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Solveig Richter
Raphael Robiatti (Eds.)

Populism and a New Age of International Fragility

Seeking Policy Innovations 40 Years After the Brandt Report




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Lastly, we thank all of the Brandt School Community. Without you, there would be no place in Erfurt where Willy Brandt's ideals about North-South cooperation remain, forty years later, so markedly present.

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Introduction

Populism and a New Age of International Fragility: Seeking Policy Innovations 40 Years After the Brandt Report

Raphael Robiatti and Solveig Richter

“At the beginning of a new decade, only twenty years short of the millennium, we must try to lift ourselves above the day-to-day quarrels (or negotiations) to see the menacing long-term problems. We see a world in which poverty and hunger still prevail in many huge regions; in which resources are squandered without consideration of their renewal; in which more armaments are made and sold than ever before; and where a destructive capacity has been accumulated to blow up our planet several times over.”

(Brandt Commission, 1980)

The North-South: A Programme for Survival, more widely known by its unofficial name *the Brandt Report*, is arguably one of the most important and visionary political study on International Development issues to date – even though its publication already dates back to 1980. Beyond engaging in a comprehensive review of the global socio-economic issues afflicting the world at the end of the 1970s, it took a solution-

oriented approach to tackle the failure of the international economic systems in addressing the growing economic disparity between nations of the Southern and Northern Hemispheres. Furthermore, it depicted inequality, in its many forms, as one of the root causes of financial and economic instability and highlighted the urgent need to reverse that trend in order to address issues such as poverty, corruption, and violence.

The pragmatism and vision of the Report were broadly accepted and praised. Many observers hoped that it would kick-start a new approach to global policymaking based on the ideas of multilateralism and humanitarianism, with the gradual obsolescence of divisions such as ‘North’ and ‘South.’ Although much has been achieved since then, it is both impressive and saddening to think that the Report, which was published in 1980, can still remain so topical 40 years later. Issues such as gender inequality, environmental protection, asylum seekers’ rights, trade openness, and financialization, which are still current issues today, had already been discussed at length in the Brandt Report. The Commission offered a diverse set of strategies to deal with these and other problems identified as the main challenges to overcoming international development issues. However, most proposals were never entirely adopted due to, among other factors, the tension of the Cold War and a general lack of international coordination and political will.

Since the 1980s, technological change has enabled an unforeseen reorganization of production chains, and world trade has increased spectacularly. This has allowed many formerly underdeveloped countries to catch up with the OECD world, but many others have fallen behind. The financialization of trade

and investment, deregulation, and increased capital mobility have increased the volatility of the financial system and the potential for economic turmoil. In many countries, funds have been diverted from social protection programs towards speculative capital. Globalization has incorporated poorer countries into global production chains, but it has also exposed them to an increased risk of instability with no effective means of protection. The critical distinction the Brandt Report tried to overcome was the juxtaposition between industrialized to developing countries. Although that terminology has, in a way, changed after 40 years, Brandt's call for a fundamental restructuring of the economic relations on a global scale was never pursued to its full potential.

Beyond the yet unsolved problems discussed in the Brandt Report, new dynamics are emerging that hinder, or at least stand in the way of, effective international cooperation for overcoming shared global problems. Nowadays, the rise of national populism critically questions the effectiveness of international multilateral order. Examples from all across the globe, from Bolsonaro in Brazil, Duterte in the Philippines, Orban in Hungary, to the contentious and impending elections in South Africa, show that fundamental human rights, democracy, and international cooperation are fragile institutions. It has also shown that old fissures between 'West' and 'East' and 'North' and 'South' have not yet been mended. Thus, it is obvious that one of the most prevalent yet contested issues both among politicians and academics is the question of how to deal with emerging but differing patterns of populism in both the Global North and the Global South. While the literature on the politics of populism has exploded, the implications for policymaking are much less clear.

Do the old categories, based on the geographic cardinal points, still make sense? Do we see changes in policy making due to these recent shifts? What kinds of policies do the new political forces champion, and how do democratic policymakers, experts, and influencers respond to these new challenges? Conceptually, are these old differences between ‘West’ and ‘East’ and ‘North’ and ‘South’ still relevant? Furthermore, how does the rise of national populism affect our understanding of these categories, and policymaking in general? In many senses, one may argue that, as a result of globalization, countries have converged in terms of cultures, politics, and economics. Social networks are becoming increasingly transnational, often following the footsteps of economic globalization. However, we also see the opposite, namely new ‘old’ patterns of geopolitical competition, e.g., between Western and Eastern Europe, and new confrontations between China and the United States. On top of that, the current pandemic clearly indicates that health policies of re-nationalization are found to be a compelling instrument for dealing with the crisis, even by multilateral leaders.

In a nutshell, the Brandt Report has neither lost its analytical relevance in describing the state of the global economic structure nor have its policy recommendations become outdated. This edition of policy papers uses the 40th anniversary of the Brandt Report as an occasion to rethink the implications of new challenges for policymaking on all levels, i.e., local, national, and global, and to discuss if and how new modes of policymaking can address these challenges.

The Willy Brandt School of Public Policy is uniquely positioned to reflect on the Brandt Report 40 years after its publication and discuss the implication for current

policymaking. Over the past two decades, the Brandt School has become a research and practice hub to capacitate future policymakers from around the world along the premises advocated by Willy Brandt, also present in the North-South Report. Through its systematic transdisciplinarity, its comprehensively global focus, and its methodical linking of theory and practice, the School has been providing highly-qualified education in core issues of public policy, such as democratic governance, conflict management, and social entrepreneurship since 2002. As a result, more than 600 students have already graduated from the School and found eminent positions in different institutions, providing a fertile ground for joint publications and discussions.¹

Contributions and Structure

The present publication is, therefore, an attempt to continue the mission of the Brandt School to link both academic and practical thinking from the North and the South in picking up the Brandt Report and linking it to one of the most relevant challenges for policymaking on a global scale – populism. The contributions to this volume bring discussions on populist distinctive elements in public policymaking in areas most directly related to the Brandt Report, as well as propose solutions for reviving the Brandt Spirit. In their conclusion to this edited volume, Kemmerling & Reis will provide a more

¹ For instance, Prof. Heike Grimm organized a book in 2019 titled ‘Public Policy Research in the Global South. A Cross-Country Perspective’, to which Brandt School’s alumni contributed, raising relevant issues and bringing new perspectives to them.

detailed account of the term populism and the respective controversy.

The first contribution to this volume by Edward Silvestre Kaweesi explores the impact of the Brandt Report's vision on subsequent efforts by international organizations to create a positive agenda for development, as materialized first by the Millennium Development Goals and, more recently, by the Sustainable Development Goals. Edward addresses the criticism received by the Report in its earlier years by pointing out its success in fostering a vision that espoused interdependence as a critical feature of international cooperation. He discusses German-African relations as a practical example of the influence and paradigmatic shift brought upon by the Report. No less important, he also frames the danger represented by populism to the continuity of this agenda.

The second article, "Global Inequality and Populism: Risks and Opportunities of Contemporary Responses to Migration" by Bastian Becker and Jalale Birru, discusses one of the most important premises of the Brandt Report: fighting inequality. The authors contextualize the changes the inequality agenda went through over the last decades to provide a more updated and modern interpretation of the recommendations made by the Brandt Report. They look at the relationship between inequality and populism to understand how they endanger the operational framework and structures of international institutions.

The third contribution, "Peace, Security, and Stability in the African Continent: 40 Years After the Brandt Report" by Steve Khaemba, reviews the recommendations of the Report for Africa through the lenses of peace and security. The author discusses what he calls "a mixed bag of progress and

regression” since the initial publication of the Report over 40 years ago. Khaemba argues that, although some progress in ending intrastate conflicts has been achieved, the solution to jihadi terrorism in the continent fundamentally depends on the reorganization and proper management of Africa’s internal affairs, rather than on its international relations.

Felipe Carrera Aguayo’s article “Global Governance of Migration: A Comprehensive Approach to Solving the Central American Crisis” revisits the topic of migration, one of the Brandt Report’s central pillars. The Report anticipated the importance of fair migration policies to overcome regional disparities and manage the flow of people moving from poorer to more affluent countries in search of a better life. Felipe reflects on the recommendations of the Brandt report to discuss the current Central American migration crisis and its associated challenges in a context in which national populism makes use of the situation to profit electorally from human suffering.

The fifth contribution also discusses populist strategies in a cross-country perspective. Patricia Loggetto’s article “Governing via Twitter: is the future of decision-making to be written in 140 characters?” discusses the potential of communication technologies to increase accountability and transparency. The article focuses on the unintended consequences of technology in the populist political strategy-mix. She compares the cases of Brazil and the USA under Presidents Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump, respectively, two rather famous examples of leaders who are very active on social networks. She investigates whether the communication patterns do represent a rupture in terms of popular participation, or are merely a platform for publicity.

Laura Barrios' contribution also focuses on the threat of national populism to both the "North" and "South." The article "Populist rhetoric in the peace process: Defending a peace with justice or spreading fear?" analyzes the threat posed by populist rhetoric in Colombia to the consolidation of democracy and political institutions in the face of the recently signed peace agreement between the government and the largest guerrilla group in Latin America, the FARC-EP. Revisiting the Brandt Report's recommendations on disarmament towards the consolidation of cooperation and peace-building, she analyzes how the discourse of populist leaders contributes to the deterioration of institutions, rather than providing positive outcomes.

The last two articles of this volume discuss the problem of the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh. Mohammad Newaz Sharif, Grigoriy Grigoryev, and Kawsher Ahamed's contribution "Ethnic Marginalization to Statelessness of Rohingyas: Policy Conundrums for Repatriation" discusses the crisis and its historical context. The authors point out the relevance of the recommendations of the Brandt Report to addressing the ongoing impasse in Bangladesh and suggest that international organizations take a higher stock in supporting a peaceful and definitive solution for the situation that has already been going for several decades and worsened in the last years.

Lastly, Ushree Barua's "The Rohingya refugee crisis and the localization of Humanitarian Assistance in Bangladesh" focuses on the potential of humanitarian assistance in bridging the gap between North and South, per the recommendations of the Brandt Report. She discusses the risk presented by populist governments to the localization agenda and the potential for

calamitous situations in the absence of cooperation efforts and high degrees of solidarity with human suffering.

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1. Africa: the Enduring Brandt Spirit, International Social Development Policies, and the Resurgence of Populism in Germany

Edward Silvestre Kaweesi

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that 40 years since its initial dissemination in 1980, the Brandt Report has had a considerable impact on the development of the world. Its recommendations have been sustained by the internationalized development agendas such as the Agenda for Development, the Millennium Development Goals, and the Sustainable Development Goals. Those agendas have variously informed the foreign *qua* development policies of the Global North towards the Global South. However, the rise of populism threatens to erode the gains so far made. Thwarting populism calls for a socialization process through which the people will be calibrated into international citizens with a philanthropic conscience and a clear vision of the benefits of increased interdependence as the hallmarks of the Brandt Spirit.

Introduction

The proposals of the Brandt Commission attracted sharp criticism, particularly from academia. They were dismissed as lacking in novelty as far as offering solutions to the poverty of the South was concerned (Singer, 1980). Some castigated the report on account that, if indeed the recommendation of the commission were a somewhat magic bullet, the question could

be, why did some of the members of the commission not implement those ideas when they were in government positions? (Frank, 1980). The interdependence and the mutual interest theses of the commission were dismissed as a mere balance sheet fit for an accountant's dream - just a balance sheet of words, not of economic realities.

The recommendation of the Brandt Report for the industrialized North to ameliorate the predicament of the South was characterized as a call for human solidarity with no intellectual basis in the international economic system. So, the report was criticized as lacking a clear grasp of economic policy. The argument was that it never appreciated that international economics operates along with the schema of the wealthier states being at a higher advantage (Pratt, 1980). Its recommendations were belittled as evangelical, not of any practical utility (Editorial, 1980).

To the dependency theorists, the report was another attempt by the North to exert hegemonic influence on the South. The Lagos Plan of Action of the Economic Development of Africa, a document that condemned the dependency of Africa on the North and argued for self-reliance, was instructive of dependency views, which stood in sharp contrast with the Brandt Report (Shaw, 1983). The argument was that the existing development chasm between the North and the South could only be blamed on the North, which exploited the South during colonialism and in the post-colonial era. Underdevelopment in the South was blamed on the North, which assiduously siphoned off the resources of the South for the sustenance of its industrial base.

Nevertheless, the spirit of the Brandt Report was cognizant of the aggregation of the problems that shaped the

underdevelopment in the South. The report was not in denial of the unfairness of the colonial policy. It was, in a sense, a somewhat partial admission of the commission that the North had selfishly pursued development at the expense and neglect of the predicament of the South. The report, therefore, put an obligation on the North to play a pivotal role in extricating the South from the predicament that the aggressive policy of colonialism created.

Much as the Report was not proposing anything novel, but the repetition of the commitment had a practical effect. The report emphasized the actions that the North had to undertake to ameliorate the conditions of the South. By emphasizing what had to be done, the report acted as a reminder to the North that the development of the world could only be meaningful and complete with the liberation of the South from its social, political, and economic challenges. The tone of the report was, therefore, prescriptive. It prescribed that the development of the world will be more sustainable if the manifestations of underdevelopment in the South are addressed.

Also, contrary to the criticism that the report was another hegemonic stunt for the Global North, the recommendations of the commission were a result of wide consultation. The prominent statesmen of Africa were equally consulted, and their trust in the commission mobilized. William Clark, the then Vice President of the World Bank, in one of his office memoranda, wrote

WB (Willy Brandt) made it quite clear that he would be primarily responsible for the final report; he had found support for this from Desai, Nyerere (then President of Tanzania) and Kaunda (then president of Zambia) on

his recent trip and from western countries with which he was in constant touch (Clark, 1978).

The credibility of the commission and the future that it envisioned for the world was further depicted in the extent of the assistance, financial and otherwise, that the commission received from a number of state and non-state actors. For instance, the two Phases of the commission's work cost about USD 1,100,000. Phase one of the commission's work that was concluded with the publication of the first Report cost about USD 750,000. The contributors were as wide-ranging as our world; they included the Dutch Government, which funded the commission's preparatory work. The governments of Denmark, Finland, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom also made substantial contributions. Regional organizations and funds, such as the Commission of the European Communities and the OPEC Special Fund, also offered substantial assistance. Research centers and foundations, such as the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich-Ebert and the Friedrich-Naumann Foundations of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the International Development Research Centre of Canada also offered support. Private sources from France and the Federal Republic of Germany also committed to contributing financially to the commission's work (Brandt 21 Forum, 2010).

The enthusiasm to support the Brandt Commission and its recommendations was further seen in the assistance that was extended to the follow-up activities after the publication of the report. The governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and the OPEC Fund offered funds for that cause. The popularity of the recommendations

and the spirit of the first report was underscored by the extent of the financial support that the commission received for the meetings for the second phase of its work. About 350,000 USD was injected during this phase. The contributions came from the governments of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Kuwait, as well as the Commission of the European Communities. This support was earmarked for travel costs and local costs for meetings. The Marshall Fund of the United States covered the costs for the follow-up of the distribution of the commission's second report, 'Common Crisis: North-South Cooperation for World Recovery' (Brandt 21 Forum, 2010).

Of course, the reception of the recommendations of the commission was overshadowed by the politics of that moment, which included the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the presidential election in the United States of America, and the Iran hostage affair (Wren, 1981). However, the fact that the second phase of the commission received generous support clearly indicates the belief in the international agenda that the commission sought to promote. Indeed, Sir Ian Gilmonr, in his presentation on the report to the United Kingdom Parliament, underscored the contribution of the report to finding solutions to the problems that were bedeviling the world (Gilmonr, 1980).

The Brandt Spirit in a Nutshell

The Brandt spirit was encapsulated in the quest of the Brandt Commission for a fair world. The Brandt Commission Report of 1980 put forward several recommendations that were aimed at addressing the inequities in international development. The

commission was concerned that, as the North prospered, the South decayed.

Brandt was cognizant of the interconnectivity of these world problems. He decried the widening gap between the North and South. As a balancing arrangement, he called for the amelioration of the situations in the South. He made a strong case for an international welfare system anchored on the provision of the basic social needs of health, education, housing, and food to the impoverished populations of the Global South. It reflected a genuine concern that the prosperous Global North had a moral and practical obligation to ameliorate the social and economic condition of the Global South. The conviction of Brandt, from Gilmonr (1980), was that

the mortal dangers threatening our children and grandchildren can be averted; and that we have a chance—whether we are living in the North or South, East or West—if we are determined to do so to shape the world's future in peace and welfare, in solidarity and dignity.

It is that philanthropic approach to international development and the call for increased interdependence between the Global North and the Global South that I take to be the Brandt spirit. This spirit was sustained in the recommendations of the commission. The recommendations of the report delineated the ways through which a more dignified position of the Global South could be realized within the international system. Responsibilities were allocated to the developed states, the developing states, and international organizations, as far as the reformist agenda of the commission was concerned. The reformist recommendations laid the foundation for the social agenda of the world. This was reflected in the international

social development agendas that have proliferated since the publication of the report.

The Brandt Spirit and the international social development agenda

From the early 1990s through the early 2000s, there emerged a number of commissions and declarations reflecting the Brandt Spirit. They included the Brundtland Commission of 1987, which refined the concept of sustainable development. Also, Mahbub ul Haq's 'Human Development Report: Concept and Measurement of Human Development of 1990' drew much from the logic of the social agenda as articulated by Brandt. Additionally, this list includes the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development of 1992, which launched a broad coalition of environmental and development groups. What is worth underscoring is that the Agenda 21 of 1992 had a full section on the 'Social and Economic Dimensions' of sustainable development. This agenda was generally Brandtian. It called for international cooperation to accelerate sustainable development in developing countries and related domestic policies, combating poverty, changing consumption patterns, protecting and promoting the condition of human health, promoting sustainable human settlement development, and integrating environmental and development considerations into decision making (UN, 1992). In addition to the initiatives of the 1990s was the Commission on Global Governance of 1995, which advanced the concept of a new multilateralism to support the objectives of sustainable development that was in line with the sustainable development idea of the report.

The early 2000s saw a proliferation of initiatives for international social development, with a touch of measured philanthropy and interdependence, part of an agenda that was initiated by the Brandt Report. These include the Millennium Development Goals of 2000, which set the measurable and internationally-affirmed objectives of sustainable development, and the Earth Charter of 2000, which elaborated on the principles and rights necessary for the transition to a global civilization based on sustainable development. Indeed, the disaggregation of the Millennium Declaration into the eight action points of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) attests to the imperativeness of the recommendations of the Brandt Report, particularly the focus on addressing the indignity of poverty. The MDGs were a direct commitment to the operationalization of the Brandt recommendation on addressing poverty.

The three sectors (health, education, and food security) that I gleaned out of what I referred to as the Brandt social agenda were the broad categories along which the MDGs were aligned. Thus, for health, the Millennium Development Goals sought to reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. For food security, a commitment was made in the MDGs to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger and to ensure environmental sustainability. Regarding education, a commitment was made to achieve universal primary education and promote gender equality and empower women (particularly in education). All of these commitments, as goals, were to be realized through the framework that was provided in goal number 8 - to develop a global partnership for development. The MDGs were generally qualitative and aligned with the views that Harlan Cleveland,

the then Director of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, brought to the urgent attention of the Brandt Commission. In his letter of 19 September, 1978, Cleveland implored the commission to

Suppose there were general agreement that the people are entitled to a minimum level of life and literacy by virtue of being people, that this 'poverty line' is properly a matter for international as well as 'domestic' politics, and even that the meeting of basic needs should be regarded as first charge on world resources (Cleveland, 1978).

After the Millennium Development Goals, the most recent declaration, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals, sounds like the reincarnation of a perpetual commitment to the social agenda of the Brandt Report. The agenda promises to eradicate all the barriers to the dignified existence of humanity. They reflect the true spirit of the Brandt Report but in absolute terms of no poverty; zero hunger; good health and well being; quality education; gender equality; clean water and sanitation; affordable clean energy; decent work and economic growth; industry, innovation, and infrastructure; reduced inequalities; sustainable cities and communities; responsible consumption and production; climate action; life below water; life on land; peace, justice, and strong institutions; and partnerships of the goals (UN, 2015).

It is in this spirit that also, the Blair's African Commission, initiated by Tony Blair in 2005 during the British G8 presidency, seemed a complete replica of the Brandt Commission as far as Africa was concerned. The only slight difference between the Blair and Brandt Commissions was that,

for the latter, some of the members of the commission were acting African leaders - Meles Zinawi of Ethiopia and Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania. As it was with the Brandt Commission, the Blair Commission promised to innovate solutions to the predicament of Africa to address famine, disease, conflict, and lack of access to education by the majority of the people (Plaut, 2004). All those delineated initiatives were underscoring the need for the operationalization of the key action areas that the Brandt Commission had proposed (Quilligan, 2010).

As such, the Brandt Report was the first statement of international character that voiced the need for international consensus on how best to address manifestations of poverty in developing countries. The report sets the pace for the internationalized agenda for social development and interdependence. It may be interesting to note that the different keywords of the report - 'Agenda,' 'development goals,' 'sustainable prosperity,' 'international agenda,' 'comprehensive understanding of security' - were later used to punctuate as titles and subtitles of the key documents of international organizations (Brandt Commission, 1980). At the same time, the development of concepts such as 'international social justice,' 'interdependence,' 'globalization,' 'sustainable development,' and 'alternative sources of development financing' is attributed to the Brandt Report (Quilligan, 2010). The UNDP Report of 1994 later gave extensive exposition to the concept of human security as a way of advancing the 'comprehensive understanding of security.' The Millennium Development Declaration has later adopted the 'development goals' as a prefixal phrase to its Millennium Development Goals, and the very recent Sustainable Development Goals borrowed the 'sustainable prosperity' of the Brandt

Commission. Furthermore, apart from adopting the lexical of the Brandt Report, the action of points of the commission were also sustained.

In this view, the report was motivated by the practical concerns that required practical solutions. The manner in which the aspects of the recommendations of the report were later essentialized by several international commissions and declarations influenced the international development *cum* foreign policies of many developed states. To that extent, the philanthropic tone and the role of interdependence advocated within the Brandt Report made it a moral and practical benchmark for the policies of the developed North in relation to the Global South. A single case of Germany-Africa relations suffices to give evidence of this point.

The Brandt Spirit and Germany foreign policy towards Africa

First, for as far as the Brandt Report was concerned, Germany's input was on the imperative of interdependence between the North and the South. The Government of Germany was of the view that economic growth was a common interest that was shared by both the North and the South. This was the position of Germany regarding the new agenda for international development that the Brandt Commission championed. Indeed, William Clark (1978) reminded Robert McNamara to clearly present to the Brandt Commission the uncompromising position of Germany, as thus,

Finally, I expect that Brandt will make it clear at some point that the central theme of the report is to be the common interest of industrialized and developing

countries in economic growth. (This is Egon Bahr's political sine qua non for any increase in German Aid).

The development *cum* foreign policy of Germany towards Africa is summarized under several policy documents. Currently, instructive of these are the Germany Marshall Plan, the German-promoted G20 African Partnership Document with Africa, and the Federal Government Policy Guidelines for Africa, in which the core objectives of Germany in Africa are delineated. The execution of those objectives is coordinated by the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development. Specifically, technical cooperation for development is coordinated by the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ), which commenced its work on 1 January 2011, as a merger of three agencies; the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ), the German Development Service (DED), and Capacity Building International, Germany (InWEnt). It should also be outlined there are other Africa-Germany initiatives that are undertaken within the purview of the German Federal Foreign Office. For instance, when Germany launched the Peace and Security in Africa Program during its 2007 Group of Eight (G8) presidency, the budget was placed under the Foreign Office. This particular budget has been staggering, between Euro 25 million to 30 million since 2008 (Engel, 2012). However, the aggregation of their activities translates into a somewhat philanthropic, conscientious international development policy that reflects the social development agenda as encapsulated by the Brandt Commission. It should be recalled that the Brandt Report called on the privileged states of the North to contribute towards the public policy process of the Global South, as far as poverty alleviation, health, education, and elimination of

hunger were concerned. Germany's foreign policy *qua* development policy in Africa is clearly aligned to the amelioration of those core sectors of social development.

At the level of operationalization, Germany's development assistance has been disaggregated into something of a trinity; economic growth, and political stability, and people's livelihoods. Economic growth and political stability have been largely viewed as the pillars of development and issues to do with people's livelihood as the foundations on which meaningful development should be anchored. It is this mix that was put as the comprehensive approach of Germany to African Policy (Federal Foreign Office).

The tri-fold nature of the German development policy stems from the logic that economic growth and political stability are a function of people's livelihood. However, it is also cognizant of the extent to which a lack of economic growth and political stability can undermine the livelihoods of the people in Africa. The belief is that where there is a harmony in the trinity of economic growth, political stability, and improved people's livelihood, then peace becomes a matter *fait accompli*. And that peace can only be realized if African states are assisted in streamlining their public policy processes. This requires assisting African states not only to be able to provide for their citizens but also to develop stable political and economic institutions. In aiding Africa, Germany is of the view that a peaceful Africa will also translate into increased stability in Europe. This is because displacement, organized crime, the proliferation of arms, and terrorism also serve to destabilize Europe and Germany. A case in point, at the moment, has been migration through the Maghreb region that has undermined the economic, social, and political stability of Europe and

Germany, according to the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin. In that sense, Germany recognizes the increased independencies for economic growth and social and political stability between Africa and Europe. It should be noted that Brandt offered the insight that the future of our world was to be punctuated by chaos, and to address it required the strengthening of the synergies for peace. His observations were

If reduced to a simple denominator, this report deals with peace. War is often thought of in terms of military conflict, or even annihilation. But there is a growing awareness that an equal danger might be chaos — as a result of mass hunger, economic disaster, environmental catastrophes, and terrorism. So, we should not think only of reducing the traditional threats to peace, but also of the need for change from chaos to order (Brandt Commission, 1980).

For that matter, as far as its development policy in Africa is concerned, Germany has supported the infrastructure for peace and security at the continental level. In doing so, it has contributed to the foundations of stability in Africa. As earlier mentioned, the logic of this path is that it is only when stability is guaranteed that meaningful economic development can be realized. This has been done through the African Union and the regional integration processes. Regional integration is usually of functional necessity. Through integration, large markets are mobilized, and barriers to trade are reduced through concessions for free movement of goods and labor. Domestic and foreign investment can also be better ensured by the presence of a larger regional market. The promotion of regional trade diffuses political tensions amongst states. In doing so,

some of the structural causes of conflicts in Africa are moderated.

Consequently, aware of the benefits of regional integration, Germany has committed between Euro 25 million and 30 million since 2008 to support the regional initiatives for peace and security. This amount has been specifically channeled to capacity-building initiatives to enable the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to be in a position to address the structural causes of conflicts (Engel, 2012). Within this scheme, the German Government has supported the African Union Department of Peace and Security in its general organization and management issues. In addition, the development of the Continent-Wide Early Warning System (CWEWS) under the AU and the Departments of Peace and Security of the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the International Authority for Development (IGAD), as well as the East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCM), are generally facilitated by German funding. Also, in support of the Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict Peace-Building Action Plan, the German Government participated in the security sector reform processes of South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Federal Foreign Office, 2011). Usually, in post-conflict societies, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) aim at aligning the security sector to the democratic principles, particularly the civilian control of the security forces. The desired end is usually the realization of good governance, the rule of law, democracy, and human rights as the *sine qua non* for stability and sustainable development. The German Government promotes democratization and good

governance as mechanisms through which stability within states can be guaranteed (Federal Foreign Office, 2011).

Also, most recently, Germany has been instrumental in helping African states to address the problems of refugees and insurgency. For instance, Germany is the largest contributor to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. It is the second-largest donor to the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees activities in Africa. It is also part of the three largest contributors to the World Food Program. As far as addressing the problem of insurgency in Africa, Germany has been at the helm of several EU and UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa. Germany has been at the center of the EU Capacity Building Missions (EUCAP) in Mali and Niger. It has participated in the training and advising local security forces in combating organized crime, championed the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali, and steered the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It was also involved in the United Nations African Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) South Sudan Bither & Zierbath, 2019). Generally, Germany contributed 6.389 percent of the approximately 7.065 billion USD, which was required to finance the 14 peace missions during the period July 2018 to June 2019 (Bundesregierung). Half of those active missions were in Africa (CRS, 2019).

The contribution of Germany to the African Peace and Security architecture is out of the conviction that meaningful economic growth in Africa, for the benefit of Africa and Germany, can only be realized in an atmosphere of stability. In this same vein, Germany is cognizant that stability can be jeopardized by the inadequate capacity of African states to undertake domestic

public policy processes, such as the provision of social services. For that reason, Germany has aided social services in Africa. The social services are generally aligned to foundational elements of the German Marshall Plan with Africa: food and agriculture, protecting natural resources, energy and infrastructure, health, education, and social protection (BMZ, 2017).

Thus far, Germany has offered sectoral support to Africa to overcome the challenges of development. Within the framework of the Millennium Development Declaration, the German Government committed 3.1 billion Euros towards the realization of the Millennium Development Goals. Regarding energy, at the EU-Africa Summit of 2007 in Lisbon, Germany pledged over 1 billion Euros to the improvement of the energy sector in Africa. This was meant to improve on the access to energy and promoting regional electricity initiatives and markets. For health, German has supported the AU's Joint Africa Health Strategy. It also provided 400 million Euros for the BMZ's Family Planning Initiative, which was unveiled at the UN Millennium Development Goals Summit in September 2010. Within the large scheme of fighting HIV/AIDS, the German Government has provided 200 million Euros annually to support programs under the Global Fund to fight AIDS. To support access to clean water and sanitation, the German Government has been providing an average of 90 to 100 million Euros per year since 2003. Seventy million of that money has been going into supplying drinking water and sanitation (Foreign Office, 2011).

Regarding education as the cornerstone of development, the German Government has supported basic and higher education. The larger concentration of its involvement has been in higher

education. To that effect, the German Government, through the German Academic Exchange Services (DAAD), has promoted collaborations between German and African universities. It has supported the creation of disciplinary Centers of Excellence at different African universities. It championed the creation of the Pan African Union in Cameroon and has facilitated scientific research through the creation of research centers. The African Institute for Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in South Africa is instructive of the research centers. As a way of supporting research and innovation in the critical medical sector, the German Government has been instrumental in promoting medical research at African medical centers. This has been done under the European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP), an initiative into new treatments and preventive measures for HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis (Foreign Office, 2011).

In short, the different frameworks and programs that Germany has supported in Africa vivify the Brandt spirit. The Brandt Commission placed a moral and practical obligation on the states of the Global North to assist the states and people of the Global South to realize their quest for emancipation. Germany has been consistently instrumental in supporting the provision of social services that are key aspects of emancipation: health care, poverty alleviation, and education. This balancing act depicted in support of Germany towards the provision of social services has somehow blurred, though not completely undone, the Global South category and poverty, ignorance, and disease as the historical markers of the South. In that, the philanthropic conscience and the idea of interdependence, the hallmarks of the Brandt Commission, have been sustained. However, the wave of populism, which has recently predominated the

political landscape of Germany, now threatens to supplant the Brandt spirit.

Populism as a Threat to the Brandt Spirit and Socialization as the Way Forward

Recently, populism has largely dominated the political landscape of the Global North. Populism connotes all manners and shades of opportunistic ideas and policies that are advanced by politicians for the purposes of winning the support of the people (Mudde, 2004). The policies are not always the best options, but they are cast in a way that resonates with the general psyche of the people. The populists who propagate such policies claim that they are representing the will of the people, as opposed to the ‘other’ self-serving political elite (Morgalit, 2019). They assert that the self-serving elites deprive the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice (Boyte, 2012).

The populist political agenda stands in stark contrast to the international social agenda of the Brandt Report. The report called for ‘responsible world citizens’ in reference to a citizenry that takes an interest in seeking and contributing to global solutions to global problems (Brandt Commission, 1980). The commission underscored the importance of interdependence among states. Populism projects a nationalistic agenda that revolves around the logic of the ‘the people’, ‘the large majority,’ and ‘the nation’ as the beginning and end of humanity. Populism is anti-pluralism. It is against policies that favor outsider groups of foreigners, immigrants, and ethnic and racial minorities (Wilterdink, 2017). Populist politicians patronize the majority and exploit their fears as they mobilize

their anger against the minority and what is perceived to be alien. They position themselves as liberators of the ‘will of the people’ from the political elites who seem to act to the detriment of the ‘common good’ (Wilterdink, 2017).

Populism thrives on skillful manipulation. It is expressed at two levels; radical right parties and small-scale bottom-up movements (Rooduijn, 2014). In Germany, it is encapsulated in the ideas professed and promoted largely by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party (Lochocki, 2015). The political demagogues, whom Lowenthal and Guterman (1949) refer to as the ‘*Prophets of Deceit*’ or ‘*the populist goons*’, have stormed the world-historical stage, manipulating what resonates with the emotions of the people.

For a long time, populists in Germany have insisted that the responsibility of the national state is exclusive to the Germans by blood, language, and culture. Kohn had long referred to these as the elements of the objective concept of nationalism that historically defined German nationalism (Kohn, 1967). The territory of Germany and the capabilities at its disposal, economic and otherwise, are supposed to benefit the Germans. The New Rightists, such as the now very popular Alternative for Germany (AfD), which was formed in 2012, draw on such emotions to promote their *metapolitical intellectualization* of the imperative of a conservative cultural revolution based on ethnic grounds (Salzborn, 2016). Economic conditions just serve as a catalyst to a cultural backlash of values and beliefs (Algan et al., 2017). Indeed, as it is with the growing influence of the AfD in Germany, economic considerations seem to be at the periphery of its mobilization strategy. What lies at the core are issues of restricting migration, the abolition of the Euro,

defending Germany's interests in general, and protecting the superiority of German culture.

The populists are of the view that the increased participation of Germany in finding and contributing to the solutions to world problems undermines the good life and progress of the Germans. The AfD calls for a general overhaul of Germany in international affairs (Lochocki, 2015). The naïve simplicity of the logic of national-exclusion as the hallmark of the populist agenda is that it stems from an attitude of self-delusion that can be summarized as follows; 'We are well, we shall be ever well. We are not responsible for the unwellness of others. Therefore, their unwellness should not interfere with our wellness'. The desire is to have a Germany that is free of foreigners (Novotny, 2009). To them, the homeland and its progress should not be sacrificed at the altar of ameliorating the predicament of the 'other' - a refugee or an economic and political asylum-seeker. This is anathema to the Brandtian meaning of interdependence that we live for each other as the world. It undoes the logic of human survival as the true sense of development. It undermines the Brandt Spirit, and it indicates that 40 years after the Brandt Report, the world, as it is usually put, has come a full circle. This begs but one normative question: How do we rediscover the Brandt spirit? The prescriptions could be as varied as the different manifestations of populism, and one cannot pretend to be exhaustive in such a discussion, but rather to make a modest contribution.

What the populists lose sight of is that, whereas Germany as a national state has obligations to its citizens, as an international state and one of the most prosperous states of the world, it has international obligations. Germany needs to find innovative ways to harmonize the dualism of the German state as a national

and international state. The complexity of that dualism is in the way it conflates the Germany psyche. The Germany psyche is torn between the desire of the German state to project an international spirit, which generally stands in sharp contrast to the psyche of some German citizens who are self-centered. So, in that order, Germany, as an international state, with an international citizen, a *Weltbürger*, is represented by Angela Merkel. She symbolizes a Germany that is committed to globalization, multilateralism (Sauerbrey, 2017), and international liberalism (Dileimy & Triggs, n.d.). Her unwavering belief in welcoming refugees despite sharp criticism from not only a section of the Germany public but also her hardline interior minister Horst Seehofer, who was demanding the right to turn away refugees, reflects a Germany that seeks to offer solutions to global problems (Connolly & Henley, 2018). Her vision of the future is inclined to a more interdependent Europe and the world. Her psyche is in sharp contrast with that of Björn Höcke and the entire leadership of the AfD nationalist party, which stand for a 'national state' that is parochially committed to the concerns of the Germany identity and its superiority in the world, as opposed to an 'international state' with a commitment to multilateralism and globalized identities.

The AfD insists that the economic growth of Germany has nothing to do with liberal economic reforms but rather to the superiority of German culture (Lochocki, 2015). The herculean task could be on how best to assuage the emotions of the Germans without manipulating what Walter Baier referred to as 'the regression to primitiveness.' To him, this requires 'the sight of a new common sense' (Baier, 2016). To me, the 'new common sense' could be the sense of 'mutual interest' and

‘mutual gain’ logic of Brandtian interdependence as the key pillars of the German international state that also caters to the German national state represented in the domestic interests of the people. Undeniably, the policymakers in Berlin and Bonn understand that logic. It defines the development and foreign policies that they promulgate.

Overcoming such a conundrum will require the strengthening of the socialization process of the German citizens into international citizens who not only pride themselves in the welfare of humanity as a whole, but also in the benefits of international interdependencies. The socialization process should be obtained from the Brandtian logic of interdependence. It should be emphasized that the development of Germany is more sustainable if conditions are favorable elsewhere. However, as it is, the Germans feel their Government is giving much to the world at their expense, yet they are getting little from the Global South, particularly Africa.

The socialization process should be elaborate. It should include the orientation of the different stakeholders, particularly the mass media, in the construction of the Germany national conscience. This is because the media sometimes projects a rather lopsided relationship between Germany and Africa. The media presents Africa as riddled with many problems, thus putting a moral obligation on Germany to assist. This explanation makes sense within the larger scheme of international humanitarianism, but it could be insufficient as a means to assuage the Germans who feel that the Germany state is providing for other people, but it is not sufficiently providing for them. In a way, this undermines the elite-citizen linkages; as the political elites are embracing universal values, the citizens feel neglected (Best & Hoffmann-Lange, 2018).

Indeed, the civic competence of the common German citizen is not generally mobilized in the direction of interdependence but rather in the direction of the ‘other’ as a moral burden of Germany. So, as the policymaker looks to Africa as a partner, the common German’s image of Africa is stark into the hackneyed perception of Africa as a ‘Whiteman’s burden.’ This reflects dependency and sustains the populism that taps into crude nationalism, more so where investments in the prosperity of the ‘other’ as ‘refugees,’ ‘migrants,’ and ‘the poverty-stricken’ of the developing world are presented as a burden that the citizens of Germany are supposed to shoulder through empathy. A narrative of interdependency should substitute this narrative of dependency, and it should be decisively articulated beyond the technocratic society of Germany.

For instance, the common German should be educated that Germany is the third-largest export economy in the world and that it can only continue to be so if other parts of the world are stabilized and developed into formidable markets. The sense will be that Aid from developed countries like Germany helps in the growth of the developing world into lucrative markets. Also, through the ‘Welcome Culture,’ *willkommenskultur*, the manufacturing sector of Germany, taps into the talents of skilled immigrants to enable sustainable industrial growth (Trauner & Turton, 2017). These narratives should be gainfully politicized within the electoral realm as the most “coherent and consistent alternatives to the often shortsighted and simplistic offerings of the populists.” The central tensions of the 21st century, such as immigration, neoliberal economics, and European integration, should be explained (Mudde, 2016). Those issues should be internalized as the worthy alternatives to the New Rightists’

populist policy prescriptions, which seem to contradict the Brandt Spirit of interdependence.

A way forward has already been provided. Hughes recommended the strengthening of the ‘checks and balances’ to the ‘social and moral constitution of (the German) society’ in order to reign on ‘negativistic and pushing attitudes’ (Hughes, 1964). To him, this was to be done by the different institutions of German society; the family, schools, government institutions, and well-intentioned civil society. He advised that such institutions should undertake the socialization of the Germans into acceptable behavior (Hughes, 1964). Of course, in contemporary German society, all those institutions have been fairly activated to address the problem of extremism, but the question remains and it is beyond the scope and imagination of this treatment: How should the process of socialization be strengthened to decisively address the resurgence of populism in Germany? The beginning of the quest for answers could be adage-like; hope springs eternal.

Conclusion

In this paper, as it was intended, I have gone past the rather intrusive academic criticism that was directed at the Brandt Report to celebrate and reflect on its enduring philanthropic vision and the desire for interdependence that it espoused. The report was a departure from the inclusive development rhetoric of the United Nations specialized agencies that were championed by the actors of the Global North in the 1980s. Nyerere described such rhetoric as ‘a tactic to gain time, divide us and talk us to death’. The consultative process through which the recommendations of the Brandt Commission emerged

indicated the straightforward intentions of the commission. It initiated a conversation about the social development of the world. This conversation was sustained, in a much practical way, by the United Nations, which has developed many international development agendas. The international development agendas impacted the nature of the foreign *qua* development policies of the Global North towards the South. The case of German-African relations is informative in that regard. This depicts the Brandt Report as something of practical influence. This trajectory undoes the earlier dismissal of the Brandt proposals as mere wishful thinking, likely to remain just at the level of good intentions. With the benefit of hindsight, 40 years since the publication of its report, it is not farfetched to assert that the Brandt Commission brought a paradigmatic shift in the development of the world. However, populism is now rising to challenge the Brandt Spirit, particularly the philanthropic conscience and the imperative of interdependence as the hallmarks of international social development. Thwarting populism and the danger that it poses to the Brandt Spirit will require a commitment to the socialization of the citizens of the world into the 'we culture'-- that we live for each other as citizens of the world. A commitment from leaders will be central to this process. The beginning is there, and Germany is showing us the way. Against all the challenges presented by populism, those in leadership can be committed to forging an international state and citizenry.

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2. Global Inequality and the Rise of Populism: Risks and Opportunities of Contemporary Debates

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Abstract: Overcoming global inequality requires changes to deep-seated institutions and structures on an international scale. This was the premise of the 1980 Brandt Report, which called on the international community to move beyond conventional and ineffective approaches to development. Despite its popularity, the Brandt Report's agenda did not lead to real improvement. Today, global inequality remains one of the major challenges of our time. In this chapter, we discuss how global inequality has changed over recent decades. We argue that the adherent rise of populism constitutes a challenge to international institutions and structures, with both risks and opportunities for combating global inequalities. Therefore, it is a good time to revisit some of the recommendations made by the Brandt Report.

Introduction

In countries across the globe, populist parties have moved into parliaments or even became the ruling party. Their success constitutes a challenge to both domestic and international institutions. While protectionist inclinations currently threaten and undermine international cooperation, we argue that the scrutiny being placed on international institutions also provides

opportunities for progressive reform. Therefore, it is a timely endeavor to revisit the Brandt Report's call for reforms to combat global inequality.

Since the initial release of the Brandt Report, global inequality has changed in important ways. On one hand, disparities between countries, as well as the Global North and South², have narrowed. On the other hand, income gaps between the rich and the poor have widened across almost all nations. While this calls for a careful consideration of the Report's more specific reform proposals, there is little doubt that a more equitable global distribution of economic resources and opportunities is only possible with changes to deep-seated institutions and structures of the global economy.

As the disappointing track record of the Brandt Report evinces, reforms of the global economy are hard to implement. Ironically, populism, itself a by-product of globalization and growing gaps between the rich and the poor, has dramatically increased the stakes for politicians in the Global North to defend and reform international institutions. Hence, forty years after the release of the Brandt Report, it might be the right time to enact reforms to reduce global inequality.

Revisiting the Brandt Report

To reduce the economic gap between the Global North and South, the Independent Commission on International

² The Commission generally categorized developing countries as those that occupy the southern hemisphere and developed countries as those that occupy the northern hemisphere, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand, which are geographically located in the south hemisphere yet are identified as developed countries by the Report.

Development Issues (ICIDI), also known as the Brandt Commission, put forward a series of recommendations in 1980 known as the Brandt Report. Instead of relying on conventional international aid, the Brandt Report recommended drastic changes to the global economy as the most effective response to overcome global inequality between the Global North and South. The main recommendations recognized the mutual benefits and interdependency of development and focused on a need for the large-scale transfer of resources to the countries in the Global South. The key recommendations focused on debt, aid, and trade.

The four “Emergency Programs” recommended by the Report were:

- Resource transfer from the North to the South - the Report suggests implementing this transfer through different methods. The first suggestion was imposing a worldwide tax on each country (except the least developed countries), based on their national income. The second suggestion was to give aid through multilateral institutions to the least developed and low-income countries for 20 years. For middle- and higher-income countries, the Report suggested providing loans with better terms.
- To make an agreement on global energy strategy - the Report asks oil producers to agree to produce oil on regulated routines and consumers to agree on consumption and conservation strategies.
- To establish a global food program to increase food production, along with the reduction of poverty in order to eliminate world hunger.

- To reform the international economic system by establishing an effective international monetary system that aims to improve the position of least developed countries in terms of the commodities trade and manufacturing (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980; Overseas Development Institute, 1980; Share the World's Resources, 2006).

The Report stressed that, through cooperation based on mutual benefits, it is possible to eradicate global inequality and an unfair international economic system.

While the Report was initially well-received, especially by governments in the Global South, its recommendations were, by and large, not implemented. As such, it experienced a similar fate to the New International Economic Order, a UN resolution that called for similar changes. While a large alliance of developing countries managed to pass the resolution in 1974, the powerful opposition of the main industrialized economies in the North hindered its actual implementation.

Instead, countries in the North began to advocate for neo-liberal economic policies based on the Washington Consensus to address the economic inequality. Their efforts followed the second oil crisis and the recession in the 1980s. Inflation occurred in countries in the North, which in turn increased interest rates and affected countries in the South by increasing their debt-servicing commitment. For example, by 1982, debt in Latin America had increased from \$27.6 billion to \$238.5 billion. Furthermore, total debt in Africa was around, “\$51.3 billion and the annual debt-servicing accounted for \$5.46 billion


or 12.6 per cent of the value of Africa's exports of goods and services" (Best, Hanhimäki, Maiolo, & Schulze, 2008, p. 330).

By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, Northern countries like the US and UK had witnessed the rise of the New Right, which emphasized liberal economic reforms for the development of countries in the South. Therefore, in exchange for financial help from international financial organizations like the World Bank, countries in the South were asked to make structural reforms. These structural reforms aimed to privatize state enterprises, introduce austerity measures, and devalue their currencies to pave the way for globalization. While the exact economic impacts of these reforms are disputed, they certainly did not constitute the reforms generally perceived as necessary to combat global inequality.

Global Inequality Now and Then

At the time the Brandt Report was written, its main concern was tackling inequalities between rich and poor countries, or even more broadly, inequalities between the Global North and the Global South. Today, vast disparities between countries continue to exist, but the gaps have narrowed (see Figure 1), albeit largely due to the success of China and other emerging economies (Alvaredo et al, 2018). At the same time, Europe and Northern America, which previously earned most of the world's income despite their relatively small populations, have fallen behind Asia. Given the non-implementation of most of the Brandt Report's recommendation, these narrowing gaps might come as a surprise.


Figure 1: Income Shares of World Regions, own computation based on World Inequality Database (2020).



A closer look at developments in global inequality reveals that it has evolved rather than disappeared. While inequalities between countries have fallen, inequalities within them have grown almost everywhere. Around the world, the benefits of economic growth have accrued mostly among the economic elite (see Figure 2). Taking the entire world together, the top one percent of the global income distribution received 27 percent of the total income growth between 1980 and 2016,

whereas the bottom half captured merely 12 percent (Alvaredo et al, 2018). As a result, wealth today is distributed much more unequally than it was at the time the Brandt Report was published.

Figure 2: Income Shares of Top 1 Percent, based on World Inequality Database (2020).



Is the Brandt Report still relevant today? On one hand, it is not clear how global inequality would have developed had more recommendations of the Brandt Report been implemented. Changes in the shape of global inequality, from *between* to

within countries, also merit the question in how far any of its specific recommendations still represent promising ways forward. On the other hand, its basic premise that reducing global inequality requires changes to deep-seated institutions and structures on an international scale remains powerful. After all, the past decades have changed the appearance of global inequality, but not its degree. In the following sections, we discuss the rise of populism that coincided with changes in global inequality and how it provides a chance to revive the Brandt Reports call for reform of global economic institutions.

Globalization and the rise of populism

Globalization and populism are often seen as going hand-in-hand. In short, globalization creates winners and losers. If the latter are not compensated, economic and political discontent grows and populist messages find increasing resonance (Katzenstein, 1985). These dynamics are amplified when the gains and losses of globalization align with pre-existing economic cleavages, and thus reinforce economic inequality. This is, of course, exactly what has happened in many countries over the past decades (Rodrik, 2018).

These developments have been considerably delayed in Europe due to strong welfare states that provided compensation to globalization losers. However, increased levels of migration, another layer of globalization, have recently contributed to what some describe as cultural backlash (Norris, 2019), adding to the political grievances of globalization losers. By now, populist parties have swept into parliaments and government all over the continent (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012).

While all European populists take issue with globalization, their messages are far from uniform. Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of populism, one on either end of the political spectrum. Whereas left-wing populism prevails in Southern Europe, right-wing populism is more common in Northern and Eastern European countries (Manow, 2018). This division arguably relates to the context in which the populists aspired: internationally-imposed austerity measures in the South and the so-called migration crisis in the North and East.

Established political parties have responded to the rise of populists in a variety of ways. While some imitate their messages, others call to address the structures that underlie their rise. These calls usually focus on compensating globalization losers through increases in minimum wages or welfare services, or they aim at international economic relations that are perceived as unfair. While such debates over national labor and social policy are not novel to Europe, the concern with international economic relations, and in particular their protectionist leaning, is.

Risks and Opportunities for Combating Global Inequality

The new debates on international economic relations are an opportunity to return to one of the Brandt Reports most courageous ambitions, to change the global economy to redress global inequalities. After all, policymakers and politicians in Europe and elsewhere have been unable or unwilling to act on the Report's insights, preferring to provide international aid over engaging in the more challenging task of reforming institutions and structures.

Unfortunately, the state of the current debate does not seem to make use of these opportunities. Global economic institutions and how they contribute to the unequal distribution of globalization's gains and losses rarely take the center stage. Instead, an obsession with unfair practices abroad, such as outsourcing or "dumping", be it through lower labor standards or state subsidies, have inspired protectionist ambitions. It is unlikely that such measures would lessen global inequality. Indeed, they actually put the economic gains that have been achieved through globalization at risk (Furceri et al., 2018).

To make progress on global inequality, it is important to remember that most inequality now exists within countries rather than between them. Unilateral approaches, such as protectionism, appear to ignore this. At the same time, national debates ignore that globalization losers in different countries have much in common. The way global economic institutions are set up equally tilts the playing field against them. However, the beneficiaries of globalization, and the institutions on which it is built, are not poor migrants or workers in other countries, but capital owners at home and abroad.

Given the widespread dissatisfaction with globalization, populism might become an unexpected ally for progressive action against global inequality. However, this requires moving the debate from national to global inequality. This could not only help in curbing the protectionist inclinations that can be observed all around the world, but it could also facilitate reforms in the direction envisaged by the Brandt Report.

While the Report focused on reforms that would undo the disadvantages experienced by countries in the Global South, debates today could focus on institutions that are regarded with skepticism in more countries. These include government

subsidies, overly business-friendly (and thus labor-hostile) trade agreements, or the functioning of international financial markets (e.g. capital mobility and taxation). Instead of letting populism serve global inequality, politicians and policymakers should channel calls for change and direct them towards reforming global economic institutions. As people in more countries now share an interest in doing so than at the time of the Brandt Report, achieving some of the Report's goals may be closer than previously thought.

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3. Peace and Security in Africa: 40 Years After the Brandt Report

Steve Wakhu Khaemba

Abstract: Forty years since the publication of the Brandt Report in 1980, this article examines the progress made by Africa through a lens of peace and security, based on the development indicators suggested in the report. The analysis indicates that the outcome of Africa's overall development, as anticipated in the report, is a mixed bag demonstrating both progress and regression. While the progress includes an end to many intrastate conflicts, Africa must now grapple with a new security challenge in the form of jihadi terrorism. Though the Brandt Report advocates for North-South partnerships to solve North-South problems, the principal solution to jihadi terrorism is to be found in the management of Africa's internal affairs.

Introduction

In recent years, a narrative of 'Africa rising' has emerged in academic, policy, and media circles. It is anchored in the idea that Africa is quickly moving towards increased development outcomes and self-reliance. In academic circles, the discussion is shaped by opposing arguments loosely characterized as optimistic or pessimistic. Scholars on either side of the spectrum often approach the debate from the comfort of their academic positions, armed with sophisticated quantitative analyses of empirical data. Optimists often rely on economic

indicators and argue, for example, that Africa's growing young population has created a window of opportunity for higher economic growth, citing factors like an enlarged market for commodities and human capital (Drummond et al., 2014). Others argue that Africa has recently attracted an increasing share of global foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, e.g., China-led expansion in intra-African FDI (Kruger & Strauss, 2015). Pessimists draw attention to the dangers of being dazzled by economic numbers, arguing that African economies remain integrated into the global economy in ways that are generally unfavorable to the continent (Taylor, 2014). Some argue that economic advancements, as reflected by the recent consistent rise in GDP, are negated by non-economic factors, such as increased population, instability, and urbanization, that leave more people poorer (Frankema & Van Wijenburg, 2018). Between the two extremes are those who are cautious and call for a holistic approach in examining whether Africa is indeed rising (Beresford, 2016). Weighing into this discourse through a lens of peace and security, this paper examines where Africa stands today in comparison to 1980 when the Brandt Report was first published.

Before delving into the status of the African continent since 1980, it is important to note that when the Brandt Report was first published, the political rhetoric in Africa was dominated by nationalist politics, initially championed by national liberation leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Patrice Lumumba, Julius Nyerere, and others. At the time, political rhetoric was generally dictated by a desire to build strong post-colonial nation-states based on a common social, economic, and political identity (Curtin, 1966). While the different forms of these nationalist projects (Shivji, 2003) have

delivered much success in some respects, including the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (later the African Union), there has also been a failure in some respects. For example, the rise of ethnic nationalism fuelled by increased political competition has seen not only increases in ethnic conflicts across the continent, but also a rise in narrow populist politics championed by populist leaders whose political rhetoric is based on strong anti-exclusion, anti-political, and anti-party discourses that are heavily-laden with ethnic and class cleavages (Hadiz & Chryssogelos, 2017; Boateng & Adjorlolo, 2018; Carbone, 2005). The rise of this brand of populism poses several challenges to Africa's progress. Many of the populist leaders across the continent constitute a threat to constitutional democracy. This crop of leaders claims to draw accountability directly from the people rather than from democratic institutions. The result is a subversion of liberal democracy and a slow pace in the fight against certain social and economic evils, e.g., corruption. For example, populist elected leaders who become implicated in corruption often resort to populist rhetoric to evade accountability. In other instances, party politics has also deteriorated in the sense that long-standing nationalist party ideologies are increasingly being challenged by populist leaders whose agendas are sometimes narrow and aimed at self-preservation (Mathekga, 2008). These and many other aspects associated with ethnic nationalism and the rise of populism in many countries pose significant challenges to the resolution of "Africa's internal affairs."

The Brandt Report

The 'Brandt Report,' formally known as '*North-South: a programme for survival*,' is a 300- page report written by the

Independent Commission on International Development Issues, chaired by Willy Brandt, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1969 – 1974) (Brandt, 1980). The Commission was made up of distinguished politicians, diplomats, bankers, international civil servants, and development experts, eleven from the Global South and ten from the Global North. It was assembled in late 1977 with the sponsorship of the Secretary-General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, on the proposal of Robert McNamara, then President of the World Bank and former U.S. Defence Secretary (Sneider, 1980). Since its members were invited to join in a private capacity and were not responsible to any government or institution, it was an independent commission. Assembled at a time of steady deterioration in North-South relations and the world's overall economic condition, the Commission's main agenda was to facilitate a "North-South dialogue" based on the principle that both the North and the South have 'mutual interests' in the solutions of North-South problems (Sneider, 1980). To achieve its objective, the Commission set up a secretariat in Geneva and traveled around the world, holding 'high level' meetings with eminent persons, government officials, and heads of state (Sneider, 1980).

To address these problems, the report outlines several broad recommendations that are predominantly economic in nature. It recommends a restructuring of North-South relationships, the international economy, and its institutions, as well as a large-scale transfer of resources and technology to developing countries based on principles of equality, fair balance, and mutual benefit (Elson, 1982). It proposes the creation of a "World Development Fund" from which flexible and affordable loans would be advanced to Third World countries to finance

development, and which would be credited through progressive taxation of states on certain items of international trade, including arms (Sneider, 1980). According to the Commission, restructuring international economic institutions should also encompass qualitative changes that give the South more influence in decision-making at international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF (Elson, 1982). To address conflicts arising out of competition for dwindling energy resources, the report calls for an international energy strategy that prioritizes energy conservation and consumption cutback and promotes the use of solar energy and similar labor-intensive 'renewable sources' (Sneider, 1980). To address trade imbalances, the Brandt Commission called on the North to reverse the trend towards protecting its industries against competition from the Third World and to instead promote a process of positive, anticipatory consultation and surveillance (Sneider, 1980). It also called on developing countries to be aware of their own protectionism and increase the competitiveness of their exports and opportunities for trade among themselves as an essential element in their cooperation (Wionczek, 1981). To eliminate world hunger and poverty, the report recommends increased food production through massive investments in labor-intensive agricultural projects (i.e., appropriate technology), population control, and decreasing the pace of urbanization (Elson, 1982).

Several issues raised in the report's recommendations warrant brief commentary. The report is populist in nature. While it addressed real concerns that African states continue to have today, its recommendations were not new (Elson, 1982; Wionczek, 1981). Questions arise as to why members of the Commission never implemented their proposals when they

were heads of governments and ministers in their respective countries (Frank, 1980). In addition, besides proposing an idealistic 'world government' that takes over-taxation responsibilities and makes development finance for Third World countries more flexible and cheaper, the report does not outline any real practical strategies for implementing its proposals. The notion of a 'world government' ignores the anarchic nature of the international system, where national interests shape the behavior of states and foreign policy. The report assumes that developed countries will gradually become more egalitarian and socialist. Such an assumption is problematic, even within Africa, considering its diverse social and political ecosystem. Obliviousness to the colonial experiences of most countries in the South shapes its attitudes towards proposals made at the international stage, as the report's proposal for large-scale transfers of resources from the North to the South falls just short of suggesting that the South can only develop if it depends on advances from the North. Perhaps this explains why, in most parts of the South, the report was viewed as representing the line of thinking of the World Bank, the IMF, and other institutions based in Northern capitals (Wionczek, 1981). With a population of 1.2 billion people and vast natural resources, what Africa needs for development is a robust improvement in the management of its internal affairs, not a reliance on external actors. Both the key issues identified and proposed solutions are heavily economic in nature and are, ultimately, lip service to the social and political conditions that determine development outcomes and the trajectory of North-South relations.

Nevertheless, in the final analysis, based on the principles of equality, fair balance, and mutual benefit, most of the


recommendations of the report have the potential to improve relations between nations, making the world more peaceful and leaving states and people better off.

Status of Africa's Social, Economic, and Political Development

Compared to 1980, the status of Africa's social, economic, and political development is a mixed bag of progress and regression, as depicted in Figure 1 (see next page, also Appendix 1).

The Brandt Report recommends energy conservation, consumption cutback, and increased use of renewable energy. Africa's consumption of non-renewable energy reduced from an average of 92.4 million metric tons in the 1990s to 50.3 million metric tons in the 2010s. This progress is largely attributable to the increased use of hydroelectric power for domestic and commercial use (Cole, Elliot, & Strobl, 2014). However, the future of hydroelectric power generation seems to be at risk. According to the World Bank, Africa's electricity production from hydroelectric sources as a percentage of total energy production steadily decreased from a continental average of 53.37% in 1980 to 35.73% in 2015 (Bank, 2020). As hydroelectric power relies on stable and increasing rainfall patterns, increased desertification indicated by the shrinking of the forested area from 65.6 (1000 ha) per 100,000 inhabitants in the 2000s to 50.4 (1000 ha) per 100,000 inhabitants in the 2010s is something policymakers on the continent should be more concerned about.

Figure 1: Graphical display of Africa's development changes between 1980 and 2020



Notes:

- A. Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)
- B. Fuel oil consumption (Metric tons, million)
- C. Poverty at \$1.90 a day (% of the population)
- D. GDP growth rate (annual %)
- E. Unemployment, total (% of the total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate);
- F. Population growth rate (average annual %)
- G. Population (billions)
- H. Fuel oil production (Metric tons, million)
- I. Forested area (1000 ha) per 100,000 inhabitants;
- J. Proportion of debt service (% of the debt)
- K. Net migration (millions)
- L. External debt stocks, total (trillion US\$)
- M. Balance of trade in food (annual average % of merchandise imports)
- N. Balance of trade (billion US\$)

Absolute poverty levels have also dropped, which can be attributed to increased economic growth and lower unemployment. It can also be attributed to a declining population growth rate, which aligns with the report's recommendation for population control. Some of the factors responsible for the decreasing fertility rate include: increased use of contraceptives among women due to expansive family planning programs; increased educational attainment for women; the impact of HIV/AIDS, mainly through its effect on female mortality, and increased safe sex practices; improved social-economic development; and more (Kebede et al., 2019). Africa's increased economic growth can also partly be attributed to increases in total revenues from the export of natural resources and fuel oil. Although data suggests that there is an overall decrease in poverty levels and an increase in economic growth, the increase in migrants moving out of Africa may signify that economic growth has been accompanied by increased inequality and increased relative poverty.

The Brandt Report proposed a large-scale transfer of resources from developed to developing countries, including through the provision of cheap, flexible loans. Compared to 1980, Africa's debt burden has nearly tripled from an average of 1.8 trillion USD in the 1980s to an average of 5.1 trillion USD in the 2010s. The weight of this burden is reflected in the withering of Africa's ability to repay back its loans, as indicated by a decrease in the proportion of debt service (% of debt) from an average of 10.2% in the 1980s to 8.3% in the 2010s. What this implies is that Africa continues to choke on the stranglehold of expensive commercial loans with questionable terms. Much of the debt burden can be attributed to increased uptake of Chinese infrastructure investment loans. For example, between 2000 and

2014, Chinese governments, banks, and contractors extended loans totaling 86.9 billion U.S. dollars to African governments and state-owned enterprises (Miao et al., 2020). Fifty-four percent of these loans were made to five countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Miao et al., 2020).


Though the Brandt Report called on the North to reverse the trend towards protecting its industries against competition from the Third World and instead to promote a process of positive, anticipatory consultation and surveillance, Africa's balance of trade has continued to deteriorate from an average of -33.9 billion U.S. in the 1980s to -508.6 billion U.S. in the 2010s. This is despite a number of initiatives, such as the 2000 US-Africa trade partnership, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Traditionally, Africa is a net exporter of food. Coupled with increased desertification, the decline in the balance of trade in food (annual average % of merchandise imports), from an average of 18.9% of merchandise imports in the 1980s to 15.4% in the 2010s, is something to worry about because it is an indication that Africa's food security is declining. The recommendation to increase intra-South trade opportunities is well on course to be realized if the recent agreement among African states establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) is fully operationalized and well-implemented.

Implications for Peace and Security

In general, as compared to 1980, other than a fall in arms imports from an average of 51.91 billion USD in the 1980 to 31.18 billion USD in the 2010s, all other indicators of peace and

security signal a deteriorating situation. See Figure 2 (See also Appendix 2).

Figure 2: *State of progress towards peace and security in Africa*




Notes:

- A. *Refugees and internally displaced persons (million)*
- B. *Returned refugees and internally displaced persons (million)*
- C. *Arms imports (US\$ billion, at constant 2017)*
- D. *Military expenditure (US\$ billion, at constant 2017)*
- E. *State-based armed conflict*
- F. *Communal and organized armed violence*
- G. *Battle-related deaths*
- H. *Peace agreements*
- I. *Terrorism incidents*

In terms of trends (see Figure 3), communal and organized armed violence and terrorism represent the continent's main threats to peace and security. While both types of violence have

steadily increased since 1980, more worrying is the tremendous increase in terrorism by more than 700%.

Figure 3: *Trend in conflict types in Africa*




In my upcoming doctoral dissertation, I find that there is a positive correlation between communal and organized armed violence in which none of the parties are the government of a state and terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa³. It has also been established that over 60% of terror-related websites in Africa

³ Terrorism and Conditions for Human Rights in Counter-terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa

are linked to vigilantes, bandits, militias, etc (Bertram & Ellison, 2014). In the 1980s, the most significant terrorism threat that Africa faced emanated from the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Kagwanja, 2006). Beginning in the late 1990s, jihadi terrorism, which is inspired by jihadi ideologies propagated by radical interpretations of Islam, has become the most serious and complex security challenge in Africa today.

Figure 4: *Proportion of Muslim population and terrorist attacks by sub-region.*



Source: The CIA World Factbook 2019 Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). Global Terrorism Database [Data file].


As seen in Figure 4, jihadi terrorism has heavily affected the Eastern and Western sub-regions of sub-Saharan Africa. This is because of the relatively higher Muslim populations in these

two sub-regions, which facilitates the propagation of radical Islamist ideologies. The threat posed by jihadi terrorism is further underlined by the emergence of an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Levant (ISIS/L)-affiliated groups, such as Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) and Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamâ in Southern Africa, outside its traditional bases in North, West, and East Africa (Fabricius, 2018). The jihadists have, in recent times, carried out several deadly attacks in Cabo Delgado in the northern province of Mozambique (Fabricius, 2018; Aljazeera, 2020).

Despite progress in some economic and social sectors, what accounts for slow progress towards peace and stability on the continent is the persistence of conditions of state weakness and poor health of political systems, e.g., the existence of large swathes of ungoverned spaces; the inability of governments to effectively maintain a monopoly on violence; corruption and extensive criminalization of law enforcement agencies; poor service delivery; general disregard for the rules of the formal political and economic sectors; lack of social justice, non-participatory political processes; civic lethargy; etc. (Cilliers, 2003).

For example, from the 1990s to the mid-2000s, significant democratic gains registered in most parts of Africa generated advances in human rights (Mutua, 2008). However, beginning the mid-2000s, a deleterious effect on Political Rights (P.L.) and Civil Liberties (CL) has been experienced, as shown in Figure 5 by the rising Freedom House human rights score. According to Freedom House, the higher the score, the less free a country or territory is.

Figure 5: *Trend in Political rights and civil liberties in sub-Saharan Africa (1998 – 2017) from House (2018).*



Conclusion and Recommendations

Forty years since the publication of the Brandt Report in 1980, the outcome of Africa's overall development as anticipated in the report is a mixed bag of progress and regression. There is evidence of progress in some areas, e.g., the energy sector, cuts in arms imports, decrease in population growth rate, a marginal reduction in overall poverty levels, etc. Other areas, such as international trade, debt burden, and food security, continue to lag and even show signs of further deterioration. Generally, there is evidence of overall economic growth and political development in some quarters where democratic space has increased, e.g., Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Gambia, etc. These

developments have seen an end to many intrastate conflicts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, some of which started in the 1980s (Straus, 2012). However, as many of these conflicts ended, the arrival of Osama Bin Laden to Africa in late 1991 brought with it a new security challenge in the form of jihadi terrorism, which is based on radical interpretations of Islam. This type of terrorism seeks the introduction of Islam into politics and society with the objective of creating modern Islamic states through jihad and martyrdom as the vital means of achieving this objective (Ousman, 2004). Overtime, jihadi terrorism has grown to become the most complex threat to Africa's peace, security, development, and stability. The most affected parts being North, West, and East Africa, and signs of its spread to the southern part of the continent are emerging. Many of the conditions that facilitate the spread of jihadi terrorism are the same that drove many of the conflicts that appeared on the African continent in the first two decades following the publication of the Brandt Report in 1980. Though the Brandt Commission sought to solve such problems through an international North-South partnership, the principal solution to jihadi terrorism in Africa is grounded in the management of its internal affairs. Both the regional body, the African Union (A.U.), and national governments must ensure that conditions of state weakness and poor health of political systems are addressed in a decisive, all-inclusive, and participatory manner. Luckily, some recent policy developments at the A.U., such as the ACFTA and Agenda 2063, contain the nuts and bolts required to assemble the required solutions. If well-implemented with an infusion of the correct dose of political will and gains sustained, these and other national development blueprints will address the drivers of jihadi terrorism and secure the future of Africa's peace, security, and development.

Finally, the rise of jihadism can also be seen as a response to poor governance and corruption, which are intimately related to an African variety of populism. Governments that do not provide any real answers to important policy problems face the risk of contestation from increasingly radical forms of opposition. To address jihadism, one also needs to address the potential sources of its legitimacy.

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Appendix

Table 1: Selected Africa development indicators (1980 – 2020)

Development Indicator	1980- 1990	1990- 1999	2000- 2010	2010- 2020
A. Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) ²	8.8	10.9	12.8	13.7
B. Fuel oil consumption (Metric tons, million) ¹	-	92.4	89.6	50.3
C. Poverty at \$1.90 a day (% of population) ²	46.1	-	43.0	-
D. GDP growth rate (annual %) ¹	1.9	2.4	5.3	2.8
E. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modelled ILO estimate) ⁴	-	9.0	9.7	8.6
F. Population growth rate (average annual %) ¹	2.8	2.5	2.5	2.6
G. Population (billions) ¹	0.5	0.7	0.9	1.2
H. Fuel oil production (Metric tons, million) ¹	-	347.4	346.8	194.8
I. Forested area (1000 ha) per 100,000 inhabitants ³	-	-	65.6	50.4
J. Proportion of debt service (% of debt) ⁵	10.2	8.4	9.3	8.3
K. Net migration (millions) ²	-3.9	-3.9	-10.2	-6.6

L.	External debt stocks, total (trillion US\$) ²	1.8	3.1	3.2	5.1
M.	Balance of trade in food (annual average % of merchandise imports) ²	18.9	18.5	15.7	15.4
N.	Balance of trade (billion US\$) ²	-33.9	-62.6	307.4	-508.6

Sources:

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4. World Trade Organisation. Accessed on 28.01.2020. Available at <https://data.wto.org/>

5. Own computation

Table 2: Africa peace and security indicators (1980-2020)

Indicator	1980-	1990-	2000-	2010-
	1990	1999	2010	2020
A. Refugees and internally displaced persons (million) ¹	36.83	52	92	71
B. Returned refugees and internally displaced persons (million) ¹	2.38	8.8	3	12
C. Arms imports (US\$ billion, at constant 2017) ²	51.91	77	72	18
D. Military expenditure (US\$ billion, at constant 2017) ²	154.89	.58	.42	.87
E. State-based armed conflict ³	128	139	122	148
F. Communal and organized armed violence ³	5	180	247	294
G. Battle-related deaths ³	34546	718	797	44
H. Peace Agreement ³	7	61	80	40
I. Terrorism incidents ⁴	1383	9	3	60

Sources

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3. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed on 28/01/2020. Available at <https://ucdp.uu.se/>

4. Global Terrorism Database, accessed on 28/01/2020. Available at <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/access/>

4. Governance of Global Migration in the Age of Populist Nationalism: A Case Study of the Central American Crisis

Felipe Carrera Aguayo⁴

Abstract: The spread of forced global migration is the defining social crisis of our time. Forty years ago, the Brandt Report anticipated the importance of reconciling the interests of countries of origin and those of destination in migration movements, as well as strengthening the rights of refugees to asylum and legal protection. However, the rise of populist nationalism in the United States of America has currently made migration one of the most important policy issues for voters, reviving "North" and "South" divisions that were thought to be obsolete and instigating an "us" against "them" narrative with hate speech implications that were considered out-of-date.

The caravans of Central Americans heading north, whether to seek better economic opportunities or to escape from the threat of gangs and organized crime bands, have produced political and humanitarian tensions across borders. Indeed, the current crisis has shown how critical international cooperation is and how a comprehensive focus on human mobility is necessary.

⁴ The author would like to thank his colleague Kevin Lopez Oliva for contributing to this essay with his perspective and understanding of the Central American Crisis as a consular official, policy analyst, and political scientist. The author's views expressed in this essay are his own.

Finding a balance between the right of states to protect their borders and the freedom of people to move is crucial to the governance of global migration. However, demagoguery and the rise of populist nationalism undermine this. Instead, just as Brandt suggested forty years ago, we should change attitudes and call for understanding, commitment, and solidarity in the way we tackle this complex issue.

The Brandt Report at 40

The Independent Commission of International Development Issues, which would become known as the Brandt Commission, was created amid a deadlock in the Conference on International Economic Co-operation (CIEC) that met periodically in Paris since the mid-1970s. More widely known as the North-South Conference, CIEC was a rather informal body that gathered developed countries, OPEC members, and developing countries to address a wide range of topics deemed critical to the development agenda (ODI, 1976), but couldn't accomplish the compromises that parties had hoped for (Amuzegar, 1977).

Robert McNamara, then President of the World Bank Group, realized how complex the development problem was and how difficult it was for rich and poor nations to find common ground in a purely political context. He proposed the idea of bringing together a group of highly respected international figures, from both developed and developing nations. Once released from the duty of bringing an official position to the table, this group could more easily agree to a common definition of the problem, develop politically and economically feasible recommendations to address it, and estimate the cost and benefits of taking action for all parties.

Willy Brandt was invited to chair the commission, given his experience in East-West relations. Being awarded the Nobel Prize earlier in the decade due to his leading role in the *Ostpolitik*, he offered the proper skillset required to bridge the North-South divide.⁵

International migration and brain drain were among the topics the commission discussed during its meetings. Accordingly, a whole chapter of the Report was dedicated to population: its growth, movement, and the environment. Since demography is - along with climate, governance, and the economy - one of the most important driving forces of international migration, it made sense to address this issue by reducing birth rates through ambitious family planning programs in the Third World. At the time, this region of the world accounted for 90% of the increase in the world population, and the experience showed that limiting population growth was correlated with improved health, better educational attainment of both women and men, and adequate food supply for the poor.

In contrast, however, the commission acknowledged that the rich Northern countries had a structural lack of manpower - whether skilled, unskilled, or professional - in industries that could not attract or keep national workers, thus requiring them

⁵ The correspondence that Brandt and McNamara exchanged as they crafted, made public, and got the commission rolling is, in itself, an example of careful diplomacy with extreme care to every detail, including language and timing. It was carefully brokered with the Venezuelan Minister, to whom he gave his assurances that the work of the Commission would not interfere with the ongoing negotiations at CIEC. The folder related to the Brandt Commission of The World Bank is public and can be accessed in the following link:

<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2014/1/612631389301411525/wbg-archives-1771347.pdf>. (Last accessed 24 Jan. 2020)

to bring in workers from poor Southern countries in a controlled and temporary fashion. Meanwhile, imbalances in income and employment opportunities pushed a large population of workers northward. It was estimated that about 20 million migrant workers were in the world at the time, with roughly one-third of them in the United States, mostly from Mexico.

The Report properly distinguished between migrant workers and asylum seekers. Rather than moving on account of demographic and economic pressures, refugees are primarily motivated to flee their countries due to intolerance, political instability, and war. Hence, the Report called for the granting of asylum and the humane treatment of refugees to be a matter of genuine concern for the international community at large.

With the Brandt Report now at 40 years of age, the challenges the U.S. faces in terms of immigration policy have radically shifted in the last few decades from migrant workers to asylum seekers, thus reflecting a completely new reality, considering the entirely different protections each status affords. In this essay, I discuss how forced displacement of Central Americans has accelerated in recent years and how the populist nationalism agenda of the current U.S. presidency has undermined the governance of the refugee system that the community of nations had long agreed upon.

Context of the Central American Crisis

In contrast to migrant workers, asylum seekers enjoy international protection⁶. The convention relating to the Status

⁶ Not surprisingly, Mexico was among the driving forces of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and

of Refugees, adopted in 1951, defines the term 'refugee' "as a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being prosecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."

The core principle of the convention is the prohibition to expel or return a refugee to the areas where his life or freedom would be threatened. This principle, known as non-refoulement, is now recognized by customary international law (UNHCR, 2010). More than 145 countries adopted both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico are parties to both the convention and the protocol, whereas the United States is a party to the protocol only. Moreover, this internationally-adopted instrument laid the groundwork for the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of 1984 that was adopted by ten Latin American countries, among them El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico (UNHCR, 2011).

The Cartagena Declaration defines 'refugee' more broadly and encompasses a wider category of persons entitled to

Members of Their Families, an instrument that intended to provide some extent of international protection to migrant workers. This convention, however, was only adopted by 55 countries, all from the Global South. Among other provisions, this convention sought to ensure equal treatment among migrant workers and nationals of the state of employment in relation to access to educational institutions and services, vocational training, housing, and social and health services, something the Northern countries did not agree to. For more information regarding this convention, see Lonroth, J. (1991). The International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families in the Context of International Migration Policies: An Analysis of Ten Years of Negotiation. *The International Migration Review*, 25(4), 710-736.

international protection. It includes, for instance, any person who has fled their country because their life, security, or freedom has been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, violation of human rights, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order. In sum, this definition recognizes that persons fleeing from situations of indiscriminate violence should also be internationally protected, regardless of whether the element of (state) persecution is present (UNHCR, 2013). Despite its non-binding nature, the definition included in the Cartagena Declaration has been considered as a reference for domestic policies and has even been incorporated into the national laws of several countries.

In the U.S., the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 follows the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention, but arguably gives both asylum adjudicators and immigration judges a reasonable margin to interpret broadly or narrowly the credible fear standard and the account on which such fear is founded. The Refugee Act of 1980 establishes two paths of obtaining asylum after meeting the definition of a refugee: either the affirmative process, when the applicant is not in removal proceedings, or the defensive process, wherein the applicant is subject to removal orders. Both paths require the asylum-seeker to be physically present in the United States. In addition, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) provides special treatment for unaccompanied children from countries with no common border with the U.S. and prevents them from being removed without having an immigration court review their asylum claims.

It is in such a legal context that the Northern Triangle of Central America region, comprising El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, has experienced an exodus of almost 10% of the population since 2014. They head to the United States to flee from violence, pursue economic opportunities, and reunify with family. It is estimated that the number of asylum-seekers from these countries has increased tenfold in the past five years (USA for UNHCR, 2020). A mix of variables, including poverty and inequality, rising rates of homicide, drug trafficking, human trafficking and gender-based violence, and the growing power of gangs and organized-crime groups, are the underlying reasons behind this massive displacement⁷.

Only in the month of June 2014, more than 68,000 unaccompanied children and a similar number of families from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador reportedly crossed the entire territory of Mexico and arrived at the U.S.-Mexican border to seek asylum in the United States. This extraordinary influx overwhelmed the U.S. government's detention capacity on the border and suddenly reached a humanitarian crisis proportion. Images of Central American children in cage-like holding cells in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Placement Center in Nogales, Arizona, went viral, adding pressure to the government to move them as quickly and as humanly as possible from detention centers⁸. Many of them

⁷ Recent estimations show that gangs in the NTCA collect more than \$660 million from extortion (Hernandez, 2019). More than 50% of the population in the NTCA is at the national poverty line. On average, almost 80% are part of the informal economy (Rooney, 2018)

⁸ The following are links to the new reports from the time in which the proportions of the crisis could be assessed:

were taken to their parents, who were already in the United States⁹.

These images reflect the new nature of displacement to the United States that has caught the world's attention: unaccompanied minors and whole families fleeing from violence, extortion, and pressure to join gangs in their home countries in Central America¹⁰. This novel reality contrasts with the traditional migration of workers: primarily men in their prime from Mexico, that first came back and forth on a seasonal basis. However, as the temporary workers program ended and immigration policy tightened, they continued to enter or remain

<https://www.vox.com/2018/6/21/17488458/obama-immigration-policy-family-separation-border>;

<https://www.vox.com/2019/6/21/18700575/trump-family-separation-policy-obama-time-telemundo>;<https://www.businessinsider.com/migrant-kids-detention-center-pictures-details-us-mexico-border-casa-padre-2018-6>;<https://www.businessinsider.com/migrant-children-in-cages-2014-photos-explained-2018-5>

⁹ The fact that many of the unaccompanied minors were reunited with family members that were already living in the U.S. created the perception in their home countries that the authorities were allowing them to stay and attracted even a larger number in the coming years.

¹⁰ The fiscal year of 2018 accounted for a total of 90,554 family unit detentions. However, by August 2019, the Border Patrol had apprehended 457,871 family units, an increase of 406% compared to the previous fiscal year (UNHC / USA, 2019). The influx of unaccompanied minors increased by 60% from 2018, resulting in more than 72,873 migrant children detained by Border Patrol while crossing the US-Mexico Southern Border (Hernandez, 2019)

illegally in the United States to be employed in all kinds of industries that demanded their labor¹¹.

Exactly one year after the onset of the Central American crisis, Donald Trump launched his candidacy to the U.S. Presidency, putting immigration at the center of his policy agenda. He explicitly referred to Mexicans crossing the border as rapists and criminals that smuggle drugs and promised to build a big (and beautiful) wall to prevent people from coming illegally to the United States¹². Despite his inaccurate diagnosis of the immigration issues the United States was facing at the time, with record low numbers of Mexican immigrants being detained at the border and neglecting to deal with an extraordinary influx of asylum seekers lawfully arriving in their ports of entry, his hateful discourse proved to be politically effective and successful at the polls.

With the election of Donald Trump and similar (right-wing) populists in other countries, a new age of populist nationalism in the governance of global migration was born.

¹¹ According to data released by the U.S Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP), the total number of apprehensions at the border during FY 2019 was 851,508, the highest level since FY 2007. Data showed a notable change in the pattern of immigrants: historically, Mexican adults accounted for 86% of the apprehensions, as shown by the FY 2011 statistics; in contrast, Northern Triangle families accounted for 81% of the apprehensions in 2019, of which 91% were family units with at least one parent/guardian with a minor (Singer & Kandel, 2019)

¹² To review Trump's discourse during his presidential campaign, visit the following links:<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/07/us-election-2016-complete-timeline-clinton-trump-president> and <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/video/donald-trump-promises-build-wall-44902349>

Global Migration in the Age of Populist Nationalism

Soon after his inauguration, President Trump signed the Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Order, which made reference to the surge of what he called 'illegal' immigration at the southern border and to the strain it allegedly placed on federal resources. Thereby, he instructed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border in order to prevent all unlawful entries into the United States.

At the same time, the order pledged to end the abuse of parole and asylum provisions that were allegedly used to prevent the lawful removal of aliens. In regards to the application of the TVPRA, the order mandated the identification of unaccompanied alien children who were victims of trafficking or were eligible for asylum or special immigrant relief, or the safe repatriation of them to their home countries if they did not fit that description. Also, this executive order terminated the CAM parole program¹³, an Obama era program that allowed

¹³ The Central American Minors Program (CAM) Refugee/Parole program was created by President Obama in November of 2014, months after the humanitarian crisis of unaccompanied minors took place in the Southern Border. Created through an Executive Order, the program allowed parents lawfully present in the United States to request access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for their children who still were in Guatemala, Honduras, or El Salvador. Ineligible children for refugee admission, yet at risk of harm, could be considered for parole on a case-by-case basis. The program intended to mitigate the influx of unaccompanied minors to the southern border of the U.S. It was not conceived as a panacea, as it recognized that governance improvements, further economic growth, and stronger regional cooperation in security were still needed (Meissner, 2015). According to some critics, the CAM program was a symbolic and rhetoric, but not impractical and ineffective solution; the application process took an average of 13 months and beneficiaries of the entire program totaled only 1,465 migrants (roughly three quarters of the refugee applications were

some parents lawfully present in the United States to request access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for their children who were still in any of the Northern Triangle countries.

The realm of policies that undermined previously-protected refugees and asylum-seekers included raising the standards for credible-fear interviews, setting limits on the number of asylum seekers allowed to enter the U.S. at Ports of Entry, asylum hearings, and asylum allowance for victims of private violence. Moreover, the Trump Administration temporarily suspended the travel of refugees from predominantly Muslim countries into the U.S., reduced the number of refugee admissions to historic lows, closed several refugee resettlement offices, set forth increased vetting requirements in advance of resettling in the U.S., and deprioritized resettlement applications of refugees from a list of countries deemed as high risk (Pierce, 2019).

When the first caravans of whole family units from Central America began their journey to the U.S. in 2018¹⁴, President Trump publicly denounced them. He called this surge of immigrants crossing the border illegally as "an invasion," citing

denied). In 2017, the CAM program's last year, the Central American refugees constituted only 1% of the refugees admitted to the U.S. (Nakamura, 2017)

¹⁴ Large organized groups identified as "caravans" began their journey of more than 2,500 miles from Central America, mainly Honduras, to the United States. Once they crossed through Mexico and arrived at the border cities of Tijuana and Mexicali, they stayed in temporary shelters while waiting for the opportunity to seek asylum in the U.S. Port of Entry. On one hand, this new practice was intended to intensify the pressure upon the U.S. Government to grant them humanitarian relief, as they were fleeing from life-threatening, endemic problems. On the other hand, they deemed that a large group is less likely to be targeted by kidnappers, human traffickers, or drug cartels during their journey north (BBC, 2018).

it as another reason why the U.S. needed to build a wall (Burnett & Rose, 2019). Besides deploying the National Guard at the southern border, and in an effort to deter the members of such caravan from seeking asylum in the U.S., the Trump administration pursued a "zero tolerance"¹⁵ policy that separated families¹⁶ at the border, before a well-known public outcry that forced the government to reconsider and pursue other practices compliant with humanitarian standards.

Later, the Trump administration pressured the Mexican government to sign a Safe Third Country Agreement and threatened to impose a 5% tariff on Mexican goods if they proved unable to prevent displaced people from Central America from crossing Mexican territory on their way to the U.S.¹⁷ Mexico refused to sign the Safe Third Party Agreement,

¹⁵ Under the zero-tolerance policy, the U.S. Department of Justice would prosecute anyone detained while crossing or attempting to cross the border illegally. Children cannot be held in federal criminal detention facilities in accordance with the so-called Flores Agreement, a federal court action limiting the detention of children, including in family detention. Children were therefore transferred to the agency responsible for handling unaccompanied minors, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which is part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), while their parents remained in detention facing federal criminal charges. The Trump administration considered separating families as a way to deter them to come to the U.S. Once it was accounted for, family separation caused yet another humanitarian crisis at the southern border (HRW, 2018).

¹⁶ The Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services revealed that a group of separated families was unaccounted for because the government lacked an effective tracking system (Jordan & Dickerson, 2019)

¹⁷ Notwithstanding the stringent policies aimed to deter the arrivals through the southern U.S. border, the immigration crisis continued. Once again, in January 2020, a new caravan of at least 4,000 people hoped to reach the U.S.-Mexico border. However, this time the Mexican National Guard forced them

but the U.S. responded by creating a Migrant Protection Protocol (MPP),¹⁸ also known as the Remain in Mexico policy, which authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to return asylum seekers back to the country where they arrived over land and have them wait there until their immigration case is resolved (Singer & Kandel, 2019).

The Trump administration applied the same pressure on Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to sign collaboration understandings that resemble the scope of "Safe Third Country Agreements." These agreements require immigrants to apply for asylum in the signatory countries on their way to the U.S. If they fail to do so, the U.S. authorities will rightfully send them back to those countries considered safe (Narea, 2019). This technically means that if, for instance, if any Honduran wants to seek U.S. asylum, he or she could be granted a "protection" from a third country, in this case, Guatemala. As nonsensical as

into a stalemate at the Mexico-Guatemala border and successfully blocked their entry (Allyn & Frederick, 2020)

¹⁸ A federal district court in California blocked the government from enforcing the policy anywhere in the United States on the grounds that the policy is likely inconsistent with both federal immigration law and the doctrine of international law barring the return of asylum seekers to countries where they may be in danger. The U.S. Supreme Court is expected to rule on the matter. Meanwhile, the policy remains in effect. (Howe, 2020). In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review postponed all MPP hearings (DHS, 2020). This action is complying with a new order issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to suspend the entry of migrants "until it is determined that the danger of further introduction of COVID-19 into the United States has ceased" (CDC, 2020). As a result, more than 28 organizations have petitioned U.S. officials to parole those immigrants that are waiting in Mexico for pending immigration proceedings, due to the sanitary risks and dangers that they may be subject to (HRF, 2020).

it seems, in practice, this gives the Trump administration enough room to claim that turning back Central American asylum seekers is now compliant with the non-refoulement principle.

All these policies not only ignore the difference between traditional immigrants and asylum-seekers but also disregard the different scope of protection that each previously had under international and U.S. immigration law. The discourse at the highest political level criminalizes forcibly-displaced people that are arguably entitled to a credible fear assessment and protection from U.S. authorities. The construction of a big "beautiful" wall and the deployment of heavily armed national guards in the border, while intimidating, could not prevent Central American asylum seekers from showing up in U.S. ports of entry to request to be admitted with refugee status. Yet, in the age of populist nationalism, it is a powerful rhetorical resource to illustrate the Trump administration's commitment to protecting the U.S. border.

How did protecting the U.S. borders become such an electorally profitable and politically advantageous issue? The fact of the matter is that immigration is a long overdue issue that both Democrats and Republicans have been unable to address on a bipartisan basis, precisely because cultural and racial resentment has radicalized its debate during the last couple of decades. Beneath the surface, however, lies a well-founded perception that inequality has risen, demography has changed, and the pace at which the economy has grown diverges across regions (Hacker & Pierson, 2019). In this context, a populist and nationalist-driven political agenda is attractive to white working-class voters because "it promises to prioritize their interests, shield them from competition from immigrants or

lower-paid workers abroad, and restore their central and dignified place in the national culture" (Wimmer, 2019).

An "America First" nativist discourse that unapologetically calls for a dividing wall sounded like music to the ears of white, Christian, and patriotic folks of the great American Heartland, despite a commonly shared understanding that Americans actually lack a common ancestry. Interestingly, it was not long ago that former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice addressed the Republican National Convention in Tampa Bay to endorse Mitt Romney for President and referred to the American Exceptionalism¹⁹ by saying that, "the essence of America is not ethnicity, or nationality or religion, it rather is the idea that you can come from humble circumstances and do great things, that it doesn't matter where you came from but where you are going," (Rice, 2012).

Conversely, Roberts-Miller, a leading rhetorician, explains, "demagoguery is about identity, [is about] reducing complicated policy issues to a binary of us (good) versus them (bad). It is a discourse that frames public policy in terms of the degree to which and the means by which (not whether) the out-group should be scapegoated for the current problems of the in-group" (Roberts-Miller, 2020). Resorting to identity might be logically problematic in terms of political correctness, but populist nationalism takes advantage of the effectiveness of categorizing people based on gender, race, nationality, and religion, and how these categories position their electoral base at the top of the social hierarchy; this is how their sole identity

¹⁹ American Exceptionalism is a concept or idea often heard in academic and policy circles that consist of believing that America's values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration (Walt, 2011).

entitles them to be held to lower standards and disregard political correctness in their hateful discourse and hostile behavior (Wimmer, 2019).

Policymakers are sensitive to the positive or negative stereotype that is attached to a certain group, depending on the political gains they obtain, and, with their discourse, they contribute to the social construction of such groups through symbolic language, metaphors, and stories (Schneider & Ingram, cited in Wagner & Morris, 2018). Indeed, social constructions influence both policy process and policy design, in addition to influencing the rationales that legitimate policy choices. Evidence shows that elected officials are motivated to produce policies that will assist them in their reelection and that social construction becomes part of the reelection calculus (Schneider & Ingram, 1997).

As a result, it is not surprising that Trump's electoral base is moved emotionally by symbolic gestures like building a wall or placing the National Guard on the border. Indeed, his base is satisfied with hardline policy decisions, like unilaterally restricting asylum options to Central Americans and those coming from Muslim countries, and encouraged by the US government's use of asymmetrical power to force nations that have no other option to reluctantly accept Safe Third Country conditions, even if their own people are looking for protection elsewhere. Therefore, it is likely that the Trump administration's populist-nationalist approach to the Central American crisis has secured the continuing support of his constituents, as it resembles the fear and anxiety that his electoral base appears to feel over their future.

This approach might be seen as a political response to the appetite of a segment of the population to counter the liberal

wave that placed diversity at the forefront of progress in recent years. However, the degenerative narrative over migrants and asylum seekers alike reflects the resentment with which they are perceived by working-class and economically marginalized populations (Wimmer, 2019).

If "public policies are the mechanisms through which values are authoritatively allocated for the society" (Easton, cited in Schneider & Ingram, 1993), it is valid to wonder what are the values that U.S. society currently stands for, given the policies that the U.S. government has undertaken recently. It is commonplace to say that the United States of America is a nation of immigrants. Since its foundation, the country was envisaged as one composed of "individuals of all nations, melted into a new race of men, whose labors and prosperity will one day cause great changes in the world" (Crèvecoeur, 2016). That nation now seems to be distant from the one that embraces a degenerative narrative towards those who were guided by what once was the beacon of America: the promise of a better life and of freedom from persecution (Wagner A. , 2018).

The fact that, with such restrictive and unwelcoming policies towards asylum seekers, an internationally protected refugee regime is being dismantled appears to be irrelevant to both the U.S. government and its electoral base, never mind the impression that U.S. global leadership is thereby being eroded. Even more troubling is that it illustrates perfectly the new paradigm on the governance of global migration in the age of populist nationalism, which has replicated itself elsewhere in the world. This very same pattern repeats not only across the North, specifically in Europe with regards to its Mediterranean neighbors, but increasingly in the South as well, in places like Kenya in regards to Somalia, Bangladesh in regards to

Rohingya refugees, and South American countries in regards to Venezuelans (Nyabola, 2019).

Brandt 2.0: The Way Forward

Willy Brandt's motivation was to provide productive suggestions for the 80's, but the Brandt Report could have actually contributed to the development of worldwide moral values. Brandt understood that the controversial issues that divided poor and rich countries, in order to be truly addressed in North-South dialogue, demanded avoiding prejudices and wishful thinking. Under his chairmanship, the commission excelled in rethinking a new kind of relationship that could accommodate all nations.

The Brandt Commission realized the importance of shifting the focus from development aid to a comprehensive approach to development on a national and international level, and ambitiously aimed to transform the world order. Since the early drafts of the Report, the commission gave special importance to the interdependence of the North and the South and acknowledged the impact that domestic policies have beyond the countries where they are implemented²⁰.

²⁰ It is worth looking at the introductory draft, as well as to the speech that Brandt gave to the UN Association of New York. Also, it is interesting to read the letter that Harlen Cleveland from the Aspen Institute wrote to Brandt, in which he stresses that, "poverty is first of all a matter of domestic institutions that discriminate, structurally and systematically, against the poor. Doing something about poverty therefore requires first of all hard decisions inside the political economies of developing countries -- decisions, for example, about land tenure, rural reconstruction, basic needs strategy, education, productivity incentives, and the widening of participation in

This is particularly relevant with regard to global migration. Evidence shows that economic growth, governance, and public goods delivery are critical to accomplishing a significant decline of mass displacement of people - whether economically motivated or due to a credible threat. For instance, the decline of Mexican immigration to the United States can be linked to demographic dynamics that resulted from successful family planning policies implemented since the 1970s, but also to the improvement of the economic conditions that Mexico experienced after signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (Villareal, 2014).

Indeed, the slowdown in the pace of migration of Mexicans to the U.S. might be correlated with the attainment of a certain level of wealth. An income threshold of around USD \$8,000 GDP per capita could be what makes people less prone to migrate. Mexico surpassed this level in 2005, around the time when numbers of migrants crossing to U.S. declined (Funde & Schneider, 2019).

Hence, there is no question that Northern Triangle countries are responsible for providing better opportunities to their own population, but the Central American crisis has demonstrated that it is in the best interest of the United States – as well as for Mexico - to contribute to their success.

The Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle was established in the aftermath of the unaccompanied minors crisis of 2014 as a thoughtful and long-sighted response. It intended to address the problem of irregular migration and

decision-making". These documents can be accessed in The World Bank's archives

create the development conditions necessary to root their populations. In it, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador – with the technical and financial support of the U.S. Government and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) - agreed to a joint structural solution to foster the production sector to create new economic opportunities, promote measures to develop human capital, improve citizen security and access to justice, and strengthen institutions to increase the trust of citizens in the government. The plan was ambitious and evidently had its shortcomings, but it was a step in the right direction that, if continued, could have accomplished significant improvements in the long run.

At the same time, innovative financial structures involving public and private funds to be strategically invested, aiming to tackle the root causes that force people displacement in the first place, have been successfully developed in recent times. For instance, the Refugee Investment Network has developed Refugee & Migration Lens to assess markets and identify refugee investment opportunities. This finance optic classifies six types of investments that benefit displaced people: refugee-owned businesses; refugee-led businesses; projects supporting refugees; projects supporting host communities through infrastructure, employment, and goods and services; lending instruments; and funds. Allowing the private sector to play a role in development is critical, and the Central American crisis offers an opportunity to develop this niche.

Brandt regretted that, back then, they were still far from a shared understanding of the principles that should guide international migration. However, in 2016, the UN decided to develop a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration, which was finally adopted in 2018. The Global

Compact for Migration is the first-ever UN global agreement on a common approach to international migration in all its dimensions. It is grounded in values of state sovereignty, responsibility-sharing, non-discrimination, and human rights, and recognizes that a cooperative approach is needed to optimize the overall benefits of migration while addressing its risks and challenges for individuals and communities in countries of origin, transit, and destination. Though it is non-legally binding, there is a consensus that its implementation at the national levels will be to everyone's benefit.

The current crisis has shown that international cooperation and a focus on human mobility is absolutely necessary. Indeed, finding a balance between the right of states to protect their borders and the freedom of people to move is crucial to the governance of global migration. Demagoguery and the populist nationalism approach that channels it will not serve this purpose. Instead, just as Brandt suggested forty years ago, we should change attitudes and call for understanding, commitment, and solidarity in the ways we tackle this complex issue. The Brandt Report is a reminder that, above all else, it is human beings who are at stake in the international migration debate.

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5. Governing with Twitter: Is the Future of Decision-Making to be Written in 280 Characters?

Patricia Loggetto

Abstract: This article investigates whether Presidents Jair Bolsonaro's (Brazil) and Donald Trump's (United States) use of Twitter contributes to increasing accountability and political participation in their decision-making. A content analysis of their tweets reveals that they replicate the traditional relationship populist leaders have with the population, where the people are a passive recipient of information and a legitimizing force for populist leadership.

From the Newsfeed to Public Policy

The Brandt Report highlighted the need for inclusive development strategies that give citizens around the globe a voice in the agenda. To some analysts, populism is about giving citizens this type of voice. Populists claim to directly address the needs of citizens and circumvent institutions that truly or allegedly allow special interests and the elites to shape the agenda to the detriment of the masses. New populist leaders have increasingly turned to new technologies and social media to engage with citizens.

The Brazilian Decree No. 9.971 had an auspicious beginning. A user asked President Jair Bolsonaro's Facebook page for lower taxes on electronic games. The president read the post and

signed the decree – born out of social media - a few weeks later. In his own words,

'After reading in my [Facebook] the request from reader Vennicios M. Teles asking to lower taxes on electronic games, I decided to consult with our economic team. Currently, the IPI [tax on industrialized products] varies between 20 and 50%. We finalized studies to lower them. Brazil is the second [biggest] market in the world in this sector (@jairbolsonaro, 2019a).'

Social media have grown beyond politicians' communication strategy and now integrate e-government to bring transparency, fast communication, participation, and accountability (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2012; Bertot, Jaeger, & Hansen, 2012; Bonson et al., 2012; Devlin et al., 2020; Gigler & Bailur, 2014; Linders, 2012; Stamati et al., 2015). They represent Web 2.0 principles by excellence, where users interact, build a network, and create and share content, different from previous channels that emphasized one-to-many communication (Porter, 2008; Small, 2012; Stamati et al., 2015).

Government actors created accounts to interact with their constituents, disseminate information, provide alerts of emergencies, and receive feedback (Wigand, 2010). This paper focuses on Twitter, popular for public administration due to its low operating costs, personal character, the potential for going viral, and built-in capabilities that allow users to broadcast information, start conversations, and collaborate with stakeholders (Wigand, 2010).

The literature on politicians' use of Twitter spreads from network analysis to content and interaction patterns (Graham et

al., 2016). Research expanded to populist leaders' online behavior (Ituassu et al., 2019; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016; Waisbord & Amado, 2017), as they seized the opportunity for unmediated communication and profited from Twitter's efficiency in spreading populist messages (Blassnig et al., 2020; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). Populism is a "thin ideology", a distinguishable pattern of ideas that places "the people" and their will at the center of legitimate politics and characterizes "the elite" as opposing "the people" (Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2016; Stanley, 2008). Claims of truly representing the people's will and the use of public support as a source of legitimacy complement the core concepts (Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2016; Urbinati, 2019; Weyland, 2001). Populists use Twitter's direct and permanent interaction to continuously reaffirm their alignment and position themselves as the real voice of the people (Müller, 2016; Urbinati, 2019; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016; Waisbord & Amado, 2017).

Populism's vague definition of 'the people' allows leaders to adapt the term to their interests, but also lacks a coherent ideology with enough range to answer political questions that emerge (Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008). Therefore, populism often combines itself with other ideologies (Mudde, 2004). Such flexibility, allied with the frequent exchanges that mark the relationship between the Global North and South nowadays, helped to spread the phenomenon across the globe. This increasingly permutable divide allowed for goods, technology, knowledge, and people to flow, but also similar problems, which politicians in one hemisphere could observe and learn from the others' responses. With the perception that the established political powers have failed to answer certain

demands, the populist discourse has risen around the world (Stanley, 2008).

This article contributes to the literature by investigating how political leaders' governing strategies have incorporated Twitter, focusing on populist leaders employing Twitter to make the governing process more participative and accountable. It applies a content analysis to two populist leaders' accounts: Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil) and Donald Trump (United States). These presidents have an intrinsic relationship with social media, which played a decisive role in their campaigns and communication.¹⁶ They tweet often (on average more than five tweets per day during the period covered), share government-related content on their accounts, and, as exemplified, can, at times, integrate social media into their decision-making. Comparing their use of Twitter in the two arenas - accountability and participation - sheds light on the similarities shared by Global North and South populist leaders in this regard.

Four more sections comprise this article. Section 1 reviews how e-government integrated social media to its arsenal and how these platforms can increase participation and accountability. Section 2 explains the theoretical framework, followed by findings in Section 3, and concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.

Citizen 2.0: No Longer only Observant, but Co-Creator?

The Internet promised innovation and interactivity and led governments to invest in e-government in hopes of benefitting from increased efficiency, democracy, transparency, and

versatile services (Skiftenes Flak et al., 2009). Among those investments was an increased presence in social media (Jackson, 2008; Maciel, 2020; McCann, 2012; Small, 2012; Wigand, 2010) part of a movement with the potential to promote citizen participation and accountability.

Social Media and Political Participation

Political participation means access to decision-making and the power to meaningfully influence a government's output (Stamati et al., 2015; Woods, 1999). Public political participation, while not a substitute to political representation, complements the policymaking process (Fung, 2006) by adding legitimacy to decisions and improving results. Participative decision-making possesses procedural legitimacy, even if it does not reach consensus, and increases the chances of just results by reducing political inequalities (Fung, 2006; Greer et al., 2016; Small, 2012). It provides information, know-how, and/or resources to policy-makers that they otherwise would not possess, improving policy quality (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2012; Fung, 2006; Greer et al., 2016). How much power is yielded to citizens varies, ranging from no participation to absolute control over the process (Arnstein, 1969).

However, participatory mechanisms can be employed as an empty ritual without truly sharing power, often entail high costs, create additional veto points, and increase the chances of decision gridlock (Arnstein, 1969; Greer et al., 2016; Immergut, 1990). Not all actors engage similarly due to their perceived expertise and educational level, amongst other factors (Fung, 2006; Konisky & Beierle, 2001). Therefore, mechanism design plays a central role in avoiding biases.

Governments can use social media to encourage participation, engagement, and discussion of policy decisions (Small, 2012; Wigand, 2010) via online consultations, webinars, and live debates, for example. Users then have an elevated status and are no longer passive observers, but contributors (Linders, 2012; Small, 2012). For populists, Twitter offers the additional advantage of serving as a low-cost space for permanent campaigning (Coleman, 2005; Jackson, 2008). Anyone can bypass intermediaries and access their representatives since tweets are publicly available. This unmediated communication between "the people" and "the leader" is claimed by populists to be more genuine (Müller, 2016; van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). However, the platform's true participatory potential comes down to its users, who can discuss ideas via replies and retweets. The dialogue flows both vertically (representative to constituents) and horizontally (among users), encouraging new policy ideas (Coleman, 2005; Jackson, 2008).

With an understanding of how social media can foster participation, we turn now to how social media can affect policymaking by increasing accountability.

Social Media and Accountability

Accountability entails answerability or the obligation an actor has to justify his or her actions to a forum, as well as enforcement, or the capacity of this forum to discuss, judge this actor, and impose consequences (Bovens, 2007; Gigler & Bailur, 2014; Greer et al., 2016; Joshi, 2013). Accountability relationships require clarity towards whom one is accountable, and its results include flexibility, learning, agent engagement,

effectiveness, and lower rates of corruption (Gigler & Bailur, 2014; Woods, 1999).

Accountability may have adverse effects (Greer et al., 2016) if it is not properly carried out (e.g., captured regulators), if agents are held accountable for smaller factors (ex: meal expenses) and not consequential ones (policies), or if agents have so little discretion they cannot act. Furthermore, accountability relationships can involve a web of principals, making the process of explaining and sanctioning confusing, thus compromising effectiveness.

Recent transparency and anti-corruption initiatives incorporated social media into their efforts, greatly reducing the costs of collecting, distributing, and accessing government information (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2012; Bertot, Jaeger, & Hansen, 2012; Roberts, 2006). Social media increases the transparency of decision-making and empowers the public to monitor their governments' activities (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2012; United States Department of State, 2009). Twitter offers a "short route" to accountability – a link between user and provider that does not pass through other government officials (Gigler & Bailur, 2014). Twitter offers real-time opportunities for interaction and feedback, enabling discussions among geographically-dispersed groups, drawing attention to problems and government behavior, and encouraging responses from the public. Despite being able to help with answerability, Twitter cannot ensure enforcement: leaders can listen to the people, but might not respond (Gigler & Bailur, 2014). Nonetheless, government officials and agencies have adopted Twitter hoping to build relationships with extended networks of followers using the tool's increasing popularity with their audience and its informal environment (Wigand, 2010).

Populist leaders traditionally do not encourage formal accountability, claiming that being a representative of the people is enough to justify trust in their actions (Urbinati, 2019). Nonetheless, adjusting their discourse and policies to public opinion can help to maintain mass support (Love & Windsor, 2018). While many sources provide information on public opinion (e.g., opinion polling), Twitter offers the chance to interact with the audience, defend contested positions, and advertise popular policies. Therefore, populists can profit from discussing their actions online.

Participation and Accountability on Twitter

How can we verify if Twitter indeed supports governments in creating participatory and accountability environments? First, goals and outputs should match the technology. Twitter has changed in format and style as users adapted it to their new needs (Leston-Bandeira & Bender, 2013; Wigand, 2010), but is the current technology sufficient?

To identify needs, we consider the platform's use. Regarding participation, governments can use Twitter in various areas; service delivery, creating awareness; garnering feedback and use of the input, or to make available content that users apply for their purposes – such as open data (Chang & Kannan, 2008; Small, 2012).

Moreover, technology can improve accountability by increasing openness and directness (Gigler & Bailur, 2014). Openness means improving access and visibility to government information, while directness refers to overcoming communication barriers – e.g., intermediaries and access. Accountability also implies consequences for the agent

(Bovens, 2007). As both presidents are currently in their first term, future research will be able to verify if Twitter impacted their constituents' voting behavior, since people express their political decisions, and thus their judgment, through their vote (Love & Windsor, 2018; Schumpeter, 1994).

This approach covers the supply (presidents) and demand (users) side, verifying how they interact online (Leston-Bandeira & Bender, 2013). User reactions, such as likes, shares, favorites, and retweets, are quantified because they indicate attention, relevance, or endorsement of the message (Blassnig et al., 2020; Wigand, 2010). Retweeting adds to the conversation as users have to read the tweet (Small, 2012) and decide to bring the topic to the agenda by reposting it.

Governing with Twitter?

A content analysis of Trump's and Bolsonaro's tweets verifies that participatory and accountability interactions are demonstrated in their use of the platform. The content analysis focuses on the content of written and symbolic materials, shedding light on the communicator, the message, and its background and/or effect (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Neuman, 2014; White & Marsh, 2006). Data from electronic sources are suitable for the methodology, as they convey messages between the sender and the receiver (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Small, 2012; White & Marsh, 2006). This article's units of analysis are tweets from the accounts @realdonaldtrump and @jairbolsonaro from the period of June 1st to December 1st, 2019. They were extracted on December 18, 2019, from the digital archives "Trump Twitter Archive" and "Jair Bolsonaro Twitter" (Brown, n.d.; Spagnuolo, n.d.).

Tweets were coded to identify those encouraging participation or dialogue ("participation tweets") and those dealing with government actions or proposals ("governing tweets"). In total, 5,837 tweets were archived and hand-coded by the author (Appendix I).

To engage with policymaking via Twitter, constituents must be able to access the information. In 2017, 49.7% of the world population had access to the Internet. In Brazil and the United States, those figures were 70% and 87% respectively (World Bank, 2018). The user also must have an account to be able to interact. In 2019, 3% and 14% of the population in Brazil and the United States were active Twitter users, respectively (4% was the world average) (Cooper, 2019; Statista, n.d.).

Secondly, users need to find relevant information. However, tweets are not segregated or filed. There is a limit of tweets displayed in the feed, and old tweets are not easily accessible from the main page. To engage in the discussion, a user needs the original Uniform Resource Locator, posing a problem for old tweets. While 25% of Bolsonaro's 1,286 tweets were governing tweets, only 7% of Trump's tweets were. This 7% is spread among 4,551 tweets, making it a hard task to find them retrospectively.

Table 1: Selected results.

	@jairbolsonaro		@realdonaldtrump	
	Participation	Governing	Participation	Governing
Total (%)	70 (5%)	324 (25%)	167 (3%)	329 (7%)
Retweeted (mean)	1,379	4,335	14,934	15,632
Favorited (mean)	8,702	24,240	57,422	61,074

Bolsonaro tweeted proportionally more government-related content, but for both presidents, the tool operated in a one-way

service delivery direction. Most participation tweets expressed congratulations or gratitude but did not establish a conversation. While Trump usually thanked other users, Bolsonaro expressed gratitude in general terms, e.g., "... Thank you all for the support and prayers!" (@jairbolsonaro, 2019b). Some of Trump's tweets quoted content from other users along with his comments, the type of dialogue we hoped to find in social media. These tweets, however, represented less than 1% of the sample (69 tweets).

Most of Bolsonaro's replies (320) were to his tweets. Governing tweets appeared on his feed on 63% of days and attracted less engagement, being on average 23% less retweeted and 29.5% less favorited (Figure 1). Trump retweeted 1,708 (37%) times, out of which 75 were retweets of his posts. Trump's governing tweets were slightly less retweeted, but 24% more favorited (Figure 2), appearing on 58% of the days. While the higher percentage of favorites suggests endorsement, the low number of governing tweets indicates that Twitter does not occupy a central role in Trump's policymaking.

Figure 1: Aggregated retweets and favorited tweets from @jairbolsonaro per day, divided by classification.




Figure 2: Aggregated retweets and favorited tweets from @realdonaldtrump, per day and divided by classification.



We can draw some hypotheses on why participation and accountability were not encouraged. Twitter had an important role as a marketing tool in both presidential campaigns (Chapola, 2018; Enli, 2017; Ribeiro, 2018), when controlling the message and image of the leader overrides the interests of initiating the public debate (Enli, 2017). Given that need to legitimize populist power still exists after the election, it likely that a previously-successful tactic would remain in use. Besides, both accuse traditional media of partisanship and criticize it as fake news (Coll, 2017; Gaglioni, 2020). While Twitter provides a path to avoid uncomfortable questions, reach followers, and make the news, it is also used by journalists as a research tool (Ernst et al., 2017; Waisbord & Amado, 2017). Since politicians have less control over the direction a conversation can take on social media, not opening space for dialogue would prevent unwanted topics.

Citizens also did not make use of Twitter's interactivity. One reason could be that social media is increasingly viewed as a source of information (Shearer, 2018), which traditionally belongs to the one-to-many communication style (e.g., radio, printed newspaper). Moreover, those using Twitter to discuss politics in regions in the United States tended to either be strongly partisan or belonging to specific interest groups (Bekafigo & McBride, 2013). If we generalize these results, the low interactivity could be explained by the relatively small groups generating it. Politicians can increase voters' interaction by reacting to their posts and inviting them to contribute (Gigler & Bailur, 2014; Graham et al., 2016). However, Bolsonaro's and Trump's reactions to their follower's posts were minimal or expressed only in short comments, potentially discouraging engagement.

Conclusion

The Brandt Report advocated for a citizen-oriented approach to development. Populism's main promise is to bypass the political elite and engage directly with ordinary citizens. The means to do so increasingly are new forms of technology.

Social media platforms integrate the innovation wave, sweeping governments in the wake of the digital revolution. Focused on interaction, social media can be a powerful tool to promote transparent and collaborative policymaking. We have investigated how two populist ruling leaders use Twitter in their governing strategy, with special attention to citizen participation and accountability. Our cases came from both the Global North and South, as populism does not limit itself to a specific region of the globe.

Despite the hopes placed in these technologies, they cannot alter the power inequalities between citizens and government, unless the latter willingly shares discretionary power. Twitter can realize new policymaking goals only for an elite with full access to its functionalities, which excludes most people from processes relying on Twitter as an access point. Twitter then becomes a barrier, best used in addition to other channels to expand - and not limit - access. In principle, public tweets favor openness. However, the newsfeed is a messy archive. If users are to engage with decisions and hold leaders accountable for their actions, they need to find this information. To fulfill this need, Twitter could adopt a filing system.

Both presidents used Twitter as an announcement and mobilization platform, where interaction with citizens was the exception and not the standard. Even if Trump's followers

engaged more with his governing tweets, these types of tweets did not account for 10% of Trump's Twitter content. Bolsonaro employed Twitter as a tool to divulge his government's actions, but these posts drew less engagement. In both cases, neither participation nor accountability seemed to improve; users were not speaking, and leaders were not listening.

Although theoretically a fracture in norms, in our cases, Twitter replicated the typical relationship populist leaders have with the population: as a passive recipient of government policies and as a legitimizing force to their leadership.

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Appendix

I. Codebook

Tweets were coded to identify two themes: participation and government-related content. A participation tweet encouraged citizen involvement in public actions, such as, for example, asking for the public's opinion and participation in decision-making or engaging in a conversation with users. A governing tweet contained the disclosure of measures, works, actions, and/or proposals from the government and its subordinate bodies. It included both legislative and non-legislative work, disclosure of direct results (actual or potential) from such actions, and nominations. Tweets that contained indicators do not fall in this category unless they expressly linked the outcome with specific actions from the government. The analysis covered only written content.

Threads, when content is split in more than one tweet, are counted per post. Since tweets do not give an indication of who is writing the post and both accounts are the presidents' personal accounts, it is assumed that Bolsonaro and Trump sanction the content, so no distinction is considered in the authorship level. Content analysis is embedded with a considerable degree of subjectivity relating to the coding scheme and classification. To increase coding validity, the author analyzed the tweets twice, with a month between each process.

Participation Tweet	Governing Tweet
<p>@RAF_SOT @MTurismo We are working on it, as we said months ago:</p> <p>https://t.co/gDTmBEPI4C</p> <p>(@jairbolsonaro, 2019d)</p> <p>The young leaders here today (@TPUSA) are part of a movement unlike anything in the history of our nation. It is a movement about reclaiming YOUR future rebuilding YOUR Country restoring YOUR destiny and renewing the values that are the true source of American GREATNESS!</p> <p>https://t.co/unURpLS8Lc (@realdonaldtrump, 2019a)</p>	<p>@Min_Agricultura closes agreements to export fruits, nuts and egg products to Saudi Arabia. Minister @TerezaCrisMS met with a representative of the Saudi health authority. Together, the products have a market potential of over \$ 2bn.</p> <p>@tvbrasilgov (@jairbolsonaro, 2019c)</p> <p>[Thread]</p> <p>I informed John Bolton last night that his services are no longer needed at the White House. I disagreed strongly with many of his suggestions as did others in the Administration and therefore... I asked John for his resignation which was given to me this morning. I thank John very much for his service. I will be naming a new National Security Advisor next week</p> <p>(@realdonaldtrump, 2019b).</p>

II. *Content Analysis Results*

	@jairbolsonaro	@realDonaldTrump
Total tweets	1,286	4,551
@replies	396	Not specified
Retweets (%)	106 (7%)	1,708 (37%)
Tweets per day (mean)	7	25
Retweeted (mean)	5,190	15,973
Favorited (mean)	30,535	48,973
	Participation	Participation
	Non-Part	Non-Part
Total (%)	70 (5%)	167 (3%)
	1,216 (95%)	4,384 (97%)
Retweeted (mean)	1,379	14,934
	5,410	15,936
Favorited (mean)	8,702	57,422
	31,791	48,034
	Governing	Governing
	Non-Gov	Non-Gov
Total (%)	324 (25%)	329 (7%)
	962 (75%)	4,222 (93%)
Retweeted (mean)	4,335	15,632
	5,478	16,000
Favorited (mean)	24,240	61,074
	32,654	48,039

6. Populist Rhetoric in the Peace Process: Defending a Peace Without Impunity or Spreading Fear?

Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal

Abstract: In a world where populism and nationalism have resurfaced, populist rhetoric might be harmful not only for the consolidation of the democracy in the North and South but also particularly counterproductive for peacebuilding processes in post-conflict settings. Therefore, it is crucial to analyze this phenomenon in order to adapt policy-making to these new challenges.

Introduction

In recent years, populism has attracted the attention of academia and the wider public. It is widely acknowledged that we are living in an age of resurfacing populism and nationalism (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2014), or in terms of Mudde (2004), a "populist Zeitgeist". For some authors, populism endangers democracy. For instance, in Europe and other parts of the globe, an exclusionary right-wing populism has intensified, largely targeted against immigrants and other minorities (Berezin, 2013; Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Norris, 2005). For some authors, on the other hand, populism has brought an inclusionary vision of society that has expanded democratic participation of previously marginalized groups and has reduced inequalities among the population, as might be the

case in Latin America (Madrid, 2008; Levitsky & Roberts 2011).

These contrasting experiences have brought into question populism as either threatening or corrective to democratic consolidation (Canovan, 2002; Kaltwasser, 2012, 2014; Mudde, 2004). As Gidron & Bonikowski (2014, p. 19) argue, "populism challenges the common sense of liberal democratic practice and may have ominous implications for liberal democracy; at the same time, populism may serve to identify otherwise overlooked political problems and give marginalized groups a legitimate voice".

In this sense, in Europe, the resurfacing of populism might be seen as a threat to political institutions and the protection of minorities. In Latin America, the old constitutions might be perceived as inadequate in protecting or serving the people's needs. These various experiences might show a clear difference between populism in the North and South. Nevertheless, this notion is far from reality. Some cases, also within Latin America, have shown that populism or populist politics might be an obstacle for shaping, "the world's future in peace and welfare, in solidarity and dignity." (Brandt, 1980, p. 5), particularly in post-conflict contexts.

In order to develop this argument, this paper aims to analyze the Colombian case following the signing of a historic peace agreement between the government and the largest guerrilla group in Latin America, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (FARC-EP). It argues that the rhetoric used by some groups led by the former president of Colombia, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, and his political party, *Centro Democrático* (CD), against the agreement is essentially populist. They spread fear among the population for political

and electoral purposes, which has hindered the implementation of the agreements and the peacebuilding process in the country.

The intention of the article by analyzing this case study is, therefore, to show the (re)surfacing of populism is not only a phenomenon that might affect the North but also hampers the possibility of peaceful development in the South, particularly for those countries that are dealing with violence.

'Uribe's populist rhetoric against the peace agreement

Penal populism is a form of rhetoric (Garland, 2001; Pratt, 2006) used primarily by politicians to strategically channel the population's sentiment of fear, anger, and victimization to question the system of criminal justice and demand stricter imprisonment and fewer rights for criminals. In this discourse, popular common sense is prioritized over expert knowledge of criminal justice.

Álvaro Uribe Vélez and his CD party have used this rhetoric to oppose the peace process, especially the agreement signed between the government and FARC-EP. Therefore, the main goal is to identify whether this rhetoric used by the opponents of the peace process aims to support peace with justice or whether it seeks to spread fear among the population in order to promote political and electoral interests.

In Colombia, due to the armed conflict, criminal law is used to serve political ends in the name of neutralizing, diminishing, detaining, condemning, or extinguishing the enemy (Barrera, 2013). In order to accomplish this objective, many political leaders in Colombia have used Security Statutes that "ended up with precisely what they said they were protecting: security,

democracy, and justice. On the other hand, those statutes (...) are based on a systematic cutback in the rights and guarantees of all citizens" (González Zapata, 2002, p. 139).

In this context, punitive desires in the Colombian population are expected. This might be evidenced in the election of candidates with authoritarian slogans, including Álvaro Uribe Vélez, the President of Colombia from 2002-2010. The majority of Colombian scholars consider him as populist or neo-populist for various reasons: (1) He was elected as an outsider of the two traditional political parties of Colombia. (2) He constituted a charismatic and authoritarian leader. (3) His discourse embodied the will of the people fighting against a common enemy of FARC (4) He changed the Constitution to allow his reelection. (5) His concentration of power. (6) His close relationship with the people built on the *Consejos Comunitarios*. (7) The continuous use of a referendum to govern, (8) The polarization of society supporting and rejecting his government, amongst others (Fierro C., 2014; Herrera Zgaib, 2012; Lopez Bayona, 2016; Patiño Aristizábal & Cardona Restrepo, 2009; Patiño Aristizábal, 2007).

However, there is no clear consensus. Other scholars (Dugas, 2003; Galindo Hernández, 2013; Kajsio, 2017, 2019) have argued that 'Uribe's ideology has nothing to do with populism, as it lacks antagonism between the people and the elite, and he enjoys higher levels of support amongst higher social strata. Even if there is no consensus, the common ground of the above-mentioned scholars is the use of populist elements in his discourse. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze if these elements are present in the rhetoric of the peace agreement opponents led by this former president and his CD party, which led a successful campaign against the peace deal. The first instance

of this discourse directly affecting the process of negotiation was the 2016 referendum on the accords. "Peace without impunity" was the slogan used by the CD to spread fear among the population and mobilize the no-voters. The rhetoric was successful: In the referendum, with a small majority (50.21%) of the votes, the no-voters won, forcing the government and FARC-EP to modify the agreements. Even if there are other elements that might explain this result²¹, the cohesive no-campaign was undoubtedly the strongest one.

As Gomez-Suarez (2017, p. 467) argues,

Uribe resorted to six scripts to spread misinformation about the negotiations, simplify the complexity of the agreements, and engender negative emotions against the negotiating parties. These scripts were: [1] 'castrochavismo'²² (...) [2] 'peace without ' impunity'²³

²¹ According to Gomez-Suarez (2017) and Basset (2018) other factors that explain this rejection of the agreements are: (1) The pedagogical strategy of the Colombian government to explain the content of the agreement was weak. (2) The short time frame between the signature and the voting to explain this deal. (3) The fact that the last point that was agreed included the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration measures, which was used by the no-campaign to generate indignation regarding the benefits that former FARC combatants would have.

²² Castrochavismo relies on the negative image of leftist governments in Cuba and Venezuela. The main message "spread fear by promoting a (fictional) threat to private property, democracy, and therefore to the national identity" (Gomez-Suarez, 2017, p. 468).

²³ 'Peace without impunity' attacked the transitional justice system created by the deal by reducing the debate to former FARC members not doing jail-time for international crimes (Gomez-Suarez, 2017).

*(...), [3] 'Santos' surrender of Colombia to the FARC²⁴
(...), [4] 'No + Santos'²⁵, [5] 'Civil Resistance'²⁶, and
[6] 'Gender Ideology'²⁷.*

Moreover, other studies (Basset, 2018) have found that the victory of the no-campaign was determined by Uribe's cleavages in urban popular sectors, peri-urban populations, and intermediary cities that did not feel represented by the discourse of peace and feared their exclusion in a post-conflict context. For this reason, the no-campaign is an example of how politicians use emotions such as hope and fear without considering the consequences of this strategy on social cohesion and the stability of the country (Valencia-tello, 2017).

By constantly repeating the above-mentioned phrases and promoting them in social media photos, videos, and memes, the

²⁴ 'Santos was surrendering Colombia to the FARC' was the message to activate "anger over the moral concern with the subversion of authority; based on the pre-existing scripting of the FARC as an 'internal enemy' that was taking over Colombia's territory" (Gomez-Suarez, 2017, p. 468).

²⁵ 'NO + Santos' demonstrations promoted "a strong emotional opposition to any proposal coming from the government, it consolidated the feeling of deception with Santos for 'betraying' the 'Democratic Security Model', a military offensive against the FARC which had been the cornerstone of Uribe's popularity" (Gomez-Suarez, 2017, p. 468). The no-campaign appealed to the sentiments of the people who missed the heavy-handed approach of dealing with the enemy (FARC) (Caicedo Atehortúa, 2016)

²⁶ The 'civil resistance' movement collected signatures to reject the Santos-FARC peace talks highlighting the moral concern of fighting against oppression (Gomez-Suarez, 2017).

²⁷ With the help of some members of the Catholic and Evangelic Church, the no-campaign promoted the 'Gender Ideology' script. They argued that the content of the agreement jeopardized the values of the traditional Colombian family (Gomez-Suarez, 2017).

expressions of anger, fear, uncertainty, indignation, and deception among the population created an anti-peace mindset, which led to the rejection of the agreements and forced a renegotiation of the final deal (Gomez-Suarez, 2017). After the signature of the revised peace accord, using a similar script, the candidate of CD, Iván Duque Márquez, won the Colombian presidency with 54% of the vote. In the presidential campaign, Duque promised to modify the deal's most contentious components, which once again moved the population, arguing, "I want peace but we can't have it without justice" (The Guardian, 2018).

In several moments during Duque's presidential period, the CD has politicized the transitional justice system, dividing the population into pro-victims and against-victims, referring to the need to punish FARC leaders with prison sentences and disqualify them from participating in politics (Semana, 2019). The Constitutional Court has protected the peace deal in the 12 years following its signing and it cannot be modified. However, Duque tried to modify the agreement from the beginning of his presidency, especially the transitional justice body – *Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz*, or JEP. He objected to a handful of articles in the law regarding this Tribunal for Peace as casting doubt on the obligation of perpetrators to provide reparations to their victims and the terms of non-extradition and lenient sentencing (Ziff & Searby, 2019).

In the end, the Constitutional Court rejected these objections, but the CD has continued its efforts to modify the Tribunal through legislative means (Semana, 2020). The international community, including the International Criminal Court, has supported its role as the key juridical body of the Peace Accords. Nevertheless, this rhetoric of the CD that appeals to

penal punishment and imprisonment for former FARC combatants has endangered the implementation of the peace agreement.

Uncertainty has increased among the low-rank FARC-EP former combatants regarding the future of the process. This mistrust of the process among the FARC has deepened due to the lack of implementation of the agreements. According to the last report of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, "From December 2016 to April 30, 2019, the number of fully and partially completed stipulations has steadily advanced. The largest share of stipulations in the accord are currently in a minimum stage of implementation" (2019, p. 1).

Moreover, there is a systematic killing of former FARC combatants: 198 have been assassinated out of the 13,000 who were demobilized since the signature of the peace agreement (UN, 2019). Despite the national effort to stop this, these killings have remained steady. This is highly problematic considering the long history of violence in Colombia against people in process of reintegration. For this reason, the lack of personal and judicial security of ex-combatants has weakened the peace building process in the country, as there is no trust in the government or in its intentions to implement the peace accords.

In addition, this rhetoric used by the CD keeps polarizing Colombian society, despite the signing of the peace agreement. Polarization here refers to the division between "us" and "others" and the establishment of dominant discourses around emotions of fear, revenge, envy, and desire for justice. This dynamic hinders the possibility of agreement and negotiation, imposing a logic of attack and defense (Guarín León, 2019). Hence, this division boosted by politicians undermines the confidence, credibility, and support of the population towards

the peace process - a variable that is crucial for the implementation of these agreements and the achievement of a long-standing peace in the country.

Conclusion

In his report, Brandt (1980) appealed to halt the arms race by negotiating disarmament measures to make the world safer. It also recommended a constructive international policy, which would have a "more comprehensive understanding of 'security' which would be less restricted to the purely military aspects" (p. 90). Finally, his report argued that peace could be only consolidated by developing systematic cooperation and building confidence.

After 40 years of the Brandt Report, we have still not followed the advice of the Commission. On the contrary, the rise of populism has jeopardized the disarmament measures taken in the past; it has impeded the consolidation of a human development approach, where security involves the social, economic, political, and environmental spheres. Finally, it has undermined the process of building confidence among the different international community actors. However, this populism is not only harming the Global North. It is also affecting the development and peace building processes in countries in the South.

As was shown in this paper, even if we cannot generalize all the populist movements (Aslanidis, 2017), the use of populist rhetoric that adopts a view of politics in terms of a friend-enemy relationship challenges the democratic consolidation and peace building processes, particularly in countries that have dealt with long-standing conflicts, as in the Colombian case.

After more than 50 years of internal conflict, an agreement between the government and FARC was achieved in Colombia. However, opponents of this agreement have used rhetoric to gain electoral support without considering its effects to the peace process. Appealing on fear, anger, disappointment, and indignation, this rhetoric has divided Colombian society along pro-agreement and anti-agreement blocs. This is highly dangerous, not only for the popular support needed for the implementation of the peace deal, but also for the process of policy-making that is necessary for peace building. If the current government led by Duque and his political party, CD, continue to hinder the implementation of the agreement based on their "peace without impunity" discourse, the agreed-upon FARC-EP disarmament, the comprehensive security approach of the peace deal, and the process of building confidence between former guerrilla combatants, the government, and the society will ultimately be compromised.

How to deal with populist rhetoric in conflict-affected societies?

In the policy-making process, it is necessary to stop using the criminal system to gain votes, particularly in societies that are trying to deal with a violent past. As Valencia-tello (2017) argues, in political systems where campaigns are based on mobilizing feelings of fear in the electorate, people can hardly feel empathy for "rival" groups, impeding the flourishing of compassion or forgiveness, feelings that are crucial in a post-conflict setting.

Dividing society into "friends" and "enemies" prevents dialogue between people who think differently. In the end, this strategy

increases the fragmentation of society. Therefore, it is crucial to think in terms of solidarity. As Brandt reflected (p.194), "Only in a spirit of solidarity based on respect for the individual and the common good will it be possible to achieve the solutions that are needed" (p. 194). In other words, we have to understand that we are part of a whole society and, therefore, we should not split it apart. We have to be able to put ourselves in our political counterparts' positions to comprehend their thoughts, feelings, and worldviews. Through dialogue, we will be able to understand suffering, we will feel compassion, and we will open up spaces of reconciliation and forgiveness. In the end, this solidarity and empathy will allow the joint construction of a better future for following generations.

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7. Ethnic Marginalization and Statelessness of Rohingyas: Policy Conundrums for Repatriation

*Grigoriy Grigoryev, Kawsher Ahamed, and
Mohammad Newaz Sharif*

Abstract: Persecution of the Rohingyas in Myanmar by military and Buddhist radical groups has been recorded on several occasions in the Rakhine state. The Rohingyas became a stateless group through their collective loss of citizenship in 1982, and violence gradually worsened in the 1980s, 2001, and 2012. Ultimately, nearly one million people fled to Bangladesh in August 2017. Numerous initiatives and subsequent policy stances have yet to resolve the crisis and ensure peaceful repatriation. Hence, this study reveals the hindrances to this goal and way forward for achieving it, with reference to the Brandt Commission propositions.

Introduction

The Rakhine state of Myanmar has been known historically as the crossroads between Muslim and Buddhist populations in Southeast Asia. Rakhine is one of the poorest states located on the west coast of Myanmar (Mohajan, 2018). The atmosphere of the Rakhine state has been a classic example of tensions between the center and periphery, and has included intercommunal and inter-religious conflict between Buddhists and Muslims (ICG, 2014). However, the ethno-religious conflict has been a common phenomenon in this province since the independence of Myanmar in 1948. Both Rakhine Buddhists

and Rohingya Muslims hold a strong sense of nativity in the state, which has been understood and presented in different ways by politicians, organizations, academic, and local people (Niti, 2020). The government of Myanmar has always favored the Rakhine Buddhists, while the Rohingyas were systematically marginalized and excluded.

Bangladesh has been the main destination of Rohingyas as a result of growing atrocities from the 1980s to 2017 when all of the Rohingyas were finally forced to leave their homes. Bangladesh first witnessed the inflow of Rohingya people from Myanmar in 1978 when their government initiated a nationwide operation to tackle the illegal immigrants. The operation forced around 200,000 Rohingya to take shelter in neighboring Bangladesh though most of the refugees returned to Myanmar under pressure from the government of Bangladesh (ICG, 2014). Following that, another wave of Rohingya people came to Bangladesh in 1992 as a consequence of continued oppression and persecution by the Myanmar military (ICG, 2019). After the second wave, most of the Rohingya refugees left to return to Myanmar, though some stayed in Bangladesh. The governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar have tried to come to repatriation agreements with several shrewd efforts since 1991. However, these attempts have failed until now.

Furthermore, several attempts were undertaken by international organizations, such as the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), while some other regional organizations, such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), remained silent. Rohingyas are skeptical of the Myanmar government's assurance to provide safety and basic civil rights, which lead to

the failure of repatriation attempts in November 2018 and August 2019.

The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is the result of ethnic conflict stemming from consistent deprivation of rights and power domination of the elites. However, the current crisis is also an economic crisis, as the apparatus of the state is controlling possession of the resource. This element of the crisis is related to the agenda of the Brandt Report, as poverty has been profound in that part of Myanmar for quite a long time. The Brandt Commission has been working since 1977 to explore future global development needs arising from economic and social disparities with the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (ICIDI)(Geography, 2020). Inclusive development focusing on health, housing, and education have been absent in Rakhine State, especially for the Rohingya people. These features of the crisis stand against the spirit of the Brandt Report that aims to achieve a peaceful world by reducing the wealth gap between the Global South and North.

At present, approximately one million Rohingyas are residing in dire conditions in camp settlements in Bangladesh. Among them, only 50,000 have secured refugee status after arriving in the early 1990s, while those who have recently migrated are designated as forcibly displaced Myanmar Nationals (Niti, 2020). This study attempts to understand and analyze the factors for peaceful repatriation and potential solutions from the current stagnation in the Rohingya crisis. Additionally, it aims to analyze particular actions and positions of the most relevant state and non-state actors to connect some elements from the Brandt Report as a tool for seeking durable decisions, especially the recommendations on Tasks of Global South, harmonizing

population growth and resources, promoting disarmament and development, as well as managing international organizations.

The Historical Context of Rohingya Marginalisation to Statelessness

The Rohingyas have been stripped of their right to citizenship of Myanmar since 1982. However, The Citizenship Law of 1948 acknowledges that the residents or settlers before the independence of the country must be given the right as a citizen (Khan, 2018 and Tran, 2015). Nevertheless, the "*nagamin operations*" in 1978 represented the cleansing attempts to purge illegitimate migrants and non-citizens (Cheesman, 2017). This was the initial period for restricting civic and political rights of Rohingyas, as well as to officially rendering them stateless (Khan, 2018). Consequently, the Rohingya community has lost its basic human rights to education, healthcare, and voting through this process.

With the promulgation of Citizenship Law in 1982, the government of Myanmar has denied the recognition of the Rohingyas as a tribe like the 135 other tribes that exist in the country. The term "Rohingya" as the name of the Muslim tribal community in Rakhine state is not recognized by the government of Myanmar or its constitution. The 1982 Citizenship Law of Myanmar has recognized three different types of citizenship: full citizenship, associate citizenship, and naturalized citizenship. The government of Myanmar has granted full citizenship to those people who belong to the 135 recognized tribes and whose ancestors have been living in Myanmar since 1823, before the British invasion of Rakhine state. On the other hand, associate citizenship is given to people

who have applied for citizenship under the 1948 law, while naturalized citizenship is bestowed up those who have entered and resided in Myanmar since before independence (Simbulan, 2013).

The government of Myanmar has deprived the t people of all three categories of citizenship, including barring them from the naturalized citizenship process (Simbulan, 2013). Moreover, the government formally defines them as illicit Bengali settlers from bordering Bangladesh (Kipgen, 2013).

The current state counselor of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi, has repeatedly denied that any military operation has been carried out against Rohingyas, except for a few attempts to arrest Muslim fundamentalists. This oppression against Rohingyas can be compared to the case of the Kurds in Iraq, where this ethnic group has had a historic connection to the land but has gradually lost their occupancy of that land (Garrie, 2017). Numerous studies and literature confirm that the Rakhine state was previously known as Arakan since the 8th century, with its citizens being referred to as Rohingya. However, based on the similarity of language with the Chattogram region of Bangladesh, the government of Myanmar identifies them as Bengali migrants.

However, Rohingya Muslim minorities are facing hostility due to the resurgence of Buddhist nationalism following the end of military rule. The common perception of Rohingya people is that they are foreign to Myanmar, fleeing from the neighboring country Bangladesh, which has fostered a systematic denial of citizenship to the Rohingyas. In recent times, this prejudiced perception is fueled by the sudden rise of populism around the world and resurgent nationalism within Myanmar, which is supported by the state. Furthermore, the notion of ethnic and

racial purity has been a dominant part of this newfound nationalism in Myanmar. Accordingly, there is the notion that foreigners or ethnic minorities need to be eradicated to uphold the spirit of the pure Burmese nation-state.

The response, Policy Stance, and Hindrances from State Parties

Due to increased tensions in the region following the 2015 Rohingya refugee crisis, some majority Muslim countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, began to take a stronger stance on the protection of the Rohingya Muslims. However, Indonesia maintained that the Rohingya crisis is a regional problem, and it still followed the non-intervention principle, emphasizing that it would pursue its policy of 'constructive engagement' rather than overtly put pressure on Myanmar.

Additionally, Malaysia was also vocal about the issue, but like Thailand, they also refused to take responsibility for all the Rohingyas who attempted to enter the country through waterways (Khairi, 2016). The Malaysian government has repeatedly emphasized that the plight of the Rohingya Muslims is a regional concern and has called for ASEAN to coordinate humanitarian aid and investigate alleged atrocities committed against them. At Malaysia's request, Aung San Suu Kyi called a special informal meeting with ASEAN foreign ministers in Yangon in December 2016 to discuss international concerns over the situation. Suu Kyi said that Myanmar would provide regular updates on the crisis to fellow ASEAN members and possibly work with them to coordinate aid efforts.

The government of Myanmar still does not recognize Rohingyas as early occupants of the state, despite centuries of

settlement in the Arakan region. However, although Myanmar and Bangladesh authorized a bilateral repatriation agreement in November 2017, this was not implemented due to the absence of legal protection provisions through citizenship (Lwin, 2019). Similarly, in 2018 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNHCR signed an agreement with the government of Myanmar to support the safe return and rebuild the lives of the Rohingyas, which has also been unsuccessful (Lwin, 2019).

Several countries have strongly criticized the failure of the government of Myanmar to remedy the protracted Rohingya crisis. China proposed major attempts to mediate the crisis without international interference as the largest investor in both Bangladesh and Myanmar (Niti, 2020).

Aung San Suu Kyi was initially considered to represent a promising hope for the Rohingyas, but she has failed to condemn the atrocities. Recently, Gambia filed a charge of genocide against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Myanmar strongly denied that its action could be regarded as ethnic cleansing, genocide, or crimes against humanity. Instead, Suu Kyi classifies those actions as anti-terror missions, while simultaneously imposing restrictions on visits to the Rakhine state by humanitarian aid workers and journalists. The Buddhist extremists who are mainly responsible for spreading hate speech among their followers often propose to resettle Rohingyas in a third country. There have been no business or economic sanctions imposed on Myanmar from any powerful country. This clearly demonstrates not only how openly the government of Myanmar practices this discrimination, but also how there was no viable attempt from the other side of "Brandt Line," also known as

"Global North," to meaningfully address this issue. Moreover, only a few European countries truly supported Gambia's concern about this issue.

The response, Policy Stance, and Hindrances from International Organizations

ASEAN could certainly play a critical role in this issue. However, ASEAN's response to the crisis has been far from sufficient. As one of the core regional organizations, ASEAN could take on a leading role in resolving this crisis. ASEAN and its member countries have a moral obligation to take necessary measures that go beyond humanitarian assistance. However, it has shown reluctance in its response, instead of focusing on very formal diplomatic processes.

There have been numerous critiques from state and non-state actors, as well as academics, for ASEAN's non-intervention principle, which restricts it from interfering in any member state internal matter until that state desires. This is depicted as being the main source of the organization's weakness in taking the lead in unraveling the crisis. On the other hand, ASEAN's policy on Myanmar is usually depicted as one of 'constructive engagement.' This policy implies that ASEAN takes a positive attitude towards military-dominated countries, such as Myanmar, which is obviously practicing discrimination, according to the Brandt Report.

This also goes against ASEAN's commitment to protecting vulnerable people, as declared in its charter and declaration of human rights. Unfortunately, at the diplomatic level, it lacks the confidence to address this crisis. The 2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant

Workers only focuses on overseas employment seekers and does not mention refugees or asylum seekers. Currently, human rights groups from the region are pressuring ASEAN to undertake a stronger stance on the safe and secure return of the Rohingyas, along with pursuing legal actions against the military and Buddhist extremists suspected of genocide and crimes against humanity.

Unlike ASEAN, the OIC was consistently concerned about rising tensions and asked the government of Myanmar to undertake robust actions (Jati, 2017 and OIC, 2015). In this regard, a high-level ministerial summit took place in 2013, where the OIC' Contact Group on the Rohingya Muslim Minority' urged to its member states to engage in certain responses to stop the crisis, referring to particular diplomatic and humanitarian stances, including coordination with UNHCR for repatriation initiatives (Jati, 2017). Despite restrictions from the government of Myanmar, OIC managed to send representatives to the Rakhine state on several occasions to obtain a clear picture of the atrocities (Radio Free Asia, 2013). Finally, OIC's focal persons for this issue managed to establish a sustained partnership with other global actors, including UN agencies.

Since the beginning of the crisis in the 1990s, UNHCR has been trying to provide humanitarian assistance and facilitate the repatriation process. So far, deploying the Kofi Anan Commission was an admirable deed by the United Nations. This commission crafted very limited, but broadly effective, recommendations, including poverty alleviation and livelihood generation for both conflicting communities, ensuring uncompromised human rights of the Rohingyas, review and amending of Myanmar's citizenship law, and an enhanced

cultural integration programming. However, the Myanmar government never agreed to follow these recommendations (Hincks, 2017 and BBC, 2017). Moreover, due to slow approaches from UNHCR, renewed tensions have grown and escalated (Khan, 2018). The first repatriation agreement was signed in 1992, targeting secured and willing return with dignity. Only a few thousand were repatriated before the influx of nearly 800,000 Rohingyas in 2017. To facilitate the process of repatriation, no country has imposed any business or economic sanctions on Myanmar to encourage bringing the Rohingyas back.

These major global and regional organizations have largely failed to negotiate with concerned state and non-state actors to formulate policies, agreements, and codes of conduct for addressing this issue in a widely accepted way manner. Though many praised recommendations made by the Kofi Anan Commission, the government of Myanmar has repeatedly refused to implement them.

Concluding Remarks And Way Forward

The peaceful and voluntary repatriation of the Rohingyas may take a long time, as no potential solutions are being visibly undertaken, and Myanmar still appears unsafe for them. Since past attempts of repatriation were unsuccessful, the rights of citizenship and recognition of the ethnic Rohingyas must be ensured before implementing any forthcoming agreement.

Taking this stance, the government of Bangladesh may shed light on the necessity of basic human and civic rights, as well as the burden being created to continue providing humanitarian assistance. China should take the lead to assist Myanmar in

preparation of accepting demands from Rohingyas for safe and voluntary repatriation. All potentially interested entities, including ASEAN and UN, should extend their hand to ensure education, medical treatment, and income-generating activities for a peaceful reintegration process.

The humanitarian concerns of this crisis need to be handled through appropriate diplomatic decisions, leading towards a long-term sustainable solution. Any forceful repatriation attempt may destroy the possibility of peacefully return in the foreseeable future. Therefore, international and regional organizations should reevaluate the situation and require a constructive and concrete mandate to ensure repatriation rights for the Rohingyas at the earliest possible time.

Despite these many challenges, the aforementioned state and non-state actors should follow the Brandt Commission's perspectives in order to explore long-term and sustainable solutions. For example, the disarmament of both Buddhist and Rohingya extremist groups, transparent actions from state parties, and the fair access of multinational, regional, and global non-state actors to the Rakhine state might bring some noteworthy progress for the peaceful repatriation of the Rohingyas.

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8. Bridging the North-South Gap through Localization: The Humanitarian Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis

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Abstract: The localization agenda is an important tool to address asymmetric power relations within the global humanitarian system. Localization can increase the efficacy of the humanitarian response and also address the uneven power relationship within the humanitarian space – especially between the international and local humanitarian actors, or, in other words, between the stakeholders of the Global North and the Global South. In doing so, it bridges the gap between the Global North and Global South and follows the ‘spirit’ of the Brandt Report and its suggested set of policies. In this contribution, I will look at how localization in humanitarian actions would help in the context of the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh.

Introduction

Forty years ago, the Report of the Brandt Commission stated that roots of refugee problems, “lie in intolerance, political instability and war” (Brandt et al., 1980 p. 113). Even in the 21st century, an exodus of refugees remains a “distressingly regular feature” (Brandt et al., 1980 p. 112), due to violent nationalism, ethnic conflict, and political instability across the world. When the Brandt Commission first published its report, the total number of world refugees was 10 million (Brandt et al., 1980 p.

112). Today, an unprecedented 70.8 million people globally have been forced to flee their home due to lingering conflict, prolonged war, and severe persecution. Nearly 30 million of these people are considered refugees (United Nations, 2020). Furthermore, countries from the Global South account for 84% of the total refugee population under the UNHCR's mandate, which further shows the asymmetry in North-South responsibility-sharing of the global refugee problem (World Economic Forum, 2017). Indeed, abuse of power in the hands of elites, growing extreme nationalism, and grave human rights violations collectively result in a major increase in the number of refugees today, mostly in the Global South.

In Myanmar (formerly Burma) in February 1978, just two months after the first convention of the Brandt Commission, the Burmese army started its operation Nagamin (Dragon King), an attempt to clear out what the then-Burmese military government referred to as “illegal migrants” from Rakhine province. Although the situation has escalated since 2017, the Rohingya have been subject to persecution since 1978. The ultra-nationalist military dictatorship sponsored the Union Citizenship Act of 1982, which stripped away the citizenship right of the Rohingya minority, a majority Muslim ethnic group in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Ever since, Bangladesh has kept its border open and accepted Rohingya refugees, who arrived in several waves, particularly in 1978, 1991, 2012, and the latest since 2017. The Bangladeshi government classified refugees who fled from Rakhine and took refuge in Bangladesh since August 2017 as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals” (FDMN) (The Daily Star, 2018).

As the Rohingya refugee crisis enters into a protracted phase, there is an increasing acknowledgement of the importance of

local actors in humanitarian response. Like the Brandt Report, The Grand Bargain (GB)²⁸, the Charter for Change (C4C)²⁹, and the Principles of Partnership asked for localization of humanitarian response, including the building of local capacities and partnerships to solve challenges in humanitarian response. The localization in humanitarian response is also expected to address the unequal power relationship within the humanitarian space, especially between the international and local humanitarian actors.

In this context, the objective of the study is to analyze how the North-South gap in the Rohingya humanitarian response is obstructing the localization of humanitarian response in Cox's Bazar, in the light of the Brandt Commission Report. To understand the dynamics that are unfolding in the context of a North-South gap in humanitarian response, this paper attempts to explore the nature of asymmetrical relations of power among Northern and Southern humanitarian actors and how the localization of humanitarian assistance is expected to increase the effectiveness of the humanitarian response.

The major theme of the Brandt Report is the North-South divide. According to Brandt, despite the division between the

²⁸ The Grand Bargain is an agreement between some of the world's largest donors and humanitarian organizations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian action. It was launched in during the World Humanitarian Summit 2016. It has 61 signatories (24 states, 11 UN Agencies, 5 inter-governmental organizations and Red Cross/Red Crescent Movements, and 21 NGOs).

²⁹ The Charter for Change is a movement/initiative, started in 2015, that aims to strengthen and empower the role of local and national actors in humanitarian response.

North and South, both the camps are “aware of their interdependence” and that the way to bridging the gap between the North and the South is, “partnership and mutual interest rather than of inequality and charity,” (Brandt et al., 1980 p. 20). Brandt further viewed that “North and South have more interests in common on a medium and long-term basis than many have so far been able to recognize,” (Brandt et al., 1980 p. 20). One of the critical aspects Brandt repeatedly focused on is the “mutuality of interest between North and South” (Brandt et al., 1980 p. 281). Brandt saw a mutuality of interest in resource transfer from the North to the South. As the report says, “The coexistence of the great needs in the South and the under-used capacity in the North suggests the scope for large-scale transfer of resources based on mutuality of interests,” (Brandt et al., 1980, p. 238).

In the context of the humanitarian response to the Rohingya crisis, we can identify positive mutual interests, as Brandt suggested. There is shared interest between Northern donors and local actors in the case of a protracted Rohingya crisis in devising a long-term, cost-effective partnership that would be based on mutual trust and cooperation. According to Brandt, mutual interests are often longer-term and, “the dialogue must be structured to allow the participants to perceive their specific mutual interests clearly on each issue,” (Brandt et al., 1980 p. 263). Brandt opined that, “At the same time, the mechanism of negotiation should be able to accommodate the principles of universality and joint responsibility,” (Brandt et al., 1980, p. 263). As the Brandt Report says, “we also believe that commitments to international cooperation in the resettlement of refugees in the future will be necessary to protect countries of

the first asylum from unfair burdens" (Brandt et al., 1980, p. 283).

The paper argues that Brandt's idea of partnership and mutuality of interest framework can be achieved through localization of the humanitarian response. However, bridging the North-South gap through localization efforts is dependent on a few factors, as evidenced from the Brandt Report: (a) reduction of the distrust between the North and South, (b) solidarity, partnership, and international cooperation in humanitarian effort (c) resource transfer, capacity-building, and sharing of know-how, and (d) inclusion of the Global South at the decision-making table.

Based on this analytical framework, the following section shall briefly discuss how the role of local actors gradually changed from being the first responders to one constituting a much more narrow implementation role.

The Challenges in Localizing Humanitarian Response

It has been long recognized that deeper partnerships between UN agencies, influential Western donors, and international humanitarian actors and local actors represent a key solution to situations involving protracted refugee crises. Humanitarian aid needs to be provided in ways that not just reduce the vulnerability of the refugees and the locals, but also empower local actors and institutions, reduce dependency on external assistance, and provide long-term solutions. To this end, the inclusion of local actors in the post-emergency phase of humanitarian aid can be more successful than cases that do not develop such partnerships with local actors. However, the ways

to better integrate local actors into the humanitarian response have largely remained unclear. Most importantly, the meaning of local has remained elusive and contested. There is no widely accepted definition of the term 'localization'. Here, localization is defined as a process that empowers and strengthens the local leadership, as well as a process that increases the ownership of the local actors in the humanitarian response. While the localization process acknowledges the role of donors and other international actors, particularly in the cases of the complex and a protracted refugee crisis, local responders need more support and funding from the donors to make humanitarian action, “as local as possible and as international as necessary” (Van Bravant & Patel, 2018).

From First Responder to the Back Burner: The Shifting Role of Local Actors

In the face of an unprecedented humanitarian tragedy, local hosts, NGOs, and faith-based groups in Cox's Bazar³⁰ were the first to provide life-saving support to the hundreds of thousands of refugees. Later, United Nations agencies and other international NGOs stepped into the situation as the magnitude and complexity of the crisis necessitated an international response. However, the dynamics of the humanitarian response changed as a result, and the deep chasm between the local actors

³⁰ Religious similarity between the host community and the Rohingyas plays a vital role in this crisis. Islam is the religion of the majority population in Cox's Bazar, and the Rohingyas are also mostly Muslims. Along with the other local organizations, Islamic faith-based organisations, such as Mosques and local Madrassas (Islamic learning centres), came forward at the very beginning of the crisis to help and support their Muslim 'brothers and sisters' who fled from Arakan, Myanmar.

and Western donors and NGOs began to widen. With the growing flow of funding and humanitarian aid from Western donors, little space remained for the local actors to take on decision-making roles. Local NGOs and organizations have been reduced to implementing partnerships with little or no involvement in the decision-making role. In other words, the situation caused the North-South divide in humanitarian response to resurface, while making asymmetric power relations between Northern and Southern humanitarian actors visible. Currently, against the backdrop of dwindling funding, the call for a cost-effective, localized humanitarian response is emerging in the policy debate. The importance of empowering humanitarian actors from the Global South has already been acknowledged in the Brandt Report, as well as in other relevant international documents, yet an analysis of the situation reveals a lack of practical application. Given the fundamental economic inequality between the local actors in Cox's Bazar and Northern humanitarian actors, the situation presents a significant challenge to formulating a response and bolstering partnership among diverse humanitarian actors.

The disproportionate allocation of financial resources to local actors is also visible in global statistics. The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015 states that only 0.2% of humanitarian funds were allocated to local actors (Roepstorff, 2019). This data indicates that the Northern or Western donors maintain a lack of trust in the Southern actors' ability to deliver aid (TNH, 2015). This is evident in the Rohingya humanitarian response case. According to a recent report, "...the majority of funding (69 per cent) goes to UN agencies, followed by INGOs (20 per cent) and the Red Cross (7 per cent) and national organisations receive only four per cent," (The Daily Star,

2019). Such a situation is a contradiction of what the Brandt Report suggested. The report says, “while these specific tasks require major transfers of finance, we believe that the power and decision-making within monetary and financial institutions must also be shared more broadly, to give more responsibility to the developing world,” (Brandt et al., 1980 p. 275).

As the crisis has entered into a protracted phase, many international actors have become actively involved in the humanitarian response. Among the 130 NGOs working in Cox’s Bazar alongside the Bangladesh government, at least 13 are local, 45 are national, 69 are international, and 12 are UN agencies (Wake & Bryant, 2018). An estimate says that about 1,296 expats are working with different organizations since 2017 (COAST, 2018). On the other hand, some of the local NGOs accuse the international and UN agencies of taking their most efficient staff members, arguing that it prevents them from effective capacity-building and strengthening of their organizations. While local workforces receive the benefit of a higher wage, such a takeover is undeniably impacting the local capacity to respond to the crisis. Besides, the nature of the humanitarian response in the protracted phase of the crisis significantly differs from the emergency phase. In a protracted humanitarian response, local actors must be included with the aim of integrated development of the affected region. As the Brandt report says, “...the prime objective of development is to lead to self-fulfilment and creative partnership in the use of a nation's productive forces and its full human potential" (Brandt et al., 1980 p. 23). While the presence of international aid workers is crucial to managing the crisis, their presence relegated many local actors to the status of only an implementing partner.

In Cox's Bazar, the discord between local and international humanitarian actors became very clear when local civil society organizations and NGOs formed an association called Cox's Bazar CSO and NGO Forum (CCNF), a platform involving local actors concerning the Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG). The ISCG is an entity hosted by International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deal with the refugee crisis in Cox's Bazar that carries out an organizing role between the Bangladesh government and the INGOs. This represents a clear division along the Northern and Southern humanitarian actors.

Ways to Localize Humanitarian Response

How does the partnership between the Western donors, NGOs, and local humanitarian actors in the Rohingya response reflect what the Brandt Report termed as, 'mutuality of interest between North and South'?

Humanitarian response is often seen as a neo-colonial or neo-liberal venture in which powerful countries and INGOs from the Global North asymmetrically dominate humanitarian response in the Global South. The localization of humanitarian response aims to bridge the power imbalance by engaging local actors and other relevant local stakeholders. To help localization and cooperation between the Northern and Southern humanitarian actors and to formulate an effective international response, significant structural changes have to be made. According to the Brandt Report, "...much determination and purposeful effort will be required to produce structural

changes with a fair balance and for mutual benefit” (Brandt Commission, 1980 p.17).

Most importantly, the transfer of resources from the North to the South can make a significant impact. Greater cooperation on the fronts of finance and capacity-building can help promote self-sustainability in the South. Making the South self-sustained is in the mutual interest of both the North and the South. To this end, purposeful cooperation between Northern and Southern humanitarian actors is required. As the Brandt Report says, “the coexistence of the great needs in the South and the under-used capacity in the North suggests the scope for large-scale transfer of resources based on mutuality of interests” (Brandt et al., 1980 p.238). Besides, to fund transfer, the localization of humanitarian response can be achieved through direct investment in local actors, improving partnerships, capacity-development, proper coordination and recruitment, and balanced communications between local and international humanitarian actors. Furthermore, greater inter-agency coordination and strengthening of locally-available institutions and actors are instrumental for an effective humanitarian response.

Outlook: Localization and Western Populism

As we celebrate 40 Years of the Brandt Commission Report, the Rohingya refugee crisis has entered into a protracted phase amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Potential funding deficit due to the COVID-19 pandemic can provide an opportunity for international humanitarian agencies to promote localization as a cost-effective strategy in the post-pandemic humanitarian response. Currently, there is a growing concern amongst local

actors that, if another large-scale humanitarian tragedy happens somewhere in the world, humanitarian aid for the Rohingya refugees will further decline. On the other hand, the rise of the right-wing populist leaders in the Western democracies presents a clear challenge to humanitarian resource transfer from the Global North to the South. Notably, the President of the United States (U.S.) Donald Trump and, to some extent, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (U.K.) Boris Johnson are spearheading numerous changes in their aid policies that may unfavorably impact countries from the Global South. This would also ultimately affect the localization agenda.

For example, the British Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons after merging the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) clearly shows that the legacy of the U.K as a humanitarian aid donor is at risk. Prime Minister Johnson clearly undermined the need to address the widening wealth gap between the Global North and the Global South and need of a different approach to many of the interlinked security and developmental undertakings of countries from the Global South when he stated, "we give ten times as much aid to Tanzania as we do to the six countries of the Western Balkans, who are acutely vulnerable to Russian meddling," (Johnson, 2020). Nevertheless, what the Brandt Commission envisioned about North-South partnership almost four decades ago, Brandt's vision of "mutuality of interest" between the Global North and the Global South, has remained strikingly relevant, despite the emergence of a global pandemic, populist sentiment, and isolationist leaders. Thus, echoing Willy Brandt, it is safe to conclude that, to face many of the today's and tomorrow's complex humanitarian challenges, including the Rohingya

refugee crisis in Bangladesh, greater solidarity and international cooperation will be required, including fair responsibility-sharing and the strengthening and empowering of the local actors, as articulated in the Brandt Report.

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Conclusion

40 years after the Brandt Report: Making the Best out of the Populist Challenge to Policy-making

Achim Kemmerling and Carolina Reis

40 years have passed since the launching of the Brandt Report. 40 uneasy years. Landmark publications like the Brandt Report often emerge in two different situations. They can usher in a new age of political thinking; in this case, they truly shape a new paradigm to change our understanding of how the world works. Alternatively, they are the last battle cry of a foregone epoch; in that case, the timing marks the end of a cycle and a style of thinking. Remarkably, the Brandt Report is both. In a positive sense, in the sense of creating a paradigm, Edward Kaweesi and Steve Khaemba have shown in this contribution how the Brandt Report has inspired policymakers to find new solutions to problems of international inequality. For instance, the Brandt Report called for an international trade organization. Indeed, a few years later, in 1994, the Uruguay round of the GATT established the foundation of the World Trade Organization.

In a negative sense, in the sense of a last battle cry, the Brandt Report epitomized the optimistic hopes of an international regime many observers called ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1982). Embedded liberalism denotes the attempt to marry liberal international economic policies on trade and migration

with the institutional buffer of progressive and inclusive social policies on the domestic level. The Brandt Report clearly shows signs of socialist and social-democratic thinking precisely at a time when the domestic politics in important countries, such as the USA and the UK, had already ushered in the demise of embedded liberalism and the rise of a neoliberal international order (Brandt & Messner, 2013). Some contributions are, therefore, more sanguine about the real effects of the Brandt Report (see, for instance, the contribution of Bastian Becker and Jalale Birru).

While the 1990s and the end of communism gave the Brandt agenda a renewed hope for common solutions to global problems, the rise of populism and nationalism in recent years poses, again, huge challenges for the visions laid out in the Brandt Report. In this edited volume, we looked at the implications of the rise of populism for the Brandt agenda. Specifically, we asked whether we could find evidence for distinctive elements of populism in public policymaking in areas most directly related to the Brandt Report.

What is Populism and What is its Impact on Policymaking?

As several contributions have highlighted, populism is a notoriously difficult term. It varies from a 'purely discursive definition' (Aslanidis, 2016) to notions based on 'identity politics' (Müller, 2016) that can be further differentiated in various ways. As Pappas (2016) explains, 'populism' first emerged in the 1960s in a European context, marking the first wave of studies on the phenomenon, which later gave rise to a worldwide trend. However, the first scholars were not able to clearly define the concept nor to explain its rise in many

different contexts. The second generation, called the ‘classical populism,’ focused on Latin American countries, and the mass movements originated in the region during the 1970s and 1980s. More than trying to define the concept, academics were interested in the socio-economic drivers of populism. By the 1990s, the scenario in Latin America had changed, and a new type of populism arose: neoliberal populism. Here, the emphasis shifted from the economic measures of populists to the populist character, mainly a man with a charismatic personality who would deploy either a populist discourse or strategy to convince and connect with his electorate. The final and current wave, which Pappas refers to as ‘contemporaries,’ expanded the research on populism from Latin America to the world, as a response to new phenomena labeled as populist in different continents. Together, these scholars aim to find the characteristics shared by these diverse episodes referred to as populism.

Therefore, several definitions were proposed. Some authors describe populism within a discourse perspective, as a pure type of discourse (Aslanidis, 2016) or as a discursive and stylistic repertoire (Brubaker, 2017) against one group, generally the elites, and in favor of others, the ‘people.’ Others adopt a political style or mode approach, claiming that the argued opposition between the virtuous ‘people’ and the corrupt ‘elites’ goes beyond the discourse and acquires mobilizational features (Jansen, 2011; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Hadiz & Chryssogelos, 2017). Populism, thus, is sustained by the direct, unmediated, and noninstitutionalized support of those who identify as ‘people,’ as in Weyland’s definition of populism (2001). This core element of populism would transmute the democratic principles into a direct representation of one specific group of

people by the leader, who communicates permanently and directly with the audience (Urbinati, 2019).

Other explanations of populism overcome the discursive and style realms. For instance, Pappas (2016) characterizes populism as a ‘democratic illiberalism,’ i.e., the phenomenon is still under the democratic umbrella, since conducted under elections and constitutional legality, but has illiberal traits, majorly described as the recognition of one single social group, the persecution of opponents, and majoritarianism. In his interpretation, Müller (2016) disagrees that populism can comply with the democratic ground rules. For the author, populism – a form of identity politics – has two main characteristics: it is anti-elitist and anti-pluralist. Furthermore, populist governance would display three features: efforts to seize control over the state apparatus, mass clientelism, and attempts to curb civil society. The difference from other leaders, says Müller, is that populists proceed in that way openly, justifying themselves through the will of the people.

The more difficult question, however, is whether we see distinctively populist policies. What do we know about populism’s effect on policymaking? Surprisingly, academics and policy pundits have still rarely addressed this question. It seems that the predominant approach to populism favors the logic of a thin-centered ideology (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017) that separates society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups – the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite.’ As a thin-centered ideology, populism would always show up tied to other ideological elements, which gives ample space to policies in many directions from right-wing, anti-democratic, xenophobic policies to excessive left-wing, big-spending

governments. Moreover, populism seems more of a rhetoric than a policy style.

For this reason, the literature on policymaking is somewhat divided. For long, economists have been unequivocal about populist policymaking, mainly referring to left-wing populism and its association with short-termism and irresponsible monetary and fiscal policies (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991). Kemmerling (2017) shows how economic populism lends itself to radical positions on the spectrum between free markets and the command economy and can give rise to policy instability. Indeed, most economists fear a rise of redistributive, short-term spending measures and restrictions to migration (Boumans, 2017). However, examples such as Mexican president López Obrador reveal that it is less than obvious that populist governments always behave that way. Rodrik (2018) even cautioned to reject all kinds of economic populism as necessarily bad.

In another policy area, international relations, scholars also have difficulties pinning down what exactly populist policymaking looks like. Sure enough, most populists have a nationalist stance in opposition to international regimes and organizations. However, the demise of multilateralism actually precedes the rise of populist leaders and there are also examples where populist leaders seek to gain international acclaim by strengthening international institutions (Plagemann & Destradi, 2019). If anything, the populist leadership style means unpredictability, which generally weakens institutionalized forms of cooperation.

We could expand the list of policy areas even further. For instance, populists question, weaken, or even destroy domestic political institutions in public administration, the media, or the

political system (e.g., Bauer & Becker, 2020). However, again, they often do so in very different ways and to very different degrees. To some, populism also is a renewed promise of deeper forms of democracy. As Lord Dahrendorf has so succinctly put it, “the one’s populism is the other one’s democracy, and vice versa” (quoted in Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Perhaps the only policy area where we find, in recent times, clear indications of a populist, right-wing form of political contestation is in migration policies (e.g., van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014).

What did we learn from the contributions in this volume?

Yet, the contributions in our volume do show some commonalities among populists in terms of policy output. In particular, the essays in this publication demonstrate that, on balance, the rise of populism severely endangers the Brandt agenda. True, populists have pointed their fingers in the open wounds of a liberal international order. Flows of goods, capital, and people more often than not benefit large companies and rich people in wealthy countries to the detriment of a declining middle class in rich countries and of poor nations in general (Rodrik, 2018). Politicians of traditional parties have somersaulted towards acknowledging these mistakes, although truly progressive solutions are still hard to come by.

However, populism itself has made finding such solutions much more difficult. First, populist leaders do stimulate democratic processes in some ways, such as voter turnout; however, as Patricia Loggetto presents, ultimately, most populists behave rather paradoxically, like personalistic anti-establishment establishments. They relegate citizens to the role of passive consumers and masses for rallies but do not really suggest new

forms of deliberative engagement between the political elite and citizens.

One of the key issues of the Brandt Report was international inequality. In this respect, the advent of populism is neither good news, according to Becker and Birru. While populism may address some form of inequality (mainly the decline of middle classes vis-à-vis the upper 10 or 1 percent in a country), it does little to address the root causes of this inequality. In addition, it clogs fundamental international adjustment mechanisms that lead to less international inequality: international trade and, especially, migration.

As already seen above, the influence of populism is nowhere clearer than on international migration. Felipe Aguayo demonstrates in his contribution how the Trump election endangered a delicate equilibrium of migration flows and policy packages that slowly, but steadily, evolved between the U.S., Mexico, and Central American countries. In a way, the rise of populism brought about some of the crises it then proceeds to scandalize.

The severity of the Mexican case is depressing but perhaps dwarfed by the problems faced when migration is the result of conflict and ethnic warfare. This is clearly visible in the Myanmar Rohingya crisis. Sharif, Grigoryev, and Ahamed note how a rise in ethnonationalism in Myanmar led to mass persecution and expulsion of Rohingya refugees to neighboring countries. The Rohingya have become the tragic symbols of new forms of nationalism, first being expelled from Myanmar and then being shuttled around between different countries. Multilateral solutions were remarkably ineffective, especially considering the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Ushree Barua, also writing on the plight of the

Rohingya, indicates that humanitarian intervention needs to be based on a more trusting relationship between donors and recipients of humanitarian aid. She still argues that localization of humanitarian aid would go a long way towards solving some of the problems of plaguing Rohingya refugees in Bangladeshi camps. However, the situation is clearly made worse by populism on the donor side, in that populist leaders challenge the humanitarian logic of aid, effectively subordinating Official Development Assistance to more selfish forms of foreign policymaking.

The effect of populism and new forms of ideology is equally evident in the area of conflict management, according to Laura Barrios. After meticulously discussing what aspects of part of the Colombian political establishment are populist, she remarks how these populist leaders have effectively sabotaged the peace agreement, which has led to a new round of destabilization and unpredictability in Colombia. While not directly related to populism, the rise of jihadism and terrorism in several African countries is another sign that we live in a new age of ideology in which conflicts severely put into question the Brandt agenda, as Steve Khaemba shows.

How to Revive the Brandt Spirit?

And yet, the contributions in this volume point out how possible solutions might look like for reviving the Brandt Spirit. To begin with, the Brandt Report diction is, at times, contradictory and naturally imperfect in its foresight. For instance, while its attempt was to overcome the North-South divide, in some ways, it also reifies such divisions. In many senses, the simplistic narratives of them-vs.-us have become obsolete (Rosling et al.,

2019). As an illustration, China hardly qualifies as a regular developing country any longer. The Brandt Report also did not foresee the severity of climate change as perhaps the most fundamental challenge to humanity in our lifetime.

Nevertheless, in most dimensions, the diagnosis of the Brandt Report has aged very well. To take Barua's example of localization: Localization exactly requires the type of mutual trust relationships, the Brandt Report not only advocated for but greatly stimulated, as Edward Kaweesi showed in this volume. A second example is the emphasis of the Brandt Report on women. Populism is clearly the second coming of macho politics (see also Laura Barrios in this publication) and, quite hopefully, its last stance. Both as targeted policies and as agents of change, women and minority groups have a huge role to play in reviving the Brandt Spirit. Current contestations on gender and identity politics demonstrate that these conflicts are far from over, but also highlight the importance of such issues in the 'Brandt Agenda 2.0'.

Brandt himself wrote in his introduction to the Report about 'Shaping Order from Contradictions.' Indeed, we do live in a new age of contradictions. The populist challenge can be a useful wake-up call to re-establish a new, more inclusive international political order that allows for more equity, peace, and prosperity for all.

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"Waste and corruption, oppression, and violence are, unfortunately, to be found in many parts of the world. The work for a new international order cannot wait until these, and other evils have been overcome. We in the South and the North should frankly discuss abuses of power by elites, the outburst of fanaticism, the misery of millions of refugees, or other violations of human rights which harm the cause of justice and solidarity, at home and abroad."

Brandt Report, 1980