness would moderate the reactions to a passing immigrant was not fully confirmed for all the dependent measures. Yet it affected the degree to which such targets were perceived as impostors and the degree to which identifying "real" (German) ingroup members was perceived to be more challenging. This was true only for high identifiers, which confirmed that these reactions are identity-based and grounded in intergroup relations. This suggests that when intergroup distinctiveness is threatened, highly identifying group members become sensitive to issues related to identifying or detecting "real" ingroup members.

Taken together, these findings suggest that among high identifiers, passing was met with rather general positive evaluations. It could be that passing signals to high identifiers that the target is an integrated immigrant by taking on a German name, thus being positively evaluated. However, when intergroup distinctiveness was undermined, questions around the "real" identity of the target became an issue for high identifiers. Nevertheless, passing here did not elicit threats related to damaging the group from within. This goes in line with our theorizing that passers are not necessarily perceived as harming the group just because they pass. Therefore, the question that remains unanswered is under which conditions a passer comes to be perceived as a Trojan horse and thus threaten to harm the group from within beyond posing a threat to the ability to detect who is a real ingroup member who is not.

3.3. Study 2

The previous study established that outgroup members can be perceived as impostors when they pass as ingroup members and when intergroup distinctiveness is simultaneously undermined. Study 1 also showed that passing as such is not necessarily perceived as causing harm to the group. In a second study, we tested our previously laid out argument that passing might be especially perceived as harmful to the group when it is associated with a potential damage the passer might inflect on the group from within.

In this study, we manipulated passing as in Study 1. We used a profile description that depicted a Turkish-German immigrant who changed his name to a German name (or did not do this in the comparison condition). To induce potential damage, participants also read a critical comment made by the target about Germans. We expected that participants would perceive the passing target more as an impostor than the authentic target but also as damaging to Germans and their reputation. We also expected that participants whose group (i.e.,

German) identity is a central part of who they are (i.e., high identifiers) would react more negatively towards the target than those who identify less strongly as German. As stated in the introduction, one of our contentions is that negative perceptions of passing stems from the fear of negative influence by outsiders who are veiled by their ability to look like insiders. We, therefore, expected that perceiving the target as an impostor would mediate the damage they are perceived to cause - the core belief is thus that the passer is not a real ingroup member.

3.3.1. Method

Participants

Participants 411 were recruited for this study at the Friedrich Schiller University and the Applied Science University in Jena. Thirty-nine participants were excluded prior to the analysis for spending less than 15 years in Germany or having a migration background from outside the EU and nine others because of failing the manipulation check (reported below). The total sample in the study was 363, of which 206 were female, 155 were male, 1 participant self-categorized as other, and one did not report their gender. Participants age (M = 22.96, SD = 4.17) ranged between 18 and 48. A sensitivity analysis (using G*power; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that the final sample size provides a power of 1- β = .80 and α = .05 to detect effect sizes as small as f^2 = .030.

Materials and procedure

Participants received instructions similar to those in the previous study. After signing a consent sheet, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. They read about a Turkish-German target who was described as either having changed his name to a German name (Michael) or having not done this (Mehmet). The target's background profile was similar to the one used in Study 1. Similar to that study, these conditions were compared to a control condition in which no additional information was provided about Mehmet's name.

After reading about the target, participants read a statement from the target about Germans. The statement was framed to describe a situation in which the target would be sometimes asked about living in Germany by international students that he assists at

university where he works as their tutor. The target's response was adapted from a similar script used in ingroup criticism literature (see Hornsey et al., 2002):

> "*When I think of us Germans, I think of us as being fairly unfriendly and condescending people. I also believe that we are generally a very undiplomatic society. However, a characteristic, which I noticed most about us, is that overall we seem to have a very bad sense of humor*".

The content of this critical statement was pre-tested among participants from the same student population[1]. Throughout the questionnaire, participants answered questions tapping their impressions of the target and their behavioral intentions towards him (described below). Participants were thanked, debriefed and rewarded with a chocolate bar.

Measurements

All measures were Likert-scales anchored from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much* unless we indicated otherwise.

Manipulation check 1. After reading the target's biography, but before reading his criticism, participants were asked to indicate whether the target changed his name with a "yes" or "no" answer. Nine participants (one of which was a missing value) did not pass this manipulation check and were excluded prior to the analyses.

Manipulation check 2. After reading the target's criticism, participants were asked to indicate how positive they thought Michael's statement was about Germans. Overall, participants in both conditions found the statement to be negative and under the scale's midpoint ($M = 2.27$, $SD = 1.24$). This was not affected by the name change manipulation either, $t(360) = 1.17$, $p = .24$.

[1] Thirty-nine students from the University of Jena rated the extent to which they find 45 statements about Germans as 1-*very negative* and 7-*very positive* on a Likert-scale. Students who indicated that they had a migration background were excluded prior to the analysis ($N = 8$). Participants' age ($M = 22.03$, $SD = 3.44$) ranged between 18 and 31 years including 14 men and 17 women. Four negative and four positive statements which were rated one standard deviation below or above the mean respectively were chosen for manipulating the comment valence. Selected negative items were Germans are unfriendly ($M = 2.35$), condescending ($M = 2.13$), undiplomatic ($M = 2.06$) and have a bad sense of humour ($M = 2.65$). Selected positive items were used later in Study 3 and included Germans are sincere ($M = 5.61$), trustworthy ($M = 5.65$), educated ($M = 6.03$) and very hard working people ($M = 5.94$)st

After reading the target's profile description, participants completed the following scales, which were also used in Study 1: *friendly intentions before* reading about the name change (α = .87), *friendly intentions after* reading about it (α = .92), *personality evaluation* (α = .89), *damage* (α = .90), *group identification* (α = .93). In this study, the measure of *negative affect* included only five items, "annoyed, irritated, offended, contempt and disgust" (α = .80), and *impostorship* comprised only two items, "Michael pretends to be someone who is not", "people like Michael are impostors" (r = .72, p < .001).

Constructiveness of the comment. After reading the target's critics, participants were asked to indicate on a 7 item scale (adapted version of Hornsey et al., 2002), the extent to which they felt that the comment was fair, constructive, that the speaker cares about Germany, that his comments were made in Germany's best interest, that his comments were well-informed, that the speaker had the right to make these comments and was qualified to make these comments (α = .84).

Demographic questions Finally, participants answered demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, country of birth). All materials and additional measurements used in this study can be found in Appendix B.

3.3.2. Results

Effect of target's criticism

Participants showed less friendly intentions (M = 4.23, SD = 1.23) towards the target after reading his criticism than before (M = 4.81, SD = 1.08), t(362) = 10.71, p < .001, d = 0.57.

Dependent measures

Means and standard deviations of the name change and the authentic condition are described in Table 4. Analyses were conducted using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013; Model 1) to analyze the main effect of the manipulation and the interaction with identification with Germans. Experimental conditions in the study were coded as -1 (target did not change his name) and 1 (target changed his name), and identification was mean-centered prior to analysis.

Marginally significant effects of the name change were apparent on friendly intentions before reading the criticism, B = -.20, SE = .12, t = -1.75, p = .081, 95% CI [-.43,

.02], after reading the critic, B = -.23, SE = .13, t = -1.77, p = .078, 95% CI [-.48, .02]. Significant main effects of this variable were revealed on personality evaluation, B = -.29, SE = .09, t = -3.05, p = .002, 95% CI [-.48, -.10], negative affect, B = .25, SE = .11, t = 2.22, p = .027, 95% CI [.03, .47], impostorship, B = .64, SE = .09, t = 6.57, p < .001, 95% CI [.45, .84], constructiveness, B = -.39, SE = .11, t = -3.32, p = .001, 95% CI [-.62, -.16] and damage, B = .24, SE = .12, t = 2.04, p = .042, 95% CI [.00, .47]. As expected, participants in the name change condition showed slightly less friendly intentions before and after reading the target's criticism, attributed less positive personality traits to the target, and expressed more negative affect compared to participants in the authentic condition. Participants also perceived the name-changing target as more impostor and found his statement as less constructive and more damaging to Germans than the authentic target.

Identification was also associated with less friendly intentions measured at Time 2, B = -.19, SE = .06, t = -3.01, p = .003, 95% CI [-.32, -.06], more negative affect, B = .26, SE = .05, t = 4.72, p < .001, 95% CI [.15, .37], greater perceived impostorship, B = .22, SE = .04, t = 4.86, p < .001, 95% CI [.13, .32], less perceived constructiveness of the criticism, B = -.15, SE = .05, t = -2.66, p = .008, 95% CI [-.26, -.04] and more perceived damage to Germans, B = .30, SE = .06, t = 4.92, p < .001, 95% CI [.18, .42].

The moderating role of identification

These main effects, however, were qualified by significant interactions between the name change manipulation and identification on personality evaluation, B = .17, SE = .09, t = 1.97, p = .049, 95% CI [.0003, .3562], r^2 = .012, constructiveness, B = .24 SE = .11, t = 2.07, p = .038, 95% CI [.01, 46], r^2 = .015 and marginally so on negative affect, B = -.21 SE = .11, t = -1.88, p = .060, 95% CI [-.431, .009], r^2 = .012. Contrary to our expectations, simple slope analysis revealed that identification moderated the effect of the manipulation, however only in the authentic condition and not in the name change condition: The more participants identified as German, the less they attributed positive personality traits to the authentic target (but not the name-changing target) and the less constructive they perceived his comments; $B_{personality\ evaluation}$ = -.15, SE = .06, t = -2.33, p = .021, 95% CI [-.27, -.02] and $B_{constructiveness}$ = -.27, SE = .08, t = -3.35, p < .001, 95% CI [-.43, -.11]. With respect to negative affect, identification in the name change condition positively predicted negative affect, B = .16 SE = .08, t = 2.10, p = .036, 95% CI [.01, .30], yet this relationship was also stronger in the authentic condition, B = .37 SE = .08, t = 4.48, p < .001, 95% CI [.20, .53]. Thus, although

reactions to the name-changing target were overall less positive, identification moderated target's evaluations more strongly in the authentic condition than the name change condition.

Table 4.

Means and standard deviations as a function of name change in Study 2

	Authentic		Name change					
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*df*	*t*	*p*	Cohen's *d*
Friendly intentions after	4.32	1.27	4.13	1.20	361	1.67	.153	0.15
Personality evaluation	5.30	0.89	5.01	0.92	361	2.96	.003	0.32
Negative affect	2.12	1.12	2.32	1.11	361	1.66	.097	0.17
Impostorship	1.38	0.67	1.97	1.17	290.33	5.92	< .001	0.62
Constructiveness	4.53	1.13	4.17	1.12	360	3.03	.003	0.32
Damage	2.10	1.15	2.27	1.17	361	1.43	.153	0.14

Note: Higher numbers indicate more endorsement of each construct on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = strongly *agree*).

The role of impostorship as a mediator

To test the hypothesis that negative reactions towards the target who changed his name were mediated through perceiving him as an impostor, we conducted a mediation analysis using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013; Model 4) and bootstrapping (5000) with perceived impostorship as a mediator. The results of this analysis showed that the name change manipulation (vs control) increased participants' perceptions of the target as an impostor, B = .59, SE = .10, t = 5.94, p < .001, 95% CI [.40, .79], and that perceived impostorship in turn increased negative affect towards the target, B = .43, SE = .06, t = 7.05, p < .001, 95% CI [.31, .54]. The marginally significant total effect of the experimental conditions on negative

affect, B = .19, SE = .11, t = 1.65, p = .099, 95% CI [-.03, .42], was reduced after impostorship was included in the model, B = -.06, SE = .11, t = -0.54, p = .588, 95% CI [-.28, .16]. The indirect effect of name change on negative effect through impostorship was significant, B = .25, SE = .05, 95% CI [.16, .37].

3.3.3. Discussion

The results of Study 2 confirmed that group members resent passing outgroup members when ingroup criticism is present. We replicated our findings from Study 1 by showing that host society members perceive passing immigrants as impostors more than authentically presented immigrants. We also showed that when passing is combined with criticism of the host society, members of the criticized group reveal sensitivity toward potential damage to their group associated with passing.

Our hypothesis however that identification with Germans would moderate the rejection of passing immigrants was not supported. We predicted that higher identifiers would be more reactive to passing than lower identifiers, given that we conceptualize passing as a form of social identity threat that occurs in an intergroup context (as demonstrated in Study 1). In fact, we found that identification predicted more negative evaluations of the target in the authentic condition, whereas evaluations in the passing condition (i.e., name change), though more negative overall, were less strongly related to identification.

One reason for the lack of support for this aspect of the hypothesis might be our design's inability to isolate the effects of criticism from those of passing. Suppose we construe passing as a potential identity threat that is amplified by other intergroup processes, such as concerns around the distinctiveness of one's group (Study 1) or its integrity (e.g., as questioned by criticism). In that case, it is important to fully explore the contextual conditions that surround evaluations of those who pass versus those who do not. Along similar lines, Study 2 further lacks the comparison to ingroup members who air the same critical views. Thus, though the results of this study again suggest that members of the receiving group are sensitive to passing and see this is as potentially damaging, the exact identity-based considerations that shape these reactions remain to be specified.

3.4. Study 3

Our theoretical argument, outlined in the Introduction, centers around the harm-related potential of passing into the dominant group. In developing this idea, we argued that members of the group should be concerned about potential "contamination" of their identity by those who they perceive to be outsiders, and that their undetectable presence might undermine their own group from within – for example in the manner of a "fifth column" or a Trojan horse.

If this reasoning is correct, group members should react only to "passing behaviors" from outgroup members, but not to similar behavior expressed by an ingroup member. Thus, we predict that a behavior such as a name change will trigger reactions to passing only when it is acted by an outgroup member because it implies crossing the group's boundaries. When an ingroup member behaves in a similar way and changes their name to another typical ingroup name, this should not induce concerns about group boundaries being threatened by the outside group because this action is carried on within the boundaries of the group. To test this argument, it would thus be critical to compare the same behavior with that acted by an ingroup member.

In Study 2, we measured the reactions of group members to a passer who criticized the group. The criticism was manipulated to elicit potential damage to the group and attempts to transform the group from within that may theoretically be associate with passing. However, to establish that indeed criticism elicits this concern and to rule out possible confounders related to the statement, in Study 3, criticism was compared to praise of the ingroup.

Thus, our next study fully crossed the name change manipulation (yes vs no change) with the target's group membership (Turkish-German vs German target) and the criticism he expressed (positive vs negative). Concretely, we compared a passing name-changed outgroup to a name-changed ingroup member who expressed either criticism or praise of the ingroup (Germans). We expected that the differences we have repeatedly observed between passing and authentic outgroup members would amplify in the context of criticism but would attenuate in the context of praise, or when an ingroup target behaved the same way (i.e., changing his name) independent of the valence of his commentary on the national ingroup.

Here too, we expected that identification would moderate these differences such that high identifiers would be more reactive than low identifiers.

3.4.1. Method

Participant

Participants were 554 students from the University of Applied Sciences in Jena, of which 273 men and 272 women (three defined their gender as "other") whose age ranged between 18 to 50 years (M = 23.00, SD = 3.93). A sensitivity analysis (using G*power; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that this final sample size provides power of 1-β = .80 and α = .05 to detect effect sizes as small as f^2 = .02. This sample included 55 participants who had a migration background outside the EU and participants who lived in Germany for less than 15 years. We did not exclude them from the analysis to enable enough power to detect complex interactions. However, analysis excluding these participants revealed a similar pattern of results.

Materials and Procedure

Participants received similar instructions as in Study 1 and 2, and filled a short questionnaire on a sheet of paper and received a piece of chocolate after completing the study. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the eight cells of a 2 (target's ethnicity: German vs Turkish) X 2 (name change: no vs yes) X 2 (comment valence: positive vs negative) between-subjects design.

Manipulation of the target's ethnicity. Participants were asked to read a brief profile description of a target which was identical to the description in Study 1, with the alteration being that they either read about a person whose "family has a German heritage" ("Michael", the German target) or whose "family has Turkish origins and his family came to Germany in the 70s" ("Mehmet", the Turkish target).

Name change manipulation. The manipulation was similar to the one in Study 1. In the German target condition, participants were told that the target changed his name from Johannes to Michael and whereas in the Turkish target condition, the target changed his name from Mehmet to Michael. In the control condition, nothing additional to the target's profile description was mentioned (i.e., there was no name change).

Manipulation of the comment valence. Participants were told that the target was sometimes asked by international students at his university about life in Germany, "what do you think about Germans?". In the positive comment condition, the target answered:

> "*When I think of us Germans, I think of us as being fairly sincere and trustworthy people. I also believe that we are generally a very educated society. However, a characteristic, which I noticed most about us, is that overall we seem to be very hardworking people*".

The negative comment condition was similar to study 1:

> "*When I think of us Germans, I think of us as being fairly unfriendly and condescending people. I also believe that we are generally a very undiplomatic society. However, a characteristic, which I noticed most about us, is that overall we seem to have a very bad sense of humour*".

In all conditions, the target used an inclusive group language (i.e., "we"). We pre-tested the dimensions of praise and criticism among participants drawn from a similar population (see details in Study 2, and in Appendix B for the pre-tested items).

Measurements

All measures were Likert-scales anchored from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much* unless we indicated otherwise.

Manipulation check 1. After reading the target's biography but before reading the criticism, participants were asked to indicate whether the target changed his name with a "yes" or "no" answer. Forty-five participants did not answer this question correctly which might have been confounded with whether the target formally or informally changed it. Excluding these from the analysis did not change the patterns of the results. Therefore, we did not exclude them from the analyses reported below.

Manipulation check 2. After reading the target's criticism, participants were asked to indicate the positivity of the comment "How positive do you think Michael's statement was about Germans?" from 1 = *not all positive* to 7 = *very positive.* We also asked participants about the *Constructiveness of the comment* ($\alpha = .88$) which was used in Study 2. Consistent with our expectations, the positive comments were perceived as more positively ($M = 5.58$, $SD = 1.61$ versus $M = 2.58$, $SD = 2.00$; $t(552) = 22.47$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.91$) as well as more

constructive (M = 4.93, SD = 1.17 versus M = 4.00, SD = 1.19; $t(551) = 9.29$, $p < .001$, d = 0.79) than the negative comments.

Participants were asked to complete a number of scales to assess their impressions of the target and their comments. These were similar to the scales used in Study 1: *friendly intentions before* reading the targets comments (α = .86), *friendly intentions after* reading the comments (α = .91), followed by a *personality evaluation* (α = .91), *negative affect* (which used only 3 items, "annoyed, irritated and offended"; α = .73), *damage* (α = .93), *impostorship* (α = .79), *group identification* (α = .93).

Demographic questions Finally, participants answered demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, country of birth). Additional scales that were added for exploratory purposes and the full materials used in this study can be found in Appendix B.

3.4.2. Results

Dependent variables

Unless otherwise indicated, the results were analyzed using Jamovi software (Jamovie project; https://www.jamovi.org/) to test the main and interactive effects of the manipulated variables and the measure of identification on the dependent variables. Identification was mean-centered prior to analysis, and manipulated factors were coded as: -1 = German target, 1 = Turkish target; -1 = no name change, 1 = name changed; -1 = positive comment, 1 = negative comment. Participants age was added as a covariate in the analysis because it correlated with the dependent variables. To probe significant four-way interactions, we split the data into positive and negative conditions and analyzed the interactions between the target's ethnicity, name change and identification.

Before reading the target's comments, participants showed overall more friendly intentions towards the Turkish target than the German target, B = .45, SE = .09, t = 4.91, $p <$ .001, 95% CI [.28, .64]. Participants also showed less friendly intentions towards the target who changed his name than the authentic target, B = -.42, SE = .09, t = -4.51, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.60, -.23].

Friendly intentions gap. To measure the influence of the comments on friendly intentions, we calculated a difference score between friendly intentions after and before reading the target's message by subtracting the former from the latter. Positive values

indicate more friendly intention after reading the comment, and negative values indicate the opposite. Analysis showed that participants expressed less friendly intentions towards the target after expressing negative comments than after expressing positive comments about Germans, B = -.92, SE = .14, t = -6.71, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.19, -.65] and slightly less friendly intentions towards the name-changed target than the authentic target, B = .28, SE = .14, t = 2.07, p = .040, 95% CI [.01, .55].

All main effects of the manipulated variable are reported in Table 5. There was a main effect for the target's ethnicity. Participants attributed more positive personality traits to the Turkish target, perceived him as less damaging to Germany and as less of an impostor than the German target. Participants also attributed less positive personality traits to name-changed target, had more negative affect towards him and perceived him as more impostor than the target who did not change his name. Main effects of comment valence were also found such that a target who expressed criticism of Germans was attributed with less positive traits, aroused more negative affect and was perceived as more damaging to the ingroup than a target who praised Germans.

Identification with the German ingroup was associated with more negative affect, B = .19, SE = .05, t = 3.08, p = .002, 95% CI [.05, .23], perceiving the target as an impostor, B = .27, SE = .05, t = 4.35, p < .001, 95% CI [.12, .32] and as more perceived damage, B = .21, SE = .04, t = 5.08, p < .001, 95% CI [.12, .29]. Additionally, we found an interaction between comment valence and identification on all dependent variables: positive evaluation: B = -.19, SE = .06, t = -2.94, p = .003, 95% CI [-.31, -.06]; negative affect: B = .62, SE = .09, t = 6.98, p < .001, 95% CI [.44, .80]; damage: B = .40, SE = .08, t = 4.94, p < .001, 95% CI [.24, .56]; impostoship: B = .36, SE = .10, t = 3.52, p < .001, 95% CI [.16, .56]. In the positive condition, the more participants identified as German the more the target was attributed positive traits to, B = .32, SE = .10, t = 3.00, p = .003, 95% CI [.11, .53] and the less participants had negative emotions towards him, B = -.17, SE = .07, t = -2.66, p = .008, 95% CI [-.30, -.05]. In the negative comment condition, identification was associated with more negative affect, B = .45, SE = .06, t = 7.15, p < .001, 95% CI [.32, .58], more perceived damage, B = .41, SE = .06, t = 7.19, p < .001, 95% CI [.30, .52] and with more impostorship accusations, B = .40, SE = .07, t = 5.66, p < .001, 95% CI [.26, .54].

There was also an interaction between identification and the target's ethnicity on negative affect, B = .20, SE = .09, t = 2.18, p = .030, 95% CI [.02, .38]. The more participants

identified with the ingroup, the more negatively they felt about the Turkish (but not the German) target, $B = .24$, $SE = .07$, $t = 3.63$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.11, .37].

Four-way interactions

An interaction between the identification and comment valence, $B = .40$, $SE = .08$, $t = 4.94$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.24, .56], an interaction between identification, speaker's ethnicity and comment valence, $B = -.46$, $SE = .16$, $t = -2.81$, $p = .005$, 95% CI [-.78, -.14] as well as a four-way interaction between all variables were found on damage, $B = .76$, $SE = .33$, $t = 2.34$, $p = .020$, 95% CI [.12, 1.41]. In the negative comment condition, there was significant interaction between target's ethnicity, name change and identification, $B = .56$, $SE = .25$, $t = 2.20$, $p = .029$, 95% CI [.06, 1.07]. As illustrated in Figure 3, analysis of simple main effects revealed our expected four-way interaction pattern: Among high (but not low) identifiers, in the context of negative remarks, the name-changed Turkish target was perceived as more damaging than the authentic Turkish target, $B = .70$, $SE = .31$, $t = 2.29$, $p = .023$, 95% CI [.10, 1.31]. In the German target condition, the pattern was the opposite: In response to negative comments, high (but no low) identifiers perceived the name-changed target as less damaging than the authentic German target, but this difference was not significant, $B = -.40$, $p = .185$. When positive comments were made about Germans, no significant interaction emerged, $B = -.19$, $p = .334$, and no difference were found between the name-changed and authentic Turkish targets, $B = .08$, $p = .724$, or the German condition, $B = .12$, $p = .608$. No further four-way interactions emerged on the other dependent variables.

Beyond this four-way interaction, an interaction between target's ethnicity and name change was found on negative affect, $B = .50$, $SE = .21$, $t = 2.34$, $p = .020$, 95% CI [.08, .92]. Analyses of simple main effects revealed that changing name change aroused more negative affect but only in a reaction to the Turkish, $B = .57$, $SE = .15$, $t = 3.74$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.27, .87] but not the German target, $B = .06$, $p = .655$. An interaction between these variables also emerged on impostorship, $B = .52$, $SE = .24$, $t = 2.17$, $p = .031$, 95% CI [.05, 1.00]. There was no difference in accusing the German and Turkish targets of impostorship when they changed their names, $B = -.13$, $p = .439$. Both were also seen more as impostors than the authentic Turkish, $B = 1.23$, $SE = .17$, $t = 7.13$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.89, 1.57] and German targets, $B = .70$, $SE = .17$, $t = 4.13$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.36, 1.04], respectively. However, it seems that in the authentic condition, participants perceived the Turkish target less as

impostor than the authentic German target, $B = -.66$, $SE = .17$, $t = -3.81$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-1.00, -.32].

Table 5.

Main effects of the manipulated variables of the dependent variables in Study 3

	Target's ethnicity						Name change						Comment valence					
	B	*SE*	*t*	*p*	*CI*		*B*	*SE*	*t*	*p*	*CI*		*B*	*SE*	*t*	*p*	*CI*	
Personality evaluation	.25	.08	3.31	<.001	.10	.40	-.35	.08	-4.71	<.001	-.50	-.21	-.54	.08	-7.21	<.001	-.69	-.39
Negative affect	-.13	.11	-1.20	.230	-.34	.08	.31	.10	2.97	.003	.11	.23	.91	.11	8.48	<.001	.70	1.12
Damage	-.40	.10	-4.14	<.001	-.21	-.31	.11	.10	1.13	.259	-.08	.30	1.06	.10	11.02	<.001	.88	1.26
Impostorship	-.39	.12	-3.25	<.001	-.63	-.15	.96	.12	8.00	<.001	.73	1.20	.15	.12	1.22	.222	-.09	.39

Note. Higher numbers indicate more endorsement of each construct on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = strongly *agree*).

Figure 3.

A four-way interaction between target's ethnicity, name change, comment valence and identification on damage in Study 3



Note. Damage was measured on a 7-point Likert scale, 1- *strongly disagree* 7-*strongly agree*. Points are displayed at -1 *SD* and +1 *SD* the mean of identification with Germany. Error bars represent standard errors.

3.4.3. Discussion

The purpose of the current study was twofold. First, to obtain a control condition for our manipulation of criticism (i.e., praise), and second to compare similar behavior across outgroup and ingroup targets. The latter, in particular, allows us to differentiate behavior that might signal something inauthentic, or at least inconsistent, about a target (changing his name) from something that becomes "passing" when performed by an outgroup member.

These adjustments allowed us to more closely test the hypothesis that passing into one's group (rather than simply changing one's name) is threatening, especially when the passer carries with them potential harm (i.e., critical attitudes). Again, because of the identity-related nature of these concerns, we expected threat reactions to be most pronounced among high identifiers.

The findings of this study confirmed these hypotheses by showing that a Turkish-German who changed his name to a German name aroused more negative emotions. This target was also perceived as more damaging to Germany than the more readily detectable (i.e., authentic) Turkish-German who did not change his name, and that this reaction to the name changing Turkish target was most evident when he expressed comments that were critical of Germans. Identification with Germans moderated the effect, such that high identifiers were more sensitive to the Turkish target's name change in the context of critical comments. We also confirmed our expectation that there would be no difference between the authentic German target and the German target who also changed his name, because name changing in this context does not qualify for passing across the groups.

Although we did not have any expectations about the overall comparison between the Turkish-German and the German targets, we observed that participants were (perhaps surprisingly) less negative towards the former than the latter. This may have been driven by participants' desire to be seen as benevolent and non-prejudiced towards the Turkish-German target since students, the study population, would generally see liberal attitudes as more socially desirable. It is also plausible that the target's profile violates negative expectations from the target as an immigrant, given that his backstory in the profile suggested a fairly integrated and successful academic. Hansen and her colleagues observed a similar pattern whereby a Turkish-German target who sounded typically German but looked Turkish was met with positive evaluations, something they also explain through this target violating stereotypical expectancies (Hansen et al., 2017).

One caveat of the previous studies reported above is that we employed a constant stimulus for examining reactions to passing (i.e., name change). To test the robustness of the threat associated with passing, other social markers signalling passing need to be examined. The next studies tackle this limitation and attempt to replicate the previously observed patterns while employing other social stimuli.

3.5. Study 4

The goal of Study 4 was to test the robustness of previous findings further. The stimulus sampling approach (Brunswik, 1947, 1955; Wells & Windschitl, 1999) maintains that experimental effects are robust when they are independent of the stimulus used in the study. Thus, varying the stimulus is essential for establishing that the Trojan horse effect is replicable in different domains relevant to passing across intergroup boundaries. Therefore, in this study, we varied the stimuli that we used so far to manipulate passing as well as the message content. We also conducted the study in Israel, a different population and a political context.

In the current study, we employed accent-free speech to allow us to test reactions to passing. The psycholinguistic literature is abundant with studies on accents, tone, pitch and other communicative styles and features of language (see Giles & Billings, 2004). There is clear evidence suggesting that accent is a stronger social cue than faces for classifying others (Hansen, 2013; Rakić et al., 2011). Previous research has distinguished between two types of accents: standard and nonstandard (e.g., Cargile & Bradac, 2001; Kristiansen, 2001). Giles and Billings (2004) defined standard accent as that is mostly spoken by the large society and identifies with "high socioeconomic status, power and media usage in a particular community" (p. 191). A nonstandard accent is associated with a foreign accent or a low socioeconomic background (Fuertes et al., 2012). Speaking with a nonstandard accent has been shown to predict discrimination in various fields such as in schools (e.g., Choy & Dodd, 1976), medical assessments (e.g., Fielding & Evered, 2013), the legal settings (e.g., (Seggie, 1983) and in judging candidates' suitability for various jobs (e.g., Giles et al., 1981).

Overall, non-accented speech is favored by the dominant group while accented speech tends to be stigmatized (for a review see Gluszek & Dovidio, 2010). Yet little attention has been given to conditions under which non-accented speech might be negatively perceived by the group (e.g., Heaton & Nygaard, 2011; Hogg et al., 1989; Powesland & Giles, 1975). We claim that non-accented speech might also be a form of passing (see also Piller, 2002), and as such might produce negative evaluations from the dominant group when an accent-free target carries with him other negative attributes, such as negative attitudes towards the dominant group, that might cause a perception of damage from within – as a Trojan horse. As we found in the previous studies, when an outgroup target who passes as a member of the ingroup by changing his name to a more prototypical ingroup name, while also expressing critical

comments about that group, they tend to be especially devalued by highly identified ingroup members. We expected unaccented speech to elicit similarly negative reactions when encountered in the context of attitudes or actions that are perceived to undermine the dominant group.

Study 4 was conducted in Israel to examine the reactions of Israeli-Jews to hearing a passing Palestinian Israeli citizen, a member of the largest national minority in Israel. Participants heard a voice-recorded message by the target who either spoke a standard (Ashkenazi) Hebrew (i.e., passer- no identifiable accent) or Hebrew with an Arabic accent (i.e., detectable outgroup member). Similar to Study 3, we crossed the passing manipulation with information that signaled the degree to which the speaker was supportive or critical of Israel. This information referred specifically to the issue of expressing loyalty to Israel (or to the Palestinians) by standing (or refusing to stand) for Hatikvah, the Israeli national anthem. The national anthem of Israel clearly represents the Jewish majority in a way that excludes Palestinians in Israel and might leave them feeling estranged and alienated (Bernstein & Mandelzis, 2009; Shor & Yonay, 2011). The act of standing or not standing for the anthem among Palestinian citizens of Israel either hides or directly conveys these feelings of estrangement and alienation.

Given the subtlety of our manipulation, which used only accents, and the potential for rapid decay in its effects (Pantos & Perkins, 2013), we avoided elaborate dependent measures (e.g., damage) in this study. Instead, we focused on short general impressions of the target. We again hypothesized that high identifiers would express more negative attitudes towards a passing target (i.e., unaccented) than a target whose outgroup membership was marked (i.e., via accented speech), and that this would be especially so when he expressed disloyalty rather than loyalty towards the ingroup. In addition to overall target evaluations, we included a measure of perceived impostorism in this study, and we expected this measure to mediate effects on evaluation.

3.5.1. Method

Participants

A total of 146 Jewish-Israeli undergraduate university students (M_{age} = 28.36 *SD* = 6.93 ranging from 17 to 64) were recruited for the current study (82 females, 64 males). A

sensitivity analysis (using G*power; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that the final sample size provides a power of 1- β = .80 and α = .05 to detect an effect size as small as f^2= .077.

Materials and procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of each cell of a 2 (accent: Arabic-accented Hebrew vs unaccented-Hebrew) X 2 (loyalty statement: loyal vs disloyal) between-subjects design. Participants received similar instructions to the previous studies, but instead of reading a profile, they listened to an audio recording and they were told that the purpose of that was to test people's impressions based on short voice messages.

Accent manipulation

We chose recordings made by a single Palestinian citizen of Israel who was able to record a short message in an Arabic-accented or unaccented-Hebrew speech (i.e., a version of the matched-guise design used in socio-linguistic experiments; see Lambert et al., 1960). We did not pre-test the recordings but relied on the judgment of the research assistants who were blind to the purpose of the study and were clearly able to identify the strengths of accent in the speech.

Loyalty manipulation

In the audio recording, the target made a statement that communicated his loyalty to Israel. This statement referred to standing for the Israeli national anthem, which is a contested subject in Israel, given that the content of the anthem exclusively represents the Jewish majority. Palestinian citizens of the country often refuse to stand for it on occasions where it is being sung, actions that often results in accusations of disloyalty (see Elias et al., 2009). To avoid gender effects, we had the target with a typical Arabic male name, which was indicated at the beginning and the end of the message, who expressed either this form of resistance to the national anthem or support for it [the latter condition is conveyed in the bracketed text]:

> "*Hello, my name is Shadi. I was asked to say a sentence as a voice message, and this is the sentence I chose: yesterday I was at an event before which everyone stood for the national anthem. I refused to stand because of commitment and loyalty to the Palestinian nation and objection to symbols that do not include me [we all stood for the anthem. I stood because of loyalty to my Israeli citizenship and respect for the symbols of the state]. Goodbye, Shadi*".

Measurements

Participants were asked to complete an 8 item identification with the national group scale (a short version of Roccas et al., 2008) which has been widely used in the Israeli-Palestinian context (e.g., "Belonging to the Palestinian nation is an important part of my identity"). After listening to the audio recordings, participants were asked to evaluate the target on *positive evaluations* including 7 items (e.g., "the speaker leaves a positive impression"; α = .92), *negative evaluations* including 6 items (e.g., "I feel annoyed by the speaker"; α = .88) and *Impostorship* which was composed of 3 items ("fake, honest – reversed item – and sycophant"; α = .69). Finally, participants completed a few demographic questions. All study materials can be found in Appendix B.

3.5.2. Results

Analyses were conducted using a PROCESS moderation model (Hayes, 2013; Model 3) to test the main and interactive effects of accent, statement, and identification. Accent was coded as -1 = Arabic-accented and +1 = unaccented-Hebrew. Statement was coded as -1 = loyal and +1 = disloyal. Identification was mean-centered prior to analysis.

A main effect of statement emerged on positive evaluations, B = -.45, SE = .10, t = -4.34, p < .001, 95% CI [-.66, -.24], and negative evaluations, B = .33, SE = .08, t = 3.98, p < .001, 95% CI [.17, .50]. A disloyal statement was met with less positive and more negative evaluations of the target. There was also a main effect of identification on negative evaluations, B = .25, SE = .07, t = 3.45, p < .001, 95% CI [.10, .39] with more highly identified participants giving more negative evaluations of the target. There was no main effect of accent on the dependent variables.

Three-way interaction

Beyond these main effects, there were significant interactions between identification and statement on all dependent variables: Positive evaluations, B = -.23, SE = .09, t = -2.35, p = .020, 95% CI [-.42, -.03], negative evaluation, B = .25, SE = .07, t = 3.46, p < .001, 95% CI [.10, .39], and perceived impostorship, B = .20, SE = .07, t = 2.68, p = .008, 95% CI [.05, .35]. These were further qualified by a three-way interaction among accent, statement and identification on negative evaluations, B = .20, SE = .07, t = 2.82, p = .006, 95% CI [.06, .34], r^2 = .047, and perceived impostorship, B = .24, SE = .07, t = 3.20, p = .002, 95% CI

[.09, .39], r^2 = .066. A similar, though not significant pattern was evident on positive evaluations also, *B* = -.17, *SE* = .09, *t* = -1.74, *p* = .084, 95% CI [-.36, .02], r^2 = .029. Simple-slope analysis revealed that the expected pattern (see Figure 4). In the disloyal condition, high identifiers evaluated the unaccented-Hebrew speaker less positively, more negatively and perceived him more as an impostor than the Arabic-accented target, $B_{postive\ evaluation}$ = -.31, *SE* = .17, *t* = -1.84, *p* = .068, 95% CI [-.66, .02]; $B_{negative\ evaluation}$ = .36, *SE* = .15, *t* = 2.37, *p* = .019, 95% CI [.06, .66]; $B_{impostorship}$ = .49, *SE* = .21, *t* = 2.32, *p* = .022, 95% CI [.07, .92]. In the loyal condition, the opposite pattern was observed, at least on negative evaluations: High identifiers evaluated unaccented-Hebrew speaker less negatively than the Arabic-accented target, *B* = -.41, *SE* = .19, *t* = -2.17, *p* = .031, 95% CI [-.79, -.03]. In other words, speaking as a native ingroup member was valued by the group only when the target said a pro-ingroup (i.e., loyal) message yet devalued and perceiving as an impostor when the target said a pro-outgroup (i.e., disloyal) message.

Figure 4.

Interaction between accent, statement and identification on negative evaluation in Study 4



Note. Negative evaluation of the target was measured on a Likert scale with 1 - *not at all* to 7 - *very much*. Points are displayed at -1 *SD* and +1 *SD* the mean of identification with Germany. Error bars represent standard errors.

The role of impostorship as a mediator

To address our hypothesis that the devaluation of a passing target (i.e., unaccented-Hebrew speaker) in the disloyal condition is mediated through perceiving him as an impostor, we conducted a moderated-mediation analysis using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013; Model 12 – see Figure 5) and bootstrapping (5000) with accent, statement and identification as

independent variables, impostorship as a mediator and negative evaluation as a dependent variable. This analysis again revealed the interaction among our independent variables on impostorship, $B = .24$, $SE = .07$, $t = 3.20$, $p = .002$, 95% CI [.09, .39], which in turn predicted more negative evaluations, $B = .60$, $SE = .07$, $t = 9.28$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.47, .73]. As can be seen in Table 6, the conditional indirect effects between statement and negative evaluations via impostorship was significant in the unaccented condition. Among high identifiers, this indirect effect was positive, $B = .30$, $SE = .12$, 95% CI [.09, .57], whereas among low identifiers the indirect effect was negative, $B = -.41$, $SE = .13$, 95% CI [-.71, -.19]. This suggests that high identifiers evaluated an accent-free speaker more negatively when he expressed ingroup critical sentiments because they perceived him to be an impostor under these conditions. Low identifiers tended to perceive the same target as less of an impostor and therefore evaluated him less negatively. The moderated mediation index was overall significant, $B = .29$, $SE = .10$, 95% CI [.12, .50].

Figure 5.

Graph of the moderated mediation in Study 4



Table 6.

Results of the conditional moderated mediation model (PROCESS; Model 11) with negative evaluation as the dependent variable in Study 4

Accent	Identification	*B*	*SE*	Boot 95% CI
Accented	Low	-.06	.12	[-.32, .15]
Accented	Medium	-.09	.08	[-.25, .07]
Accented	High	-.12	.12	[-.35, .11]
Unaccented	Low	-.41	.13	[-.71, -.19]
Unaccented	Medium	-.05	.08	[-.21, .09]
Unaccented	High	.31	.12	[.09, .57]

Note: The independent variables in the model were statement (-1 positive, +1 negative), accent (-1 accented, +1 non-accented) and identification (mean-centered).

3.5.3. Discussion

In Study 4, we successfully replicated our previous findings while using different stimuli that replaced passing via name change with accent-free speech and criticism with an expression of disloyalty to the ingroup. In this study, we used the matched-guise technique (Lambert et al., 1960) that has been widely used in psycholinguistic literature, which allows testing the effect of standard and nonstandard accents combined with different speech content (Giles & Billings, 2004). Here again, we found that passing as an ingroup member – in this case by speaking without a marked accent – was evaluated negatively by highly identified group members when such passing was associated with potential damage (i.e., dual loyalty) to the group. Supporting our conceptualization of passing as not necessarily threatening to the group but rather context-dependent, we found that passing of this kind can be valued, but only when the target is likely to carry ingroup supportive sentiments with him into the group, for example through displays of loyalty. From a psycholinguistic perspective, this finding speaks against the common understanding that standard speech is always valued by the dominant group. Instead, accented speech can be favored over non-accented speech when it clearly marks group boundaries, something that is important when loyalty to the group is at stake. We thus contribute to the psycholinguistic literature that looks at the "over-accommodating" communication via speech (e.g., Dragojevic et al., 2015; Giles & Ogay, 2007).

We also found that impostor perception of the target underlay the mechanism through which this evaluation took place is. That is, a minority group member who, on the one hand, passes over the boundary of group membership in ways that might be undetected by others but nonetheless harbors negative attitudes towards the group, is suspected of being an impostor. These results support our contention that there is a fear of Trojan horses: Outgroup passers are perceived as having intentions to harm the group which are concealed under aesthetics that allows them to look or sound to others as if they were ingroup members.

In the previous studies, we showed that passing can occur via name change as well as non-accented speech. Essentially, these cues indicate some degree of assimilation into the majority group where markers of the minority identity are attenuated and adapted to those of the majority which allow minority group members to go "undetected". Assimilation may however take other forms and be manifested in, for example, having friends from the majority group or expressing appreciation for being a member of the majority and distancing one's self from the minority. We thus raise the question of whether assimilated immigrants can be views as Trojan horses who become a threat to the group when they act in ways that are negatively perceived by the group. The next two studies will try to answer these questions and look at the Trojan horse effect in the context of dual-identification of immigrants in Germany and how assimilation plays a role in how the majority views them.

3.6. Study 5

In the current era of globalization and migration, assimilation into the hosting culture as an acculturation strategy (see Berry, 2006) comes with some degree of passing and blending into the native group. It is well documented that immigrants who are perceived to adhere to the host's cultural norms and traditions are likely to be favored over those who live in segregation and resist adapting to the hosting culture (e.g., Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Politi et al., 2020; Roblain et al., 2016). Yet a question remains about how members of the host culture perceive immigrants who are not either-or, but rather both: that is, immigrants who have assimilated culturally but nonetheless maintain strong engagement with the cultural life of their homeland.

The duality of being both was present in the recent debates over Turkish-Germans who live in a democratic society like Germany, but nonetheless support the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a figure who is viewed as undemocratic by many in Germany and

Europe more widely. This debate emerged, for example, when the Turkish-German national football player Mesut Özil took a picture with president Erdoğan, something that he was sharply criticized for by fellow Germans. This criticism resulted in Özil's resignation from the national team (Oltermann, 2018).

Our final two studies capitalized on this context to further explore reactions to passing, and to further widen out the scope of our discussion of this phenomenon. Specifically, in these studies, we examined whether assimilated immigrants can become negatively perceived when they express support to the leader of their homeland. As a first step, we conducted Study 5 to test whether our assumption that support for the (Turkish) outgroup leader was indeed perceived as a violation of host culture norms. This study was framed around the political discourse that emerged in Germany after the constitutional referendum that took place in Turkey in July 2017. Following a military coup, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested a constitutional amendment that would further enhance his power as a president. Turkish-Germans, among other Turks in the diaspora who held Turkish citizenship, were allowed to vote in this referendum, and the majority of Turkish-Germans voted "Yes", indicating their support for the constitutional amendments. This resulted in substantial criticism from Germans towards their Turkish-German compatriots for supporting a leader who they (i.e., the German majority) perceive as authoritarian, and whose aspirations were perceived to be contrary to the democratic values of Germany (Oltermann, 2018). This raises the question of whether it is permissible for citizens of democratic lands to express their right to vote in undemocratic ways, and more specifically, what happens when migrant communities exercise that right to do so.

Some recent research provides relevant clues to this question. A study by Kunst et al. (2019) found that negative attitudes towards dual-identified minority members – that is, those who express identification with both majority and minority groups – are explained by perceiving them as disloyal to the majority. Apparently, it is not enough to express loyalty to the majority group; minorities must also disavow allegiance to the minority in order to assuage suspicions against them. In the same vein, supporting the leader of a national outgroup should be perceived by the majority as an act of disloyalty to the majority's ingroup, especially when that leader's stance is perceived as inconsistent with ingroup values and their legitimacy is contested by members of that group. In an experimental setting, we examined the attitudes of German participants towards Turkish-German minorities who express support for Erdoğan. We predicted that highly identified Germans would evaluate

Erdoğan supporters especially negatively, indicating that such actions are incongruent with German identity (at least in the eyes of majority-group Germans).

3.6.1. Method

Participants

A total of 720 participants were recruited from all over Germany through an online panel. 19 participants who had a family with non-EU migratory background were excluded prior to the analysis, as well as 128 participants who did not pass the manipulation checks reported below. The remaining sample included 573 participants (283 women, 290 men) whose age ranged between 20 to 45 years old (M = 34.33, SD = 7.07), of which 24 participants had EU migration history in the family. All participants were born in Germany, spoke German as a mother tongue and held a German nationality. A sensitivity analysis (using G*power; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that the final sample size provides a power of 1-β = .80 and α = .05 to detect an effect size as small as f^2 = .019.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were told that they would participate in a study that examined how people judge others according to decisions they make. Participants signed a consent sheet and filled a scale assessing identification with being German (based on Leach et al., 2008). Before reading about and evaluating the target in the study, participants were asked to read an adapted short extract of a German newspaper article about the Turkish constitutional referendum that took place a year before in April 2017. This extract conveyed the key information that the referendum was about amending the Turkish constitution and that, if approved, the office of the Prime Minister's office would be abolished and replaced by an executive presidency (Cupolo, 2017). The article described the sequence of events leading up to the referendum, starting from the attempted military coup in Turkey, the actions president Erdoğan took in response (e.g., suspending civil servants, imprisonment of citizens) and that eventually led him to propose the referendum. The article mentioned that Turkish-Germans had the right to cast a ballot in the referendum. In sum, the article stressed the threats this referendum poses to democracy and free speech while also portraying Turkish-German relations as worsening in light of the recent events.

Manipulation of the target:

Afterwards, participants were told that "the University of Jena was interested in how people will vote in the referendum. Therefore, Turkish-Germans were interviewed on the day of the referendum by a university researcher". Participants then read a short biography of the target that was similar to the biography used in Study 1:

> "*Mehmet is 22 years old. He was born and raised in Germany. His mother tongue is German. Mehmet's family has Turkish roots. His family came to Germany in the 70s. Mehmet graduated from high school and studied at a university in Germany*".

The Vote Manipulation:

To Manipulate the vote of the target, participants read a statement from the target that either supports (Yes voter) or opposes (No voter) Erdoğan. Participants in the supporter condition read the following:

> "*Of course I voted "yes". Erdoğan is a strong leader who has brought Turkey forward and will continue to bring it forward. He has turned Turkey back into a regional power and given the Turks back their self-confidence. Today I am proud of my Turkish roots*".

Participants in the opponent condition read the following:

> "*Of course I voted "no". Erdoğan is a bad president who has ruined Turkey and will continue to ruin it. This man is very obsessed with power. Turkey was once on its way to becoming a democratic country. Today I am ashamed of my Turkish roots*".

These statements were generally based on quotes of Turkish-German interviewees in German media around the referendum.

Measurements

Manipulation checks. Participants were asked five manipulation check questions about the information listed in the newspaper article they read, the target's profile and the target's vote. A total of 128 participants who failed the manipulation were excluded prior to the analysis.

Unless otherwise indicated, all responses in the study were given on a Likert-scale that ranged from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (7). Participants completed a set of questions similar to those in Study 1 starting with identification with being German ($\alpha = .95$) before the exposure to the manipulation. Before reading about the target's vote, *friendly*

intentions before (α = .95) was completed. After reading the target's vote, participants evaluations followed: *friendly intention after* (α = .95), *personality evaluation* which were trustworthiness, likeability, open-mindedness, and honesty (α = .89); *negative affect* in addition to emotions measured in Study 1, we added other emotions to the scale: "satisfied (reversed item), threatened, happy (reversed item), angry, disappointed" (α = .95); *damage* was shortened to 4 items "People like Mehmet give other Germans a bad name", "Mehmet encourages others to disparage Germans", "Mehmet made Germans as a group vulnerable to criticism", and "Mehmet's behavior threatens our integrity as Germans" (α = .95); *Impostorship* to which we included two items "Mehmet pretends to be loyal to Germany", "In Mehmet hides an authoritarian personality" and combined with *the inability to identify real Germans* measured with "people like Michael make it difficult to identify real Germans" (α = .84).

Discrimination and deportation. Four items were created to measure the extent to which participants endorse discriminatory actions in order to curtail minority influence: "Germany should ensure that people like Mehmet cannot be elected to a German city council", "Germany should ensure that people like Mehmet cannot be elected to the German Bundestag (German parliament) as politicians", "German authorities should have the right to deport people like Mehmet to Turkey", "Germany should have the right to prevent German Turks from taking part in elections in Turkey" (α = .85).

Disloyalty and ungratefulness. Ten items measured the extent to which participants perceived the target as disloyal and ungrateful to Germany: "Mehmet betrays his German friends", "Mehmet's vote in referendum shows his disloyalty to Germany", "Mehmet is ungrateful for everything that Germany has given him", "Mehmet does not appreciate his life in Germany", "Mehmet should decide whether he wants to live in Germany or Turkey", "Mehmet should move back to Turkey", "Mehmet is loyal to Germany" (reversed item), "Mehmet has integrated himself well into Germany" (reversed item), "Mehmet has adopted German values", (reversed item), and "Germany is a good place to live for Mehmet" (reversed item; α = 91).

All study materials and additional measures were included in the questionnaire for exploratory purposes but were not analyzed but can be found in Appendix B.

3.6.2. Results

A significant interaction between the voting decision of the target and friendly intentions towards him before versus after reading about the vote was observed, $F(1, 571) = 501.48$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .468$. Participants intentions towards the target became more friendly after they learned that he voted no ($M_{before} = 3.96$ & $M_{after} = 4.61$), $F(1, 571) = 101.19$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .151$, 95% CI [.10, .20], whereas intentions became less friendly after they learned he had voted yes ($M_{before} = 4.01$ & $M_{after} = 2.65$), $F(1, 571) = 475.65$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .454$, 95% CI [.40, .50]. Voting Yes in the Turkish referendum negatively influenced our participants' willingness to befriend the target.

Dependent variables

Results were analyzed using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013; Model 1) to measure the main effect of and interaction between the vote manipulations and identification on our dependent variables. Identification was mean-centered and our manipulated factor were coded as -1 (vote = no) and 1 (vote = yes).

As expected, a main effect of the voting decision emerged on all our dependent variables. Compared to No voter condition, participants attributed less positive personality traits to the Yes voter, $B = -.78$, $SE = .05$, $t = -15.14$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.88, -.67], felt more negative affect, $B = 1.12$, $SE = .04$, $t = 25.25$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [1.03, 1.20], and perceived the him to be more damaging to Germany, $B = .76$, $SE = .05$, $t = 12.93$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.64, .87], more of an impostor, $B = .53$, $SE = .05$, $t = 10.55$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.43, .63], and as more disloyal and ungrateful to Germany, $B = .98$, $SE = .04$, $t = 22.47$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.90, 1.07]. Lastly, after reading about the Yes voter, German participants were more likely to endorse discrimination and deportation, $B = .59$, $SE = .05$, $t = 10.83$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.48, .70].

Main effects of identification also emerged. The more participants identified with being German, the less they attributed positive personality traits to the targets, $B = -.11$, $SE = .04$, $t = -2.54$, $p = .013$, 95% CI [-.20, -.02], the more they felt negative affect, $B = .22$, $SE = .03$, $t = 5.78$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.14, .29], the more they perceived the them as damaging to Germany, $B = .43$, $SE = .05$, $t = 9.02$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.33, .52], more as an impostor, $B = .36$, $SE = .03$, $t = 9.56$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.29, .44], more disloyal and ungrateful to Germany,

B = .30, *SE* = .03, *t* = 8.67, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.23, .37] and the more they endorsed discrimination and deportation, *B* = .51, *SE* = .04, *t* = 11.88, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.42, .59].

These main effects, however, were qualified with interactions with identification on negative affect, *B* = .09, *SE* = .03, *t* = 2.51, *p* = .012, 95% CI [.02, .17], r^2 = .007, damage, *B* = .19, *SE* = .04,*t* = 3.98, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.09, .28], r^2 = .022, impostorship, *B* = .11, *SE* = .03, *t* = 2.94, *p* = .003, 95% CI [.03, .18], r^2 = .011, disloyalty and ungratefulness, *B* = .14, *SE* = .03, *t* = 4.00, *p* < .001, 95% CI [.07, .21], r^2 = .015 as well as on discrimination and deportation, *B* = .12, *SE* = .04, *t* = 2.93, *p* = .004, 95% CI [.04, .21], r^2 = .011. Interestingly, in both the Yes and the No voting conditions, the more participants identified as German the more they negatively perceived the target. However, this association was more pronounced when the target had voted Yes.

3.6.3. Discussion

Study 5 establishes that voting in favor of the outgroup Turkish leader, even when this is one's democratic right, is perceived as a norm violation to German participants, especially to those who identify highly with this national group. To explore this further, in our final study, we crossed the norm violating actions (i.e., voting behavior) with a manipulation of passing. For this study, passing was conveyed not through a name change or accent alone but rather through information suggesting that the target was otherwise very assimilated into German culture.

3.7. Study 6

Study 6 extends the Trojan horse effect we have explored to see whether highly assimilated immigrants can be more negatively perceived than less assimilated immigrants when they engage in conduct that contradicts majority group norms by expressing loyalty to a disliked outgroup leader. Highly assimilated immigrants in this setting are possibly perceived as Trojan horses, who appear to be similar to the ingroup, but whose actions suggest fundamentally different values. Thus, although dominant groups typically prefer assimilation over multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2010), and thus should prefer more assimilated immigrants over less assimilated ones, we claim that this preference might reverse as soon as assimilated immigrants behave in ways that are perceived as harmful to ingroup values. Again, and consistent with previous studies, we expected these reactions to be amplified among highly

identified German ingroup members. We tested this hypothesis by crossing the voting manipulation pretested in Study 5 with a manipulation of assimilation, which we describe below. To make the study more relevant to the events at the time the study was conducted, we framed this study around the Turkish presidential elections that were more relevant at the time of data collection than the referendum that was the topic of Study 5. Here too, Turks in the diaspora were also allowed to take part in.

3.7.1. Method

Participants

For the current study, a total of 801 participants were recruited via a German online panel, of which 237 participants were excluded prior to the analysis due to failing multiple manipulation checks (n = 179) as reported below, due to completing the study in either extremely short (under 5 minutes) or long (above 45 minutes) participation time (n = 43), or for having migration background outside of the EU (n = 15 of 21, from Muslim countries mostly). The final sample consisted of 564 participants whose age (M = 32.67, SD = 7.11) ranged from 19 to 45 and 318 were female while 246 were male, and of which 31 had EU migration history. A sensitivity analysis (using G*power; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that the final sample size provides a power of 1-β = .80 and α = .05 to detect an effect size as small as f^2= .019.

Materials and procedure

We followed a similar procedure to Study 5 with a few changes. In this study, participants also read a short newspaper article to provide some context, yet this was about the presidential elections in Turkey. The article described the background to the elections (including the constitutional referendum that preceded it) and the consequences these elections would bring to the future:

" *...the presidential elections will take place, the first since the constitutional amendments following last year's referendum. The elected president will therefore be both head of state and head of government of Turkey and will assume the final function of prime minister. In Germany, too, an election campaign is being conducted on this occasion, as there are almost three million people of Turkish descent living in the Federal Republic, almost 1.5 million of whom are Turkish citizens...*"

Participants were then invited to read about an interview with the target in the study.

The assimilation manipulation

In pilot work, we first asked 54 German participants (M_{age} = 32.89, *SD* = 7.17; 33 females, 21 males), to rate the degree to which 69 behaviors signaled whether or not an immigrant had assimilated into German society (see Appendix B). Behaviors that scored one standard deviation above and below the mean were chosen to form our assimilation manipulation.

For the manipulation that was developed from this, participants were told that "In a long interview with Mehmet, the university researcher asked Mehmet few questions about himself. The researcher has noticed few remarkable things about Mehmet". In the assimilation condition, participants read the following:

> *"As Mehmet grew up in Germany, his mother tongue is German. Mehmet is not only fluent in German but he also has no accent whatsoever when he speaks. During their conversation, Mehmet said he likes his life in Germany and he appreciates the local culture. Mehmet has mostly German friends and he told the researcher that, overall, he feels German and has adopted German values to his set of personal values".*

Whereas participants in the non-assimilation condition read the following:

> *"Although Mehmet grew up in Germany, his mother tongue is Turkish. Mehmet speaks fluent German now, but he does so with a Turkish accent. During their conversation, Mehmet said that he likes his life in his neighborhood, which is mostly populated by other Turks, and he appreciates that local culture. Mehmet has mostly Turkish friends and he told the researcher that, overall, he feels Turkish and maintains Turkish traditions in his daily lifestyle".*

The vote manipulation

Participants then read about the target's vote which was similar to that in Study 5 except that the target said that he voted for or against Erdoğan in the election instead of voting Yes or No in the referendum.

Measurements

Manipulation checks

These included multiple-choice questions about the target's profile ("Where did Mehmet's family originally come from?"), the integration manipulation ("What did the researcher notice about Mehmet?"), the vote manipulation ("What will Mehmet vote in the elections"), the newspaper article ("Can Turkish-Germans vote in the Turkish elections?"). 237 failed these questions and were excluded prior to the analysis.

Similar to Study 5, participants completed a measure of *identification* with being German before the manipulation (α = .95); *friendly intentions before* reading about the target's vote (α = .95); *friendly intention after* reading about the target's vote (α = .94); *personality evaluation* (α = .85); *negative affect* (α = .94); and *damage* (α = .94). For this study, the measure of *impostorship* included items that we used in the previously reported studies to capture general attributions of impostorship (4 items, e.g., "Mehmet pretends to be someone he is not"; α = .81), We assessed the specific attribution of impostorship that involved *concealing being authoritarian* using one item ("In Mehmet hides an authoritarian personality") because this was more pertinent to the political context of the study. *Discrimination and deportation*, α = .88; *disloyalty and ungratefulness,* α = .89, were measured as in previous studies. All study materials and additional questions were used for exploratory analysis and can be found in Appendix B.

3.7.2. Results

There was a significant interaction between the target's vote and friendly intention before and after learning about this, $F(1, 560) = 311.82$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .358$. Participants showed increased friendly intentions to the target after reading that he had opposed Erdoğan in his vote (M = 3.73 & 4.29), $F(1, 560) = 113.26$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .168$, 95% CI [.12, .22], whereas participant showed reduced friendly intention to the target after learning that he had voted in support of Erdoğan (M = 3.72 & 3.02), $F(1, 560) = 206.01$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .269$, 95% CI [.21, 33].

Dependent variables

Unless mentioned otherwise, analyses were conducted using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013; Model 3) to assess the main and interactive effects of vote, assimilation cues, and identification with being German. Vote was coded as -1 = Erdoğan's opponent and 1 = Erdoğan's supporter. Assimilation was coded -1 = not assimilated and 1 = assimilated. Identification was mean-centered prior to analysis.

There was a main effect of vote on all the dependent variables. Participants expressed more negative attitudes towards Erdoğan's supporter than Erdoğan's opponent. Compared to Erdoğan's opponent, participants attributed less positive personality traits to Erdoğan's supporter, B = -.41, SE = .04, t = -8.52, p < .001, 95% CI [-.50, -.31], felt more negative affect towards him, B = .77, SE = .05, t = 15.95, p < .001, 95% CI [.68, .87], perceived him as more damaging to Germany, B = .53, SE = .05, t = 9.82, p < .001, 95% CI [.42, .64], as more disloyal and ungrateful to Germany, B = .63, SE = .04, t = 13.87, p < .001, 95% CI [.54, .72], more as impostor, B = .36, SE = .05, t = 6.92, p < .001, 95% CI [.25, .46] as well as more as someone who conceals an authoritarian personality, B = .39, SE = .06, t = 6.12, p < .001, 95% CI [.27, .52], and finally, endorsed more discriminatory and deportation statements towards him, B = .42, SE = .06, t = 6.53, p < .001, 95% CI [.29, .55].

There was also a main effect of assimilation on all of the dependent variables, except for impostorship and concealing an authoritarian personality. Participants expressed more positive attitudes towards the assimilated immigrant than non-assimilated immigrant. Compared to the non-assimilated target, participants attributed more positive personality traits to the assimilated immigrant, B = .35, SE = .04, t = 7.42, p < .001, 95% CI [.26, .45], felt less negative emotion towards him, B = -.13, SE = .04, t = -2.73, p = .007, 95% CI [-.22, -.03], perceived him as less damaging to Germany, B = -.32, SE = .05, t = -5.97 p < .001, 95% CI [-.43, -.21], and less disloyal and ungrateful to Germany, B = -.47, SE = .04, t = -10.55, p < .001, 95% CI [-.56, -.39] as well as endorsed less discrimination and deportation, B = -.26, SE = .06, t = -4.14, p < .001, 95% CI [-.39, -.14].

There was a main effect of identification on all the dependent variables. The more participants identified as German, the more they felt negative emotions, $B = .15$, $SE = .04$, $t = 3.61$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.07, .23], the more they perceived the targets as more damaging, $B = .37$, $SE = .04$, $t = 8.37$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.29, .46], and more disloyal and ungrateful, $B = .23$, $SE = .03$, $t = 5.95$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.15, .30]. Identification also predicted more endorsement of discrimination and deportation statements, $B = .63$, $SE = .05$, $t = 11.65$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.52, .73], and higher perception of the target as an impostor, $B = .36$, $SE = .04$, $t = 8.27$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.28, .45] and as someone who was concealing his authoritarian personality, $B = .29$, $SE = .05$, $t = 5.70$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.19, .39].

Figure 6.

Interaction between assimilation and identification on the negative affect and damage in Study 6



Note. Dependent variables were measured on a Likert scale with 1 - *not at all* to 7 - *very much*. Points are displayed at -1 *SD* and +1 *SD* the mean of identification with Germany. Error bars represent standard errors.

Beyond these main effects, there was a significant interaction between identification and assimilation on negative affect, $B = -.10$, $SE = .04$, $t = -2.42$, $p = .015$, 95% CI [-.18, -.02], and damage, $B = -.09$, $SE = .04$, $t = -2.09$, $p = .037$, 95% CI [-.18, -.006]. To probe the interactions, we used the Jamovi software (Jamovie project; https://www.jamovi.org/). Analyses revealed that, as shown in Figure 6, the more participants identified with being German, the more they expressed negative emotions towards the non-assimilated target, $B = .25$, $SE = .05$, $t = 4.98$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.15, .36] but not towards the assimilated target, $B = .05$, $p = .382$. Both assimilated, $B = .28$, $SE = .06$, $t = 4.36$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.16, .41] and

non-assimilated targets, $B = .47$, $SE = .06$, $t = 8.13$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.36, .59] were perceived as more damaging the ingroup, the more participants identified with Germans, yet the effect was larger for the non-assimilated target (see Figure 6).

There was also a significant interaction between identification and vote on damage, $B = .10$, $SE = .04$, $t = 2.42$, $p = .015$, 95% CI [.02, .19] such that the more participants identified as German, the more they perceived Erdoğan's supporter, $B = .49$, $SE = .05$, $t = 8.25$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.37, .60] as well as, yet to a small extent, Erdoğan's opponent, $B = .27$, $SE = .06$, $t = 4.18$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.14, .40] as damaging Germany.

Three-way interaction

Contrary to our expectations, there were no significant three-way interactions between the independent variables except on the measure of concealing being an authoritarian, $B = .15$, $SE = .05$, $t = 3.05$, $p = .002$, 95% CI [.05, .26], $r^2 = 015$. As illustrated in Figure 7, in the Erdoğan supporter condition, the more participants identified as German the more they perceived the assimilated target as hiding an authoritarian personality, $B = .47$, $SE = .09$, $t = 4.88$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.28, .66] but not the non-assimilated target, $B = .15$, $p = .160$. Interestingly, in the Erdoğan-opponent condition, this effect was reversed. Here, the more participants identified with the ingroup, the more they perceived the non-assimilated target as someone who is concealing an authoritarian personality, $B = .43$, $SE = .07$, $t = 5.85$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.29, .58], but not the assimilated target, $B = .12$, $p = .341$. The differences however between high and low identifiers' perception of the assimilated versus non-assimilated target under these conditions were not significant, $B_{Erdoğan's\ supporter} = .18$, $p = .196$; $B_{Erdoğan's\ opposer} = -.10$, $p = .450$.

Figure 7.

Interaction between vote, assimilation and identification on concealing being authoritarian in Study 6



Note. Concealing being authoritarian was measured on a Likert scale with 1 - *not at all* to 7 - *very much*. Points are displayed at -1 *SD* and +1 *SD* the mean of identification with Germany. Error bars represent standard errors.

3.7.3. Discussion

The results of the current study showed that voting for Erdoğan in the Turkish election made the Turkish-German target to be more negatively evaluated. Independently, being assimilated to German culture was positively perceived among participants in this study. These two factors, however, did not interact as expected on evaluation of the target, except in so far as the participants suspected the target of hiding an authoritarian personality – a measure that alludes to the expected impostorship of this target. The more participants identified as German, the more they perceived the assimilated target who supported Erdoğan to be disguising an authoritarian personality. Given the effect size of the voting manipulation on our results, it is plausible to suggest that there was a ceiling effect for this manipulation, and thus a lack of variance did not allow interaction with the assimilation manipulation.

Study 6 showed again that supporting Erdoğan was negatively perceived among our German participants. One caveat of this study is that it is not possible to infer from the design used here whether the resentment towards supporting Erdoğan is generalizable to any support of outgroup leaders that represent immigrants' homeland country. This is study, however, did

not aim at achieving this goal. We were rather interested in how the duality of being assimilated in the host country yet showing support to Erdoğan might be one situation within which "fifth column" concerns arise. This however was partially successful and indeed related to impostorship. Overall, however, the differences between the degrees of assimilation were not significant in the supporter condition among high identifiers.

Additionally, our manipulation included two parallel statements: voting to support the Turkish president while praising him simultaneously. Although the two were often coming together in the discourse around the Turkish elections (and the referendum), this makes it harder to disentangle the source of our participants' derogation of the target in the Yes voter condition. Therefore, further research is required to understand the nature of this effect.

3.8. General discussion

Passing across group boundaries is not uncommon in our times when different genders, races, ethnicities, and nations live side by side, interact, and have the potential to change each other. Passing across groups is ubiquitous and inevitable, even when there are vigorous attempts of different poles of modern society to maintain group boundaries as clear and distinct. Passing has traditionally been seen as a purposeful performative act that involves deception of others through hiding markers of social identity that allows passing into a desired group (see Renfrow, 2004, for a review). Similarly, social psychologists have also looked at impostors who make claims for an identity while failing to fulfil key criteria of belonging (Hornsey & Jetten, 2003; Jetten et al., 2005; Schoemann & Branscombe, 2011; Warner et al., 2007). These prior studies show that impostors are perceived as a threat to the group and are thus harshly treated by its members.

Passing can nevertheless occur without intentions to deceive others or to lie about a group membership. In addition, passing may also result from being (mis)categorized as a group member. Take for example the following quote from Jim, an interviewee in Renfrow (2004, p. 493), speaking about passing as a heterosexual without any intention to do so:

> *"I think of when individuals mistake me for being straight (when I'm gay). For instance, girls may try to talk to me, or guys may ask me about girls… I guess I don't act the typical (or stereotypical) way a homosexual acts, so I guess that's why people perceive me to be straight until I tell them, or they figure it out for themselves".*

This example clearly illustrates that passing does not always reside in the goals of the person who passes but rather in the eyes of the perceiver. This notion however has not received much attention from social psychologists. Nevertheless, other disciplines in social sciences have looked at the individual strategies in performing passing to avoid stigmatization as well as identity negotiation in the face of miscategorization (e.g., Goffman, 1963; Renfrow, 2004). The purpose of this chapter was to examine what yet remains undiscovered: How does the receiving group react to passing individuals, and what social identity motives are at play?

Relying on the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), which argues that group members are assumed to seek maximisation of differences between their ingroup and the outgroup (Turner, 1982; 1987), passing is a potential threat because it blurs intergroup distinctions. More than this, however, the threat of passing is that by crossing group boundaries, passers might also bring with them ideas, values, or behaviors that inflict harm on the receiving group: A passing outgroup member can benefit from being perceived as one of the group yet decide to act in ways that violate group norms and go unnoticed just like a Trojan horse. In extreme cases, passers can be perceived as playing the role of a spy and can keep a watch on the group's activity (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011).

In the current chapter, we investigated the effect of passing on the receiving group in two different societal and political contexts; the one is German-migrant relations while the other is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First, we began our studies by looking at passing through name change as a cue for passing. Study 1 shows that a Turkish immigrant in Germany who changed his name from a Turkish (i.e., Mehmet) to a German name (i.e., Michael) is evaluated negatively by German participants yet was not perceived as causing damage to Germany. We found that under a condition whereby intergroup distinctiveness was undermined, such immigrant was perceived among high identifiers as someone who makes it more difficult to identify real ingroup members. This suggests that passing as such triggers concerns about identifiability of in/outgroup members yet not fear that the person might attempt to harm the group under the mask of passing. This finding goes in line with the finding of Castano and colleagues (2002; also Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992) which shows that in a face classification task, high identifiers (but not low identifiers) categorized more targets as outgroup members. High identifiers also took longer to decide whether a target is an in/outgroup member the more similar they were to ingroup face suggesting that there is a fear of "contamination" by outsiders.

We then followed up by examining the Trojan horse hypothesis by exploring situations under which passing can further elicit fear of damaging the ingroup. Previous research suggested that the rejection of ingroup criticism expressed by outgroups is underlined by concerns about how constructively motivated the person is (Hornsey et al., 2002; Hornsey & Imani, 2004). We thus manipulated ingroup criticism to elicit concerns about damage to the ingroup and crossed it with the name change manipulation. Results of Studies 2 and 3 indicated that negative ingroup criticism by a passing immigrant was perceived more negatively and more damaging to the group than when it was uttered by an authentic immigrant (i.e., who did not change their name). Further, we examined this effect in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by looking at passing via accent-free speech. Israeli-Jewish participants evaluated a Palestinian citizen of the country after hearing him saying a loyal or a disloyal message about Israel either with an identifiable Arabic accent or without (in Hebrew). Results yielded a similar effect in which a passer (i.e., unaccented-Hebrew speaker) was found more negatively than an authentic target (i.e., Arabic-accented speaker) when he expressed disloyalty to Israel which was mediated through perceiving him as an impostor. Here too, these reactions were found among high identifiers suggesting these evaluations are motivated by social identity concerns. Despite countries viewing successful integration by, for instance, means of mastering the language of the dominant group (Bourhis et al., 1997), our findings suggest that this can backfire and can even be seen as a form of impostorship.

These studies support our Trojan horse hypothesis. Passing members of the outgroup are not necessarily damaging to the group, but when their values or behavior deviates from group norms, passers become a threat to the group, and group members may start to see them as damaging. They are thus perceived as impostors, hiding behind masks (i.e., their typical ingroup name or non-accented speech) that allows their harmful potential to go undetected and become all the more damaging because of this.

We also found in Study 4 that passing can be viewed as positive by the receiving group when the (Palestinian) passer (i.e., non-accented speaker) expresses a loyal statement to the ingroup (i.e., Israel). This finding supports in part our conceptualization of the phenomenon. This suggests that passing itself is not the problem per se – it can be welcomed when it conveys an appreciation of the ingroup by the outgroup passer. It could however be that this effect emerged due to mere congruence between how the speaker sounded and the

content of their message, for which our design did not offer a control condition that allows a proper comparison.

One possible criticism against our studies could be that we provided participants with scenarios in which passing was not fully accomplished as they were told the target had changed their name or heard that the unaccented speaker is an Arab (because their name was provided). We thus did not omit information that makes the targets' outgroup social identity identifiable. A design that would resemble a real situation in which people interact with others and only later they discover they are not whom they thought they were would indeed be useful for follow up studies. Yet it is plausible to argue that participants could very well imagine interacting with such (passing) targets and not realizing they are also members of the outgroup and hence evaluate the targets accordingly. Moreover, to evaluate a target twice before and after revealing that they can pass as an ingroup member can be prone to social desirability bias. In fact, we were reluctant to employ such a method in the current chapter and therefore minimized asking participants repeatedly similar questions (within-subject design) to friendly intentions before and after reading the target's name change (and criticism).

In the last two studies of this chapter, we attempted to replicate our findings by looking at evaluations of assimilated Turkish immigrants in Germany (vs non-assimilated). We aimed to examine whether assimilated immigrants can be perceived as Trojan horses when they express disputable attitudes, such as support to an outgroup leader (i.e., Erdoğan) with whom the minority is associated. Our findings did not fully support our hypotheses. We found however that the more participants identified as German, the more the assimilated immigrant was perceived as someone concealing an authoritarian personality when he supported Erdoğan (vs opposed him). Here again, we show that assimilation as a form of passing can be devalued when it is incongruent with the behavior the group expected one to act upon.

Research on passing provides an ample opportunity to explore processes related to becoming a new group member, accommodation and essentialism of outgroups. Most importantly though, the studies above tap into the very question of what constitutes a real ingroup member. It is yet hard to tell from our data what the answer is to this question is. It is clear though that an assimilated newcomer whose outgroup identity marker vanishes can hardly be appreciated by the group. This position of ambiguity has been further discussed in

the seminal work of the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1989), *Modernity and the Holocaust*. In his book, Bauman contends that modernity was a sufficient precondition for the holocaust to happen. Bureaucracy, mental distance, and dehumanization of Jews sufficed to make the holocaust happen. However, Bauman also argued that the modern state was engineered and constructed around clarity of identities and (national) group boundaries, thereby dismissing social identity ambiguity. In the feudal era, Jews lived in ghettos and endured restriction as a caste within a societal hierarchy. Jews in modernity however dissolved in the modern unified society. As Bauman (p. 45) put it:

> *For centuries, Jews were safely isolated in partly enforced, partly freely chosen enclosures; now they emerged from their seclusion, bought property and rented houses in once uniformly Christian districts, became part of daily reality and partners of diffuse discourse unconfined to ritualized exchanges. For centuries the Jews were distinguishable on sight: they wore their segregation, so to speak, on their sleeves, symbolically and literally. Now they dressed like all the others, according to social station rather than caste membership.*

Given the racist and essentialist beliefs about Jews, through passing, they were thus seen as taking advantage of the new liberties, living among and disguising a full group membership in the majority, yet being destructive (Oxaal, 1991). Bauman suggested that the marking Jewish shops and forcing Jews to wear the Star of David badges imposed by the Nuremberg Laws illustrate means to make Jews visible and reasserting the "purity" of the Aryan race.

The current chapter offers to put intergroup distinctiveness back to the center of our attention as social scientists. We relied on the classic social identity approach to intergroup distinctiveness and argued that outgroup members who transgress intergroup boundaries (i.e., passers) yet fall in-between being part of "us" yet essentially part of "them" are likely to be disliked by the group they pass into for undermining people's need for intergroup distinctiveness. We also showed that this makes group members accuse others of being impostors and thus have dishonest intentions and even goals to harm their group. Importantly, we claim that undermining intergroup distinctiveness is not sufficient for rejecting passers. Group members are motivated by fear of "fifth column" individuals, who are feared to harm the group from within.

Our findings on passing have important implications for the inclusion of minorities in the majority group. The studies reported in this chapter were conducted among majority group members who reacted to passing in-between group members who pass as majority members while sharing a group membership in a minority outgroup. Be it Turkish-German or Palestinian-Israeli, we show that such minority group members who seek to be integrated and blend in the majority may face obstacles to achieve full membership in the majority and may sometimes be accused of being impostors. The findings thus show that majority group members may push passers outside the group boundaries when their presence is seen as threatening. Although we did not study how minority group members experience such rejection, it is safe to say this would likely not enhance feelings of belongingness and identity recognition.

Our conceptualization and studies of passing highlight the need to examine phenomena that involve everyday passing of in-between group members, such as transgender phobia, religious conversion as well as people's perception of racially and ethnically ambiguous others. Empirical scrutiny of transgender prejudice and discrimination should look at the role of intergroup distinctiveness and identifiability of transgender targets (see similar recent studies, Broussard & Warner, 2019; Jaurique, 2019) and whether these are motivated by fear of passing into the group of cisgender people (whose sense of gender identity corresponds with their birth sex). Importantly, it is vital to start addressing ways in which transgressing the binary gender boundaries can be better tolerated among cisgender people.

Recent work Amer, Halabi and Gleibs (in preparation) has similarly examined reactions of Muslims and White British participants towards White British Muslims. This category is indeed interesting because it is an in-between category for which passing across the two ingroups, Muslim and White, could cause different identity negotiation but also could be faced with undesirable reactions (Amer, 2020a). The authors found that (imagined) meeting a White British Muslim, who had no detectable signifiers of their Muslim identity and later revealed their White Muslim identity, induced more distinctiveness threat after the revelation among White British participants. Moreover, the target was more recognized as Muslim than White. These findings allude to the hypodescent phenomenon: the tendency to assign biracial individuals (e.g., Black-White) the status of the subordinate category (e.g., Black); (Ho et al., 2011, 2017).

Future studies are needed to further understand the essence of the perceived damage associated with passing. This will allow us to fully account for reducing this threat and identifying ways that would lead to more acceptance of passing minority members. Here, we looked at negative ingroup criticism that elicited damage to German reputation and damage associated with disloyalty. However, it is unclear whether passing in other instances would elicit this or other types of threat (see Stephan et al., 2016). We thus recognize the importance of examining this phenomenon in different political, racial and cultural contexts and interactions whereby passing occurs.

4. A warrior or an ambassador? Attitudes towards accent accommodation while addressing an outgroup audience

4.1. Introduction

The question of how to bring about positive social change for minorities and disadvantaged groups is central to much research in social psychology. However, one of the challenges of social change is that this can be met with resistance from the powerful and advantaged groups (Teixeira et al., 2020). Such resistance can be harsh, for example, through violence towards those who protest against authorities and their situation (Reicher, 1984). Foreseeing potential outgroup resistance to social change, low-status group members might be strategic in how they engage with the outgroup while pursuing their cause (Cornish, 2012). Although there are many ways to approach social change (e.g., signing petitions, spreading information on social media, taking to the streets to protest), all methods involve communication between the disadvantaged and advantaged groups. Even when communications are indirect, minority members are likely to be sensitive to how audiences view their actions and what this might mean for their response. Awareness of this raises questions over whether, and how, disadvantaged groups accommodate their communications with outgroups in mind while simultaneously advancing ingroup goals.

The current chapter revolves around this question from a psycholinguistic perspective. We examine the attitudes of disadvantaged group members towards linguistic accommodation when communicating with outgroup audiences. In particular, we focus on accommodation that involves the modulation of one's accent as a marker of social identity. This chapter contains two experimental studies conducted with Palestinian citizens of Israel, a group that is immersed in long-lasting intergroup conflict with the Israeli-Jewish majority (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Before presenting the specific rationale for these studies, we first review the relevant literature on identity strategies, linguistic accommodation, and the potential link between these.

4.1.1. Strategies to achieve group goals – identity performance

Social identity theory contends that group members are motivated to maintain a positive intergroup distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and may experience a threat to their social identity when this need is not satisfied (Branscombe et al., 1999). For example, when outgroups or prevailing cultures devalue the ingroup, group members may become motivated to engage in various identity management strategies (Ellemers, 1993; Mummendey et al., 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Typically, this literature distinguishes between individual identity management strategies (e.g., exiting the group or downplaying its significance for the self) and collective identity management strategies (e.g., redefining group value through social creativity or actions intended to agitate for social change; Blanz et al., 1998). Within this broad literature, work on "identity performance" also highlights the strategic ways group members act to cultivate different images of their group as they navigate the views of others (Klein et al., 2007). A number of studies reveal the shifting expression of group identity (e.g., Barreto et al., 2003, 2006; Hopkins et al., 2007; Klein & Azzi, 2001; Klein & Licata, 2003; Rabinovich & Morton, 2010) and associated group norms (e.g., Reicher & Levine, 1994a, 1994b), as a function of the specific audiences that evaluate such expressions, and the power they have to facilitate or impede ingroup goals.

In one example of this work, Klein and Azzi (2001) found that Belgian participants communicated more positive meta-stereotypes and less negative meta-stereotypes about their group when addressing an outgroup (French) audience versus an ingroup audience. These authors argue that the participants were selectively articulating ingroup representations that the outgroup would agree with rather than reject (because they are part of the meta-stereotype) while simultaneously and subtly influencing the positivity of the outgroup's representation. Similarly, Klein et al. (2003) found that while highly-identified Greek participants expressed anti-Turkish prejudices to ingroup audiences, they refrained from this when addressing prototypically European audiences (for whom perceived tolerance is normative). Again, these authors argue that by strategically revealing or hiding prejudices, individuals mitigate against possible rejection of themselves and their group by powerful others. Finally, research on intergroup criticism also demonstrates that highly identifying group members avoid expressing critical ingroup opinions when outgroup audiences are present (Elder et al., 2005) or intergroup conflict is salient (Packer, 2014). These findings

suggest that group members are attentive to how critical messages might be used against them.

Disadvantaged minorities are not just concerned with maintaining a positive group image while avoiding or dismantling the discriminatory attitudes of the majority (e.g., Morton & Postmes, 2009; Verkuyten, 2003). They are also often motivated to engage the solidarity of the dominant group and, with their involvement, to create meaningful social change. Engaging dominant groups in a shared project necessarily involves some sensitivity to their perspectives and concerns, and engaging in behaviors that affirm rather than attack these. Illustrative of this, Cornish and colleagues (Cornish, 2012; Cornish et al., 2010) found that sex worker organizations in India made calculated decisions about allying with the authorities in their successful project to bring about social change – for example, by providing local police with information about criminal activity, holding information-giving meetings, or dropping by the police to say "hello". These gestures cultivated positive and supportive relations with the authority, which eventually reciprocated through support for the minority cause.

Similarly, African Americans, especially those high in implicit power motive, were observed to use affiliation strategies (e.g., expressing warmth towards the outgroup) when they interacted with a White American partner about the history of slavery in the US (Ditlmann et al., 2017). Reciprocally, White interaction partners were more engaged when they received affiliation messages from an African American interaction partner than when affiliation was absent. Ultimately, then, signals of affiliation were a communicative tool that was successfully deployed by power-conscious minority group members to manage the majority in what might otherwise be an uncomfortable discussion of the problematic history between these groups.

4.1.2. Language and communication accommodation theory

The underlying dimension of the examples mentioned above is the common considerations that people make about how they communicate with outgroup members – and how successful communication strategies might facilitate ingroup goals. However, most of this research views communication very broadly and focuses on the content of what is said between groups. Exactly how things are said, for example through more subtle variations in speech and language, is also pivotal for intergroup communication

(Giles & Reid, 2010; Reid & Giles, 2005). Indeed, there has been a growing interest among sociolinguistics and social psychologists in understanding how language features (e.g., voice, pitch, accent, speech rate) influence social interactions and foster interpersonal and intergroup understanding (see Giles, 2016). Much of this body of literature builds on or is informed by communication accommodation theory (Giles et al., 1973; Giles & Ogay, 2007).

Communication accommodation theory focuses on how interaction partners accentuate or attenuate verbal and non-verbal features to create distance or closeness between them. For example, according to the theory, one can accommodate to an interaction partner by adjusting communication in ways that minimize differences between self and other (e.g., by speaking at a similar rate). This convergence can, in turn, reduce feelings of social distance, induce perceptions of similarity between partners, and lead to more effective communication (Giles & Ogay, 2007). Alternatively, a speaker may communicatively diverge from their interactive partner (e.g., by using unshared turns of phrase or idiosyncratic language, amplifying unshared accents, or displaying asymmetric body language) and thereby highlight the broader differences between self and other (Dragojevic et al., 2016; Giles et al., 1973; Giles & Ogay, 2007).

Researchers within this framework note that language is a powerful marker of social identity (Giles et al., 1977; Giles & Johnson, 1987; Rakić et al., 2011), and accordingly that language use can be viewed through the lens of intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, Turner, 1982). From this angle, accommodation between interaction partners both reflects and reinforces shared identity, whereas divergence can emphasize intergroup boundaries and display distinctiveness. Language use can also be implicated in identity management strategies, for example when an individual from a linguistically marked group accommodates their speech style in order to "pass" as a member of the higher status outgroup (Sachdev & Bourhis, 2005). While this strategy of linguistic convergence might elicit positive reactions from majority group members (e.g., Hornsey & Gallois, 1998), little is yet known about how members of low-status groups respond to linguistic accommodation by other ingroup members (with some exceptions; Hogg et al., 1989; Klar et al., 2020).

Linguistic minorities are likely to be concerned with maintaining the vitality of their identity by resisting convergence towards dominant speech forms (e.g., Giles et al., 1995), especially when language is under threat (Giles & Johnson, 1987). Yet, scholars have also found evidence that divergence by means of, for example, speaking with nonstandard accents

is devalued (Giles et al., 1995) and can result in discrimination in schools (e.g., Choy & Dodd, 1976), health (e.g., Fielding & Evered, 2013) and legal settings (e.g., Seggie, 1983), and when seeking employment (e.g., Giles et al., 1981; for a review see: Giles & Billings, 2004; Gluszek & Dovidio, 2010). Thus, while linguistic maintenance might be valued, minority individuals might recognize situations in which "code-switching" is necessary for their own personal outcomes. Integrating with the previous discussion of identity performance, this might also be necessary when trying to build a bridge to outgroup audiences and engage them in ways that further group-based goals. The potential tension between maintaining minority speech codes versus "sounding like them" is the focus of the current research.

4.1.3. Attitudes towards speaking the majority's accented speech – competitive hypotheses

The minority's attitudes towards speaking the outgroup's language in ways that are marked by an ingroup accent or are unmarked by speaking with a native outgroup accent are likely to be motivated by identity concerns. In the context of social change, we identify two plausible motives that might guide minority responses to speech accommodation. In elaborating these motives, we liken attitudes about minority speech to a choice between sending to the outgroup an envoy in the form of a *warrior* or an *ambassador*. As the term suggests, the warrior is a person who does not make compromises, whose identity is clear and does not raise doubts or uncertainties about who they are and what they represent: they are an authentic and committed ingroup member. This person maintains the ingroup position and embodies this in all that they do – including how they speak. The ambassador, on the other hand, is a diplomat who is tactful and sensitive to the needs of those they address, seeking to maximize goodwill, even among adversaries. This person builds bridges and is likely to be flexible and accommodating in their language and speech, especially when they broach difficult topics. Our question is: Which of these representatives is preferred, by whom, and why? Below we elaborate on the theoretical mechanisms that might guide responses to each type of ingroup representative.

4.1.3.1. The warrior hypothesis

From the perspective of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), where accents mark intergroup differences, minority individuals adapting to a high-status group's speech

blur intergroup boundaries and distinctiveness. This concern should be of particular importance for minorities in evaluating in-between group members who straddle their minority and the majority identity simultaneously. Speaking the majority's style could thus signal an attempt to conceal the minority ingroup identity and individually defecting from the ingroup by passing into the majority (Hogg et al., 1989; Klar et al., 2020). Moreover, this could leave the impression that this person is disloyal and not motivated by the minority's collective interests (Levine & Moreland, 2002; Piller, 2002; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). Therefore, divergence from the ingroup normative speech may also lead minority observers to question the authenticity of the speaker's identity (Giles & Ogay, 2007; Jetten & Hornsey, 2014). These critical reactions should be especially evident among minority individuals who identify strongly with their ingroup.

Consistent with the above ideas, Hogg and colleagues (1989) found that the more Italian-Australians identified with their ethnic group, the more they downgraded a fellow ingroup member who spoke the dominant group's language. Similarly, a recent study by Klar and colleagues (2020) supports this hypothesis, finding that a Palestinian Israeli-citizen speaker who mixed Arabic (i.e., the ingroup language) with Hebrew (i.e., the outgroup's language) was downgraded by fellow ingroup members relative to a purely Arabic speaker. High identifiers were especially sensitive to this code-mixing and especially downgraded such targets (see also Hansen et al., 2018). Therefore, it is plausible that the minority members would always prefer linguistic maintenance over accommodation when communicating to outgroups, and therefore "warriors" who sound (and by inference think) as typical group members.

4.1.3.2. The ambassador hypothesis

An alternative hypothesis is that conforming to majority speech codes, for example by speaking their language accent-free, signals high competence. To succeed in the labor market and achieve upward mobility, it is vital to master the language of the dominant society. Given the pervasive stigmatization of nonnative accented speakers (see Gluszek & Dovidio, 2010, for a review), it is plausible that linguistic minorities recognize the bind they are in, and accordingly "refrain from displaying their adhesion to aspects of the in-group stereotype that are considered illegitimate and/or punishable by the out-group." (Klein et al., 2007, p. 37). Concretely, this would mean avoiding discrimination through converging towards majority speech (Barreto et al., 2006; Goffman, 1963; Renfrow, 2004).

Accommodation is easily conceptualized as an individual identity management strategy. However, the strategic value of modulating one's speech to avoid disfavor by the majority might be recognized more widely among minority group members. In the context of intergroup interactions with members of the majority, linguistically skilled representatives of the minority group might be perceived as assets. When the minority also needs to engage the majority in difficult conversations, for example around ingroup grievances (e.g., inequality, institutional racism), the value of convergence towards majority speech codes for establishing common ground might become especially evident. Viewed this way, being an ambassador and speaking like a native may be strategically appealing, at least given certain circumstances.

4.1.4. Audience considerations and choice of strategy

As already noted, various lines of research converge in showing that individuals are sensitive to the audiences that view and evaluate their behavior, and that this has implications for how group membership is enacted and expressed (Barreto et al., 2003; Carnaghi & Yzerbyt, 2007; Elder et al., 2005; Hopkins et al., 2007; Klein & Azzi, 2001; Rabinovich & Morton, 2010; Reicher & Levine, 1994a, 1994b). Of the conditions that shape such identity performances (Klein et al., 2007), most of this work has focused on parameters of audience power (e.g., to punish) and the visibility (versus anonymity) of performers to them. However, in addition to these parameters, beliefs about the degree to which audiences can actually be influenced (versus being closed to this) seem likely to guide strategic considerations about engaging with them.

Research in both interpersonal and intergroup settings (e.g., Halperin et al., 2011; Wohl et al., 2015) suggests that beliefs about whether or not people and groups are capable of change are central to communicative engagement. For example, individuals who believe that personality is not fixed but can change are more likely to successfully elicit self-disclosure from interaction partners (e.g., Levontin et al., 2019). Similarly, when individuals believe that groups are capable of change, they are more motivated to engage with outgroup members (Halperin et al., 2015), more open to compromise in intergroup negotiations (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014; Halperin et al., 2011) and more willing to accept conciliatory gestures from outgroups and engage in forgiveness (Wohl et al., 2015). Conversely, believing that outgroups cannot change leads to hardening intergroup orientations (e.g., Kahn et al., 2018).

Along these lines, we expect that the perceived malleability for audiences is likely to be a factor that influences the preferred strategy for engaging with them. Because accommodating strategies in intergroup communication, like speech or accent modulation, may be perceived as compromising of ingroup identity, it is a strategy that is likely to be supported only when there is a reasonable chance of success (e.g., Morton et al., 2007). This would require an audience that is open to influence, that is malleable. For audiences that are more fixed in their position, and therefore for whom influence is unlikely, the risks of accommodation may outweigh any perceived benefits. This reasoning leads to the prediction that 'ambassadors' will be recognized as valuable for intergroup communication when audiences are perceived to be malleable, whereas 'warriors' will be preferred when audiences are perceived to be fixed.

4.1.5. Research Context

Both studies reported here were conducted in Israel and, as such, are embedded within the Israeli-Palestinian intergroup conflict. Israel is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual state, however Hebrew, the language of the Israeli-Jewish majority, is the lingua franca. The standard way of speaking Hebrew is characterized by the Ashkenazi (European Jewish) accent (Yaeger-Dror, 1988). Palestinian citizens of Israel are the largest ethnolinguistic minority in Israel and native speakers of Arabic. When they speak Hebrew, they may do so with an identifiable Arabic accent. This marks their identity and is likely to result in negative evaluations from members of the Israeli-Jewish majority. Yet some Palestinian citizens of Israel, especially those identify with Israel and thus can be seen as in-between group members, may be highly proficient in Hebrew, capable of speaking accent-free, and therefore able to pass as members of the majority group undetected. That is, to be categorized as members of the majority in the absence of identity markers indicating their membership in the Palestinian minority.

Studies 1 and 2 explore Palestinian participants' evaluations of ingroup representatives who accommodate to their outgroup audience (the Jewish-Israeli majority) by speaking accent-free versus diverge from majority group linguistic norms and maintain minority speech markers. To examine competing hypotheses about exactly when ambassadors versus warriors would be preferred, Studies 1 and 2 crossed the speech style with manipulation of message content. In one condition, the target expressed criticism towards Israel about its national anthem (Study 1) or policies around freedom of speech

(Study 2). Both of these are topical issues within Israel and practices that privilege the rights of the Jewish majority and their determination of the state, at the exclusion of Palestinian citizens. In the alternative condition, the speaker expressed a non-critical stance on these issues.

The *warrior hypothesis* predicts that disadvantaged group members will positively evaluate a fellow member who maintains their minority identity at all times. This means both speaking in normative ingroup styles (i.e., with Arabic accented Hebrew) and delivering normative ingroup messages (i.e., being critical of the Israeli state). Targets that deviate from normative standards of speech or content should be devalued. Instead, the *ambassador hypothesis* predicts that disadvantaged group members are sensitive to whether and how an ingroup representative's message is likely to be heard by the outgroup. From this perspective, the ingroup member who can accommodate to the outgroup by speaking with their accent might be recognized as an asset, especially when trying to engage the outgroup in challenging conversations about the intergroup struggle. If this is correct, the unaccented Hebrew-speaking Palestinian-Israeli should be evaluated more positively than the Arabic-accented speaker of Hebrew when their message is critical of the dominant group.

Study 2 further probes the role of such strategic thinking when evaluating different ingroup representatives by testing whether reactions to these are further moderated by the perceived malleability of the audience to which their communications are directed. In general, we expected strategic calculations to be amplified when a strategy is likely to pay off – that is, when the audience is malleable rather than fixed. Across studies, individual differences in Palestinian identification were included as an additional moderating variable. Higher identification with the minority could be expected to amplify both concerns about ingroup loyalty, leading to preferences for the warrior, or concerns about ingroup strategy, leading to preferences for the ambassador, at least given the right conditions.

4.2. Study 1

4.2.1. Method

Participants

A total of 142 Palestinian citizens of Israel (M_{age} = 22.89, SD = 4.31 ranging from 18 to 48) were recruited for the current study via online advertisement and snowballing method

(100 females, 42 males). A sensitivity power analysis (using G*power; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that with a power of 1- β = .80 and α = .05, a sample of N = 141 is sufficient to obtain an effect size as small as f = 0.24.

Materials and procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (speech style: Arabic-accented vs unaccented Hebrew) X 2 (message: critical vs non-critical) between-groups design. Participants were asked to listen to voice recordings and were told that the purpose of that was to test people's reliable impressions of others through listening to short voice messages. Although audiences were not explicitly manipulated in this study, given that the target is an identifiable Palestinian (conveyed via name) but speaking Hebrew, the implied audience is the Jewish outgroup rather than the Palestinian ingroup.

Speech style manipulation

One single Palestinian citizen of Israel who was able to record a short message in accent-free Hebrew or with an Arabic accent was chosen to be the target in the study. We did not pre-test the recordings systematically but relied instead on the judgment of the research assistants who were blind to the purpose of the study and clearly were able to identify whether the target was native sounding or with an identifiable Arabic accent. As much as possible, other voice features such as speech rate, tone, and recording length were kept constant across the recordings.

Message manipulation

The content of the message was about standing for the Israeli national anthem which is a contested issue in Israel given that the content of the anthem exclusively represents the Jewish majority. Palestinian citizens of the country often refuse to stand for the anthem in national events where the Jewish majority traditionally sings it which results often in disloyalty accusations against them (see Elias, Jamal, Soker, 2009). To avoid possible gender effect, we had a target with a typical Arabic male name which was indicated at the beginning and the end of the message [the non-critical message]:

> "*Hello, my name is Shadi. I was asked to say a sentence as a voice message, and this is the sentence I chose: yesterday, I was in an event before which everyone stood for the national anthem. I refused to stand because of commitment and loyalty to the Palestinian nation and objection to symbols that do not include me [we all stood for*

the anthem. I stood because of loyalty to my Israeli citizenship and respect to the symbols of the state]. Goodbye, Shadi".

Measurements

Participants were asked to complete an 8-item measure of minority group identification (a short version of Roccas et al., 2008; e.g., "Belonging to the Palestinian nation is an important part of my identity"). After listening to the audio, participants were asked to give their impressions of the target on 16 items forming the *evaluation of the speaker* (e.g., "the speaker leaves a positive impression", "I feel annoyed by the speaker" – reversed item; $\alpha = .95$). Finally, participants completed a few demographic questions and were debriefed about the actual purpose of the study. All study materials, including additional measures used in this study, can be found in Appendix C.

4.2.2. Results

Analyses were conducted using ANCOVA procedure that sought to test the main and interactive effects of speech style (-1 Arabic-accented Hebrew, +1 unaccented Hebrew), message content (-1 non-critical, +1 critical) and identification (that was added as a continuous variable which was mean-centered) on the evaluations of the target. Marginal means and standard errors of each condition are presented in Table 7.

There was a main effect of speech style on the evaluation of the target, $F(1, 131) = 4.66$, $p = .033$, $\eta_p^2 = .034$, 95% CI [.00, .11]. Participants evaluated the unaccented-Hebrew speaker ($M = 4.20$, $SE = 0.14$) more slightly positively than the Arabic-accented Hebrew speaker ($M = 3.78$, $SE = 0.14$). There was also a main effect of the message content on the evaluation of the target, $F(1, 131) = 76.34$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .368$, 95% CI [.24, .47] such that the critical speaker ($M = 4.84$, $SE = 0.13$) was evaluated more positively than the non-critical target ($M = 3.14$, $SE = 0.15$). There was no significant interaction between the message content and speech style, $F = 2.12$, $p = .148$. There was also no three-way interaction between message content, speech style and identification, $F < 1$, $p = .971$.

Table 7.

Marginal means and standard errors as a function of message content and speech style in Study 1

	Critical				Non-critical			
	Arabic-accented Hebrew		Unaccented Hebrew		Arabic-accented Hebrew		Unaccented Hebrew	
	M	*SE*	*M*	*SE*	*M*	*SE*	*M*	*SE*
Evaluation of the speaker	4.84	.17	5.19	.19	3.07	.22	3.21	.20

Note: identification with the ingroup was included in the model to form main and interactive effects with the manipulated variables.

There was however an interaction between the message content and identification, $F(1, 131) = 24.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .158$, 95% CI [.06, .27]. The more participants identified with the ingroup, the more positively they perceived the critical speaker, $B = .26$, $SE = .10$, $t = 2.51$, $p = .013$, 95% CI [.05, .47] and the less positively they perceived the non-critical speaker, $B = -.56$, $SE = .13$, $t = -4.35$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.81, - .31].

4.2.3. Discussion

The goal of Study 1 was to test responses of minority group members to ingroup representatives who accommodate to majority outgroup speech styles when delivering intergroup messages. The study results show that for Palestinian citizens of Israel, the unaccented speaker of Hebrew (i.e., accommodating to the majority group's speech style) was slightly more positively evaluated than the Arabic-accented speaker (i.e., who maintained the minority speech style). Independently, a critical message of the outgroup received more favourable evaluations than a non-critical message the more participants identified with the ingroup. Contrary to our expectations, we did not obtain a significant interaction between the content of the message and the speech style of the speaker.

These findings are interesting because they suggest that while there was a (predictable) preference for critical representatives of the group, minority group members did not uniformly prefer representatives who were also ingroup-normative in their speech style dimension. This pattern could imply that minorities sometimes see value in modulating their collective speech when addressing the majority outgroup. Of course, it could also be that there is a general preference for dominant speech styles, but given the openly conflictual relationship between Israelis and Palestinians, we do not think this is a plausible explanation for the observed effect. However, without additional evidence – for example, specific conditions under which minorities tolerate the softening of ingroup normative communication to achieve group goals – it is also difficult to conclude that strategic calculations guided this preference.

A number of additional limitations of the study relate to this point. First, although the messages were Hebrew, implying the addressed audience is the Jewish-Israeli outgroup, this audience was not directly manipulated. In the absence of explicit audiences, participant's evaluations might not have been informed by strategic considerations. Second, in delivering his criticism, the target justifies why he refused to stand in respect for the anthem (i.e., "I refused to stand because of commitment and loyalty to the Palestinian nation and objection to symbols that do not include me"). This justification includes two elements: criticizing the unfair exclusion of Palestinian citizens from the state and affirming ingroup loyalty. Accordingly, the support for the unaccented-Hebrew speaker, at least when they delivered criticism, might have been influenced by his explicit affirmation of loyalty to the minority ingroup rather than ideas about how they might appeal to an outgroup audience. Third, our ideas about possible strategic calculations in intergroup communication are not directly addressed by evaluations of the target. More precise measures of the effectiveness of the target's message, for example, would be preferable. Last, we did not find any evidence for identification in guiding preferences for either warriors or ambassadors. This may have been due to the sample size in this study, which was relatively small to detect complex interactions. Study 2 will address these issues and provide a larger sample size of the same target group.

4.3. Study 2

Study 2 further examines the attitudes of minority group members towards accent modulation in the context of intergroup communications. Importantly, this study more explicitly targeted possible strategic considerations by bringing audiences more squarely into focus. To achieve this, participants received information about the context within which the message was expressed and the audience that received this. Across conditions, the audience was always a committee of the majority group of Israeli Jews, but we manipulated whether this committee was presented as being open to new opinions and motivated to listen (i.e., malleable) versus with strong opinions and a motivation to speak rather than listen (i.e., fixed). Reflecting the focus on malleability and influence, we ensured that the target's criticism was about something possible to change. Rather than the national anthem, which is unlikely to realistically change, the criticism in this study was focused on restrictions to the ingroup's freedom of speech within Israeli society. Therefore, this study provides a fuller test of how minority group members respond to linguistic accommodation by ingroup representatives when they try to engage with the outgroup around social change.

4.3.1 Method

Participants

Participants were 549 Palestinian citizens of Israel who took part in the current study. Participants were recruited online via social media platforms as well as via a snowballing method. Twenty-four participants failed the manipulation check as detailed below and were thus excluded before the analysis. The total number of participants was 525 whose ages ranged from 18 to 71 (M = 26.11, SD = 8.46). A sensitivity power analysis (using G*power; Faul et al., 2007) indicated that with a power of 1- β = .80 and α = .05, this sample size is sufficient to obtain an effect size as small as f = 0.12.

Materials and procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (speech style: Arabic-accented Hebrew vs unaccented Hebrew) X 2 (message content: critical vs non-critical) X 2 (audience: fixed vs malleable) between-subjects design. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to examine how people perceive others based on how they express their opinions. Participants were then asked to fill an identification scale with their ingroup. Afterwards,

participants were told they "will listen to a short extract from a speech of an Arabic speaker" (in Arabic: a speaker from the Arabic minority in Israel). The speaker will give this speech before a Jewish-Israeli audience at a conference that he was previously invited to. The conference was organized by a committee that was founded to discuss current issues related to the situation of the citizens in Israel".

Audience manipulation

Participants were then told about the type of audience. In the fixed audience condition, participants read the following:

> *"Members of the committee are all Jews with strong opinions about this issue. Although the speaker was invited to express his views, the main motivation of the audience is to speak their mind rather than listen to others".*

In the malleable audience condition, participants read the following:

> *"Members of the committee are all Jews who have a variety of opinions about this issue and are (particularly) interested in hearing the opinions of others. The speaker was invited to express his views, and therefore the main motivation of the audience is to listen to him rather than speak their own mind".*

Message content manipulation

Participants heard an extract from the target's planned speech about the restriction on freedom of speech for the Palestinian minority. In the critical condition, the target said:

> *"Hello, my name is Samer. We gathered here to talk about freedom of speech. Unfortunately, our freedom of speech as Arabs in Israel is very limited. For example, in times of tension in the south or during wars, we know that the mere expression of an opinion from our side can put us in danger of getting interrogated and even arrested. This could be because of attending demonstrations or even because of a Facebook post. To achieve equal and genuine freedom of speech to everyone, it is very important to create a fundamental change in the state's treatment of Arab citizens."*

In the non-critical condition, the target said:

> *"Hello, my name is Samar. We gathered here today to talk about freedom of speech. In Israel, freedom of speech is a right granted to all citizens of the state, without*

distinction between Arabs and Jews. At any given moment and in every situation, we Arabs in the country feel safe enough and free to say everything that comes to mind. And, this is because we know that we are free to express ourselves without fear and any limitations whatsoever. It is very important that we recognize this fact and should make appropriate use of it."

Speech style manipulation

The manipulation of accent and the selection of the target was similar to Study 1. Here too, the speaker was one single ingroup male target, able to modulate his Hebrew speech to be Arabic-accented or accent-free, who generated the messages for all conditions.

Measurements

Manipulation checks. Participants were asked about what the topic of the speech was ("freedom of speech" or "civic service"; 24 participants failed this question and were excluded prior to the analysis), about the target's name[2] ("Samer" or "Rami"), on a 7 point-Likert scale about the impression of the previously described audience ("how would you imagine the audience?": close-minded to open-minded, biased to impartial, hostile to friendly, and motivated to keep things as they are to motivated to create social change), the target's style and accent ("clear", "fluent", "Ashkenazi/Jewish sounding" and "having an Arabic accent"), the extent to which they view the speech as (1) non-critical to (7) critical. Participants were also asked the extent to which they agreed with the speech given by the speaker (1 = *totally disagree*, 7 = *totally agree*). Unless mentioned otherwise, all subsequent responses were also given on the same 7-point scale of agreement.

Identification. Similar to Study 1, we used Roccas et al. (2008) identification scale with Palestinians.

Evaluation of the speaker. Participants were asked about their evaluation of the target on 30 items that consisted of positive and negative traits attributed to the speaker (e.g., "friendly, intelligent") and positive and negative emotions they felt in response to him (e.g.,

[2] Twenty-two participants failed this question, one of which also failed the previous manipulation check. We however did not exclude the remaining 21 participants as we assumed it is rather likely that participants did not pay attention to the name of the speaker as it was not an important detail they are asked to pay attention to.

"annoyed, closeness"). All items were averaged to provide a single index on which high scores indicated more positive evaluations (α = .97).

Perceived authenticity. Ten items measured the perceived authenticity of the speaker (e.g., "the speaker behaves following his values and beliefs", "the speaker is committed to the Palestinian cause in Israel"; α = .92).

Perceived damage. Six items measure the perceived damage of the target to the ingroup which were adapted from (Warner et al., 2007; e.g., "the speaker makes us as Palestinians vulnerable to criticism"; α = .91).

Perceived motivation to inform the audience. Three items measure the extent to which participants perceived the speaker as motivated to inform the audience about a topic they lack knowledge about (e.g., "the speaker's goal is to inform the audience about something they might not know about", α = .70)

All measurements, including exploratory measurements, were used in the study and can be found in Appendix C.

4.3.2. Results

Manipulation checks

Overall, participants agreed with the critical statement (M = 5.90, SD = 1.49) more than the non-critical statement (M = 3.64, SD = 2.08), $t(467.99) = 14.29$, $p < .001$. Participants in the malleable condition also rated the audience as being more impartial (M = 3.80, SD = 1.53), $t(493.54) = 2.82$, $p = .005$, open-minded (M = 4.29, SD = 1.65), $t(523) = 5.49$, $p < .001$, friendly (M = 3.87, SD = 1.48), $t(506.22) = 3.03$, $p = .003$, and motivated to create social change (M = 4.28, SD = 1.75), $t(512.76) = 4.02$, $p < .001$ than participants in the fixed condition (M = 3.38, SD = 1.90; M = 3.48, SD = 1.71; M = 3.45, SD = 1.71; M = 3.63, SD = 1.95, respectively).

Finally, participants rated the unaccented-Hebrew speaker as more fluent (M = 5.28, SD = 1.47), $t(523) = 2.92$, $p = .004$, more Ashkenazi/Jewish sounding (M = 4.40, SD = 1.98), $t(471.45) = 14.61$, $p < .001$, and having less Arabic accent (M = 3.53, SD = 1.86), $t(451.69) = 17.29$, $p < .001$ than in the Arabic-accented Hebrew speaker (M = 4.89, SD = 1.58; M = 2.11, SD = 1.55; M = 6.00, SD = 1.35, respectively). No difference between the conditions was found on the clarity of the speaker's speech, $t(523) = 1.09$, $p = .276$, which excluded

alternative explanations for effects based on intelligibility. We can therefore confirm that each of our manipulations was successful.

Table 8.

Marginal means and standard errors of the main effects of message content, speech style and audience in Study 2

	Message content				Speech style				Audience			
	Critical		Non-critical		Accented-Arabic		Unaccented Hebrew		Fixed		Malleable	
	M	*SE*	*M*	*SE*	*M*	*SE*	*M*	*SE*	*M*	*SE*	*M*	*SE*
Positive Evaluation	5.00	.07	3.75	.08	4.47	.07	4.27	.08	4.30	.08	4.44	.07
Perceived authenticity	4.75	.08	3.47	.08	4.20	.08	4.02	.08	4.06	.08	4.16	.08
Perceived damage	2.20	.09	3.38	.09	2.71	.09	2.87	.09	2.92	.09	2.66	.09
Perceived motivation to inform	4.81	.09	3.73	.09	4.24	.09	4.30	.09	4.20	.09	4.34	.09

Note: identification with the ingroup was included in the model to form main and interactive effects with the manipulated variables.

Table 9.

Means, standard deviations and correlations between the dependent variables in Study 2

	1	2	3	4
1 Positive evaluation				
2 Perceived authentic	.84**			
3 Perceived damage	-.72**	-.72**		
4 Perceived motivation to inform	.65**	.65**	-.48**	
M	4.37	4.11	2.78	4.27
SD	1.38	1.46	1.60	1.59

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$

Dependent variables

A series of 2 (speech style) X 2 (message content) X 2 (audience) ANCOVA were conducted on the dependent variables with the measure of minority group identification included as a mean-centered covariate. The model was specified to test all main and interactive effects of the four independent variables. To analyze the simple slopes of significant interactions, we probed the interactions using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013), in which identification was entered as a moderator. Given that PROCESS does not support analyses of interactions larger than three-way interactions, we split the data into critical and non-critical conditions and analyzed the interactions between speech style, audience and identification. Means and standard deviation, and correlations between the dependent variables are presented in Table 9.

Positive evaluation of the speaker

A main effect of the message content emerged on the evaluation of the speaker, $F(1, 509) = 139.99$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .216$, 95% CI [.16, .27]. As presented in Table 8, the critical speaker was evaluated more positively than the non-critical speaker. This effect of content was moderated by interactions involving identification, $F(1, 509) = 13.42$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .026$, 95% CI [.006, .06], identification and audience, $F(1, 509) = 4.32$, $p = .038$, $\eta_p^2 = .008$,

95% CI [.00, .03] and finally by the four-way interaction involving speech style, audience and identification, $F(1, 509) = 6.21$, $p = .013$, $\eta_p^2 = .012$, 95% CI [.0004, .04].

Figure 8.

Interaction between speech style, message content, audience and identification on positive evaluation of the speaker in Study 2



Note. Low identifiers and high identifier are those -1 SD below and +1 SD above the mean of idenitifiaction. Error bars represent standard errors.

Contrary to our predictions about the relative merits of an ambassador versus a warrior when delivering a difficult message, we did not find a significant interaction between speech style, audience, and identification when the message was critical, $B = -.03$, $p = .550$. Instead, there was a three-way interaction on evaluation of the target in the non-critical condition, $B = .17$, $SE = .06$, $t = 2.81$, $p = .005$, 95% CI [.05, .29]. Simple slope analyses (see Figure 8) revealed that high identification was associated with less positive evaluations of the non-critical speaker only when he delivered his message to an outgroup audience that was fixed and did so using unaccented-Hebrew speech, $B = -.63$, $SE = .13$, $t = -5.09$, $p < .001$,

95% CI [-0.88, - 0.39]. In all other combinations of audience and speech style, identification was not associated with more negative evalations of the non-critical speaker: fixed audience + Arabic-accented, B = -.13, p = .317; malleable audience + unaccented-Hebrew, B = .006, p = .95; malleable audience + Arabic-accented, B = -.18, p = .156.

Perceived authenticity

A main effect of the message content emerged on the perceived authenticity of the speaker, $F(1, 509) = 125.12$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .197$, 95% CI [.14, .26]. The critical speaker was perceived as more authentic than the non-critical speaker. Again, this main effect was qualified by a four-way interaction between message content, accent, audience and identification, $F(1, 509) = 6.27$, $p = .013$, $\eta_p^2 = .012$, 95% CI [.0005, .04].

Here too, simple slope analyses revealed no significant interactions in the critical condition, B = -.08, p = .228, whereas in the non-critical condition the three-way interaction was significant, B = .14, SE = .07, t = 2.11, p = .035, 95% CI [.01, .28] (see Figure 9). Simple slope analysis revealed that the more participants identified as Palestinian, the less they perceived the unaccented-Hebrew speaker as authentic when he addressed a fixed audience, B = -.53, SE = .13, t = -3.95, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.79, - .26]. This negative relationship between identification and evaluations of the non-critical speaker was not present in any other conditions: fixed audience + Arabic-accented, B = -.07, p = .625; malleable audience + unaccented-Hebrew, B = -.002, p = .989; malleable + Arabic-accented, B = -.13, p = .369.

Perceived damage

There was a main effect of the message content on the perceived damage to the ingroup, $F(1, 509) = 83.27$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .141$, 95% CI [.09, .20]. The non-critical speaker was perceived as more damaging to the ingroup than the critical speaker. There was also a small main effect of the audience type, $F(1, 509) = 4.08$, $p = .044$, $\eta_p^2 = .008$, 95% CI [.00, .03], such that the speaker who addressed the fixed audience was perceived to be more damaging than the speaker who addressed the malleable audience.

A main effect of identification also emerged on perceived damage, $F(1, 509) = 4.10$, $p = .043$, $\eta_p^2 = .008$, 95% CI [.00, .03] which was qualified by an interaction with the message content, $F(1, 509) = 7.98$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .015$, 95% CI [.001, .04]. Simple slope analysis revealed that the more participants identified with the ingroup, the more they perceived the non-critical message as damaging the ingroup, B = .25, SE = .07, t = 3.53, $p < .001$, 95% CI

[.11, .40] but this relationship was not observed in response to the critical message, B = -.04, p = .582. No significant four-way interaction emerged on perceived damage, F = 1.02, p = .313.

Perceived motivation to inform

A main effect of the message content emerged on the perceived motivation to inform, $F(1, 509) = 76.59$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .131$, 95% CI [.08, .18]. The critical speaker was perceived as more motivated to inform the audience than the non-critical speaker. There were also interactions between audience and identification, $F(1, 509) = 4.78$, $p = .031$, $\eta_p^2 = .009$, 95% CI [.00, .03] audience, accent and identification, $F(1, 509) = 7.75$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .015$, 95% CI [.001, .04] statement, accent and identification, $F(1, 509) = 9.03$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .018$, 95% CI [.002, .05] and a four-way interaction that involved all variables, $F(1, 509) = 3.94$, $p = .048$, $\eta_p^2 = .008$, 95% CI [.00, .03].

Again, simple slope analysis revealed a significant interaction between identification, accent, and audience, that was present in response to the non-critical speaker, B = .23, SE = .07, t = 3.24, p = .001, 95% CI [.09, .38], but not the critical speaker, B = .04, p = .525.

Consistent with the patterns mentioned above, simple slope analyses (see Figure 10) revealed that identification was associated with a perception that the non-critical speaker was less motivated to inform when he was speaking to a fixed audience with unaccented-Hebrew, B = -.61, SE = .15, t = -3.89, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.92, -.30]. This relationship between identification and perceived motive to inform was reversed, though not significant, when the speaker addressed the same audience and spoke with Arabic-accented Hebrew, B = .26, SE = .14, t = 1.80, p = .072, 95% CI [-.02, .55]. When the audience was malleable, identification was not associated with perceived motives to inform, neither when the speech was Arabic-accented, B = .03, p = .83, or unaccented-Hebrew, B = .10, p = .34.

Figure 9.

Interaction between statement, accent, audience and identification on perceived authenticity in Study 2



Note. Low identifiers and high identifier are those -1 SD below and +1 SD above the mean of idenitifiaction. Error bars represent standard errors.

The role of authenticity and motivation to inform as mediators

To further explore the mechanism underlying the evaluation of the target in the non-critical condition, we examined the role of perceived authenticity and the motivation to inform the audience as potential mediators. We conducted moderated-mediation analysis using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013; Model 12) and bootstrapping (5000), in which identification, accent and audience were entered as the independent variables while perceived authenticity and motivation to inform were entered as mediators. Results again show that the interaction among identification, audience and accent was significant on both perceived authenticity, B = .14, SE = .07, t = 2.11, p = .035, 95% CI [.01, .28] and perceived motivation to inform, B = .23, SE = .07, t = 3.24, p = .001, 95% CI [.09, .38]. These mediators in turn predicted more positive evaluation of the target: perceived authenticity, B = .66, SE = .05, t = 13.28, p <

.001, 95% CI [.56, .76]; motivation to inform, B = .15, SE = .04, t = 3.28, p = .001, 95% CI [.06, .24]. Conditional indirect effects revealed that perceived authenticity mediated the link between identification and target evaluation in the unaccented-Hebrew speaker and fixed audience condition only, B = -.35, SE = .09, 95% CI [-.55, -.17]. Similarly, perceived motivation to inform mediated the link between identification and evaluations in this condition, B = -.09, SE = .03, 95% CI [-.17, -.03] and in the condition in which the Arabic accented-Hebrew speaker addressed the same fixed audience, B =.04, SE = .02, 95% CI [.003, .10]. Indexes of moderated-mediation effects were significant: perceived authenticity: B =.37, SE = .18, 95% CI [.05, .77]; perceived motivation to inform: B =.14, SE = .05, 95% CI [.05, .29].

To summarize, an ingroup representative who delivered a non-critical message using unaccented majority speech to a majority audience portrayed as fixed in their views was evaluated most negatively by highly identified minority group members. These negative evaluations were mediated through perceived inauthenticity and the perception that the speaker was not motivated to inform. The negative evaluation of high identifiers was attenuated when the ingroup representative maintained their minority linguistic style in the face of the same audience, something that was mediated through a perceived motive to inform, and when the audience was instead portrayed as malleable.

Figure 10.

Interaction between statement, accent, audience and identification on perceived motivation to inform in Study 2



Note. Low identifiers and high identifier are those -1 SD below and +1 SD above the mean of idenitifiaction. Error bars represent standard errors.

4.4. General discussion

Social change involves disadvantaged groups identifying effective strategies to reducing intergroup disparities and engaging advantaged group members to help them in this project. Although loudly and proudly displaying one's disadvantaged group membership might consolidate a movement and mitigate against some of the psychological burdens of disadvantage, this alone does not engage the outgroup. In the current research, we asked whether and how members of a minority group recognize the strategic value of modulating their identity when addressing majority members. Overall, our results did not straightforwardly conform to our initial predictions because we expected strategic thinking to

be evidenced when difficult (i.e., critical) messages have to be conveyed. Instead, we find evidence of alternative calculations in the context of messages that are less critical (but perhaps more concerning from the perspective of the minority). In this discussion, we try to make sense of the overall pattern of results obtained.

Strategic calculations or sense-making?

In making our original predictions about the possible strategic value of communication accommodation in intergroup settings, we drew on various lines of prior research on "identity performance" (Klein et al., 2007). Among other things, work in this area suggests that the enactment of ingroup norms, and the requirement for other ingroup members to express these, can be guided by strategic considerations over the best path to influence and social change (e.g., Barreto, Ellemers, & Banal, 2006; Barreto, Spears, Ellemers & Shahinper, 2003; Hopkins et al., 2007; Klein & Azzi, 2001; Klein & Licata, 2003; Rabinovich & Morton, 2010). Connecting this concept to the literature on intergroup communication, we suggested that such strategic thinking might also involve sensitivity to the linguistic markers that convey group membership, or downplay this, when attempting to engage outgroups in a conversation about social change.

In both experiments we reported here, Palestinian-Israeli participants evaluated an ingroup representative who spoke Hebrew, the official language of Israel, in ways that either maintained minority linguistic features (i.e., Arabic accent) or accommodated to majority speech (i.e., speaking accent-free). We predicted that attitudes towards speaking Hebrew with or without an Arabic accent may depend on the value of maintaining versus minimizing ingroup distinctiveness for prompting change in the outgroup's perspective. We proposed two plausible hypotheses about this. The first – the "warrior" hypothesis – predicts that minority participants will always prefer an ingroup representative who communicates ingroup grievances to the outgroup and does so without compromising their own prototypicality as an ingroup member. The warrior, therefore, does not just speak for us; they speak *like* us (i.e., using its prototypical accent). The second hypothesis – the "ambassador" hypothesis – instead predicts that minority group members might sometimes recognize the value of an ingroup representative who is sensitive to the needs of the outgroup and tries to signal closeness to them. This person might soften the signals of minority group membership (e.g., their accent) to sound more convincing to the ears of the outgroup. Because softening might

be especially important when the ambassador has a difficult message to convey, we expected strategic calculations to be most evident when criticizing the outgroup.

Study 1 provided mixed support for both ideas. On the one hand, highly identified Palestinian participants evaluated a speaker who was critical of the outgroup more positively than one who was not critical in their message about standing for the national anthem. Through their message, the critical speaker conformed to ingroup norms, which are generally critical of the Israeli outgroup, and as such is a warrior for the ingroup cause. Independently, however, the speaker who spoke in the style of the majority group (accent-free Hebrew) was evaluated more positively than the Arabic accented speaker. As such, although the unaccent speaker linguistically accommodated to the outgroup, they were not punished for this, suggesting some awareness of the value of accommodation (or at least a willingness to tolerate it). This tendency was however independent of the criticism the speaker expressed and did not interact with the level of identification of the participants with the ingroup. The lack of such interactions makes it difficult to attribute strategic motives to accent-based speaker evaluations. In addition, the lack of any mention of the audience in this study meant that this was implied (to be Jewish) rather than explicit, perhaps also interfering with any strategic thinking on the part of perceivers.

Study 2 refined the method, included an explicit mention and manipulation of the audience, and tested effects in a larger sample of Palestinian citizens of Israel. Here, we expected that strategic considerations about how best to engage with an outgroup audience would be most prominent when any strategy had some chance to pay off – that is, when the audience was portrayed as open for influence (i.e., "malleable") rather than rigid and set in its views (i.e., "fixed"). Accordingly, we expected perceivers to value the "ambassador", who metaphorically speaks the outgroup language, when influence is possible, but prefer the "warrior" when influence is less likely and the group has nothing to gain through accommodation. The results of this more complete study were mixed.

Contrary to our hypotheses, evaluations of the critical speaker were not dependent on the target's accent or the audience he addressed, and thus no interactions emerged in this condition. Critical speakers were straightforwardly preferred, and significant interactions between these variables emerged on reactions towards the non-critical speaker. To begin understanding the findings, we reconsidered the literature on identity performance (Klein et al., 2007). In so doing, it became clear that studies in this field typically examined the

expressions (i.e., attitudes or behaviors) of participants themselves in relation to some audience, rather than how they perceive the behavior of others who are engaged with audiences in vignettes. By employing vignettes, we might have immersed participants in a situation where their primary concern was to make sense of the target's actions rather than engage in calculations about how best to reach the outgroup while criticizing it. When making sense of the behavior of others, especially in the context of protracted intergroup conflict, questions of allegiance are probably likely to be the focus of perceivers attention. Accordingly, messages straightforwardly displaying commitment to the ingroup position may have been sufficient for participants to make sense out of the speaker's action without any need to consider variations in speech style or audience: The identity and intention of this person are clear.

In the non-critical condition, on the other hand, the identity and intentions of the speaker are ambiguous and making sense of this person is likely to be a concern. Here, it is interesting that high identifiers especially used accent and audience factors when arriving at a judgment about the person. High identifiers' negative reactions towards the unaccented-Hebrew speaker when he addressed a fixed outgroup audience suggest that they were unable to make sense of this speaker – an interpretation that is supported by the mediating processes of heightened inauthenticity and the perceived lack of motive to inform under the same conditions. The attenuation of these negative reactions in the alternative conditions conversely suggests that high identifiers were able to find some meaning in the target's actions – or at least were able to suspend their negativity – perhaps because they recognized some possible strategy. High identifiers saw especially the Arabic-accented speaker as motivated to inform the outgroup when the audience was fixed, which mediated their less hostile reaction under these conditions.

Although these specific interpretations are speculative, at a broader level, they do show that when trying to resolve questions about an ingroup representative's motives – especially when they say something that is out-of-step with ingroup norms – perceivers are influenced by more than what the ingroup representative say. They are also influenced by how they deliver their message (speech style) and to whom (audience), and highly-identified group members seem especially sensitive to these factors. Arguably, when an ingroup member makes a problematic comment to an audience that is hostile to the ingroup and does so in a way that linguistically aligns them with the outgroup, these cues reinforce the suspicion of high identifiers that they are a "traitor". However, when the same comment is

made by a speaker who otherwise displays their ingroup membership (accent) or to a potentially sympathetic outgroup audience, high identifiers seem to give them the benefit of the doubt. Overall, then, high identifiers do seem to be attuned to some kind of strategic calculation that takes into account what has been said, to whom, and how when making inference about an ingroup representative's motives and allegiance to the group and its cause.

Future directions

Although we find the observed patterns intriguing, given their unexpected nature there is much for future research to probe and resolve. To furnish our focus on strategic thinking in communicative contexts, it would be important for future research to determine whether minority group members perceive that accommodation, linguistic or otherwise, has implications for successfully changing the attitudes of the outgroup. Said differently, it would be interesting to explore the self-conscious theories that minorities hold about the communicative strategies involved in social change.

Another important focus for future research would be to explore communicative strategies in action, employing direct behavioral measures. For example, Palestinian-Israeli citizens could be asked to record messages that would ostensibly be sent to a committee of Jewish policymakers who would be interested in hearing what the Palestinian minority in Israel thinks about a social issue that involves an unfair treatment of them. Alternatively, participants could be asked to interact with a Jewish-Israeli partner in a bogus online chat through which they would be asked to exchange voice messages and be instructed to speak about social issues that affect their lives. In either study, implicit beliefs about the receiving majority person or committee could be manipulated or measured. These voice recordings can be coded later to measure whether speech modulation occurred when participants expressed critical messages and whether this interacted with the audience type they ostensibly faced. In doing so, we might be able to test our original hypothesis in a more naturalistic way while avoiding focusing participants' attention on retrospectively making sense of the actions of others.

To summarize, the current chapter extends the literature on communication accommodation theory (Dragojevic et al., 2016; Giles et al., 1973; Giles & Ogay, 2007) to explore the attitudes of disadvantaged group members towards intergroup linguistic accommodation. Our findings highlight the complex mechanisms underlying the attitudes towards such accommodations and explore the interaction between the communicating

person, their message content and the addressee audience. Previous research within the framework of communication accommodation theory has mainly focused on the reactions of the majority group members to speech accommodation by minority targets. Less attention has been given to the perspective of minority members, whether and when they see value in accommodating their communications style to the majority versus maintaining ingroup-normative modes of speech. Overall, our studies show that minority group members are most concerned with what their representatives say, and specifically whether it aligns with the ingroup's normative position in relation to the majority. However, when ingroup representatives say something unexpected, questions of how they said it and to whom may guide their reactions. As such, we open up questions about how communication accommodation is perceived in the context of intergroup relations and the struggle for social change.

5. General discussion

The modern world's rich composition of ethnic, racial and national groups offers novel avenues to study in-between groups. As communicated throughout this dissertation, in-between groups are groups that represent in part an overlap between the boundaries of two (or more) social categories to which their members simultaneously belong. Belonging to in-between groups is ubiquitous and characterizes many communities around the globe, including immigrant, mixed-race, non-binary or transgender communities. Because in-between group members cross different social categories that at times can be perceived as conflicting, they become relevant to important research questions concerning the psychological underpinnings of group membership and boundary drawing.

Revolving around relations between groups that stand in conflict, the current dissertation sought to understand how in-between group members navigate their relations with conflicting groups to which they belong, and how social identification with these groups affects their relations. Additionally, a large body of this thesis was dedicated to understanding the relevant other's perception of in-between groups. Because in-between groups are situated at the overlap of boundaries of groups that are thought to be mutually exclusive, the ways in which these groups perceive members of in-between groups offer a novel investigation of intergroup relations and were thus the focus of this dissertation as well.

The current thesis was divided into three chapters. Chapter 2 investigated the experiences of in-between group members themselves, while Chapters 3 and 4 looked at relevant others' perceptions of in-between groups. Relying on the social identity approach (see Reicher et al., 2010), I explored ways in which in-between group members' different social identities affect their relations with relevant others. The same approaches also guided studying how the movement of in-between group members across intergroup boundaries can be perceived as an asset (or mainly) as a threat to relevant others. The following discussion reviews the main findings of this thesis, their implications and contributions to the existing knowledge, and discuss possible directions for future research.

5.1. The main findings, implications and contributions

Aiming to find answers to how in-between group members navigate their relations with relevant others, the second chapter of this dissertation examined an in-between group that is immersed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The Druze. The Druze in Israel belong to a religious Arab minority that can be seen as an in-between group, because its members share an Israeli identity with Israeli-Jews through being granted citizenship in the country, and an Arab identity with Palestinian-Israelis by virtue of being Arabs (see Halabi, 2014). In addition to these two identities, they also hold a unique Druze (cultural and religious) identity. This chapter aimed to understand how Druze's multiple identities affect their intergroup orientation. Relying on the social identity approach, we argued that the extent to which members of the in-between group are invested in membership of each of the rival groups would be linked to acting in those groups' respective interests (Branscombe et al., 2002; Drury et al., 2009; Turner & Reynolds, 2011). Specifically, we predicted that Druze's identification with Israel would predict a pro-Israeli orientation, while identification with Palestinians would predict a pro-Palestinian orientation on conflict-related matters.

Study 1 examined these predictions by looking at Druze's endorsement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict narratives. Conflict narratives typically contrast ways in which the two opposing groups view the reality of the conflict (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Ross & Ward, 1995). Interestingly, unlike Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Israelis, Druze participants took a neutral stance in their endorsement of conflict narratives, while the former groups favored their respective narratives. However, as expected, we found that individual differences in identification were linked to narrative endorsement: Israeli identification was associated with endorsing the narrative of the dominant Jewish-Israeli group, whereas Palestinian identification was associated with endorsing the Palestinian national narrative.

Study 2 also examined how these multiple identifications affected alliance with Palestinian-Israelis in demanding amendments to the Israeli nation-state law that discriminates against all non-Jewish citizens, including Druze and Palestinians. Compared to identification with Israel and the Druze community, identification with Palestinians was relatively low (Studies 1 and 2). Nonetheless, we found that Druze preferred to advocate for amending the law to include positive changes not only for Druze, but also for Palestinians. Following the recent triadic social stratification theory (Caricati, 2018), it is reasonable to assume that because Druze occupy a relatively higher status than Palestinian-Israelis but

lower than Israeli-Jews, allying with Palestinians could be a strategy to create dependency, which in turn permits maintaining their higher status and thereby the need for positive distinctiveness (Caricati et al., 2020b). Again, the study material could not provide precise answers to whether or not this is the case. It is also plausible to argue that discrimination by the higher-status group amplified the common grievances between Druze and Palestinian-Israelis to cause the inclusion of Palestinians in Druze's group boundaries which in turn enhanced advocating for inclusive amendments (see similar arguments in the political solidarity model of social change; Subašić et al., 2008). Nevertheless, we found that identification with Palestinians predicted greater alliance with Palestinians by endorsing inclusive amendment, while identification with Druze and Israel was linked to exclusive amendments that favor the Druze alone.

These studies contribute to the emerging literature on in-between groups' experiences (K. Brown, 2000; Caricati, 2018; Dixon et al., 2020). Some of these have primarily focused on the impact of occupying an intermediate status between higher- and lower-status groups and how their status impacts in-between groups' attitudes towards the other groups (see Caricati, 2018, for a review). Our studies expanded this approach to examine the social identification processes involved in intergroup behavior among in-between group members. The studies also expand the social identity tradition that has thus far focused primarily on relations between the "ingroup" and "outgroup" and overlooking in-between groups and their role in these relations, as well as the impact of these relations on them (see Dixon et al., 2020, for a review).

Beyond their own experiences, how do relevant others perceive in-between groups? To answer this question, it is important to note here that one of the features of in-between groups is their ability to switch between the different identities they hold that offers some degree of flexibility in, for example, avoiding stigmatization when necessary (Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Switching between identities by accentuated majority or attenuated minority identity markers allows in-between group members to pass into the majority (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011; Renfrow, 2004). That is, to be perceived as an ingroup member in the absence of cues indicating outgroup membership. Because in-between group members also hold the outgroup minority identity, the receiving majority group may experience their passing as a threat to their social identity and boundaries.

In Chapter 3, we examined the reactions of majority groups in Germany and Israel to a member of the in-between group (Turkish-German, Palestinian-Israeli, respectively) who passes as an ingroup member. We argued that passing blurs the distinctions between the ingroup and the outgroup; passing could therefore undermine the motivation to create intergroup distinctiveness, that is, having clear intergroup boundaries (Jetten et al., 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982). Undermining this identity motivation can be experienced as a threat by group members and is likely to result in negative treatment of passers (Branscombe, Spears, et al., 2002; Hornsey & Jetten, 2003; Jetten et al., 2005; Warner et al., 2007). Supporting this hypothesis, we found in Study 1 that a passing Turkish-German target (who passed because of having a typical German name) was perceived both as threatening and as an impostor by German participants. However, the role of intergroup distinctiveness seemed limited to causing highly identifying participants to become concerned about categorizing "real" (German) ingroup members.

These findings highlight the importance which group members attach to establishing clear intergroup boundaries and how passers may impede this. The results also echo the "over-exclusion" effect found in the literature, which shows that highly identifying group members are reluctant to categorize targets into their group in a face classification task (Castano et al., 2002; see also Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992; Yzerbyt et al., 1995). In those studies, high identifiers also took a long time to classify faces, suggesting they are mainly concerned with potential group contamination by outgroup members (Castano et al., 2002).

In addition to undermining intergroup distinctiveness, passing may arouse concerns about transforming the essence of the receiving group by bringing divergent group norms and ideas that may challenge the group conventions, especially when passers stem from a devalued minority (see Hornsey & Esposo, 2009). Studies 2 and 3 examined this hypothesis by manipulating passing (also through having a typical German name) while being accompanied by criticism of Germans. The results showed that among high German identifiers, a Turkish minority passer who delivered ingroup criticism was perceived more negatively and as more damaging to the German ingroup than a Turkish minority member who could (easily) be identified as such.

Similarly, highly identifying Israeli-Jewish participants in Study 4 showed more negative reactions to a Palestinian-Israeli speaker who passed through unaccented Hebrew speech when the speaker expressed disloyalty to Israel than to a speaker who had a detectable

Arabic accent. This study also showed that perceiving the target as an impostor also mediated participants' negative evaluations. Finally, in Studies 5 and 6, we examined the interplay between passing through being assimilated in Germany and supporting the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in the Turkish elections and the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum. Similar findings were found, as an assimilated (but not unassimilated) target who also supported Erdoğan was perceived to be hiding an authoritarian personality – hence perceiving the target as camouflaging his true identity through their ability to pass as ingroup members.

These findings have important implications for the acceptance of minorities as part of the national group. Although passing into the majority may seem appealing to some immigrants, especially when it helps to avoid stigmatization and discrimination of the minority (Goffman, 1963; Renfrow, 2004), it seems that passing can carry the risk of being excluded from the national group as well, at least for those are perceived to deviate from ingroup norms. Moreover, as it seems from our studies, the casual exercise of being a member in a communality such as expressing criticism (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011) appears to risk being perceived as damaging rather than caring for the group. These identity concerns and reactions of the majority might impede the inclusion of the minority in the national group and may in part explain the occurrence of denying minority groups' national identity (Blackwood et al., 2015; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Hopkins, 2011).

The findings of Chapter 3 also shed light on the emergence of impostorship accusations in the intergroup context. Previous research has shown that groups are wary of others who pass as ingroup members by making public claims for group membership while disguising their failure to fulfil inclusion criteria (e.g., claiming to be vegetarian while being a meat-eater; e.g., Hornsey & Jetten, 2003; Jetten et al., 2005; Warner et al., 2007). While such individuals can objectively be seen as impostors for lying about their group membership (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011), passers in our studies did not make any false claims for membership in the majority. In fact, these represent genuine group members who also happen to share a group membership in the minority group (i.e., bicultural or binational minority group members). However, members of the majority group seemed to question their authenticity, especially when they voiced criticism of the majority.

If accusations of impostorship are directed at some group members, who qualifies then to be a genuine group member? While there is no objective answer to this question, such

accusations may reflect a psychological function. It is important to note here that group members vary in the extent to which they are perceived to represent the group's features best. While some are perceived to be closer to the defining exemplar of the group (i.e., the prototype), other members may be perceived to occupy a marginal position within the group boundaries (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). These perceptions however vary from one group member to another and are context-dependent. Some members have a broader and more inclusive perception of the group boundaries while others have more strict standards (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011). For example, some gay people might perceive bisexuals as part of the gay community while others might strictly contest that. Because in-between group members straddle the identity of the majority and the minority, they may thus be farther away from the group's prototype compared to solely identifying ingroup members. Being at the margins of group boundaries therefore puts them in a vulnerable position and at risk of being pushed outside the group boundaries. When in-between group members deviate from established group norms or behave in ways that are perceived to be threatening to the group, impostorship accusation may come "to psychologically remove them from the group which justifies treating them as an outgroup member" (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011, p. 168). Such accusations may therefore function as means to reestablish differentiation from the outgroup and clarify group norms.

In addition to the majority's perception of in-between groups, Chapter 4 studied the reactions of another ingroup with which in-between group members share an identity: the minority group. Here too, in-between group members' movement between the minority and majority group (i.e., passing) might be perceived by minority group members as threatening because it blurs the valued intergroup distinctiveness. Passing into the majority might also risk being perceived as an act of defecting from the minority to personally obtain a better status associated with membership in the majority, which can therefore elicit a threat to the minority group (see Levine & Moreland, 2002).

However, passing can be an asset to the group if minority group members see it as a possible accommodation strategy to influence the majority group to the advantage of the minority group. In the context of social change, purposeful accommodation to the majority (e.g., adopting its speech style) that can guarantee potential engagement of its members in the minority's cause may become helpful in achieving group goals (see Klein et al., 2007). Minority group members may thus perceive passing into the majority as something of which the group should take advantage. Therefore, we hypothesized that the perception of passing

among minority group members could also be strategic and may be positively perceived when a passing ingroup member maintains his loyalty to and support of the minority.

To test these competitive hypotheses, two experiments were conducted among Palestinian-Israeli, the largest minority group in Israel, who were asked to evaluate an ingroup member who could pass into the Jewish majority by speaking unaccented Hebrew (vs Arabic-accented Hebrew), the language of the Jewish majority group. Speech style was crossed with message content that was critical (vs non-critical) of the majority. This criticism was about the exclusiveness of the Israeli national anthem (in Study 1) or the limitation of freedom of speech for the Palestinian-Israeli minority (in Study 2). The findings of both studies did not provide explicit answers to our research question. In both studies, participants, especially high identifiers, preferred the critical to the non-critical speaker. This however was not influenced by whether the speaker spoke unaccented or accented Hebrew. Therefore, we could not confirm whether a passing minority group elicited concerns about the loss of intergroup distinctiveness or whether influence strategies were considered.

Although these results could not provide answers to our research question, findings from Study 2 might be indicative of minority group members' evaluations of passing into the majority. Again, compared to the critical speaker, the non-critical speaker received more negative ratings from the participants. In addition to manipulating speech style and message content, we also manipulated implicit beliefs about the outgroup audience the speaker was ostensibly addressing in Study 2. The Israeli-Jewish audience was portrayed either as fixed (i.e., interested more in arguing than listening) or malleable (e.g., willing more to listen than to argue) in its opinions. We found that high identifiers' negative perception of the non-critical speaker was only present when the speaker addressed a fixed outgroup audience.

Moreover, we found that these negative evaluations of the non-critical speaker were attenuated when the speaker either maintained a minority speech style (i.e., used Arabic-accented Hebrew) while addressing the fixed audience, or when the audience was perceived as malleable. Speculatively, we argue that minority group members might have been engaged in trying to make sense of the target's allegiance based on the available cues: his accent, what he said, and to whom. In other words, a passing target who delivers a non-critical message to an outgroup audience that seemed hostile to the minority was treated particularly negatively (e.g., perceived as less likeable and less authentic). However, when the target did not pass into the group because of maintaining the minority accent, or when he addressed a less hostile

outgroup audience, participants seemed to give him the benefit of the doubt and attenuated their negative reactions.

What is interesting here is that minority group members relied on the target's accent and the type of audience he addresses to judge who he is. This suggests that minority attitudes towards passing into the majority do not take place in a vacuum but rather shaped by the context in which passing happens. When there were cues suggesting that the passing ingroup member "collaborates" with a hostile majority audience, harsher attitudes seemed to emerge, including doubts concerning their authenticity. It is thus plausible that these negative perceptions stemmed from perceiving the speaker as defecting from the group to join a rather hostile outgroup.

These findings not only contribute to understanding minority attitudes towards passing into the majority, but they also contribute to research on linguistic attitudes and intergroup communication (see Dragojevic et al., 2015; Giles & Billings, 2004). Similar identity concerns were documented by Hogg and colleagues (1989) who found that high identifying Italian immigrants in Australia had negative attitudes towards speaking the dominant language, indicating a fear of betrayal of the group. Similarly, Klar and colleagues (2020) found that high identifying Palestinian-Israelis were particularly wary of a target who borrowed Hebrew words while speaking Arabic compared to a purely Arabic speaker. Findings of Study 2 also suggest that in intergroup communication, group members attend not only to speech style and message content, but also to the type of audience being addressed.

To summarize, both perceptions of the majority and minority of passing in-between group members seem to indicate a degree of suspicion about their motivation and identity. The passing of in-between members into the majority triggers fears of "Trojan horses" who might harm the group "from within". Passing into the majority appears to arouse the minority's fear of defecting from the group when passing is associated with working for the interest of the majority group.

5.2. Limitations, future research and conclusions

While the findings mentioned above offer a broad range of perspectives on in-betweenness, they suffer some caveats that must be pointed out and taken into consideration. To begin with, the focus on in-between group's experiences in this thesis was limited to the experiences of Druze in Israel. The construction of the Druze identity in Israel and the context in which they were studied are unique research cases. A more full understanding of the psychology of in-between groups and their perception of the different, and sometimes conflicting, identities, can only be achieved through the examination of other in-between groups (e.g., Circassian-Israeli; Coloureds in South Africa; biracial individuals) and in other social and political contexts, especially those that do not necessarily involve an ongoing armed conflict.

Moreover, the studies conducted on the subjective experiences of in-between group members among Druze in Israel were mainly correlational. Thus, they are not sufficient to isolate the different proposed factors that motivated their intergroup orientation. As reported earlier, social identification with either rival group seemed to play a role in their intergroup orientation. Nonetheless, their motivation to maintain positive group distinctiveness while occupying an intermediate social status in comparison to Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Israelis might have guided their attitudes as well. Further studies are therefore needed to disentangle these factors. Nonetheless, it is crucial to recognize that studying realistic groups necessarily imposes restrictions on the type of research methods that can be used.

The studies on the perception of in-between group members attested to the significance of in-betweenness in exploring the constitution of membership in the group and how members "police" their group boundaries. However, the studies conducted among the majority society consisted mainly of vignettes or audio recordings to which participants were asked to react. To increase the external validity of these findings, reactions to passing into the ingroup can be examined in "real life" interactions between a passer and perceiver. Such studies would permit direct examination of group members' reactions to passing. One way to do so would be to immerse people in an interaction with a confederate who can pass as a participants' ingroup member by holding identity markers that allow passing (e.g., accent, phenotype, name). Instead of asking participants to evaluate the confederate, behavioral measures would be more helpful in measuring direct reactions to the confederate and how this may shift as a response to the revelation of holding an outgroup identity.

Similarly, direct measures would also help explore the possible strategic considerations minority groups make concerning passing into the majority. For example, instead of examining these considerations in their evaluation of passing via accent-free speech, one could ask minority group members to produce voice recordings in which they record themselves trying to persuade the majority to engage in the group cause (versus a neutral message content). Modulation of speech style according to the spoken message content would make it possible to determine whether or not such considerations exist on this linguistic dimension.

Future research is needed to explore conditions under which accusations of impostorship emerge. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, such accusations may emerge to legitimize the negative treatment of ingroup members who are also members of the outgroup. However, such accusations may also target ingroup members who do not staddle the outgroup identity yet simply adhere to (some) values of a relevant outgroup. Such cases exist in the political arena where accusations of being a "traitor" or "fifth column" are commonly used against politicians whose ideological views shift and may go in line with some values of the outgroup (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011). Similarly, expressing criticism against one's ingroup, if it fundamentally blurs the distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup, may lead to the critics being called out as traitors. Such accusations probably help the group establish clearer group boundaries and group norms. Studying the conditions under which such accusations emerge would make a valuable contribution to our understanding of group members' response to expressions of criticism (or dissent) from within their own ranks, and also to our understanding of how they define membership in their group.

The phenomenon of in-between group membership is multi-faceted and offers many potential avenues for researchers to explore – though these were unfortunately beyond the scope of the present study. One such direction would be to explore how dominant group members strategically use in-between groups to convey their political interests. For example, it would be interesting to see how conservative politicians invoke the example of immigrant communities, especially the less integrated ones, in order to exemplify and support their arguments against immigration and immigrants; or how Israeli politicians, for example, draw on Druze's support for and loyalty to Israel in order to delegitimize Palestinian-Israelis' claims about the state's practices of oppression of and discrimination against them. Using the Druze case again, further research could explore, for example, Palestinian-Israelis may also argue against the integration of their communality in the state of Israel referring to Druze's

relatively lower status compared to the Jewish majority and to the failed attempts to obtain equal citizenship with the Jewish majority.

Finally, if the findings of these various avenues of empirical research could be drawn together, they would stand to enhance and deepen our current understanding of in-between groups. Although social psychology research is rich with studies on individuals who belong to multiple social groups, a theorizing that considers in-between groups may elucidate the fundamental mechanism through which group members define their groups and how they draw criteria for group membership. The current thesis also shows that in-between groups can be interesting for various social phenomena, such as passing, intergroup communication, identity performance, and more.

Despite the aforementioned limitations, the findings presented across the three chapters of this thesis have made a contribution to our understanding of in-between groups, most notably taking the multiple perspectives of groups to which in-between group members belong. Building on the social identity approach, the studies conducted here expanded this approach to look at complex intergroup relations that involve more than two groups. In doing so, the current thesis highlighted the importance of social identification processes in understanding the ways in which in-between group members navigate their relations with the multiple groups they belong to. Moreover, many of the studies reported here were concerned with relevant others' perceptions of in-between groups and the conditions under which they are perceived as a threat to them. I hope that this thesis opens new doors for more research on in-between groups that would help us understand the ways in which groups navigate, negotiate and police their group boundaries.

Appendix

Appendix A

Study 1

Narrative endorsement

English translation	The original Arabic version
1. The video shows the whole picture of the conflict	الفيلم يصور الصورة الكاملة للصراع
2. The video presents the conflict accurately	الفيلم يعرض الصراع بدقة
3. The video represents all the important aspects of the conflict	الفيلم يمثل كل الجوانب المهمة للصراع
4. The video showed all conflict-related information	الفيلم عرض كل المعلومات ذات الصلة بالصراع
5. The video shows an objective picture of the conflict	الفيلم يصور الصورة الموضوعية للصراع
6. The video allows an accurate understanding of the history of the conflict	الفيلم يتيح فهماً دقيقاً لخلفية الصراع التاريخية
7. In my opinion, the video I saw is reliable	الفيلم الذي شاهدته موثوق برأيي
8. In my opinion, the video I saw is convincing	الفيلم الذي شاهدته مقنع برأيي
9. I learned new things from the video	تعلمت أشياء جديدة من الفيلم

Identity conflict between Druze and Arab identities

English translation	The original Arabic version
1. I feel conflicted between being Druze and Arab	أشعر بصراع بين كوني درزي وكوني عربي

2. I feel like someone moving between Druze and Arab identities	انا شعر مثل شخص يتأرجح ما بين الهوية الدرزية والهوية العربية
3. I feel caught between my Druze and Arab identities	أشعر بأنني محاصر بين هويتي الدرزية و هويتي العربية
4. There is tension between my Druze and Arab identities	هناك توتر بين هويتي الدرزية و هويتي العربية

Identity conflict between Druze and Israeli identities

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
1. I feel conflicted between being Druze and Israeli	أشعر بوجود صراع بين كوني درزي وبين كوني اسرائيلي
2. I feel like someone moving between Druze and Israeli identities	انا شعر مثل شخص يتأرجح ما بين الهوية الدرزية والهوية الاسرائيلية
3. I feel caught between my Druze and Israeli identities	أشعر بأنني محاصر بين هويتي الدرزية و هويتي الاسرائيلية
4. There is tension between my Druze and Israeli identities	هناك توتر بين هويتي الدرزية و هويتي الاسرائيلية

Group identification

Three versions of the questionnaire were completed among Druze participants, each for one identity: Druze, Israeli, Palestinian. Below is an example of the identification scale referring to identification with Israel.

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
1. I feel strongly affiliated with Israel	أشعر بقرب قوي من دولة اسرائيل
2. Other groups can learn a lot from Israel	تستطيع دول أخرى أن تتعلم الكثير من دولة اسرائيل

3. Belonging to Israel is an important part of my identity.	حقيقة كوني إسرائيلي هي جزء مهم من هويتي
4. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the Israeli leaders.	عند حدوث مشكلة، من المفضّل الاعتماد على قادة الدولة الإسرائيلية
5. I am strongly committed to Israel.	أشعر بالتزام شديد تجاه دولة إسرائيل
6. Relative to other groups, Israel is a very moral group.	دولة إسرائيل على مستوى عال من الأخلاقيات مقارنة بشعوب أخرى
7. When I talk about Israelis, I usually say "we" rather than "they."	عندما أتكلم عن الإسرائيليين عادةً ما أقول "نحن" وليس "هم"
8. It is disloyal to criticize Israel.	انتقاد دولة إسرائيل هو تعبير عن عدم الإخلاص لها

Exploratory measures

Lack of endorsement of the narrative

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
1. The video shows the conflict only partly	الفيلم يقدم الصراع بصورة جزئية فقط
2. The video presents the conflict from a one-sided perspective	الفيلم يعرض الصراع من جانب واحد
3. The video hides important information the contribute to understanding the conflict	الفيلم يخفي معلومات مهمّة لفهم الصراع
4. The video shows only one analysis of the conflict	الفيلم يعرض تحليل واحد فقط للصراع

The FENCE scale (adapted from Klar & Baram, 2016)

This questionnaire was completed twice, each referring to one of the narratives (i.e., Israeli or Palestinian)

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
1. The Palestinian story of the conflict is the most accurate one	الرواية الفلسطينية حول تاريخ الصراع اليهودي الفلسطيني هي الأكثر دقة وصحة
2. To preserve the unity of Palestinians as a group, Palestinians must believe in their cause	كي يُحافظ الفلسطينيون على وحدتهم على الفلسطينيين أن يؤمنوا بصدق قضيتهم
3. I admire Palestinians who can cope with different versions of the conflict (reverse coded)	أنا أقدّر الفلسطينيين الذين يستطيعون التعامل مع وجهات نظر مختلفة حول الصراع اليهودي الفلسطيني سواء كانت فلسطينية أو يهودية
4. I get annoyed with Palestinians who tend to blame the Palestinian side for what is or has happened between the Israeli-Jews and Palestinians	يغضبني الأشخاص الفلسطينيون الذين يميلون دوماً إلى لوم الفلسطينيين على ما حدث بين الفلسطينيين واليهود
5. It is important for Palestinians, as a group, to know that they are on the right side of the conflict	من المهم أن يُدرك الفلسطينيون كمجموعة على حق في الصراع مع اليهود
6. It is always important to question what Palestinians know about the conflict (reverse coded)	من المهم أن يُشكك الفلسطينيون دوماً بما يعرفونه عن الصراع اليهودي الفلسطيني
7. Having many opinions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict weakens the Palestinians in the face of their enemies	تعدد واختلاف وجهات النظر عن الفلسطينيين يُضعف الفلسطينيين أمام أعدائهم

8. Palestinians who doubt their cause only make the Israeli-Jewish side stronger	فلسطينيون الذين يشككون بعدالة قضية فلسطين يجعلون الجانب الإسرائيلي اليهودي في الصراع حول فلسطين أقوى
9. A nation that doubts its history can only get weaker.	الشعب الذي يشكك بتاريخه لا يمكن إلا أن يضعف
10. A firm, unified attitude of the Palestinians towards the history of the conflict will strengthen them as a nation	موقف صلب وموحد من الفلسطينيين تجاه تاريخ الصراع سيعزز مكانتهم كشعب
11. Many things that the Palestinians say about the conflict have been shown to be wrong (reverse coded)	العديد من الأمور التي قالها الشعب الفلسطيني حول الصراع اليهودي الفلسطيني ثبت خطأها
12. It is important for Palestinians to be united in their belief that they are doing the right thing	من المهم أن يكون الشعب الفلسطيني موحدا في إيمانه بأنه يفعل الصواب

Additional analyses

Study 1

Study 1 included additional scales measured among our Palestinian participants:

Identification with Palestinian identity. Participants were asked about the extent to which they identify with being Palestinian on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7); $\alpha = .85$. Based on previous pilots we conducted among Palestinian citizens of Israel, answering questions about identification with the Israeli identity was often met with antagonism and eventually canceling off their participation. Thus, we adopted a culturally sensitive approach and refrained from asking about this.

Identity conflict. Conflict between being Arab and Israeli was measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Higher values indicate more conflict between the two identities; $\alpha = .86$

Regression analyses. To provide an integrative picture of the effects of the identities interplay on the positions vis-à-vis the contrasting conflict narratives, we conducted among Druze participants a multiple regression analysis with the narrative gap as the dependent

variable (see Table 10), and identifications with the Druze, Israeli and Palestinian identities and identity conflicts as predictors. The coefficient of identification with Druze identity did not account any longer for a significant amount of variance compared to its contribution in the simple regression (c = .42, p = .001). Similarly, both identifications with the Israeli and Palestinian identities did not significantly predict the narrative gap compared to their contribution in the simple regression (c = .48, p < 001; c = -.42, p = .001 respectively) in which the former predicted a pro-Israeli narrative gap and the latter predicted a pro-Palestinian narrative gap. On the other hand, conflict between being Druze and Israeli accounted in the multiple regression analysis for a significant amount of the variance similar to its contribution in the simple regression (c = -.50, p < .001) and reduced the pro-Israeli narrative bias. In addition, the conflict between the Druze and Arab identities accounted for a significant amount of variance in the multiple regression analysis despite not being a significant predictor in the simple regression (c = .21, p = .123) and increased a pro-Israeli narrative bias. These results remained significant even after controlling for participants' age, gender, and the presentation order of the videos.

We also conducted a similar analysis on the Palestinian sample among which, as mentioned above, we measure identification with Palestinians and identity conflict between being Arab and Israel. As can be seen in Table 11, identification with the Palestinian identity significantly predicted a pro-Palestinian narrative gap which did not differ from its contribution in the simple regression analysis (c = -.26, p = .015). However, conflict between being Arab and Israeli did not significantly predict the narrative gap as was also the case in the simple regression analysis (c = -.09, p = .411).

Table 10.

Summary of a multiple regression analysis predicting narrative gap in Study 1 in the Druze sample (N = 57)

	b [95% CI]	*SE*	*t*	*p*
Identification with Druze identity	-.03 [-.35, .29]	.28	-0.19	.853
Identification with Israeli identity	.18 [-.14, .50]	.24	1.11	.274
Identification with Arab-Palestinian identity	-.05 [-.35, .25]	.24	-0.32	.749
Conflict- Druze and Israeli identities	-.47 [-.78, -.15]	.30	-2.99	.004
Conflict- Druze and Arab identities	.30 [.03, .57]	.24	2.56	.028

Note. Narrative gap was calculated by subtracting Palestinian narrative endorsement from Israeli narrative endorsement; $F(5, 51) = 6.45$, $p < .001$; $R^2 = .39$.

Table 11.

Summary of a multiple regression analysis predicting the narrative gap in Study 1 in the Palestinian sample (N = 88)

	b [95% CI]	*SE*	*t*	*p*
Identification with the Arab-Palestinian identity	-.25 [-.47, -.03]	.17	-2.33	.022
Conflict- Arab and Israeli identities	-.02 [-.24, .19]	.17	-0.26	.838

Note. The narrative gap was calculated by subtracting Palestinian narrative endorsement from Israeli narrative endorsement; $F(2, 85) = 3.07$, $p = 052$; $R^2 = .07$.

Study 2

Amendment's endorsement

Items in italic represent inclusive amendments

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
1. *Members of the Druze community must oppose any law or other measure that discriminates against all Arab citizens of the State of Israel (as compared to Jewish citizens of the country), even if the discrimination is not applied to the Druze*	يجب على أبناء الطائفة الدرزية أن يعارضوا أي قانون أو أي خطوة أخرى تميّز ضد جميع المواطنين العرب في دولة إسرائيل (مقارنة مع المواطنين اليهود في الدولة)، حتى لو ان التمييز لا يُطبّق على الدروز
2. I would be satisfied if, as a result of opposing the nation-state law, the Druze in Israel would have a special status that distinguishes them from Arab citizens	سأكون راضيًا إذا كانت معارضة قانون القومية تعني أن الدروز في إسرائيل يحظون بوضع خاص يميزهم عن المواطنين العرب
3. *The nation-state law aims to humiliate the Arab citizens of Israel*	قانون القومية يهدف إلى إذلال المواطنين العرب في إسرائيل
4. If there were a special law besides the nation-state law guaranteeing special privileges for the Druze, it would be an achievement for the Druze in Israel	إذا كان هناك قانون خاص إلى جانب قانون القومية يضمن امتيازات خاصة للدروز فسيكون إنجازًا للدروز في إسرائيل

5. *If there is a special law besides the nation-state law that guarantees benefits to the Druze, this will isolate the Druze from the Arab community in Israel*	إذا كان هناك قانون قانون خاص إلى جانب قانون القومية الذي يضمن مزايا للدروز فهذا سيعزل الدروز عن المجتمع العربي في إسرائيل
6. In the end, if the nation-state law includes another law guaranteeing the status and rights of the Druze community that will distinguish them from other Arab groups in the State of Israel (such as Muslims and Christians), then I think it is important that the Druze support the nation-state law	في النهاية، إذا كان قانون القومية يتضمن إلى جانبه قانونًا آخر يضمن مكانة وحقوق الطائفة الدرزية الذي سيميزها عن المجموعات العربية الأخرى في دولة إسرائيل (مثل المسلمين والمسيحيين)، فعندئذ أعتقد أنه من المهم أن يدعم الدروز قانون القومية
7. *If the Druze get closer to their Arab identity, it will be a positive result*	إذا اقترب الدروز من هويتهم العربية أكثر فسوف يكون ذلك نتيجة إيجابية
8. *One of the consequences of the nation-state law will be that the Druze in Israel get closer to their Arab identity*	إحدى عواقب قانون القومية ستكون أن يقترب الدروز في إسرائيل من هويتهم العربية أكثر
9. If the nation-state law harms the Druze in Israel, this certainly does not indicate the legislators' bad intentions, and they will correct it.	إذا كان قانون القومية يضر الدروز في دولة إسرائيل، فهذا بالتأكيد لا يشير على الإطلاق إلى نوايا سيئة من المشرعين وسيقومون بتصحيحه
10. If the Druze get closer to their Arab identity, it will be a negative result	إذا اقترب الدروز من هويتهم العربية أكثر فسوف يكون ذلك نتيجة سلبية

11. It is justified to create a distinction in Israeli laws between members of the Druze community and all Arab citizens because of the special contribution of the Druze community to the protection and security of Israel.	من المبرر خلق تمييز في القوانين الإسرائيلية بين أبناء الطائفة الدرزية وجميع المواطنين العرب بسبب المساهمة الخاصة للطائفة الدرزية في حماية وأمن دولة إسرائيل.

Exploratory measures

Closeness to different social groups.

Please indicate how important each of the following statements is to you:

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
1. The closeness of the Druze in Israel to the State of Israel and its institutions	قرب الدروز في إسرائيل من دولة إسرائيل ومؤسساتها
2. The closeness of the Druze in Israel to the Jewish community in Israel	قرب الطائفة الدرزية في إسرائيل من مجتمع اليهود في إسرائيل
3. The closeness of the Druze in Israel to other Druze in Israel	قرب الدروز في إسرائيل من الدروز الآخرين
4. The closeness of the Druze in Israel to Druze brothers all over the middle east.	قرب الدروز في إسرائيل من الأخوة الدروز في جميع أرجاء الشرق الأوسط
5. The closeness of the Druze in Israel to the Arab community in Israel	قرب الدروز في إسرائيل من مجتمع العرب في دولة إسرائيل

Additional analyses

Participants were asked to indicate how important it was for them that Druze were close to five groups: the state of Israel and Jewish society (α = .86), other Druze in Israel and the Middle East (α = .80), Arabs in Israel (using 1 item). Consistently with the hierarchy of identities reported in the chapter, our Druze participants attributed greater importance to being close to other Druze in Israel and the Middle East (M = 6.05, SD = 1.35) than being close to Israel and Jewish society (M = 5.33, SD = 1.62) while both of which were higher than the importance of closeness to other Arabs in Israel (M = 5.09, SD = 1.76), F(1.75, 949.77) = 79.88, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .128$.

Table 12 contains means, standard deviations, and variable inter-correlation for measurements that were collected at Time 2 in which participants reported their answers according to how they felt at that moment after they completed questions about the nation-state law.

Regression analyses. To fully understand the interplay between the set of social identities and respondents' preferences for amendments of the law, a multiple regression analysis was conducted by entering the amendment gap as the dependent variable (regression coefficients are presented in Table 13) and identification with Druze, Israeli and Palestinian identities as well as the Druze-Israeli and Druze-Arab identity conflicts as predictors. Identification with Druze and Israeli identities were positively related to a pro-exclusivity amendment gap, the contributions of which were not very different those in the simple regressions (c = .43, $p <$ .001; c = .51, $p < .001$ respectively). On the other hand, identification with Palestinian identity was related to a pro-inclusivity amendment gap that also did not differ much from its contribution in the simple regression (c = -.39, $p < .001$). Conflict between being Druze and Israeli predicted a pro-inclusivity amendment gap whose contribution was reduced but yet remained significant (c = -.13, $p < .001$), while conflict between being Druze and Arab predicted a pro-exclusivity amendment gap although it did not significantly predict this gap in the simple regression analysis (c= .04, p = .363). The same pattern of results remained after controlling for participants' age and gender.

Table 12.

Descriptive statistics, zero-order correlations and their associated 95% confidence intervals for variables used at Time 2 in Study 2

Measures	*M* (*SD*)	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Identification-Druze identity	5.51 (1.39)					
2. Identification-Israeli identity	4.39 (1.66)	.51* [.43, .58]				
3. Identification-Palestinian identity	2.10 (1.21)	-.35* [-.44, -.25	-.30* [-.40, -.20]			
4. Conflict Druze-Israeli	2.93 (1.44)	-.06 [-.04, .17]	-.16* [-.26, -.06]	.10 [-.003, .21]		
5. Conflict Druze-Arab	2.24 (1.31)	.07 [-.03, .17]	.07 [-.17, .04]	.02 [-.08, .13]	.57* [.50, .63]	
6. Amendment gap	-1.11 (2.31)	.38* [.28, .47]	.52* [.44, .60]	-.41* [-.31, -.49]	-.11* [-.20, -.02]	-.003 [-.20, .09]

Note. Amendment gaps was calculated by subtracting inclusive amendment-option from exclusive amendment options, which were collected only once. * $p < .05$

Table 13.

Summary of hierarchical regression analysis predicting the amendment gap in Study 2

	b [95% CI]	*SE*	*t*	*p*
Identification with Druze identity	.19 [.11, .27]	.08	4.90	.000
Identification with Israeli identity	.33 [.25, .41]	.06	8.18	.000
Identification with Arab-Palestinian identity	-.22 [-.29, -.14]	.07	-6.03	.000
Conflict- Druze and Israeli identities	-.08 [-.16, -.002]	.07	-2.01	.045
Conflict- Druze and Arab identities	.08 [.003, .16]	.07	2.05	.041

Note. Amendment gap was calculated by subtracting inclusive amendment-options from exclusive amendment-options; $F(5, 562) = 61.64$, $p < 001$; $R^2 = .35$.

Appendix B

Study 1

Identification scale

The original German version
1. Ich fühle mich mit den Deutschen verbunden
1. Ich bin für die Deutschen
1. Ich stehe hinter den Deutschen
2. Ich bin froh, ein/e Deutsche/r zu sein
3. Ich denke, dass die Deutschen stolz auf sich sein können
4. Es ist angenehm zu den Deutschen zu gehören
5. Zu den Deutschen zu gehören, gibt mir ein gutes Gefühl
6. Ich denke oft daran, dass ich ein/e Deutsche/r bin
7. Zu den Deutschen zu gehören, ist ein wichtiger Teil meiner Identität
8. Den Deutschen anzugehören, ist ein wichtiger Teil von mir
9. Ich habe viel mit anderen Deutschen gemeinsam
10. Ich bin den anderen Deutschen ähnlich

The filler task

Morgen- und Abendmenschen

1. Zu welcher Tageszeit würden Sie aufstehen, wenn Sie völlig frei darin wären, Ihren Tag zu planen und nur Ihren eigenen „Wohlfühlrhythmus“ vor Augen hätten?

Uhrzeit:

5.00 ----- 6.00 ----- 7.00 ----- 8.00 ----- 9.00 ----- 10.00 ----- 11.00 ----- 12.00 ----- 13.00

2. Zu welcher Tageszeit würden Sie zu Bett gehen, wenn Sie völlig frei darin wären, Ihren Tag zu planen und nur Ihren eigenen „Wohlfühlrhythmus“ vor Augen hätten?

Uhrzeit:

20.00 ----- 21.00 ----- 22.00----- 23.00----- 0.00----- 1.00----- 2.00----- 3.00------ 4.00

3. Wenn es eine bestimmte Zeit gibt, zu der Sie morgens aufstehen müssen: in welchem Ausmaß sind Sie darauf angewiesen, dass Sie durch einen Wecker aufgeweckt werden?

____ überhaupt nicht abhängig
____ etwas abhängig
____ ziemlich abhängig
____ völlig abhängig

4. Angenommen, Sie befinden sich unter normalen Umweltbedingungen: wie leicht würde es Ihnen fallen, morgens aufzustehen?

____ überhaupt nicht leicht
____ nicht sehr leicht
____ ziemlich leicht
____ ausgesprochen leicht

5. Wie wach fühlen Sie sich während der ersten halben Stunde, nachdem Sie morgens aufgewacht sind?

____ überhaupt nicht wach
____ nicht sehr wach
____ ziemlich wach
____ ausgesprochen wach

6. Wie ist Ihr Appetit während der ersten halben Stunde, nachdem Sie morgens aufgewacht sind?

____ überhaupt nicht groß
____ nicht sehr groß
____ ziemlich groß
____ ausgesprochen groß

7. Wie müde fühlen Sie sich während der ersten halben Stunde, nachdem Sie morgens aufgewacht sind?

____ ausgesprochen müde
____ ziemlich müde
____ ziemlich frisch
____ ausgesprochen frisch

8. Wenn Sie am nächsten Morgen keinerlei Verpflichtung haben, zu welcher Zeit gehen Sie dann – verglichen mit anderen Tagen – zu Bett?

____ nicht später
____ weniger als eine Stunde später
____ ein bis zwei Stunden später
____ mehr als zwei Stunden später

9. Stellen Sich sich vor, Sie würden sich mit einem Freund verabreden, um Sport zu treiben. Der Freund schlägt Ihnen vor, sich zweimal pro Woche zu treffen und die beste Zeit für ihn wäre morgens zwischen 7.00 und 8.00 Uhr. Wenn Sie nun nur Ihren besten Wohlfühlrhythmus vor Augen haben, in welcher Leistung würden Sie sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt wohl befinden?

____ würde mich in guter Form befinden
____ würde mich in angemessener Form befinden
____ würde ich schwierig finden
____ würde ich sehr schwierig finden

10. Zu welcher Zeit am Abend fühlen Sie sich müde und betrachten es daher als angebracht, zu Bett zu gehen?

Uhrzeit:

20.00 ----- 21.00 ----- 22.00----- 23.00----- 0.00----- 1.00----- 2.00----- 3.00------ 4.00

11. Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie hätten am nächsten Tag eine mental sehr anstrengende Prüfung, die zwei Stunden dauern würde und bei der Sie gerne eine möglichst gute Leistung zeigen möchten. Wenn Sie völlig frei wären, den Tag zu planen und nur Ihren eigenen „Wohlfühlrhythmus“ vor Augen hätten, welche der folgenden vier Prüfungszeiten würden Sie wählen?

____ 8.00 – 10.00 Uhr
____ 11.00 – 1.00 Uhr
____ 15.00 – 17.00 Uhr
____ 19.00 – 21.00 Uhr

12. Wenn Sie um 23.00 Uhr ins Bett gingen, wie müde wären Sie dann?

____ überhaupt nicht müde
____ ein wenig müde
____ ziemlich müde
____ sehr müde

13. Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie wären aus irgendwelchen Gründen mehrere Stunden später als üblich zu Bett gegangen, aber es gäbe keinen Grund am nächsten Morgen zu einer bestimmten Zeit aufzustehen. Welche der folgenden Möglichkeiten würde am wahrscheinlichsten passieren?

____ würde zur gleichen Zeit aufwachen wie gewöhnlich und nicht wieder einschlafen
____ würde zur gleichen Zeit aufwachen wie gewöhnlich und danach weiterdösen
____ würde zur gleichen Zeit aufwachen wie gewöhnlich, aber danach wieder einschlafen
____ würde erst später als gewöhnlich aufwachen

14. Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie müssten in einer Nacht zwischen 4.00 und 6.00 Uhr wach sein, um einen Nachtdienst durchzuführen. Am nächsten Tag hätten Sie keinerlei Verpflichtungen. Welche der folgenden Alternative würde am besten zu Ihnen passen?

____ ich würde nicht zu Bett gehen bis der Nachtdienst vorbei wäre
____ ich würde vorher ein Nickerchen machen und anschließend richtig schlafen
____ ich würde vorher richtig schlafen gehen und anschließend ein Nickerchen machen
____ ich würde nur vorher schlafen und anschließend überhaupt nicht mehr

Intergroup group distinctiveness manipulation

1. **Hight distinctiveness condition**

Leseverständnis

In der folgenden Aufgabe geht es um Leseverständnis. Bitte lesen Sie die folgende kurze Beschreibung einer Studie, die an der Universität Jena durchgeführt wurde:

Ein großes Interesse im Bereich der Sozialpsychologie gilt der Herkunft der Menschen und insbesondere ihrer Kultur. Psychologen interessieren sich besonders für den Zusammenhang zwischen der Kultur und bestimmten Aspekten der Persönlichkeit eines Individuums. So hat in den letzten Jahren eine Vielzahl an Studien die Ähnlichkeit von Deutschtürken und Deutschen dahingehend untersucht, welche Wichtigkeit sie verschiedenen Werten in ihrem Leben (z.B. Familie, Erfolg, Tradition und Karriere) beimessen. Die Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena hat 2017 eine umfassende Studie durchgeführt, in welcher 100 Deutschtürken und 100 Deutschen mehrere Fragen bezüglich dieser Werte gestellt wurden. Die Forscher stellten fest, dass es *große Unterschiede* darin gibt, welche Wichtigkeit Deutschtürken und Deutsche jeweils diesen Werten beimessen.

Bitte sehen Sie sich das untenstehende Histogramm an. Es zeigt die von Deutschtürken und Deutschen durchschnittlich den Werten beigemessene Wichtigkeit in ihren Leben (die Deutschtürken sind in den dunkleren Balken dargestellt, die Deutschen sind in den diagonalen Linien dargestellt).



Ähnlichkeit in der beigemessenen Wichtigkeit der Werte

Wie Sie in der oberen Abbildung erkennen können, zeigen die Ergebnisse der Studie, dass sich die beigemessene Wichtigkeit der Werte zwischen deutsch-türkischen und deutschen Teilnehmern unterscheidet und sich nicht überlappt.

2. Low intergroup distinctiveness

Leseverständnis

In der folgenden Aufgabe geht es um Leseverständnis. Bitte lesen Sie die folgende kurze Beschreibung einer Studie, die an der Universität Jena durchgeführt wurde:

Ein großes Interesse im Bereich der Sozialpsychologie gilt der Herkunft der Menschen und insbesondere ihrer Kultur. Psychologen interessieren sich besonders für den Zusammenhang zwischen der Kultur und bestimmten Aspekten der Persönlichkeit eines Individuums. So hat in den letzten Jahren eine Vielzahl an Studien die Ähnlichkeit von Deutschtürken und Deutschen dahingehend untersucht, welche Wichtigkeit sie verschiedenen Werten in ihrem Leben (z.B. Familie, Erfolg, Tradition und Karriere) beimessen. Die Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena hat 2017 eine umfassende Studie durchgeführt, in welcher 100 Deutschtürken und 100 Deutschen mehrere Fragen bezüglich dieser Werte gestellt wurden. Die Forscher stellten fest, dass es *geringe Unterschiede* darin gibt, welche Wichtigkeit Deutschtürken und Deutsche jeweils diesen Werten beimessen.

Bitte sehen Sie sich das untenstehende Histogramm an. Es zeigt die von Deutschtürken und Deutschen durchschnittlich den Werten beigemessene Wichtigkeit in ihren Leben (die Deutschtürken sind in den dunkleren Balken dargestellt, die Deutschen sind in den diagonalen Linien dargestellt und die Überlappung der beigemessenen Wichtigkeit wird durch den gepunkteten Bereich dargestellt).



Ähnlichkeit in der beigemessenen Wichtigkeit der Werte

Wie Sie in der oberen Abbildung erkennen können, zeigen die Ergebnisse der Studie, dass die beigemessene Wichtigkeit der Werte zwischen deutsch-türkischen und deutschen Teilnehmern, ähnlich ist und sich überlappt.

Manipulation check of intergroup distinctiveness

Auf Grundlage der oben genannten Ergebnisse, wie sehr stimmen Sie zu, dass herausgefunden wurde, dass:

The original German version
1. Deutschtürken und Deutsche sehen ähnliche Werte als wichtig an
2. sich die beigemessene Wichtigkeit von Werten durch Deutschtürken und Deutsche unterscheidet

3. sich die beigemessene Wichtigkeit von Werten durch Deutschtürken und Deutsche überlappt

Self-stereotyping

Wir sind alle Mitglieder verschiedener Gruppen und Kategorien. Geben Sie bei den folgenden Aussagen an, wie Sie es subjektiv empfinden, ein/e Deutsche/r zu sein. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten bei dieser Aufgabe; wir sind lediglich an Ihren persönlichen, ehrlichen Einschätzungen interessiert. Inwieweit stimmen Sie den folgenden Aussagen zu?

The original German version
1. Ich habe viele Gemeinsamkeiten mit einer/m typischen Deutschen
2. Ich ähnele einer/m typischen Deutschen sehr
3. Ich bin ein/e typische/r Deutsche/r

Name change manipulation

1. **Name change condition**

Die Forscher haben in der oben genannten Studie zudem einige Teilnehmer interviewt und ihnen weitere, offene Fragen gestellt. Bitte lesen Sie das nachfolgende Persönlichkeitsprofil eines Studienteilnehmers mit dem Namen Michael:

Michael ist ein deutscher Staatsbürger, der dort auch lebt. Er ist 22 Jahre alt. Michael wurde in Deutschland geboren und ist dort aufgewachsen. Er absolvierte seine Schulausbildung und studierte dort an einer Universität. Seine Muttersprache ist Deutsch. Michaels Familie hat türkische Wurzeln. Seine Familie kam in den 70er Jahren nach Deutschland.

Friendly intentions before

In den folgenden Fragen interessieren wir uns dafür, wie Sie über Michael denken.

The original German version
1. Ich würde Michael gerne kennenlernen
2. Michael ist jemand, mit dem ich gerne befreundet wäre
3. Michael ist mir sympathisch

Bitte lesen Sie die folgenden Informationen über Michael und beantworten Sie die Fragen:

Als Michael geboren wurde, hieß er Mehmet. Als er aber heranwuchs, entschied er sich, seinen Namen zu Michael zu ändern. Seitdem stellt er sich jedes Mal, wenn er neue Leute kennenlernt, als Michael vor. Seinen wirklichen Namen offenbart er gegenüber niemanden, außer wenn er dies muss, etwa wenn er mit öffentlichen Behörden zu tun hat. Auf der Arbeit zum Beispiel kennt ihn jeder als Michael. Allerdings kennt sein Chef seinen wirklichen Namen und alle seine offiziellen Dokumente sind mit seinem offiziellen Namen versehen (Mehmet).

Name change manipulation check

Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen über die Person, über die Sie in der vorherigen Biographie gelesen haben.

The original German version
Ist Michael ein deutscher Staatsbürger ? 1. Ja 2. Nein
Stammt Michaels Familie ursprünglich aus der Türkei?

1. Ja 2. Nein
Nennt sich diese Person anders? 1. Ja 2. Nein

Friendly intentions after

Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen

The original German version
1. Ich mag Michael
2. Ich möchte mit Michael befreundet sein
3. Michael macht einen guten Eindruck auf mich

2. No name change condition

Die Forscher haben in der oben genannten Studie zudem einige Teilnehmer interviewt und ihnen weitere, offene Fragen gestellt. Bitte lesen Sie das nachfolgende Persönlichkeitsprofil eines Studienteilnehmers mit dem Namen Michael:

Mehmet ist ein deutscher Staatsbürger, der dort auch lebt. Er ist 22 Jahre alt. Mehmet wurde in Deutschland geboren und ist dort aufgewachsen. Er absolvierte seine Schulausbildung und studierte dort an einer Universität. Seine Muttersprache ist Deutsch. Mehmets Familie hat türkische Wurzeln. Seine Familie kam in den 70er Jahren nach Deutschland.

Manipulation check

In den folgenden Fragen interessieren wir uns dafür, wie Sie über Michael denken.

Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen über die Person, über die Sie in der vorherigen Biographie gelesen haben.

The original German version
1. Ist Mehmet ein deutscher Staatsbürger? Ja Nein
2. Stammt Mehmet Familie ursprünglich aus der Türkei? Ja Nein

Friendly intentions after

Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen.

The original German version
1. Ich mag Mehmet
2. Ich möchte mit Mehmet befreundet sein
3. Mehmet macht einen guten Eindruck auf mich

The following scales were filled by participants in all conditions. Targets' names followed the condition that participants were assigned to; Michael in the name change condition and Mehmet in the authentic condition.

Personality evaluation

Wie sehr ist Michael Ihrer Meinung nach:

The original German version
1. intelligent
2. vertrauenswürdig
3. hinterhältig
4. aufgeschlossen
5. liebenswürdig
6. nett
7. verlogen
8. interessant
9. freundlich
10. betrügerisch
11. angesehen
12. ehrlich

Negative emotions

Wie sehr fühlen Sie das Folgende, wenn Sie über Michael lesen?

The original German version
1. Genervt
2. Irritiert
3. Verletzt
4. Verachtung

5. Verärgert
6. Abgeneigt
7. Angst
8. Angeekelt

Damage

Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen.

The original German version
1. Menschen wie Michael sind verantwortlich dafür, wenn die Deutschen einen schlechten Ruf haben
2. Menschen wie Michael sind schlecht für Deutschland
3. Michael stellt die Deutschen in ein schlechtes Licht
4. Michael bringt andere Menschen dazu, auf die Deutschen herabzuschauen
5. Menschen wie Michael lassen die Deutschen vor anderen schlecht aussehen
6. Menschen wie Michael machen es leicht, die Deutschen zu kritisieren
7. Wegen Menschen wie Michael haben die Deutschen einen schlechten Ruf.

8. Michaels Verhalten bedroht unsere Integrität als Deutsche

Impostorship

Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen.

The original German version
1. Michael gibt vor jemand zu sein, der er nicht ist
2. Menschen wie Michael sind Hochstapler

The inability to identify real Germans

The original German version
1. Wegen Menschen wie Michael sind wirkliche Deutsche schwer zu identifizieren

Categorizing the target

Item 2 was not included in the scale

The original German version
1. Wenn ich Michael treffen würde, wüsste ich nicht, ob er Türke oder Deutscher ist
2. Hätte ich nicht gewusst, dass Michael Türke ist, wäre ich nicht darauf gekommen

3. Wenn ich Michael treffen würde, wäre ich mir über seine Herkunft nicht sicher

Exploratory measures

Perceived target's national identification

Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen**.**

The original German version
1. Michael identifiziert sich stark mit seinem Deutsch-Sein
2. Michael sieht sich selbst mehr als Deutscher denn als Türke
3. Eigentlich ist Michael in der Türkei zuhause
4. Türke zu sein ist für Michael wichtiger als Deutscher zu sein
5. Michael identifiziert sich stark mit seinem Türkisch-Sein
6. Eigentlich ist Michael zu Hause in Deutschland
7. Michael ist es egal ob er Deutsch ist

National exclusion scale (adapted from (Ditlmann et al., 2011)

Für manche Menschen gibt es gewisse Voraussetzungen, um als wirklich deutsch zu sein. Bitte geben Sie an, wie wichtig die folgenden Aussagen <u>für Sie</u> sind. Dabei bedeutet 1 „Finde ich überhaupt nicht wichtig" und 7 „Finde ich sehr wichtig".

The original German version
Um wirklich deutsch zu sein, ist es wichtig, dass man...
1. ...die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft besitzt
2. ... die deutsche Sprache spricht
3. ... deutsche Vorfahren hat
4. ... in Deutschland geboren ist
5. ... die meiste Zeit seines Lebens in Deutschland gelebt hat
6. ... Christ ist
7. ... die Gesetze und politischen Institutionen Deutschlands respektiert
8. ... sich deutsch fühlt
9. ....einen deutschen Namen hat

Trust in the reported results

The original German version
Bitte geben Sie an, als wie verlässlich Sie die Ergebnisse der oben beschriebenen Studie (Leseverständnisaufgabe) einstufen: gar nicht 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 sehr

Study 2

Measurements that were identical to those in Study 1 are not reported below.

Target's profile

Bitte lesen Sie das nachfolgende Persönlichkeitsprofil einer Person mit dem Namen Mehmet:

Mehmet ist ein deutscher Staatsbürger, der dort auch lebt. Er ist 22 Jahre alt. Mehmet wurde in Deutschland geboren und ist dort aufgewachsen. Er absolvierte seine Schulausbildung und studierte dort an einer Universität. Seine Muttersprache ist Deutsch. Mehmets Familie hat türkische Wurzeln. Seine Familie kam in den 70er Jahren nach Deutschland.

Mehmet arbeitet an einer deutschen Universität. An der Universität arbeitet er als Tutor für ausländische Studierende, die für das Studium aus dem Ausland nach Deutschland kommen. Er hilft ihnen bei ihrem Studium und bei Angelegenheiten im Zusammenhang mit Ämtern und Einrichtungen auf dem Campus.

Hier sind weitere Informationen über Mehmet. Bitte lesen Sie den folgenden Text und beantworten Sie die untenstehenden Fragen .

Manchmal befragen Studierende Mehmet zum Leben in Deutschland. Er wurde zum Beispiel gefragt: „*Was denkst du über die Deutschen?". Mehmet antwortet dann: „Wenn ich an uns Deutsche denke, glaube ich, dass wir ziemlich unfreundliche und sehr herablassende Menschen sind. Ich glaube auch, dass die Leute bei uns im Allgemeinen sehr undiplomatisch sind. Ein Wesenszug, der mir besonders an uns auffällt, ist der schlechte Sinn für Humor.*"

Manipulation check 1

This manipulation check was identical to the name change manipulation check used in Study 1.

Manipulation check 2

Bitte beantworten Sie die folgende Frage, welche sich auf den obigen Kommentar bezieht. Dabei bedeutet 1 "nicht sehr positiv" und 7 "sehr positiv".

The original German version
Als wie positiv beurteilen Sie Mehmets Aussage über Deutsche? nicht sehr positiv 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 sehr positiv

Negative affect

The original German version
Genervt
1. Irritiert
2. Verletzt
3. Verachtung
4. Angeekelt
5. Genervt

Constructiveness of the comment

Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen über Mehmets Kommentar.

The original German version
1. Als wie fair beurteilen Sie Mehmets Aussage gegenüber Deutschen?
2. Zu welchem Grad denken Sie, waren die Kommentare konstruktiv?

3. Zu welchem Grad denken Sie, dass Deutschland für Mehmet wichtig ist?
4. Zu welchem Grad denken Sie, dass Mehmets Kommentare im besten Interesse für Deutschland waren?
5. Zu welchem Grad denken Sie, waren Mehmets Kommentare gut fundiert?
6. Zu welchem Grad denken Sie, dass Mehmet das Recht hat, diese Kommentare zu machen?
7. Zu welchem Grad denken Sie, dass Mehmet qualifiziert ist, diese Kommentare zu machen?

Exploratory measures

Intergroup distinctiveness threat

Bitte geben Sie an, zu welchem Grad Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen.

The original German version
1. Mehmet verwischt die Grenzen zwischen wirklichen Deutschen und Migranten
2. Mehmet verwischt die Unterschiede zwischen wirklichen Deutschen und Migranten
3. Mehmet verringert Unterschiede zwischen wirklichen Deutschen und Migranten

4. Mehmet erschwert eine Aussage darüber, wer wirklich deutsch ist und wer nicht
5. Mehmets Verhalten bedroht unsere Integrität als Deutsche

Target perceived identification with Germany

Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen.

The original German version
1. Mehmet identifiziert sich stark mit seinem Deutsch-Sein
2. Mehmet sieht sich selbst mehr als Deutscher denn als Türke
3. Eigentlich ist Mehmet in der Türkei zu Hause
4. Türke zu sein ist für Mehmet wichtiger als Deutscher zu sein
5. Mehmet identifiziert sich stark mit seinem Türkisch-Sein
6. Eigentlich ist Mehmet zu Hause in Deutschland

Additional analysis

Pre-test of criticism manipulation

Instructions:

Bitte geben Sie an zu welchem Grad Sie die folgenden Aussagen als negativ oder positiv empfinden. Dabei bedeutet 1 "sehr negativ" und 7 "sehr positiv".

Items, means and SD are presented below

The original German version **Items**	**Mean**	**SD**
1. Die Deutschen sind im Allgemeinen eine ungebildete Gesellschaft	1,77	1,09
2. Die Deutschen sind ziemlich rassistisch	1,87	1,02
3. Die Deutschen sind nicht so zivilisiert wie andere Gesellschaften	1,90	0,87
4. Die Deutschen sind sehr undiplomatisch	2,06	0,77
5. Die Deutschen sind sehr herablassend	2,13	1,36
6. Die Deutschen sind intolerant gegenüber Ausländern	2,23	1,38
7. Die Deutschen sind anderen gegenüber sehr aggressiv	2,29	1,10
8. Die Deutschen sind ein ziemlich unfreundliches Volk.	2,35	1,36
9. Die Deutschen haben einen schlechten Sinn für Humor.	2,65	1,25
10. Die Deutschen sind nicht einfühlsam	2,68	1,40
11. Die Deutschen sind sehr gierig	2,68	1,25
12. Die Deutschen sind ziemlich kalt	2,81	1,40
13. Die Deutschen sind sehr arrogant	2,84	1,39
14. Die Deutschen sind sehr unemotional	2,90	1,37
15. Die Deutschen sind sehr geizig	2,97	1,52
16. Die Deutschen sind sehr egozentrisch	3,10	1,60

17. Die Deutschen sind nicht fähig, Small Talk zu halten	3,19	1,47
18. Die Deutschen sind sehr distanziert	3,42	1,52
19. Die Deutschen sind sehr zynisch	3,50	1,48
20. Die Deutschen sind sehr gehorsam	3,90	1,54
21. Die Deutschen sind sehr pedantisch	4,00	1,21
22. Die Deutschen sind sehr traditionell	4,06	1,39
23. Die Deutschen sind ziemlich direkt	4,81	0,98
24. Die Deutschen sind sehr bescheiden	4,97	1,25
25. Die Deutschen sind sehr selbstsicher	5,00	1,37
26. Die Deutschen lieben Regeln	5,06	1,67
27. Die Deutschen sind sehr großzügig	5,13	1,45
28. Die Deutschen sind ziemlich warmherzige Menschen	5,13	1,63
29. Die Deutschen lieben Ordnung	5,23	1,33
30. Die Deutschen sind sehr zivilisiert	5,32	1,19
31. Die Deutschen sind sehr ehrlich	5,39	1,23
32. Die Deutschen sind sehr höflich	5,42	1,06
33. Die Deutschen haben einen guten Sinn für Humor	5,48	1,43
34. Die Deutschen sind sehr kultiviert	5,52	1,09
35. Die Deutschen sind sehr diplomatisch	5,55	1,26
36. Die Deutschen sind sehr effizienzorientiert	5,55	1,21
37. Die Deutschen sind ein ziemlich freundliches Volk	5,58	1,31
38. Die Deutschen sind sehr gut organisiert	5,61	0,92
39. Die Deutschen sind sehr aufrichtig	5,61	1,17

40. Die Deutschen sind sehr pünktlich	5,65	1,11
41. Die Deutschen sind sehr vertrauenswürdig	5,65	1,08
42. Die Deutschen haben ein gutes Benehmen	5,65	1,23
43. Mit Deutschen kann man gut arbeiten	5,90	0,91
44. Die Deutschen sind ein fleißiges Volk	5,94	0,89
45. Die Deutschen sind im Allgemeinen eine gebildete Gesellschaft	6,03	0,71

Study 3

Scales that were also used in the studies reported above are not reported again below.

Manipulation of the target's ethnicity

Bitte lesen Sie das nachfolgende Persönlichkeitsprofil einer Person mit dem Namen Michael:

1. **German target**

Michael ist ein deutscher Staatsbürger, der dort auch lebt. Er ist 22 Jahre alt. Michael wurde in Deutschland geboren und ist dort aufgewachsen. Er absolvierte seine Schulausbildung und studierte dort an einer Universität. Seine Muttersprache ist Deutsch. Michaels Familie ist schon immer deutsch.

Als Michael geboren wurde, hieß er Johannes. Als Michael aber heranwuchs, entschied er sich, seinen Namen zu Michael zu ändern. Seitdem stellt er sich jedes Mal, wenn er neue Leute kennenlernt, als Michael vor. Seinen wirklichen Namen offenbart er gegenüber niemanden, außer wenn er dies muss, etwa wenn er mit öffentlichen Behörden zu tun hat. Auf der Arbeit zum Beispiel kennt ihn jeder als Michael. Allerdings kennt sein Chef seinen wirklichen Namen und alle seine offiziellen Dokumente sind mit seinem offiziellen Namen versehen (Johannes).

Michael arbeitet an einer deutschen Universität. An der Universität arbeitet er als Tutor für ausländische Studierende, die für das Studium aus dem Ausland nach Deutschland kommen. Er hilft ihnen bei ihrem Studium und bei Angelegenheiten im Zusammenhang mit Ämtern und Einrichtungen auf dem Campus.

2. **Turkish target**

Michael ist ein deutscher Staatsbürger, der dort auch lebt. Er ist 22 Jahre alt. Michael wurde in Deutschland geboren und ist dort aufgewachsen. Er absolvierte seine Schulausbildung und studierte dort an einer Universität. Seine Muttersprache ist Deutsch. Michaels Familie hat türkische Wurzeln. Seine Familie kam in den 70er Jahren nach Deutschland .

Als Michael geboren wurde, hieß er Mehmet. Als er aber heranwuchs, entschied er sich, seinen Namen zu Michael zu ändern. Seitdem stellt er sich jedes Mal, wenn er neue Leute kennenlernt, als Michael vor. Seinen wirklichen Namen offenbart er gegenüber niemanden, außer wenn er dies muss, etwa wenn er mit öffentlichen Behörden zu tun hat. Auf der Arbeit zum Beispiel kennt ihn jeder als Michael. Allerdings kennt sein Chef seinen wirklichen

Namen und alle seine offiziellen Dokumente sind mit seinem offiziellen Namen versehen (Mehmet).

Michael arbeitet an einer deutschen Universität. An der Universität arbeitet er als Tutor für ausländische Studierende, die für das Studium aus dem Ausland nach Deutschland kommen. Er hilft ihnen bei ihrem Studium und bei Angelegenheiten im Zusammenhang mit Ämtern und Einrichtungen auf dem Campus.

Manipulation of the comment valence

Hier sind weitere Informationen über Michael. Bitte lesen Sie den folgenden Text und beantworten Sie die untenstehenden Fragen.

1. Positive comment (praise)

Manchmal befragen Studierende Michael zum Leben in Deutschland. Er wurde zum Beispiel gefragt: „*Was denkst du über die Deutschen?“. Michael antwortet dann: „Wenn ich an uns Deutsche denke, glaube ich, dass wir sehr aufrichtige und sehr vertrauenswürdige Menschen sind. Ich glaube auch, dass die Leute bei uns im Allgemeinen sehr gebildet sind. Ein Wesenszug, der mir besonders an uns auffällt, ist, dass wir fleißig sind.*“

2. Negative comment (criticism)

Manchmal befragen Studierende Michael zum Leben in Deutschland. Er wurde zum Beispiel gefragt: „*Was denkst du über die Deutschen?“. Michael antwortet dann: „Wenn ich an uns Deutsche denke, glaube ich, dass wir ziemlich unfreundliche und sehr herablassende Menschen sind. Ich glaube auch, dass die Leute bei uns im Allgemeinen sehr undiplomatisch sind. Ein Wesenszug, der mir besonders an uns auffällt, ist der schlechte Sinn für Humor.*“

Study 4

Identification scale

English translation	The original Hebrew version
1. I feel strongly affiliated with Israel	אני חש קרבה נפשית למדינת ישראל.
2. Other states can learn a lot from Israel	מדינות אחרות יכולות ללמוד הרבה ממדינת ישראל.
3. Belonging to Israel is an important part of my identity.	העובדה שאני ישראלי היא חלק חשוב מזהותי.
4. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the Israeli state's leaders.	בעת בעיה, כדאי להסתמך על מנהיגי המדינה.
5. I am strongly committed to Israel.	אני חש מחויבות גבוהה למדינת ישראל.
6. Relative to other states, Israel is a very moral state.	מדינת ישראל הנה בעלת מוסריות גבוהה יחסית למדינות אחרות.
7. When I talk about Israelis, I usually say "we" rather than "they."	כשאני מדבר על ישראלים אני בדרך כלל אומר "אנחנו" ולא "הם".
8. It is disloyal to criticize Israel.	העברת ביקורת על המדינה היא ביטוי לחוסר נאמנות לה.

Loyalty manipulation

English translation	The original Hebrew version
1. Loyal condition Hello, my name is Shadi. I was asked to say a sentence as a voice message and this is the sentence I chose: yesterday I was at an event before which everyone	שלום, שמי שאדי. התבקשתי להגיד משפט אחד בטור חתימה קולית וזה המשפט שבחרתי- אתמול הייתי באירוע. לפני תחילתו שרו את התקווה. כולנו עמדנו לכבוד ההמנון. עמדתי מתוך מחויבות ונאמנות לאזרחות

stood for the national anthem. We all stood for the anthem. I stood because of loyalty to my Israeli citizenship and respect for the symbols of the state. Goodbye, Shadi.	שלי במדינת ישראל, ומתוך כבוד לסמלים של המדינה. להתראות שאדי.
2. Disloyal condition Hello, my name is Shadi. I was asked to say a sentence as a voice message and this is the sentence I chose: yesterday I was at an event before which everyone stood for the national anthem. I refused to stand because of commitment and loyalty to the Palestinian nation and objection to symbols that do not include me. Goodbye, Shadi.	שלום, שמי שאדי. התבקשתי להגיד משפט אחד בטור חתימה קולית וזה המשפט שבחרתי- אתמול הייתי באירוע לפני תחילתו כולם עמדו לכבוד ההמנון. סירבתי לעמוד מתוך מחויבות ונאמנות לעם הפלסטיני, ומתוך התנגדות לתת כבוד לסמלים שלא מכלילים אותי. להתראות שאדי.

Positive and negative evaluations

English translation	**The original Hebrew version**
1. Do you feel affection towards the person?	האם את/ה חש/ה חיבה כלפי האדם ששמעת בהקלטה?
2. Do you feel uncomfortable with this person?	האם את/ה חש/ה אי-נוחות כלפי האדם הזה?
3. Do you think this person makes you feel proud?	האם לפי הרגשתך האדם הזה גאה?
4. Does this person leave a positive impression on you?	האם האדם הזה מעורר רושם חיובי?
5. Do you feel this person is nice?	האם האדם הזה נעים לך?
6. Do you feel this person is impressive?	האם את/ה חש/ה שהאדם הזה מרשים?

7. Do you feel disgusted when I hear the person?	האם את/ה חש/ה סלידה כלפי האדם ששמעת בהקלטה?
8. Do you feel closeness towards this person?	האם את/ה חש/ה קירבה כלפי האדם הזה?
9. Do you feel this person is honest?	האם את/ה חש/ה שהאדם הזה כן?
10. Does this person leave a negative impression on you?	האם האדם הזה מעורר רושם שלילי?
11. Do you feel that this person makes you want to laugh at him?	האם את/ה חש/ה שהאדם הזה מעורר לעג?
12. Does this person annoy you?	האם האדם הזה מעצבן אותך?
13. Do you feel distance toward this person?	האם את/ה חש/ה ריחוק כלפי האדם הזה?

Impostorship

English translation	**The original Hebrew version**
1. Do you feel this person is a fake?	האם לפי הרגשתך האדם הזה מזויף?
2. Do you feel this person is a sycophant?	האם לפי הרגשתך האדם הזה חנפן?
3. Do you feel this person is honest?	האם את/ה חש/ה שהאדם הזה כן?

Additional scales

Trans-Generational and Endurance of Ingroup Suffering

Before completing the identification scale, participants were asked to fill the Trans-Generational and Endurance of Ingroup Suffering scale (taken from Kahn et al., 2017) which was used for exploratory purposes and was not included in the main analysis.

English translation	The original Hebrew version
1. For me, my national group includes all the generations of group members that ever have and ever will live	עבורי, הקבוצה הלאומית שלי כוללת את כל דורות חברי הקבוצה שחיו ויחיו אי פעם.
2. When I think of my national group, I don't only think of the current generation, but also of all the generations of the group of the past	כשאני חושב על הקבוצה הלאומית שלי, אני חושב לא רק על הדור הנוכחי, אלא גם על כל הדורות של חברי הקבוצה בעבר.
3. When I think of my national group, I don't only think of the current generation, but also all the generations of the group of the future	כשאני חושב על הקבוצה הלאומית שלי, אני חושב לא רק על הדור הנוכחי, אלא גם על כל הדורות של חברי הקבוצה בעתיד.
4. I don't believe that there is a national identity that we carry from generation to generation	אני לא מאמין שיש זהות לאומית מהותית שאנו נושאים בכל דור ודור.
5. Members of my national group in every generation share a common base that unites each other across the generations	חברי הקבוצה הלאומית שלי בכל דור ודור, חולקים יסוד משותף שמאחד אותנו מעבר לדורות השונים.

Study 5

Identification scale

The original German version
1. Ich denke oft an die Tatsache, dass ich Deutsche/-r bin
2. Die Tatsache, dass ich ein/-e Deutsche/-r bin, ist ein wichtiger Teil meiner Identität
3. Deutsche/-r zu sein ist ein wichtiger Teil dessen, wie ich mich selbst sehe
4. Ich fühle mich mit Deutschen verbunden
5. Ich empfinde Solidarität mit Deutschen
6. Ich fühle mich in das, was Deutsche betrifft, involviert
7. Ich bin froh, dass ich deutsch bin
8. Ich finde es angenehm, deutsch zu sein
9. Es gibt mir ein gutes Gefühl, deutsch zu sein
10. Ich habe viele Gemeinsamkeiten mit einer/-m typischen Deutschen
11. Ich ähnele einer/-m typischen Deutschen sehr
12. Ich denke, dass Deutsche auf vieles stolz sein können
13. Deutsche haben viele Gemeinsamkeiten miteinander

14. Deutsche ähneln sich einander sehr

Newspaper article

Please note that the article was designed to look like an article from a popular German newspaper and included a picture with a Turkish flag.

Liebe Teilnehmer, liebe Teilnehmerinnen,

Bitte lesen Sie den folgenden Text, um den Kontext zu verstehen, in dem die Person die Entscheidung getroffen hat. Es handelt sich um einen Zeitungsartikel vom April 2017 über das Referendum in der Türkei. Für diese Studie wurde nur ein Ausschnitt des Textes verwendet. Bitte lesen Sie den Artikel und beantworten Sie anschließend die Fragen dazu.

Referendum in der Türkei

Ein Land am Scheideweg

Mehr Macht für Präsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan - darum geht es am Sonntag bei der Abstimmung über die türkische Verfassungsreform. Was das bedeutet und was zu erwarten ist. Der Überblick.

Die steht am 16. April vor einer weitreichenden Entscheidung. Die Bürger sind aufgerufen, in einem Referendum über die künftige Macht des Staatspräsidenten zu entscheiden. Das heißt im Klartext: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will per Verfassungsänderung den Wechsel mehr Macht erhalten. Das türkische Parlament hat bereits zugestimmt. Da dort jedoch eine Zweidrittelmehrheit nicht zustande kam, ist ein Votum der Wähler erforderlich.

Stimmt die Mehrheit der Wähler für Erdogan, soll die türkische Verfassung geändert werden. Dem Präsidenten erlangt dadurch deutlich mehr Macht als bisher: Er ist Staats- und Regierungschef zugleich und darf, anders als bisher, einer Partei angehören und sie sogar führen. Das Amt des Ministerpräsidenten wird es nicht mehr geben. Parlament und Justiz werden deutlich geschwächt.

Die etwa 1,4 Millionen türkische Staatsbürger, die in Deutschland leben, waren ebenfalls wahlberechtigt. Sie durften ihre Stimme vom 27. März bis zum 9. April in der türkischen Botschaft in Berlin oder den türkischen Konsulaten abgeben.

Die Beziehung zwischen Deutschland und der Türkei ist seit Juli 2016 angespannt. Nach dem Putschversuch im Sommer 2016 hat die türkische Regierung den Ausnahmezustand

verhängt. Das bedeutet die Freiheitsrechte türkischer Bürger sind stark eingeschränkt. Die Regierung hat die Aufarbeitung des Putschversuchs und anhaltende Terrorattacken als Begründung herangezogen, dutzende Medienhäuser zu schließen und Journalisten zu inhaftieren. Der regierungskritischen Presse hat sie damit einen heftigen Schlag versetzt. Der deutsche Außenminister Sigmar Gabriel sagte kürzlich, das Verhältnis von Deutschland und der Türkei "steht gerade vor einer der größten Belastungsproben in der Gegenwart". Es gebe "sehr große Bewertungsunterschiede" bei der Presse- und Meinungsfreiheit zwischen beiden Ländern, so Gabriel.

Doch nicht nur die Presse ist betroffen: Erdoğan regiert nun per Dekret. Wer ihm widerspricht, wird als vermeintlicher Putschist verfolgt. Fast 140.000 Staatsbeamte wurden seit dem vergangenen Juli vom Dienst suspendiert, etwa 50.000 Menschen verhaftet.

…

Manipulation checks (reading comprehension of the newspaper article)

The original German version
Was wollte Erdogan? 1. Ein Referendum zur Verfassungsänderung 2. Pressekonferenz über eine Verfassungsänderung
Wie viele Menschen wurden nach dem Putsch verhaftet? 1. 50.000 Menschen 2. 1.000 Menschen
Was beabsichtigte Erdogan damit? 1. die demokratischen Werte stärken 2. seine Präsidialmachtstärken

Target's profile

Bitte lesen Sie sich nun die Beschreibung eines Wählers durch:

Die Universität Jena interessierte sich dafür, wie Menschen in dem Referendum wählen werden. Deshalb wurden Türk/-innen mit Migrationshintergrund, die nicht in der Türkei leben am Tag der Wahl von Forscher/-innen der Universität befragt.
Der folgende Text ist eine kurze Biographie über den deutsch-türkischen Mehmet: Mehmet ist 22 Jahre alt. Er wurde in Deutschland geboren und ist dort aufgewachsen. Seine Muttersprache ist Deutsch. Mehmet Familie hat türkische Wurzeln. Seine Familie kam in den 70'er Jahren nach Deutschland. Mehmet absolvierte die Schule in Deutschland und studierte dort an einer Universität.

Vote manipulation

1. **No voter condition**

Bezüglich des Referendums äußerte sich Mehmet folgendermaßen gegenüber den Forscher/-innen:

„Natürlich habe ich mit „Nein" gestimmt. Erdogan ist ein schlechter Präsident, der die Türkei ruiniert hat und weiter ruinieren wird. Dieser Mann ist ziemlich machtbesessen. Die Türkei war einmal auf dem Weg, ein demokratisches Land zu werden. Heute schäme ich mich für meine türkischen Wurzeln."

2. **Yes voter condition**

„Natürlich habe ich mit "Ja" gestimmt. Erdogan ist ein starker Führer, der die Türkei nach vorne gebracht hat und weiterhin nach vorne bringen wird. Er hat die Türkei wieder zu einer regionalen Macht gemacht und den Türken Selbstbewusstsein zurückgegeben. Heute bin ich stolz auf meine türkischen Wurzeln."

Vote manipulation check

The original German version
Wie hat Mehmet bei dem türkischen Referendum abgestimmt? 1. Ja 2. Nein
Woher stammt Mehmets Familie ursprünglich? 1. Türkei 2. Deutschland

Discrimination and deportation

The original German version
1. Deutschland sollte sicher stellen, dass Menschen wie Mehmet nicht in einen deutschen Stadtrat gewählt werden können
2. Deutsche Behörden sollten das Recht haben, Menschen wie Mehmet in die Türkei abzuschieben
3. Deutschland sollte das Recht haben, Deutschtürken davon abzuhalten an Wahlen in der Türkei teilzunehmen
4. Deutschland sollte sicherstellen, dass Menschen wie Mehmet nicht

als Politiker in den deutschen Bundestag gewählt werden können

Disloyalty and ungratefulness

The original German version
1. Mehmet hat sich gut in Deutschland integriert
2. Mehmet hat deutsche Werte übernommen
3. Mehmet verrät seine deutschen Freunde
4. Mehmets Stimme im Referendum zeigt seine Illoyalität gegenüber Deutschland
5. Mehmet ist undankbar gegenüber allem, was Deutschland ihm gegeben hat
6. Mehmet weiß sein Leben in Deutschland nicht zu schätzen
7. Mehmet sollte sich entscheiden, ob er in Deutschland oder der Türkei leben will
8. Deutschland ist für Mehmet ein guter Wohnort
9. Mehmet sollte zurück in die Türkei ziehen
10. Mehmet verhält sich loyal gegenüber Deutschland

Exploratory measures

The original German version
1. Mehmet beschäftigt sich viel mit der türkischen Politik
2. Mehmet ist die Politik in der Türkei sehr wichtig
3. Mehmet hätte im Referendum nicht wählen sollen
4. Mehmet hätte im Referendum anders wählen sollen
5. Deutschtürken sollten sich nur an der Politik in Deutschland beteiligen
6. Deutschtürken sollten sich von der türkischen Politik distanzieren
7. Deutschtürken sollten sich nicht an der Politik in der Türkei beteiligen
8. Die Grenzkontrollen sollten wieder eingeführt werden, damit nicht noch mehr Migranten nach Deutschland kommen
9. Deutschland sollte Menschen wie Mehmet dabei unterstützen, Machtpositionen in der deutschen Politik zu erreichen
10. Deutschland sollte Menschen wie Mehmet besser integrieren

Further knowledge- and opinion-based questions about the Turkish Referendum

The original German version
Wenn Sie die Möglichkeit hätten im Referendum abzustimmen, was würden Sie wählen? 1. Ja 2. Nein
Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen. Dabei bedeutet 1 "überhaupt nicht" und 7 "sehr". Wie verständlich war der Zeitungsartikel geschrieben, den Sie gelesen haben? Wie sehr interessierte Sie dieser Artikel?
Haben Sie von diesem Thema vorher schon gehört? 1. Ja 2. Nein
Was war letztendlich das Ergebnis des Referendums? 1. Die Mehrheit der Türken stimmte für „Ja“ 2. Die Mehrheit der Türken stimmte für „Nein“ 3. Ich weiß es nicht
Die Mehrheit der Deutschtürken beteiligte sich am Referendum: 1. Ja

2. Nein
3. Ich weiß es nicht

Study 6

Newspaper article

Liebe Teilnehmer, liebe Teilnehmerinnen,

Bitte lesen Sie den folgenden Text, um den Kontext zu verstehen, in dem die Person die Entscheidung getroffen hat. Es handelt sich um einen Zeitungsartikel vom Juni 2018 über die Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Türkei. Für diese Studie wurde nur ein Ausschnitt des Textes verwendet. Bitte lesen Sie den Artikel und beantworten Sie anschließend die Fragen dazu.

20. Juni 2018, 16:58 Präsidentschaftswahl unter Erdoğan

Wie Türkeistämmige in Deutschland wählen

Die Türkei wählt am 24. Juni 2018 ein neues Parlament. Am selben Tag finden auch die Präsidentschaftswahlen statt, die ersten nach der Verabschiedung der Verfassungsänderungen in Folge des Referendums im vergangenen Jahr. Der gewählte Präsident wird demnach sowohl Staatschef als auch Regierungschef der Türkei sein und die letzten Funktionen des Premierministers übernehmen. Auch in Deutschland wird aus diesem Anlass Wahlkampf betrieben, denn es leben fast drei Millionen türkisch stämmige Menschen in der Bundesrepublik, knapp 1,5 Millionen sind türkische Staatsbürger.

Die Deutschtürken hatten vom 07. bis zum 19. Juni Zeit, in einem der 13 Wahllokale in deutschen Konsulaten und der Berliner Botschaft in Deutschland ihre Stimme abzugeben.

...

Manipulation checks (reading comprehension of the newspaper article)

The original German version
Können Deutschtürken bei den Wahlen in der Türkei abstimmen? 1. Ja 2. Nein

Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen. Dabei bedeutet 1 "überhaupt nicht" und 7 "sehr". Demokratische Werte werden in Deutschland und in der Türkei zu einem ähnlichen Grad geschätzt
Bitte geben Sie an, wie sehr Sie jeder der folgenden Aussagen zustimmen. Dabei bedeutet 1 "überhaupt nicht" und 7 "sehr". Ich persönlich mache mir um die Situation in der Türkei Sorgen

Target's profile

Die Universität Jena interessierte sich dafür, wie Menschen bei den türkischen Präsidentschaftswahlen wählen werden. Deshalb wurden Personen mit türkischem Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland am Tag der Wahl von Forscher/-innen der Universität befragt. Einer der Befragten heißt Mehmet. Mehmet ist 22 Jahre alt. Er wurde in Deutschland geboren und ist dort aufgewachsen. Mehmets Familie hat türkische Wurzeln. Sie kam in den 70'er Jahren nach Deutschland.

Assimilation manipulation (see pre-test findings below)

1. **Assimilation condition**

In einem langen Interview mit Mehmet stellte der Universitätsforscher Mehmet einige Fragen über sich selbst. Dem Forscher sind an Mehmet einige bemerkenswerte Dinge aufgefallen. Da Mehmet in Deutschland aufgewachsen ist, ist seine Muttersprache Deutsch. Mehmet spricht nicht nur fließend Deutsch, sondern hat auch keinen Akzent, wenn er spricht. In ihrem Gespräch sagte Mehmet, dass ihm sein Leben in Deutschland gefällt und er die lokale Kultur schätzt. Mehmet hat hauptsächlich deutsche Freunde und gab dem Forscher gegenüber an, dass er sich insgesamt deutsch fühle und deutsche Werte in seine persönliche Wertvorstellung übernommen habe.

2. **Non-assimilation condition**

In einem langen Interview mit Mehmet stellte der Universitätsforscher Mehmet einige Fragen über sich selbst. Dem Forscher sind an Mehmet einige bemerkenswerte Dinge aufgefallen. Obwohl Mehmet in Deutschland aufgewachsen ist, ist seine Muttersprache Türkisch. Mehmet spricht jetzt fließend Deutsch, allerdings mit türkischem Akzent. Während ihres Gesprächs sagte Mehmet, dass ihm sein Leben in seiner Nachbarschaft, die hauptsächlich aus weiteren Türken besteht, gefällt, da er diese lokale Kultur schätzt. Mehmet hat hauptsächlich türkische Freunde und gab dem Forscher gegenüber an, dass er sich insgesamt türkisch fühle und türkische Traditionen in seinem täglichen Leben pflege

Assimilation manipulation check:

The original German version
Was ist dem Forscher an Mehmet aufgefallen? 1. Mehmet hat hauptsächlich deutsche Freunde 2. Mehmet hat hauptsächlich türkische Freunde

Vote manipulation

1. **The No voter condition**

Der Forscher fragte Mehmet dann nach seiner Meinung zur Wahl und ob er zum Beispiel Erdogan unterstützt. Mehmet sagte folgendes:

„Natürlich habe ich nicht für Erdogan gestimmt. Erdogan ist ein schlechter Präsident, der die Türkei ruiniert hat und weiter ruinieren wird. Dieser Mann ist ziemlich machtbesessen. Die Türkei war einmal auf dem Weg, ein demokratisches Land zu werden. Heute schäme ich mich für meine türkischen Wurzeln.“

2. **The Yes voter condition**

Der Forscher fragte Mehmet dann nach seiner Meinung zur Wahl und ob er zum Beispiel Erdogan unterstützt. Mehmet sagte folgendes:

„Natürlich habe ich für Erdogan gestimmt. Erdogan ist ein starker Führer, der die Türkei nach vorne gebracht hat und weiterhin nach vorne bringen wird. Er hat die Türkei wieder zu einer regionalen Macht gemacht und den Türken Selbstbewusstsein zurückgegeben. Heute bin ich stolz auf meine türkischen Wurzeln.“

The vote manipulation check

The original German version
Was wird Mehmet bei der Wahl wählen? 1. Mehmet hat für Erdogan gestimmt. 2. Mehmet hat nicht für Erdogan gestimmt.
Woher stammt ursprünglich Mehmets Familie? 1. Türkei 2. Deutschland

Exploratory measures

Perceptions of core democratic values in Germany

Inwieweit betrachten Sie die folgenden Werte als Kernwerte im Deutschen. 1 bedeutet "überhaupt nicht" und 7 bedeutet "sehr".

The original German version
1. Ein demokratisches politisches System zu haben
3. Die Menschen wählen ihre Volksvertreter in freien Wahlen

Perceptions of core democratic values in Turkey

Inwieweit betrachten Sie die folgenden Werte als Kernwert in der Türkei. 1 bedeutet "überhaupt nicht" und 7 bedeutet "sehr".

The original German version
1. Ein demokratisches politisches System zu haben
2. Die Menschen wählen ihre Volksvertreter in freien Wahlen

Further knowledge- and opinion-based questions about the Turkish elections

The original German version
Wenn Sie die Möglichkeit hätten an der Wahl teilzunehmen, was würden Sie wählen? 1. Ich würde für Erdogan stimmen 2. Ich würde nicht für Erdogan stimmen
Haben Sie von diesem Thema vorher schon gehört? 1. Ja 2. Nein
Was waren die Ergebnisse bei der Wahl : 1. Mehrheit der Türken in der Türkei stimmte für Erdogan 2. Mehrheit der Türken in der Türkei stimmte nicht für Erdogan 3. Ich weiß nicht.
Was waren die Ergebnisse bei der Wahl :

1. Mehrheit der Türken in Deutschland stimmte für Erdogan 2. Mehrheit der Türken in Deutschland stimmte nicht für Erdogan 3. Ich weiß nicht.
Die Mehrheit der deutschen Türken nahm an der Wahl teil: 1. Ja 2. Nein 3. Ich weiß nicht

Pre-test of assimilation manipulation

Instructions

Liebe Teilnehmer und Teilnehmerinnen,

Wir führen an der Universität Jena eine Studie über die Integration türkischer Migrant*innen in Deutschland durch. Die Menschen in Deutschland haben unterschiedliche Meinungen darüber, was Migrant*innen tun müssen, um sich in Deutschland zu integrieren. Deshalb sehen manche die Art, wie sich türkische Migrant*innen verhalten und leben als ein Zeichen von Integration, während andere dies nicht tun.

Wir bitten Sie im Folgenden anzugeben, wie sehr sie das jeweilige Verhalten als Zeichen sehen, dass der türkische Migrant in Deutschland integriert ist. 1 bedeutet, dass er gar nicht in Deutschland integriert ist, 4 weder noch/neutral und 7 bedeutet, dass er komplett in Deutschland integriert ist.

Es gibt dabei keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Wir sind an Ihrer ehrlichen Meinung und an Ihrer Sichtweise interessiert. Ihre Angaben werden anonym und vertraulich behandelt. Bitte beantworten Sie alle Fragen und versuchen Sie, keine Fragen offen zu lassen. Dies wird uns dabei helfen, aussagekräftige Ergebnisse zu erzielen.

Viel Spaß bei der Untersuchung. Institut für Psychologie, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

Wir bitten Sie im Folgenden anzugeben, wie sehr sie das jeweilige Verhalten als Zeichen sehen, dass der türkische Migrant in Deutschland integriert ist. 1 bedeutet, dass er gar nicht in Deutschland integriert ist, 4 weder noch/neutral und 7 bedeutet, dass er komplett in Deutschland integriert ist.

Items, means and SD are presented below

The original German version **Items**	**Mean**	**SD**
1. Meidet den Kontakt zu Deutschen	2,23	1,60
2. Glaubt nicht an die Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und LGBT-Menschen	2,23	1,45
3. Hat nur türkische Freund*innen	2,83	1,48
4. Partizipiert in türkischen Wahlen	2,96	1,46
5. Kleidet sich in traditionell türkische Kleidung	3,21	1,32
6. Fühlt sich türkisch	3,29	1,43
7. Interessiert sich hauptsächlich für die türkische Geschichte und Kultur	3,31	1,26
8. Hat überwiegend türkische Freund*innen	3,33	1,24
9. Lebt in einem Stadtteil, in dem größtenteils Türk*innen leben	3,33	1,58
10. Pflegt türkische Traditionen	3,38	1,35
11. Hat traditionell türkischen Werten	3,40	1,36
12. Betet in der lokalen Moschee	3,50	1,27
13. Feiert muslimische und türkische Feiertage	3,58	1,35
14. Hört gerne türkische Musik	3,60	1,30
15. Ist Fan eines türkischen Fußballvereins in Istanbul	3,63	1,21
16. Ist gläubiger Muslim	3,63	1,28

17. Isst kein Schweinefleich	3,63	1,10
18. Ist bei Fußballweltmeisterschaften für das türkische Team	3,73	1,44
19. Ist Mitglied in einem türkischen Kulturverein	3,75	1,16
20. Geht an Wochenenden in Shishabars	3,77	1,13
21. Besucht häufig Familienangehörige und Freund*innen in der Türkei	3,81	1,27
22. Trinkt keinen Alkohol	3,81	1,25
23. Hat eine türkische Freundin	3,83	1,21
24. Studiert Turkologie an einer Universität	3,88	1,27
25. Hat Beziehungen mit Türk*innen in der Türkei	3,96	1,37
26. Spricht fließend Türkisch	3,96	1,01
27. Verfolgt die Nachrichten türkischer Medien	3,98	1,18
28. Hat einen türkischen Vornamen	4,02	1,18
29. Kennt die Geschichte der Türkei	4,15	0,92
30. Ist ADAC Mitglied	4,23	1,17
31. Hat die Schule nicht mit dem Abitur abgeschlossen	4,25	0,81
32. Ist kein gläubiger Muslim	4,27	1,18
33. Ist ein sekulärer Mensch	4,33	1,06
34. Ist Fan eines deutschen Fußballvereins	4,44	1,50
35. Arbeitet in einer Bäckerei	4,48	1,15
36. Hat einen deutschen Vornamen	4,50	1,27
37. Spricht deutsch mit einem türkischen Akzent	4,52	1,13
38. Geht am Wochenende zu Partys	4,56	0,99
39. Hat eine deutsche Freundin	4,58	1,44

40. Hört die Musik, die in Deutschland beliebt ist	4,58	1,11
41. Hat die Schule mit dem Abitur abgeschlossen	4,60	1,35
42. Hat eine erfolgreiche Karriere	4,60	1,09
43. Ist in Forschung und Lehre tätig	4,60	1,16
44. Liest deutsche Zeitungen	4,60	1,61
45. Kleidet sich modern	4,60	0,98
46. Wir bitten Sie im Folgenden anzugeben, wie sehr sie das jeweilige Verhalten als Zeichen seTrinkt Alkohol	4,65	1,23
47. Arbeit als Mechaniker in einer Garage	4,65	1,31
48. Studiert an einer deutschen Universität	4,71	1,07
49. Kleidet sich westlich	4,71	1,09
50. Lebt in einem Stadtteil, in dem überwiegend Deutsche leben	4,71	1,25
51. Trennt seinen Müll	4,73	1,25
52. Isst Schweinefleich	4,81	1,35
53. Ist ein erfolgreicher Ingenieur	4,85	1,17
54. Trifft sich in seiner Freizeit mit deutschen Freund*innen in Bars	4,96	1,35
55. Hat überwiegend deutsche Freund*innen	4,98	1,28
56. Studiert Germanistik an einer Universität	4,98	1,33
57. Interessiert sich für die deutsche Geschichte und Kultur	5,00	1,35
58. Feiert offizielle deutsche Feiertage	5,02	1,38
59. Verfolgt die Nachrichten in Deutschland	5,02	1,19
60. Kennt die Geschichte Deutschlands	5,13	1,20
61. Spricht den lokalen Dialekt der Stadt, in der er in Deutschland lebt	5,19	1,33

62. Partizipiert in deutschen Wahlen	5,23	1,40
63. Spricht akzentfrei deutsch	5,25	1,36
64. Schätzt die deutsche Kultur	5,25	1,31
65. Fühlt sich deutsch	5,42	1,56
66. Glaubt an die Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und LGBT-Menschen	5,46	1,30
67. Spricht fließend deutsch	5,52	1,27
68. Hält sich an die Gesetze und Regeln in Deutschland	5,56	1,38
69. Hat die deutschen Werte übernommen	5,65	1,38

Appendix C

Study 1

Identification scale

English translation	The original Arabic version
1. I feel strongly affiliated with the Palestinians	أشعر بارتباط قوي بالشعب الفلسطيني
2. Other groups can learn a lot from the Palestinians	تستطيع شعوب أخرى أن تتعلم الكثير من الشعب الفلسطيني
3. Being Palestinian is an important part of my identity	تعتبر كوني فلسطينيا جزءا مهما من هويتي
4. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the Palestinian leaders	عند حدوث المشاكل، من الأفضل الاعتماد على قادة المجتمع الفلسطيني
5. I am strongly committed to the Palestinians	أشعر بالتزام شديد تجاه الشعب الفلسطيني
6. Relative to other groups, the Palestinians are a very moral group	الشعب الفلسطيني على مستوى عال من الأخلاق مقارنة بشعوب أخرى
7. When I talk about the Palestinians, I usually say "we" rather than "they"	عند الحديث عن الفلسطينيين عادةً ما أقول "نحن" وليس "هم"
8. It is disloyal to criticize the Palestinians	انتقاد الشعب الفلسطيني هو عدم إخلاص

Message content

English translation	The original Hebrew version
1. Non-critical message: Hello, my name is Shadi. I was asked to say a sentence as a voice message, and this is the sentence I chose: yesterday, I was in an event before which we all stood for the anthem. I stood because of loyalty to my Israeli citizenship and respect for the symbols of the state. Goodbye, Shadi.	שלום, שמי שאדי. התבקשתי להגיד משפט אחד בטור חתימה קולית וזה המשפט שבחרתי, אתמול הייתי באירוע לפני תחילתו שרו את התקווה. כולנו עמדנו לכבוד ההמנון. עמדתי מתוך מחויבות ונאמנות לאזרחות שלי במדינת ישראל, ומתוך כבוד לסמלים של המדינה. להתראות שאדי.
2. Critical message: Hello, my name is Shadi. I was asked to say a sentence as a voice message, and this is the sentence I chose: yesterday, I was in an event before which everyone stood for the national anthem. I refused to stand because of commitment and loyalty to the Palestinian nation and objection to symbols that do not include me. Goodbye, Shadi.	שלום, שמי שאדי. התבקשתי להגיד משפט אחד בטור חתימה קולית וזה המשפט שבחרתי, אתמול הייתי באירוע לפני תחילתו כולם עמדו לכבוד ההמנון. סירבתי לעמוד מתוך מחויבות ונאמנות לעם הפלסטיני, ומתוך התנגדות לתת כבוד לסמלים שלא מכלילים אותי. להתראות שאדי.

Evaluation of the speaker

English translation	The original Arabic version
1. Do you feel affection towards the person?	هل تشعر بالحنين تجاه الشخص الذي سمعت صوته في التسجيل؟
2. Do you feel uncomfortable with this person?	هل تشعر بعدم الارتياح تجاه الشخص الذي سمعت صوته في التسجيل؟

3. Do you think this person makes you feel proud?	هل تشعر بأن هذا الشخص يجعلك تشعر بالفخر؟
4. Does this person leave a positive impression on you?	هل ترك هذا الشخص انطباعًا إيجابيًا لديك؟
5. Do you feel this person is a hypocrite?	هل تشعر بأن هذا الشخص منافق؟
6. Do you feel this person is nice?	هل تشعر بأن هذا الشخص لطيف؟
7. Do you feel this person is impressive?	هل تشعر بأن هذا الشخص مثير للإعجاب؟
8. Do you feel disgusted when I hear the person?	هل تشعر بالاشمئزاز عندما أتحدث عن هذا الشخص؟
9. Do you feel closeness towards this person?	هل تشعر بالألفة تجاه هذا الشخص؟
10. Do you feel this person is a sycophant?	هل تشعر بأن هذا الشخص متملق؟
11. Do you feel comfortable with this person?	هل تشعر بأن هذا الشخص مريح؟
12. Do you feel this person is honest?	هل تشعر بأن هذا الشخص صادق؟
13. Does this person leave a negative impression on you?	هل ترك هذا الشخص انطباعًا سلبيًا لديك؟
14. Do you feel that this person makes you want to laugh at him?	هل تشعر بأن هذا الشخص مثير للسخرية؟
15. Does this person annoy you?	هل يثير هذا الشخص أعصابك؟
16. Do you feel distance toward this person?	هل تشعر بالنفور تجاه هذا الشخص؟

Exploratory measures

Trans-Generational and Endurance of Ingroup Suffering

Before completing the identification scale, participants were asked to fill the Trans-Generational and Endurance of Ingroup Suffering scale (taken from Kahn et al., 2017) which was used for exploratory purposes and was not included in the main analysis.

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
1. For me, my national group includes all the generations of group members that ever have and ever will live	ب النسبة لي، مجموعتي القومية تتضمن جميع الأجيال التي كانت في الماضي وأيضًا التي ستكون في المستقبل.
2. When I think of my national group, I don't only think of the current generation, but also of all the generations of the group of the past	عندما أفكر في مجموعتي القومية، فأنا لا أفكر فقط في الجيل الحالي، لأنني أيضًا في كل أجيال مجموعتي القومية في الماضي.
3. When I think of my national group, I don't only think of the current generation, but also all the generations of the group of the future	عندما أفكر في مجموعتي القومية، فأنا لا أفكر فقط في الجيل الحالي، لأنني أيضًا في كل الأجيال التي في المستقبل.
4. I don't believe that there is a national identity that we carry from generation to generation	لا أعتقد أن هناك هوية قومية مشتركة من جيل إلى جيل.
5. Members of my national group in every generation share a common base that unites each other across the generations	أفراد مجموعتي القومية في كل جيل وجيل يتقاسمون أساسًا مشتركًا يوحدهم على مدار الأجيال.

Study 2

Identification scale

English translation	The original Arabic version
1. I feel strongly affiliated with the Palestinians	أشعر بارتباط قوي بالشعب الفلسطيني
2. Other groups can learn a lot from the Palestinians	أعتقد أن شعوباً أخرى تستطيع التعلّم الكثير من الشعب الفلسطيني
3. Being Palestinian is an important part of my identity	كوني فلسطينياً جزء مهم من هويتي
4. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the Palestinian leaders	عند حدوث مشكلة، من الأفضل الاعتماد على قيادة المجتمع الفلسطيني
5. I am strongly committed to the Palestinians	أشعر بالالتزام الشديد تجاه الشعب الفلسطيني
6. Relative to other groups, the Palestinians are a very moral group	الشعب الفلسطيني على مستوى عالٍ من الأخلاقيات مقارنة بشعوب أخرى
7. When I talk about the Palestinians, I usually say “we” rather than “they”	عندما أتكلم عن الفلسطينيين عادةً ما أقول "نحن" وليس "هم"
8. It is disloyal to criticize the Palestinians	انتقاد الشعب الفلسطيني هو عدم ولاء وخيانة

Audience manipulation

English translation	The original Arabic version
Opening before audience manipulation: Now you will listen to a short extract from a speech of an Arabic speaker [in Arabic: a speaker from the Arabic minority in Israel]. The speaker will give this speech in front of a Jewish-Israeli audience in a conference that he was previously invited to. The conference was organized by a committee that was founded in order to discuss current issues related to the situation of the citizens in Israel.	سوف تستمع الآن إلى مقطع قصير من خطاب لمتحدث من الأقلية العربية في إسرائيل سوف يلقي هذا الخطاب أمام جمهور يهودي في مؤتمر قد دعي إليه . عُقِدَ هذا المؤتمر من قبل لجنة تم تأسيسها من أجل مناقشة القضايا الحالية التي تتعلق بوضع المواطنين في إسرائيل
1. Fixed audience Members of the committee are all Jews with strong opinions about this issue. Although the speaker was invited to express his views, the main motivation of the audience is to speak their mind rather than listen to others	جميع أعضاء اللجنة هم يهود ولديهم آراء متشددة حول هذه القضية بالرغم من أنّ المتحدث قد دُعي للمؤتمر ليبدي وجهة نظره بالقضايا المطروحة، إلّا أنّ الدافع الرئيسي لجمهور اليهودي هو التعبير عن أفكارهم الخاصة بدلاً من الاستماع له .
2. Malleable audience	جميع أعضاء اللجنة هم يهود ولديهم آراء متشددة حول هذه القضية و هم مهتمون بشكل خاص بسماع آراء الآخرين وقد دُعي المتحدث للمؤتمر ليبدي وجهة نظره بالقضايا المطروحة لذلك فأن الدافع الرئيسي لجمهور اليهودي هو الاستماع للمتحدث بدلاً من التعبير عن أفكارهم الخاصة

Members of the committee are all Jews who have a variety of opinions about this issue and are (particularly) interested in hearing the opinions of others. The speaker was invited to express his views, and therefore the main motivation of the audience is to listen to him rather than speak their own mind	

Audience manipulation check

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
Before you listen to the recording, we would like to have your impressions of this audience. How do you imagine them to be? When I think about this audience, I imagine them to be: **1.** 1 - Close-minded; 7 – Open-minded. **2.** 1 – Biased; 7 – Impartial **3.** 1 – Hostile; 7 – Friendly **4.** 1 – Motivated to keep things as they are; 7 – Motivated to create social change	قبل الاستماع إلى التسجيل الصوتي، اذكر ما هو انطباعك عن هذا الجمهور الذي سوف يتواجد في المؤتمر. كيف تتخيل هذا الجمهور؟ عندما أفكر في هذا الجمهور، أتخيل أن يكون: 1 - مغلق 7 - منفتح. 1 - متحيّز 7 – محايد 1 - معاد 7 - ودود 1 – لديه الدافع للحفاظ على الأمور كما هي 7 – لديه الدافع لخلق تغيير اجتماعي

Message content manipulation

English translation	**The original Hebrew version**
1. Critical: Hello, my name is Samer. We gathered here to talk about freedom of speech. Unfortunately, our freedom of speech as Arabs in Israel is very limited. For example, in times of tension in the south or wars, we know that the mere expression of opinion on our side can put us in danger of getting interrogated and even arrested. It can be because of attending demonstrations or even because of a Facebook post. In order to achieve equal and genuine freedom of expression to everyone, it is very important to create a fundamental change in the state's attitude (treatment of) toward the Arab citizens.	שלום, שמי סאמר. התכנסנו כאן היום כדי לדבר על חופש הביטוי. לצערי, חופש הביטוי שלנו כערבים בישראל מוגבל מאוד, כך למשל ברגעי מתיחות בדרום או במלחמות, אנחנו יודעים שעצם הבעת דעה מהצד שלנו יכולה לסכן אותנו בחקירות ואפילו מעצרים. זה יכול להיות בגלל השתתפות בהפגנות, או אפילו בגלל פוסט מחאה בפייסבוק. כדי שיתקיים חופש ביטוי שווה ואמתי לכולם, חשוב מאוד שיקרה שינוי מהותי ביחס המדינה כלפי האזרחים הערבים.
2. Non-critical: Hello, my name is Samar. We gathered here today to talk about freedom of speech. In Israel, freedom of speech is a right granted to all citizens of the state, without distinction between Arabs and Jews. At any given moment and in every situation, we Arabs in the country feel safe enough and free to say everything that comes to mind. And, this is because we know that we are free to express ourselves without fear and without any limitations whatsoever. It is very	שלום, שמי סאמר. התכנסנו כאן היום כדי לדבר על חופש הביטוי. בישראל, חופש הביטוי הינו זכות שניתנת באופן גורף לכל אזרחי המדינה, ללא הבדל בין ערבים ויהודים. בכל רגע נתון ובכל מצב, אנחנו הערבים במדינה, מרגישים מספיק בטוחים וחופשיים, להגיד את כל מה שעולה בדעתנו. וזאת, מתוך ידיעה שאנחנו חופשיים להתבטא ללא כל חשש וללא מגבלות כלל. חשוב מאוד שנכיר בעובדה הזאת ורצוי שנעשה בזכות זו שימוש הולם.

important that we recognize this fact and should make appropriate (good) use of it.	

Message content - manipulation checks

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
1. What is the name of the speaker? 1. Samer 2. Rami 2. Please answer the following questions: 1. The speech was about: a. Freedom of speech b. Civil/national service 3. How would you describe the speaker's way of talking? (1-7 scale) a. Clear b. Fluent c. Ashkenazi/Jewish sounding d. Arabic sounding 4. How would you describe the speaker's overall message to their audience: (1-7 scale) a. Critical – Non-critical 5. To what extent do you, personally, agree with what the speaker has said? (1-7 scale) a. Not at all – very much	**1.** ما هو اسم المتحدّث؟ **1.** سامر **2.** رامي 2 الخطاب الذي ستستمع إليه كان حول: 1. حرية التعبير 2 الخدمة العسكرية/الوطنية 3. كيف تصف طريقة حديث المتحدث؟ (اختر من 1-7) أ. واضح ب. فصيح ج. يتحدث كأنه أشكنازي/يهودي د. له لهجة عربية 4. كيف تصف الرسالة العامة للمتحدث: أ. إقناعية - غير إقناعية 5. إلى أي مدى توافق أو تختلف مع ما قاله المتحدث؟ أ. لا اتفق على الإطلاق – اتفق كثيرا جدا

Evaluation of the speaker

English translation	The original Arabic version
Having listened to part of this person's speech, to what extent you do feel the following towards the speaker?	ما مدى شعورك تجاه المتحدث بعد الاستماع إلى جزء من خطاب هذا المتحدث؟
1. Do you feel affection towards the person?	هل تشعر بالمودة تجاه الشخص الذي تستمع لصوته؟
2. Do you feel uncomfortable with this person?	هل تشعر بعدم الارتياح تجاه الشخص الذي تستمع لصوته؟
3. Do you think this person makes you feel proud?	هل تظن ان هذا الشخص يجعلك تشعر بالفخر؟
4. Does this person leave a positive impression on you?	هل ترك هذا الشخص انطباعاً إيجابياً لديك؟
5. Do you feel disgusted when I hear the person?	هل تشعر بالاشمئزاز تجاه هذا الشخص؟
6. Do you feel closeness towards this person?	هل تشعر بالألفة تجاه هذا الشخص؟
7. Do you feel this person is a sycophant?	هل تشعر أن هذا الشخص متملق؟
8. Do you feel comfortable with this person?	هل تشعر بالارتياح تجاه هذا الشخص؟
9. Does this person leave a negative impression on you?	هل ترك هذا الشخص انطباعاً سلبياً لديك؟
10. Do you feel that this person makes you want to laugh at him?	هل تظن ان هذا الشخص يجعلك تريد السخرية منه؟
11. Does this person annoy you?	هل هذا الشخص يزعجك؟
12. Do you feel distance toward this person?	هل تشعر بالنفور تجاه هذا الشخص؟

What is your more general impression of this person? To what extent would you describe him using each of the following adjectives?	ما هو انطباعك العام عن هذا الشخص؟ إلى أي مدى تصفه باستخدام كل من الصفات التالية؟
1. Deceitful	مخادع
2. Devious	مراوغ
3. Friendly	ودود
4. Intelligent	ذكي
5. Interesting	يثير الاهتمام
6. Likeable	محبوب
7. Lying	كاذب
8. Nice	لطيف
9. Pretentious	مدعي (يتظاهر)
10. Competent	كُفء
11. Trustworthy	جدير بالثقة
12. Truthful	صادق
13. Fake	مُزيّف
14. Impressive	يثير الإعجاب
15. Honest	صادق
16. Genuine	حقيقي
17. Hypocritical	منافق
18. Effective	فعّال

Perceived motivation to inform the audience

English translation	The original Arabic version
Thinking about the speaker's words and the audience they are addressing, what do you think they might be trying to achieve? To what extent do you think the speaker might be motivated by each of the following goals:	عند التفكير في كلمات المتكلم وفي الجمهور الذي يخاطبه، ماذا يحاول المتكلم ان يحقق من خلال خطابه؟ إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المتكلم قد يطمح لكل هدف من الأهداف التالية:
1. To express his genuine views to the audience	التعبير عن وجهة نظره الحقيقية للجمهور
2. To persuade the audience with their opinion	إقناع الجمهور برأيه
3. To inform the audience about something they might not know about	إبلاغ الجمهور بأمر قد لا يعلمون به

Perceived damage

English translation	The original Arabic version
1. The speaker encourages Jewish-Israeli to disparage/look down at us	المتحدث يشجّع اليهود في إسرائيل على النظر بفوقية إلينا
2. People like the speaker make us Palestinians look bad before Jewish-Israeli	أشخاص مثل المتحدث يجعلوننا (كعرب فلسطينيين) نظهر بصورة سيئة امام اليهود
3. The speaker makes us as a group vulnerable to criticism	المتحدث يجعلنا كمجموعة (كعرب فلسطينيين) عرضة للانتقاد

4. The speaker gives us Palestinians a bad name	أشخاص مثل المتحدث يسببون الإساءة لسمعتنا (كعرب/كفلسطينيين)
5. People like the speaker make Jewish-Israelis not believe in our struggle	أشخاص مثل المتحدث يسهمون بأن لا يؤمن اليهود الإسرائيليين في نضالنا
6. People like the speaker make Jewish-Israelis not take us seriously	أشخاص مثل المتحدث يسببون بأن لا يأخذنا اليهود الإسرائيليين على محمل الجد

Perceived authenticity

English translation	The original Arabic version
1. The speaker is committed to the cause of Palestinians in Israel	المتحدث ملتزم بقضية العرب/الفلسطينيين في إسرائيل
2. The speaker clearly has the interests of Palestinians in Israel at heart	من الواضح أن مصلحة العرب/الفلسطينيين في إسرائيل هي في صميم قلب المتحدث
3. The speaker cares a lot about the fate of Palestinians in Israel	المتحدث يهتم كثيراً بمصير العرب/الفلسطينيين في إسرائيل
4. The speaker is willing to make sacrifices for Palestinians in Israel as a group	المتحدث مستعد لتقديم التضحيات للعرب/الفلسطينيين في إسرائيل كمجموعة
5. The speaker is committed to his real self	المتحدث ملتزم لكيانه الحقيقي
6. The speaker is pretending to be someone who he is not	لا يتصرف المتحدث لشخصه الحقيقي
7. The speaker is an impostor	المتحدث محتال

8. The speaker is honest about who he really is	المتحدث صادق حول من هو حقا
9. The speaker is true to himself in this situation	المتحدث صادق بما يفعل في هذه الحالة
10. The speaker behaves in accordance to his values and beliefs	يتصرف المتحدث وفقا لقيمه ومعتقداته

Exploratory measures

Perceived motivation of the speaker

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
Thinking again about the speaker's words and the audience they are addressing, irrespective of what they might be trying to do, how likely do you think it is that their speech will lead to the following consequences:	بالتفكير مرة أخرى في كلمات المتكلم والجمهور الذي يخاطبه بغض النظر عما قد يحاول المتحدث تحقيقه، الى اي مدى حسب رأيك من المرجح أن يؤدي خطاب المتحدث الى كل من الاتي:
1. To offend the audience	إهانة الجمهور
2. To mock the audience	السخرية من الجمهور
3. To provoke the audience	لاستفزاز الجمهور
4. To be admired by the audience	أن ينال أعجاب الجمهور
5. To get the audience's approval	إظهار القرب من الجمهور
6. To show closeness to the audience	لخلق شعور بجو (عائلي) مع الجمهور

Audience's perceived motivation of the speaker

English translation	**The original Arabic version**
Thinking about the speaker's words and the audience they are addressing, what do you think they might be trying to achieve? To what extent do you think the speaker might be motivated by each of the following goals:	عند التفكير في كلمات المتكلم والجمهور الذي يخاطبه، ماذا تعتقد أن المتكلم يحاول تحقيقه من خلال خطابه؟ إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن المتكلم قد يكون مدفوعًا بكل هدف من الأهداف التالية:
1. Express his genuine views to the audience	التعبير عن آرائه الحقيقية للجمهور
2. Persuade the audience with their opinion	إقناع الجمهور برأيه
3. Inform the audience	إبلاغ الجمهور بأمر لم يكن على علم به
4. Offend the audience	إهانة الجمهور
5. Mock the audience	السخرية من الجمهور
6. Aggravate the audience	استفزاز الجمهور
7. Be admired by the audience	الحصول على إعجاب الجمهور
8. Be approved by the audience	الحصول على موافقة الجمهور
9. Elicit closeness from the audience	التقرب من الجمهور
10. Create a good feeling with the audience	خلق شعور جيد (إيجابي) مع الجمهور

Possible outcomes of the speech

English translation	The original Arabic version
1. Ultimately, I think Jews at the conference will be affected by this speaker	في نهاية المطاف، أعتقد أن اليهود في المؤتمر سوف يتأثرون بهذا المتحدث
2. Ultimately, I think that Jews at the conference are likely to listen to the speaker and question their beliefs	في نهاية المطاف، أعتقد أنه من المرجح أن يستمع اليهود في المؤتمر إلى المتحدث وأن يشككوا في معتقداته
11. Ultimately, I think that the Jews at the conference are likely to reject the speaker's speech	في النهاية، أعتقد أنه من المرجح أن يرفض اليهود في المؤتمر خطاب المتحدث
12. Ultimately, I think that the Jews at the conference are likely to simply ignore the speaker's speech	في نهاية المطاف، أعتقد أنه من المرجح أن يتجاهل اليهود ببساطة خطاب المتحدث

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Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung

Hiermit erkläre ich, dass mir die Promotionsordnung der Fakultät für Sozial- und Verhaltenswissenschaften der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena bekannt ist. Ich habe die vorgelegte Dissertation selbstständig und ohne unerlaubte fremde Hilfe sowie nur mit den Hilfen angefertigt, die ich in der Dissertation angegeben habe. Alle Textstellen eines Dritten oder eigener Prüfungsarbeiten, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus veröffentlichten Schriften entnommen sind, sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Ich habe weder die Hilfe eines Promotionsberaters in Anspruch genommen noch haben Dritte weder unmittelbar noch mittelbar geldwerte Leistungen von mir für Arbeiten erhalten, die im Zusammenhang mit dem Inhalt der vorgelegten Dissertation stehen. Ich habe weder die vorliegende Abhandlung noch eine in wesentlichen Teilen ähnliche Abhandlung noch eine andere Abhandlung bei einer anderen Hochschule bzw. anderen Fakultät als Dissertation eingereicht.

Slieman Halabi – Berlin, den