Transformation of Parliamentary Elites: Recruitment and Careers of Legislators in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 1990-2012

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Introduction

> "The pathways taken to office by political leaders certainly affect the way in which they will govern."
> Prewitt (1970: 22)

> "In the long run who gets into the legislature, perhaps rising during a twenty- or thirty-year career into the highest offices of state, may have more important repercussions for the future of the country than other electoral choice." Norris (1997: 3)

The processes of transition in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s were about transformation of political elites and re-emergence of freely elected parliaments that have been and remain a cornerstone of representative democracy. Parliamentary representation, in spite of the egalitarian democratic idea behind it, turned out to be the main pathway into the political elite and confirmed the pattern of many established, long lived and stable democracies where recruitment from the parliament remains the most common route to the top.

Classical elite theories (Pareto and Mosca) and most recent studies on political elites (Higley and Lengyel 2000; Best and Cotta 2000; Best and Higley 2010) relate the change and stability of a political order to changes in the personnel of the formal institutions of government (circulation of elites). The competitive theory of democracy (Schumpeter 1979; Sartori 1987) sees political elites as a fundamental element of democratic regimes.

Pareto and Mosca emphasised the *extent* of circulation (how much of it matters?), most recently this line is being followed by Best and Cotta (2000). The study by Higley and Lengyel (2000) argues that what matters is not the extent of elite circulation, but its *manner* (the way elite is changing). The third group would emphasise neither extent nor manner, but *frequency* of circulation (Matland and Studlar 2004).

The literature divides elite circulation into a circulation of individuals and into a circulation of their social/political profiles (Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell 1952; Keller 1991). Although a circulation of social/political profiles (*structural circulation*) always involves circulation of individuals (*individual circulation*), the opposite is not necessarily the case: individual circulation does not necessarily mean a structural

circulation. In other words, we may have totally different names (persons) in a parliament, but their social/political profiles would be the same ones as of persons who did not come back to a parliament.

The issue of circulation shaped the main discourse in research on the Eastern European elites after 1989. One group of scholars - Hankiss (1990) and Staniszkis (1991) - argued that old (communist) elites continued, the other - Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (2000) – attempted to prove that a new elite came into power. However, this discussion on the Eastern European elites has been mostly limited to the individual circulation. The issues of structural circulation have been taken into account in the study by Eyal and Townsley (1995) and Best and Edinger (2003), but this is rather an exception of the common stream.

The question of circulation, among the questions of elite cohesion, attitudes and behavior, was considered in the most prominent study on the Baltic elites by Steen (1997), but it was rather limited to circulation of individuals. Individual circulation is a main concern of the article on Estonian elites by Steen and Ruus (2002) as well. Differently from them, the structural circulation is being investigated by Klāsons (2003), but it takes into account the 7th Latvian Saeima (from 1998 to 2002) only. Some elements of structural circulation analysis could be found in the article on the Lithuanian parliamentary elite 1990-2000 by Matonytė (2003), but cross-country dimensions are missing.

My own dissertation focuses on the recruitment and careers of the Baltic parliamentary representatives and argues that not only individual but also structural circulation takes place among the Baltic parliamentary elites after 1990. It provides evidence that we have not only new elite members but also a transformation of their social and political profiles.

The dissertation takes the social background of legislators (variables of occupation, education, gender, ethnicity and age) as an indicator of the structure of social power and views the political background of MPs (their political party family affiliation) as an indicator of political power. At the same time, variables of gender and ethnicity are employed for measurement of democratisation and the mean number of legislative elections and incumbency rates are used for measuring political professionalisation. By doing this, the presented work treats changes in parliamentary representation as a proxy of structural circulation (transformation) of parliamentary elites.

The dissertation, as the first *comparative longitudinal* study on the parliamentary elites from all three Baltic countries, contributes to the research into the Baltic elites by using original longitudinal data[1] - it covers the social and political backgrounds of the Baltic parliamentary representatives in the period from 1990 to 2012. The cross-Baltic comparison in an Eastern and Western European perspective and application of both structural and individual elite circulations are the steps making this area of research more comparative and systematic.

[1] The Estonian and Latvian data were collected and coded by myself. The Lithuanian dataset for the period from 1990 to 2008 was kindly provided by Prof. Irmina Matonytė, however, the variables of education, occupation and political experience were recoded by me in order to match the Latvian and Estonian data.

1. Parliamentary Recruitment and Theory of Elites

1.1. The Recruitment Process

Parliamentary recruitment is a part of political recruitment which is defined as "a process by which individuals are inducted into active political roles" (Marvick 1976: 29). The process of parliamentary or legislative recruitment happens in the political party context which is affected by the general structure of opportunities. In this process individuals start with meeting legal requirements and end up with serving in parliament (see figure 1). The first step in the recruitment process is decision to run for a parliament or selecting yourself (Matland 2005: 94). This step involves motivation (personal ambition) and resources. In the second step – selection by the political party – individuals move from the pool of aspirants to the pool of candidates. At this stage the preferences and decisions of party gatekeepers (selectorate) are crucial. The third and final step is parliamentary election: here the voters (electorate) determine who will enter a new legislature.

Motivation and Resources

Motivational factors (the desire for prestige, power and material rewards) and resources (relevant qualifications and skills, ability to fund electoral campaign, social capital) are crucial in turning an eligible into an aspirant. Personal ambition is a precondition for any aspiring politician[2], however, it is constrained by a political party context and legal, electoral and party system structures which any candidate must cope with. The current office (occupational position) of the eligible also belongs to structure of opportunities.

Schlesinger (1966: 9) argues that "the independent influence of ambition upon opportunity occurs early in a man's career; as he moves on, both in office and in age, the possibilities modify his ambitions". Schlesinger (1966: 10) distinguishes three types of ambitions: discrete, static and progressive. In our interpretation, the discrete ambition would mean that an aspirant wants to be elected a legislator for a limited time after which he or she would withdraw from the legislative office. The static ambition would refer to a parliamentary representative who wishes to remain in a parliament and make a long-standing career as a legislator. The progressive ambition

[2] According to Schlesinger (1966: 3-6), any theory of recruitment includes a theory of ambition.

would refer to the situation in which the aspirant seeks a higher or a more important office. Certainly, ambitions change over time. Someone, who has a discrete ambition

Figure 1. Parliamentary Recruitment



Source: Adapted and modified from Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 184).

initially, may find a legislative activity so exciting that later develops static or progressive ambitions.

If we take the gender perspective, the structure of opportunities is also shaped by the cultural milieu and the level of socio-economic development. If running for parliament is conceived as not really appropriate activity for a woman, the probability is high that there will be less female aspirants than in the country with a pronounced egalitarian culture; and more female aspirants will come in the advanced industrial country than in the developing one (Matland 1998; Matland and Montgomery 2003:

21-23). With regard to resources, female dispositions of time (due to tasks such as childraising, cooking and cleaning) and cultural capital (levels of education) are considered to be inferior in comparison with acquisitions of their male counterparts (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes 2007: 267). Women as elected officials tend to be older than men when they become active in politics, have no children, or have fewer children than their male counterparts (Thomas 1994: 4; Matland and Montgomery 2003: 23).

Selectorate

Although the voters are those who make the final judgement about candidates through elections, the elitist approach assumes that the demand of selectors is the most important one: the selectors turn aspirants into candidates first and only then the voters have a say about the proposed candidates.

We assume that selectorates choose candidates upon meritocratic criteria (qualification, experience, etc), however, it is unlikely that all candidates are very well known to them. Therefore, perceptions of selectorates are affected by what Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 14) calls direct and imputed discrimination towards certain types of applicants. In the case of direct discrimination, candidates are being positively or negatively evaluated not so much on the individual but rather on the group characteristics. In the case of imputed discrimination, certain applicants, personally favoured by some selectors, may not be selected due to expectation that this candidate would lose votes among the electorate. Secondly, the selection (and discrimination) criteria may vary not only among the political parties but within the same party from election to election: if selectorate is more confident about control of a large part of electorate, electoral competitiveness of candidates will be of less importance than their expected loyalty, managing skills or ideological suitability (Best and Cotta 2000: 12). Finally, candidates may be screened for qualities and capacities their current selectorates never had to possess (Marvick 1976: 37).

Electorate

Electorate has a final say on the list of candidates proposed by selectorate and it is very likely that the end consumer (voters) judge candidates on other information and criteria than those by selectorate. Information on candidates' credibility, competence and influence is being inferred from educational, occupational and political

background of parliamentary candidates, however, the weight and importance of certain biographical details change with new demands of the electorate.

This work, relying on the fundamentals laid down by Norris and Lovenduski (1995), Norris (1997), Best and Cotta (2000), treats parliamentary recruitment as an outcome of interaction between the supply of aspirants and candidates and the demand of both the selectorate and electorate. The formal structure of opportunities is seen as a framework where interaction between supply and demand sides takes place. The legal acts on citizenship and voting rights, laws on the political party membership, regulations on remuneration of MPs and other practices would belong to this structure. These kinds of regulations and practices influence selectors and candidates and affect the supply and demand side of recruitment.

As mentioned above, motivational factors and resources determine the size and quality of aspirants' and candidates' pool. If the pool is large enough, the selectors cannot claim that they have not been able to select more ethnic minority and female candidates. On the demand side, the electorate and, especially, the selectorate shape a legislature to be elected.

The supply and demand model is seen in the light of a 'new institutionalism research design' which emphasises the role of formal institutions - the legal, electoral and party system rules – in selecting parliamentary candidates.

Recruitment, a concept with its roots in the structural-functional school of sociological thought, needs to be placed in a wider (more general) theoretical framework connecting society and politics. One possible framework is offered by democratic elitism. It sees a parliament as an elitist foundation of democracy and, at the same time, allows to observe the election of parliamentary representatives as a process of political elite recruitment. The elitist perspective also allows to explain the change of political order by the transformation of political elites and enables to go back to the roots of the classic elite theory.

1.2. Elite Circulation as a Link between Parliamentary Recruitment and Democratic Elitism

1.2.1. Heritage of Modern Machiavellians

Although theory of elites is almost always associated with the writings of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, the modern thought on elites reaches the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, a statesman and thinker of Italian Renaissance.[3] The Machiavellian thesis on historical cycles and description of rulers as lions and foxes[4] found a profound impact on the theory of elite circulation by Pareto. 'Political formula' by Mosca[5] as self-justification of elite rule has its origins in the teaching of manipulation techniques by Machiavelli. A scientific (value-free) Machiavellian manner to analyse political power was an innovative step in contemporary political theory[6] and laid down fundamentals for the political sociology of elites.

The unavoidable division of society into elites and non-elites or into a small ruling (organised) minority and large unstructured masses was the main message of the elite theory that emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century[7]. Still, the elite theory sees the contest for political control not in the competition between elites and masses but between one elite and another.

In the sociology of Mosca, the society is divided into two political classes: a ruling class and the ruled (Mosca 1939: 50). The ruling class is divided into the highest stratum (very few persons at the top) and the second stratum, which is more numerous but nevertheless more important than the highest stratum: the stability of the political system mainly "depends on the level of morality, intelligence and activity

[3] James Burnham (1943: 82) was the first to assign the label "modern Machiavellians" to the classical elite theorists Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels. For the most recent analysis of the Machiavellian thought, see Donskis (2011).

[4] The ruler must act (at least appear) as both the lion and the fox: "because the lion is defenceless against traps and a fox is defenceless against wolves. Therefore one must be a fox in order to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten off wolves. Those who simply act like lions are stupid" (Machiavelli 1981: 99). Lions personify force, Foxes are associated with fraud. Foxes are more common in political affairs than Lions: "men rise from a low to a great position by means rather of fraud than force" (Machiavelli 1983: 310).

[5] Elites "do not justify their power solely by de facto possession of it, but try to find a moral and legal basis for it, representing it as a logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted" (Mosca 1939: 70).

[6] The cost of this Machiavellian innovation was a widespread blame for divorcing politics from ethics and opening opportunities for legitimation of political immorality.

[7] We should mention the well known 'iron law of oligarchy' by Michels which reads that any organised society has its elite: "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy" (Michels 1966: 365).

that this second stratum has attained" (Mosca 1939: 404); this second stratum "alone is capable of bridging the gap between the few and the many" (Meisel 1965: 6). Secondly, the deficiences in the second stratum cause much greater danger to the survival of the political system, since the repair of rather similar deficiences in the second stratum is more difficult in comparison with the tiny highest stratum (Mosca 1939: 404-405).

The competition between one elite and another occur through the contest of mechanisms of power and elite recruitment. In the conception of Mosca (1939: 394-395), the power flow is characterised by the opposing 'autocratic' and 'liberal' principles and sources for elite[8] recruitment by the division into competing 'aristocratic' and 'democratic' tendencies. The principles refer to the direction of power flow which is either "from above downward" (*autocratic principle*) or "from below upward" (*liberal principle*); the tendencies refer to sources for elite recruitment that are either lower classes (*democratic tendency*) or from within the elite (*aristocratic tendency*). Mosca allows for the fusion and balance of 'principles' and 'tendencies'. After cross-tabulating two principles with two tendencies, one receives four types of variation in power flow and elite recruitment:

> "At first glance it might seem that the predominance of what we call the "autocratic" principle should go with what we call the "aristocratic" tendency; and that the opposite principle which we call "liberal" should go with the tendency that we call "democratic". Examining a number of types of political organizations, one might conclude that a certain affinity does exist between autocracy and aristocracy on the one hand, and between liberalism and democracy on the other. That, nevertheless, would be a rule that is subject to a great many expectations. It would be easy to find examples of autocracies that have not recognized the existence of classes on which birth conferred legal privileges. The Chinese empire, during long periods of its history, might be mentioned in that regard. It would be easier still to find examples of elective systems in which the electing group has been made up entirely of hereditary ruling classes. That was the case in Venice and in the Polish republic." (Mosca 1939: 395-396)

Thus, we have not only autocratic-aristocratic and liberal-democratic, but also autocratic-democratic and liberal-aristocratic types. Following this typology, the optimal form governance and elite recruitment would be a balance of principles and tendencies, "with enough democratic openness to refresh the ruling class and enough

[8] To be precise, Mosca uses the term 'ruling class', not 'elite'.

of an aristocratic restrictiveness to ensure stability, a 'liberal' system of elective authority but an electorate confined to the middle class" (Parry 1980: 40).

The main criterion for elite recruitment, according to Mosca, is the ability to rule:

"Add to it the will to rule and the conviction of possessing the right qualities – qualities which undergo continuos change as the conditions of each people in intellectual, moral, economic, as well as in military matters change continuously, with the result that each people's political and administrative arrangements also need appropriate modifications.

These modifications may take place gradually, in which case the new elements who infiltrate the ruling class will not effect a radical change in its attitude and structure. If, on the contrary, the changes in the composition of the ruling class take place in a tumultuous and rapid fashion, the replacement of the old minority by the new elements may be almost completed in the course of one or two generations. In the first case, the prevailing influence is, as we called it elsewhere, the aristocratic tendency; in the second it is the one which we called the democratic." (Mosca 1958: 388-389)

Pareto also divides the elite into two groups: the governing and the non-governing (Pareto 1942: 1424). He terms the movement between the elite and non-elite 'the circulation of elites' (Pareto 1942: 1426) the most precise description[9] of which is the following:

"Let A be the elite in power, B the social element seeking to drive it from power and to replace it, and C the rest of the population, comprising the incompetent, those lacking energy, character and intelligence… an army without commanders. They become important only if guided by the A or B. Very often – in fact almost always – it is the B who put themselves at the head of the C, the A reposing in a false security or despising the C. Moreover, it is the B who are best able to lure the C for the simple reason that, not having power, their inducements are long-dated. It sometimes happens, however, that the A endeavour to get the better of the B, seeking to content the C with apparent concessions. If the B gradually take the place of the A by slow infiltration, if the movement of social circulation is not interrupted, the C become deprived of the leaders capable of spurring them to revolt, and there ensues a period of prosperity. The A usually strive to resist this infiltration, but their resistance may be ineffective and amount in the end only to an inconsequent resentment. But if the resistance of the A is effective, the B can wrest the position from them only by open conflict, with the help of the C. If they succeed and get into power, a new challenging elite, D, will be formed and will play the same role vis-à-vis the B as the B played vis-à-vis the A, and so on." (Pareto 1966: 134-135)

[9] Marie Kolabinska, one of Pareto's students, distinguished three types of circulation in his theory: "First, there is the circulation which takes place between different categories of the governing élite itself. Secondly, there is the circulation between the élite and the rest of the population, which may take either two forms: (i) individuals from the lower strata may succeed in entering the existing élite, or (ii) individuals in the lower strata may form new élite groups which then engage in a struggle for power with the existing élite" (Bottomore 1993: 36).

Circulation of elites by Pareto needs to be seen in a wider context of his sociological thought. The theory of social action by Pareto lists six types of constant elements (they are called residues) that do not change or change very little over time[10]. Out of all of them, the residue of combination and the residue of group-persistencies (persistent aggregates) are the most important for change and replacement (circulation) of elites:

"The first, called *the residue of combination*, corresponds to the progressive and inventive type – in business it is the speculator; in politics, the Machiavellian fox, who prefers cunning and appeasement to brute violence – whose methods are "humanitarian", democratic, corrupt, and corrupting. The second, *the residue of persistent aggregates*, is Pareto's term for the mentality of the herd, worshipping tradition, and fond of foreceful action." (Meisel 1965: 9)

The most optimal conditions for a well-functioning society, according to Pareto, are a relatively free circulation of elites and a balanced distribution of residues across social strata: predominance of residues of combination ('foxes') in the elite and prevalence of residues of group-persistences ('lions') in the non-elite with a condition that residues of group-persistences ('lions') are not excluded from the elite.

The main differencies between Mosca and Pareto are the quantitave superiority of the second stratum of the ruling class by Mosca in comparison with a qualitative superiority of the governing elite by Pareto[11]. Secondly, "Mosca's conception of a closely knit and self-conscious organized minority is demonstrably too narrow to fit modern democracies; but Pareto's network of 'leading minorities' is too broad to distinguish between them" (Finer 1966: 81).

The common thing between Mosca and Pareto is that they treat the contest for political control not as the competition between elites and masses but as a struggle between one elite and another. Another common thing is that the classic theory of elites[12] is constructed not only as a counter-theory to Marxism but also as an

[10] The six types of residues are: (1) instinct for combination, (2) group-persistences (persistence of aggregates), (3) need of expressing sentiments by external acts, (4) residues connected with sociality, (5) integrity of the individual and his appurtenances, and (6) the sex residue (Pareto 1942: 516-519).

[11] One of the examples of the qualitative superiority of elite is the following statement: "Three or even four mediocre engineers cannot achieve the output of one capable and intelligent engineer" (Pareto 1986: 76)

[12] James H. Meisel claims that one more common thing for classical elite theorists is their belief that elites function according to the law of "the three Cs: group cohesion, consciousness, conspiracy – the unity of being, thought, and purpose" (Meisel 1958: 16).

expression of scepticism toward the functioning of representative democracy. Therefore, elites and democracy are opposing and conflicting entities in the works of Pareto and Mosca; democratic representation and democratic governance are merely a fiction for them[13].

1.2.2. Democratic Elitism since Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter

Elites and democracy were reconciled in the works of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter. Democratic elitism is, however, not only about reconciliation of democracy and elites, but also about replacement of cyclical understanding of history with a more linear mode of change. Secondly, a classic Paretian circulation of elites is disrupted by violent upheavals and revolutions, whereas modern representative democracy institutionalises competition of elites for power into the negotiated regular and peaceful parliamentary elections. Of course, democracies can fail and democratisations can experience set-backs (see Huntington 1993), however, Paretian (or even Aristotelian or Polibian) certainty in cyclical historical change of political regimes is abolished. One could certainly observe electoral cycles in contemporary representative democracies, but they happen within one type of regime; thus, their notion is different from the historical cycles of Pareto.

In the conception of Weber, a strong, democratically elected parliament was seen not only as a counter-balance to the powerful bureaucracy but also as the main training ground for political elites. Second, Weber regarded a strong parliament as a protector of civil rights and individual liberties "in face of power of the plebiscitary leader" (Beetham 1992: 114).

Schumpeter treated democracy as a method for selecting political leaders: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter 1979: 269). For Schumpeter parliamentary elections are merely a procedure by which political elites acquire the power.

Like Pareto, Schumpeter was an economist. This enabled him to draw paralels between economy and politics and allowed him to see politics as a market: "What businessmen do not understand is that exactly as they are dealing in oil so I am dealing in votes" (Schumpeter 1979: 285). Schumpeter was sceptical about the

[13] Geraint Parry argues that in his later years Mosca "was amongst the first to offer a mode of reconciling elites with democracy" (Parry 1980: 143).

capacity of voters to “pick their members of parliament from the eligible population with a perfectly open mind” (1979: 282) and considered party politicians as a mere “response to the fact that the electoral mass is incapable of action other than stampede” (1979: 283).

The poorly informed electorate, centrality of political leadership and competition between rival political elites were only some of the conditions of democratic elitism by Weber and Schumpeter. Among the other conditions were: domination of parliament by party politics, parliamentary government with strong executive, bureaucracy as an independent and well-trained administration and a political culture tolerating differences of opinion (Held 1987: 184).

The Schumpeterian version of democratic elitism, also termed the competitive theory of democracy (Sartori 1987), was continued by Sartori (1987: 156) who defined democracy as “the by-product of a competitive method of leadership recruitment”.

The evolution of democratic elitism owes much to the development of political science in the North America where the classic elite theory was transformed. Firstly, thanks to Harold D. Laswell, the analysis of elites was re-oriented from historical change to the political process (Seligman 1974: 300). Secondly, from being conservative (liberal anti-Marxist) in the continental Europe, elite theory turned into instrument of leftist criticism in the North America (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 143). Radical elite theory, represented by James Burnham (1960; originally in 1941) and, especially, by C. Wright Mills (1956), Floyd Hunter (1953) and G. William Domhoff (1967), challenged the belief in the pluralistic structure of democratic elites.

Burnham in his “Managerial Revolution” argued that the ruling class of capitalists, former managers of their own enterprises, are being replaced by the rising professional managerial elite[14]. Mills with his “Power Elite” disclosed the exploitive institutional triumvirate of the highest position holders from the military, the big corporations and the political executive, unresponsive to the electorate and allocating only a secondary role to the US Congress. Hunter with his “Community Power Structure” revealed a similarly exploitive and unresponsive power elite on the regional level. The findings and analysis of the ‘governing class’ by Domhoff

[14] Raymond Aron criticised this thesis as inadequate because “the character of the society is entirely different if those managers come to power within a pluralistic society or if they do so through the seizure of power by a unified élite. The managers are one of the groups in any modern élite. They are never, as managers, the ruling group” (Aron 1950: 142).

confirmed to a large extent the thesis of power elite by Mills. Walker (1966) criticised democratic elitism for its normative shortcomings and inadequate guide to empirical research. The critique of democratic elitism by Bachrach (1969) proposed democracy not only as the political method but also as an ethical end with alterable elite-mass structure, equality of power and reliance upon broadening and enriching the democratic process.

Radical elite theory received a strong criticism from Robert A. Dahl (1958; 1966) and other pluralists, mainly for inadequacy of the ruling elite model, misleading measurement of political control and unity of elites, and inadequacy of elitist interpretations of American democracy both empirically and normatively. Radical elite theorists themselves believed that coexistence of elites and democracy is possible but with one condition - if conspiracy of elites, one of the three essential elements of “the three C’s law” by Meisel, is eradicated.

Neither radical elitists, nor pluralists managed to eradicate the tradition of democratic elitism. It was continued by Suzanne Keller (1991; originally in 1963) and revived by Field and Higley (1980)[15]. The most recent interpretations of democratic elitism are those by Higley and Burton (2006) and Best and Higley (2010). They relate the stability of democratic regimes to the classic circulation of elites[16].

[15] As Best and Cotta (2000: 17) observe, “Incidentally, it is interesting to note that characteristics of political elites which were considered by authors like C.W. Mills (1956) to be incompatible with pluralist democracy were treated by Field and Higley as its cornerstones”.
[16] Higley and Lengyel (2000: 5) characterise the classic elite circulation as “gradual and peaceful in mode” and “wide and deep in scope”. For a more detailed description see chapter 2.

1.3. Changes in Social and Political Background of Legislators as an Indicator of Parliamentary Elite Transformation

> "Individual turnover is clearly an important issue. . . . But if incumbent and successor are basically similar, so that the social composition of the elite remains constant, we hardly want to speak of elite transformation."
>
> Putnam (1976:168)

Although some scholars argued that elite circulation "has been used from Mosca on as a synonym for recruitment" (Zartman 1974: 487; Harasymiw 1984: 15), we should be aware that the classic elite theory by elite circulation meant not only recruitment but also elite transformation: "By the circulation of elites, the governing elite is in a state of continuous and slow transformation" (Pareto 1966: 250). In other words, the elite theory is interested not only who gets into power but also how one type of elites (*lions, rentiers*) is replaced by another type of elites (*foxes, speculators*). Therefore, elite circulation is also about elite transformation which implies changes in the form and stability of political order. This line of classical elite theory is followed in the most recent studies on political elites (Higley and Lengyel 2000; Best and Higley 2010).

The literature divides elite circulation into a circulation of individuals and into a circulation of their social/political profiles, or what Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell 1952: 8) call 'personal circulation' and 'social circulation' and what Keller (1991: 227-258) differentiates between 'circulation of elite individuals' and 'circulation of elite positions'. Although a circulation of social/political profiles (*structural circulation*) always involves circulation of individuals (*individual circulation*), the opposite is not necessarily the case: individual circulation does not necessarily mean a structural circulation. In other words, due to a high legislative turnover we may have totally different names (persons) in a parliament, but their social/political profiles would be the same ones as of persons who did not come back to a parliament.

Inquiry into structural circulation of elites requires studying their social and political backgrounds and relies on a solid and established tradition of research into political elites (Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell 1952; Matthews 1954; Eulau and Sprague 1964; Putnam 1976; Matthews 1984).

Although an explanatory value of social background for elite behaviour and attitudes is rather mediocre (Edinger and Searing 1967; Searing 1969; Schleth 1971)[17], it serves "as a kind of seismometer for defecting shifts in the foundations of politics and policy" (Putnam 1976: 43). It also allows to make inferences about elite integration, stability of political system and political legitimacy. Moreover, social characteristics of elite members provide a solid ground for detecting patterns of parliamentary elite recruitment. The latter is not an aim in itself - it serves as an indicator of structural circulation of elites or, in other words, as an indicator of parliamentary elite transformation.

Parliamentary recruitment, as a process by which individuals are inducted into active legislative roles, is not identical with the political elite recruitment, however, a main pathway into the political elite goes through the parliament. Cabinet ministers, chairmen of the parties and heads of state may also be recruited from the media, bureaucracy or military, but recruitment from the parliament remains the most common route in most democracies (Norris 1997; Blondel 1987). Secondly, this work treats parliament both as (1) a picture of political power distribution and (2) a connection between social structure and the political elite.

The first perspective is close to the object of political science viewing parliament as an assembly of most powerful political parties divided into governing and opposing ones and spread along spectrum of different political ideologies. The second perspective is close to political sociology; it goes beyond institutions of political representation and searches for the social roots of the political. Certainly, the connection between the social structure and political elites is complex one and not a one way street. It is legitimate to see parliamentary representation as a translation of society into politics and view individual and collective features of parliamentary representatives as a reflection of society and its changing structure. However, parliamentary representatives shape the political form of society and, to some extent, society itself (Best and Cotta 2000: 7-8). In one case parliamentary recruitment is seen as a dependent variable, in another – as independent variable:

[17] Compared to highly developed societies, significance of social background for elite behaviour is greater in developing countries (Quandt 1970: 197-198). Putman suggests to look at the social background of elite members not so much as a predictor of individual behaviour but rather "as an indicator of the structure of social power" (Putnam 1976: 43).

"The elite recruitment pattern both reflects and affects the society. As a dependent variable, it expresses the value system of the society and its degree of consistency and contradictions, the degree and the type of representativeness of the system, the basis of social stratification and its articulation with the political system, and the structure of and changes in political roles. As a factor which affects change or as an idependent variable, elite recruitment patterns determine avenues for political participation and status influence the kind of policies that will be enacted, accelerate or retard changes, effect the distribution of status and prestige, and influence the stability of the system." (Seligman 1964: 7)

Focusing on the social background of legislators "as an indicator of the structure of social power" (Putnam 1976: 43) and treating political background of MPs as an indicator of political power, this work views changes in parliamentary representation as a proxy of structural circulation (transformation) of parliamentary elite. The latter can be defined in two ways; in a broad (institutional) sense, all members of parliament would belong to the parliamentary or legislative elite, similarly as ministers are considered the executive elite and judges treated as the judiciary elite. In a narrower sense, the parliamentary elite would be only those legislators who affect the national political outcomes regularly and substantially. The parliamentary elite in this narrow sense is a part of political elite, defined as "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes and the workings of political institutions regularly and seriously" (Best and Higley 2010: 6).

Schematically we can view the members of parliament with their individual and collective features in the following way:



The above scheme is expected to capture the process of political modernization, defined as "a shift of power from landed interests and rural leadership groups to urban elites and secondary or tertiary sector interests" (Best, Hausmann and Schmitt 2000: 149) and as "increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society"

(Huntington 2006: 34).[18] The proposed scheme is open for inclusion of both (contradictory) streams of political modernization: (1) democratisation as increased representation of women, ethnic minorities and other previously politically disadvantaged groups and (2) political professionalisation as a mechanism of social closure, accompanied by increase of degrees with university education, overrepresentation of certain types of occupations and establishment of parliamentary activity as a full-time paid occupation[19].

Modernization means a rapid development[20] and proliferation of various social groups and their their complex (also conflictual) relations. Parliament cannot include all of them and, if it somehow could, the numerical strength of those groups would be also different[21]. In spite of the universal suffrage and well established democracy, a parliament functions as an elitist mechanism, providing access for the strongest politically. Although historically "cumulative inequalites" give ways to "dispersed inequalities" (Dahl 1961: 85-86) and hereditary principles of recruitment have been replaced by meritocratic ones, 'the law of increasing disproportion' by Putnam (1976) remains an essential element of representative democracy. Still, the society or, to use the vocabulary of Mosca and Pareto, "social forces" make an impact on a parliament, therefore its members are being changed not only individually, but also structurally.

[18] Increased participation of various social groups in politics is only one of the three components of political modernization. The other two are the rationalisation of authority and the differentiation of structures (see Huntington 2006: 34).
[19] Best, Cotta and Verzichelli (2006: 91) propose to interprete the long-term change in parliamentary representation "as a process of *retarded* political development" and treat parliamentary recruitment "as a kind of brake, delaying political change and separating it from the dynamics of change in other sectors of society". A similar approach is held by Putnam (1976: 179-180) who treats elite composition as "the lagged response" to changes in society.
[20] On the speed of the social change and modernization see Suda 1981.
[21] We focus on what Hanna Pitkin (1972) calls 'descriptive representation' or, to use the wording by Jane Mansbridge (1999), on the mode of representation when "blacks represent blacks and women represent women". However, instead of choosing its 'microscopic' form (see Birch 1995: 72-73) implying that a parliament represents a microcosm or a representative sample of the electorate, we concentrate on what Mansbridge (1999) calls the 'selective' form of descriptive representation.

2. Elite Transformation in Eastern Europe after 1989: A Literature Review

One of the first thorough analyses of the literature on the Eastern European elites has been the study by Best and Becker (1997). Since then a number of additional surveys on post-communist elites has been conducted and they were followed by literature reviews. Most recent ones are those by Bozóki (2003), Wesołowski (2000), Higley and Pakulski (2000).

A huge pile of the literature that emerged after 1989 focused on the negotiations, pact-making and pact breaking of elites, their attitudes and, of course, on the issue of renewal and reproduction of elites. Survival of the old (Communist) elites and recruitment of the new ones or the issue of reproduction and circulation of elites shaped the main discourse in research into Eastern European elites after 1989. One group of scholars - Hankiss (1990) and Staniszkis (1991) - argued that old (Communist) elites continued, the other - Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (2000) – attempted to prove that a new elite came into power. The empirical evidence suggests that the countries most advanced in the processes in democratisation and democratic consolidation were those that had relatively lower reproduction rates among political elites. In his study on Russia, Hungary and Poland, Wasilewski (1998) found 48.2 percent continuity for the political elite in Russia, although the aggregate average for all three countries in his study was about one-third; he also found that significant proportions of the elite members had been "deputies" one step below the top nomenklatura in 1988: 49 percent in Russia, 37.4 percent in Hungary and 26 percent in Poland. The ratios of winners to losers (between those who were elites and subelites in 1988 and 1993 and elites and subelites of 1988 not in 1993 elite positions) were following: 90:10 in Russia, 19:10 in Poland and 21:10 in Hungary (Wasilewski 1998: 166).[22] The continuity of the old elites in the Czech Republic was 42 percent in politics, 40 percent in the economy and 33 percent in culture (Machonin and Tucek 2000: 36-37). The Hungarian data provided evidence for elite circulation in politics and reproduction in economy (Szelényi, Szelényi and Kovách 1995). The Baltic data on elites showed a combination of continuity and change (Steen 1997b: 166): 46 percent of Lithuanian Central Committee members of the Communist Party continued in politics and state administration, 54 percent of Estonian CC members of the CP

[22] Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski (1996: 146) argue that Wasilewski's figures understate the continuity of Hungarian and Polish elites – the return of former communist leaders after parliamentary elections in Poland in 1993 and in Hungary in 1994 and after Polish presidential election in 1995 is not taken into account.

acquired positions in business (Steen 1997a: 43). Slovenia, an example of successful democratic consolidation, was a notorious exeption from the common trend; it demonstrated a spectacular reproduction of elites at a general rate of 77 percent: 66 percent in politics, 78 percent in culture and 84 percent in business (Adam and Tomšič 2002: 440; also Iglič and Rus 2000: 103).

How these changes in recruitment patterns of elites could be explained? Which theories could account for them? A survey below reviews the main theories on elite change in Eastern Europe.

2.1. Linking the Type of Elite, Regime and Circulation

The three-fold typology of political elites (consensually united, ideocratically united, disunited) proposed for the analysis of processes in post-Communist Eastern Europe by Higley and Burton in 1997 was later expanded to a four-fold one and enriched with world-wide applications (Higley and Lengyel 2000: 3; Higley, Pakulski and Wesołowski 1998: 5). The four-fold typology supposes a link between a certain type of elite and a certain type of regime. For instance, the consensual elite relates to the consolidated democracy, the fragmented elite is linked with unconsolidated democracy and possibly a short-lived authoritarian regime; the divided elite is characterised by authoritarian or sultanistic regime, and the ideocratic elite is related to totalitarian or post-totalitarian regime. Since elites are treated as an independent variable and considered “the principal determinants of political orders” (Higley and Pakulski 2000: 39), the link could be described in the following way: the elite → political order.

In the scheme of Higley, certain type of elite and regime is related to a certain type of circulation (elite change). For example, the consensual elite and consolidated democracy correspond to classic circulation (“gradual and peaceful in mode and wide and deep in scope”). The fragmented elite and unconsolidated democracy are associated with reproduction circulation (“gradual and peaceful in mode but narrow and shallow in scope”), the ideocratic elite and totalitarian or post-totalitarian regimes are connected to replacement circulation (“wide and deep in scope but sudden and enforced in mode”). The divided elite and authoritarian or sultanistic regimes are linked to quasi-replacement circulation which is “sudden and enforced in mode and narrow and shallow in scope” (Higley and Lengyel 2000: 7). Following this typology, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are classified as having classic circulations,

Russia, Slovakia and Bulgaria as having reproduction circulations, Serbia and Croatia are characterised by quasi-replacement circulations (Higley and Lengyel 2000: 13-14). Classified as divided (Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski 1996: 142-143), the elites of Romania, Ukraine and Belarus would refer to the cases of quasi-replacement circulation.

Since consolidated democracy is an aim and since it is determined by elites, the valid question becomes how to make the consensual elites. One of the ways, discussed by Higley and his collaborators, is an elite settlement, characterised by quick face-to-face negotiations, formal agreements, informal forbearance and experienced leaders (Burton and Higley 1987: 299-300). However, elite settlements are exceptional and rare events. For instance, elite settlements in Poland and Hungary in 1989 are two[23] out of only twelve cases in the world history during the last 300 years.[24] Hence, Higley and Burton describes two other ways in which consensual elites and stable democracy emerge: (1) gradual convergence "toward restrained competitions and agreed institutions through successive electoral contests in unstable democracies" and (2) "the long experience of limited representative political practices under British colonial rule, augmented by unifying elite mobilizations to win national independence"(Higley and Burton 1998: 99).[25] Consensual elites and consolidated democracy can emerge from unstable (unconsolidated) democracy, traditional, authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes. What is excluded in the scheme of Higley is the emergence of consensual elites and consolidated democracy *from totalitarian* regimes[26] (Dogan and Higley 1998: 22).

Critique. Elites are treated as an independent variable, they are ontologically self-sufficient. Higley allows one case where political crisis makes an impact on elite change (Dogan and Higley 1998: 23), but in other cases they are "principal causes" and "prime shapers" (Higley and Pakulski 2000: 40). This causal primacy of elites was criticised by Tarrow (1995: 205). Merkel (1997: 14) criticises Higley and

[23] The case of Czechoslovakia in November-December 1989 could be considered an elite settlement with reservations only.

[24] The other ten countries are: England 1688-89, Sweden 1808-09, Mexico 1928-29, Costa Rica 1948, Colombia 1957-58, Venezuela 1958, Spain 1977-78, Uruguay 1984, Korea 1987, South Africa 1992-93 (Burton and Higley 1998: 50-51).

[25] According to Higley and Burton, the first elite settlement occurred in England in 1688-89 and was diffused overseas during eighteen and nineteenth centuries.

[26] This scheme does not list a possibility of turning a stable (consolidated) democracy into unstable democracy and authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.

collaborators for "overestimating the role of elites in the mobilisation of anti-regime protests and underestimating the readiness of the mobilised mass movements for compromise and action". The analytical scheme of Higley receives a critique from Plasser, Ulram and Waldrauch (1997: 64-65) not only for ignoring the level of masses but also for fading out the institutional level and isolating elites from societal and political-cultural processes.

Finally, in the scheme of Higley, only classic circulation relates to the consensual elites and consolidated democracy. This can be challenged by the case of Slovenia where after 1989 consensual elites and consolidated democracy emerged together with a very clear reproduction circulation (see Adam and Tomšič 2002: 440).

2.2. Professionalisation of Parliamentary Elites

The main focus of the parliamentary elites project by Best and Cotta (2000) and Cotta and Best (2007) has been recruitment and professionalisation of Western European parliamentary representatives. After collecting the data reaching back to the 19th century and developing a typology of MPs, the project has been "expanded to the East" and has already resulted into the study of the Eastern European parliamentary representatives (see Best and Edinger 2003). As in the study of 2000, professionalisation of political elites is treated as a necessary condition for consolidated democracy. Differently from other occupations, a professional politician is being taught and trained not in a university, but in the parliament. Therefore, terms served in the parliament (not diploma in politics) and full time activity in politics (living off politics, to use a phrase of Max Weber) count as professionalisation. According to the project results, the rising trends of political professionalisation were observed for all the countries under investigation: Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Recently, the project has been expanded and includes eleven countries from Central and Eastern Europe (see Semenova, Edinger and Best 2013).

The political professionalisation thesis for the Czech Republic and Poland was confirmed also by scholars (Shabad and Slomcynski 2002) that are not associated with this project. However, this positive trend goes together with a very high turnover of Eastern European MPs (much higher than of their Western European counterparts); this can be interpreted as a possibility to attain elite status for a larger number of persons, but it also means a smaller number of professional politicians in a parliament.

It may even be that slow and not sufficient professionalisation of legislators in Eastern Europe provides Western democracies with an image of their own future, including insight into the consequences of political career insecurity (Best 2007b: 30-31).

2.3. Different Elites for Each Phase of Social and Political Change

Wasilewski's three types of elites correspond to the different phases of social and political change in East Central Europe (Wasilewski 2001: 133-142). He claims that certain periods require certain types of elites. For instance, transition, "as a relatively brief period between two regimes, during which new rules of the political game are established", requires the elite of transition (it is the elite of mission and vision). Transformation, defined as a period between transition and consolidation, requires the elite of transformation (it engineers the new order). Consolidation requires the elite of consolidation (it integrates and habituates the new order).

Transition, or period of "symbolic politics", is a time of leaders of mass democratic movements, dissidents, party reformers, visionaries, popular tribunes, devoted designers. Transformation, or period of "reform politics", is a time of policy-makers, planners and technologists of democracy and market economy. Consolidation, or a period of "distributive politics", is a time of professional politicians, moderators, growth-inducers (Wasilewski 2001: 137).

Critique. Differently from Higley, emphasising the crucial role of elites in the beginning (the first stage) of transition[27], and differently from Rustow (1970), highlighting the importance of elites in the second ("decision") phase of democratisation[28], the scheme of Wasilewski assigns an equally important role to elites in three different stages of social and political change. To some extent it could be compared with the model of Merkel (1997) treating elites as the most important actors in three of four levels of democratic consolidation[29]. On the other hand, the scheme of Wasilewski could be put into a more longitudinal perspective – the study

[27] At this stage the crucial role is assigned to what Higley and Burton (1998, 2006) call "elite settlements".

[28] In the analysis of Rustow (1970: 356), the elite plays a crucial role in "the decision phase" of democratic transition which comes after "the background and preparatory conditions" are fulfiled.

[29] The first three levels, involving elites, are: institutional consolidation, representative consolidation and behavioural consolidation. The fourth (last) level – consolidation of civic culture – is assigned to the masses (see Merkel 1997: 23).

on the European parliamentary elites by Best (2007a: 85) explaining the emergence of different types of elites by the "selectorates' responses to a sequence of fundamental problems challenging polities" could be a good example of this.

On the empirical level, Wasilewski accepts that his theoretical construct of the distinctiveness of three elites has a weak empirical ground in the Polish case: there are no major differences in sociological terms between the elite of transformation and elite of consolidation. Therefore, the analysis should be better focused on the transition elite and the post-transition elite, or on the first generation of elites and the second generation of elites, as another study by Frentzel-Zagórska and Wasilewski (2000) suggests.

2.4. Theory of Elite Control and the Elite Network State

The study by Steen (1997a) claims that configurations, interaction and orientation of the elites in the Baltics can be explained by a theory of elite control. Ethnic proportions, social cleavages and cultural traits are main causes for the elites to control the political development by selective recruitment to power positions forming specific networks and choosing policies favourable for elite control (Steen 1997a: 345). The 'elite network state' is especially emphasised in creating 'ethnic democracies' in Estonia and Latvia and explaining the nationalist and ethnocratic positions of their elites. In the case of Lithuania, rather authoritarian attitudes among elites allow the author to interpret this as the elite network state.

Ethnic structures are the most import ones comparing attitudes and behaviour of the Baltic political elites (or Estonia and Latvia, on the one hand, and Lithuania, on the other). Due to importance of ethnicity in Latvia and Estonia, the political attitudes towards communist past does not matter as much as in Lithuania. According to the author, a more tense ethnic situation in Latvia and Estonia results in a more integrated and consensual elite there. The Lithuanian elite is characterised as a more polarised and conflictual, having more distrust in other elites and fewer inter-elite contacts (Steen 1997a: 353).

Critique. Importance of the Latvian club '21' for the integration of the national elite is rather overestimated (see Matonytė 2001). Indeed, the Latvian club '21' was unique in the Baltics (nothing similar had emerged in Estonia and Lithuania after 1990), it involved not only ethnic Latvians but also the representatives of ethnic minorities; it

included not only former Soviet nomenklatura but also emigré Latvians from western Diaspora. However, its impact on ethnic integration at the elite level for the years to come was almost non-existant: for the last twenty years none of the parliamentary political parties having most ethnic minorities and sometimes almost one-third of all parliamentary seats managed to enter the Latvian governing coalitions and their cabinets of ministers.

2.5. Political Capitalism, Conversion of Power and the "Grand Coalition"

"Political capitalism" of Staniszkis (1991) refers to Eastern European capitalism after 1989 designed by political means for the needs and interests of the resigning communist political elite. Although political capitalism with its six possible forms of combining power and capital (Staniszkis 1991: 42-45) has advantages – nomenklatura did not oppose the change of the system due to its interests in privatisation, there are also disadvantages. One of them is a compromising nature of the state sector privatisation from the viewpoint of society.

Thesis of Hankiss (1990) is similar to that of Staniszkis. Ruling elites are never ready to resign from power.[30] If they do that voluntarily, there must be special conditions that attract and motivate them. Privatisation is one of them since it saves political power by converting it into another field (economy). Winners of this social and political change would merge into the "grand coalition" consisting of the former communist oligarchy, upper and upper-middle layers of state bureaucracy, and classes of managers (from big state companies and agricultural co-operatives) and entrepreneurs (Hankiss 1990: 240).

Critique. Eyal, Szelény and Townsley (2000: 4-5) find little evidence in support of the political capital thesis in Central Europe. There were a couple of successful political capital conversions into private wealth in the countries of Central Europe, but this is more an exception rather than a common rule. Eyal, Szelény and Townsley claim that, differently from Central Europe, a thesis of political capitalism would explain the social and political change much better in Russia and China.

[30] There are a couple of historical exceptions, but they only confirm the common rule (Hankiss 1990: 253).

2.6. Post-Communist Managerialism and the Dominance of Cultural Capital

Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1997) explain the changes in East Central Europe (defined as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) by their theory of post-communist managerialism[31]. Post-communist managerialism is characterised by diffuse ownership with no identifiable owner and a legitimate decision-making power which is appropriated by managers (Eyal et al. 1997: 70). They claim that the power elite, constituted by the coalition of class fractions and elites, currently controls the command positions of political, cultural and economic institutions in East Central Europe (Eyal et al. 1997: 61). The authors reject the thesis of conversion of political capital into economic capital (this was claimed by Hankiss and Staniszkis) on the basis that a new system does not have ... clear property owners. The post-communist society is run by managers, who *are not owners* and who have already been managers in economic positions during communism. The clear owners are missing, only managers are identifiable. Therefore, it is called 'capitalism without capitalists' or 'capitalism from above'. This new power elite consists of the technocratic-managerial elite and intellectual elite from humanities and social sciences, and, according to the authors, "resembles most closely what Bourdieu has called 'the dominated fraction of the dominant class' in Western capitalism: it exercises power principally on the basis of knowledge, expertise and the capacity to manipulate symbols, in short, 'cultural capital'" (Eyal et al. 1997: 61). Cultural capital in post-communism is dominant, social capital is dominated, and economic capital is a subordinate one[32] (Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley 2000: 191). The new power elite in East Central Europe exercises "power as symbolic domination and legitimate their claims on the basis of technical know-how rather than ownership of economic capital" (Eyal et al. 1997: 91). However, as authors conclude, it is not clear if post-communist managerialism will dominate societies of East Central Europe in the future. If propertied bourgeoisie is not formed, post-communist managerialism may consolidate itself as a new form of a unique managerial capitalism.

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[31] The roots of this theory are in the "Managerial Revolution" by James Burnham (1960; originally in 1941), who was influenced by "The Bureaucratization of the World" by Bruno Rizzi (1985; originally in 1939), in "The New Class" by Milovan Djilas (1957) and "Nomenklatura" by Mikhail Voslensky (1984).

[32] This is a case with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The USA, England and France are the countries where economic capital is a dominant one, cultural capital is dominated and social capital is subordinate. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are characterised by the dominance of economic capital, a dominated social capital and a subordinate cultural capital.

Critique. The boundaries between classes and elites are not clearly defined. The analytical distinction between big capital owners and managers is overestimated. Inconsistencies between the statement "the incumbents of economic command positions are those who were already in managerial positions prior to the fall of communism" (Eyal et al. 1997: 61) and the statement "many old-style communist managers indeed lost power in 1989 and the years that followed" (Eyal et al. 1997: 91). If we take the former statement as a correct one and consider owners and managers constituting the same class, the Staniszkis and Hankiss theses of political capitalism and power conversion would be confirmed. This would mean a reproduction of communist nomenklatura in the economy.

Bozóki (2003: 235) argues that thesis of nomenklatura reproduction in economy has been proved correct. Wasilewski's data confirm the conversion of political capital into economic assets, particularly, as he writes, in Hungary and Poland (Wasilewski 1998: 165)! This supports the main theses of Hankiss and Staniszkis, formulated in 1990 and 1991.

2.7. Other Studies

Other studies worth mentioning are those by Szalai (1995 and 1996) and Kaminski and Kurczewska (1995). The former is rather similar to the studies of Hankiss and Staniszkis; it argues that "the political transition was initiated partly by groups who hoped to retain their positions in the new political regime, or at least to convert their political power into economic power" (Szalai 1996: 120). These elite groups, consisting of (1) new technocrats or the late Kádár technocrats, (2) the democratic opposition and (3) the new reformist intellectuals, formed the latent alliance which was dissolved during the regime change (Szalai 1995: 159-161). The first group members (new technocrats) "became managers with private banks operating with international capital, thus creating new economic power centers" (Szalai 1995: 162).

The study on elites as institution-builders by Kaminski and Kurczewska (1995) attributes quality of democratic transition to the availability of certain types of elites. Building upon the authority typology of Max Weber, authors distinguish among four types of elites: traditional, charismatic, bureaucratic-collectivist and interactionist-individualist ones (Kaminski and Kurczewska 1995: 143-145). The most advanced transitions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and, especially, Poland are explained by

Table 2.1. The Main Studies on Elite Transformation in Eastern Europe

Types of Elites	Authors
Politicians of morals, politicians of historical vision, politicians by chance, the old nomenklatura, an emerging new professional political elite	Ágh (1996)
Political elites	Baylis (1994 and 1998) von Beyme (1993) Lane (1996)
Parliamentary elites	Best and Edinger (2003) Best (2007) Ilonszki and Edinger (2007) Semenova, Edinger and Best (2013)
Functional elites	Best and Hornbostel (2003)
Professionals, missionaries, hesitants and retreatists	Bozóki (2003)
The power elite of professionals, the technical intelligentsia and owners of cultural capital	Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1997)
"Grand coalition" of the former communist oligarchy, upper and upper-middle layers of state bureaucracy, and classes of managers and entrepreneurs	Hankiss (1990)
Consensual, ideocratic, fragmented, divided	Higley and Lengyel (2000)
Traditional, charismatic, bureaucratic-collectivist, interactionist-individualist elites	Kaminski and Kurczewska (1995)
Post-communist political elites	Krupavičius (1996)
Government, parliament, party elite, top leadership, regional elite, business elite	Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996)
Nomenklatura and political elite	Lane (1997) White and Kryshtanovskaya (1998)
Post-communist elites	Higley, Pakulski and Wesołowski (1998) Matonytė (2003a)
Parliamentary, administrative, business, party, intellectual, judicial, local elites	Steen (1997a)
New technocrats, democratic opposition and new reform intelligentsia	Szalai (1995 and 1996)
Elites of transition, transformation and consolidation	Wasilewski (2001)
"A paid job" politician, "politician with a calling" and a charismatic leader	Wesołowski (2000)

Source: Own selection.

the strongest presence of interactionist-individualist elites in those countries in comparison with other states of Eastern Europe.

Other studies on Eastern European elites not reviewed but worth mentioning here are included in the table 2.1.

2.8. Summary: Issues of Elite/Class and Circulation/Reproduction

Theories by Hankiss, Staniszkis, Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley have lots of things in common: they all are influenced by Bourdieu theory of cultural, social and economic capitals (1986) and they are focused more on the classes than elites, or, in other words, their authors are interested more in socio-economic development than political structure of institutions. It seems that a uniting pattern in their theories is the astonishment that a socialist revolution happened in Eastern Europe (Russia) in 1917 without a proletariat and that after 1989 capitalism is emerging there in absence of capitalists.

The studies by Higley, Burton, Pakulski, Lengyel, Dogan, Best, Wasilewski and Steen share their interest in elites in the context of structure and change of political institutions. This group of researchers, differently from the first one, uses mainly a concept of elite, not a class. Of course, "using the elite concept is not the same as adopting the elite paradigm" (Higley and Pakulski 2000: 38), but theories of the scholars from the second group seem to be closer to the elite paradigm than the studies of the theorists from the first group. Alternatively, usage of the class term and ignoring the concept of elite do not preclude the possibility to adopt the elite paradigm – Gaetano Mosca used a concept of the ruling class (Mosca 1939) and did not refer to the elite term.[33]

Hence, clearly defined political or ruling class is not a problem for the elite theory. The analyses by von Beyme (1996) and Etzioni-Halevy (1998) serve as a positive example of using "elite" and "class"; the terms are clearly defined and not used interchangeably. The problem, however, occurs when both the social class and political elite concepts, or both Marxist and elite theories are combined. The elite and Marxist theories are rooted into different paradigms (meta-theories).[34] Paradigms are

[33] The only time he mentions elite is in his final version of the theory of the ruling class, but only as a reference to the term of Pareto (Mosca 1958: 382).

[34] Paradigms are conceptual world-views that consist of formal theories, classic experiments and trusted methods (Kuhn 1996).

self-contained and, differently from theories, are not subject to empirical testing: it is possible to test a number of alternative approaches, but it is not possible to test the paradigms (Kuhn 1996: 144). Paradigms "do not provide explanations, only instructions as to where to go for explanations" (Janos 1986: 1). From this perspective, "the elite paradigm denies that there can be a politically meaningful social class without an elite shaping and leading it; the class paradigm regards elites as epiphenomena rather than social class cores. Theories that have their roots in two or more such opposing paradigms will confuse more than illuminate" (Higley and Pakulski 2000: 39).

This critical remark would first apply to the studies by Hankiss (1990), Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (1997, 2000) that seem to define "elite" and "class" in a rather loose manner and use these concepts almost interchangeably and, indirectly, to Bourdieu. On the other hand, out of all the theories on Eastern European elites discussed and mentioned here, only the studies of Higley would probably satisfy the criteria of the purity of the elite paradigm (one of the instructions formulated by Higley and Pakulski is that "elites are the principal determinants of political orders"). An absolute majority of scholars currently working on elites follow, to use the terms of Wesołowski (2000: 18), neither elitaristic nor elitist, but the neutral approach.

The second evident issue in the reviewed works is the one of circulation and reproduction of elites – the concepts are differently defined by the researchers studying the Eastern European elites. For instance, Szelényi and Szelényi (1995) define circulation and reproduction as alternative forms of social and political change. For them, circulation means that "the transition to postcommunism resulted in a structural change at the top of the class hierarchy: new people are recruited for command positions on the basis of new principles". The reproduction means that "revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe did not affect the social composition of elites. This because the old nomenklatura elite has managed to survive at the top of the class structure and is now becoming the new propertied bourgeoisie" (Szelényi and Szelényi 1995: 616).

Differently from Szelényi, for whom circulation and reproduction are *alternative* forms of elite change, Higley and Lengyel use a term "reproduction circulation". For them, reproduction circulation, as well as classic circulation, replacement circulation and quasi-replacement circulation, means the mode (gradual and peaceful or sudden

and coerced) and the scope (wide and deep or narrow and shallow) of elite change (Higley and Lengyel 2000: 5).

Wesołowski (2000) argues that Szelényi's concept of circulation is too broad, it does not differentiate between termination of employment due to age and a politically motivated expulsion from one's job. He attacks the concept of reproduction in elite studies of Szelényi ("reproduction is an intergenerational, not an intragenerational phenomenon; it refers to changes of positions between generations: father to son, mother to daughter"). However, his proposals to use (1) retention, (2) formal transfer to equivalent position, and (3) reincarnation through conversion of resources (Wesołowski 2000: 30-32) do not seem to be convincing conceptual alternatives.

2.9. Literature on the Recruitment and Transformation of Elites in the Baltics

The literature review on elite transformation in Eastern Europe provided a glimpse into a general context of elite theorising, however, it could not include a comprehensive inventory of the studies on the Baltic elites. The table below lists both one country and comparative studies on the Baltic elites. We would like to concentrate our further review on the comparative studies focusing on the recruitment and transformation of national elites in all three countries.

The largest body of literature on the Baltic elites belongs to Anton Steen, Vello Pettai and Irmina Matonytė. Our list also includes the book on the Baltic elites by Sten Berglund and Kjetil Duvold, a discussion paper on the Baltic political elites by Algis Krupavičius and a doctoral dissertation on the Soviet nomenklatura in the Baltics from 1953 to 1990 by Kastytis Antanaitis.

Matonytė locates research tradition on elites in the Baltics as belonging neither to, what she calls, the Warsaw-Budapest nor Moscow zone, but to the third separate Grey zone. In the text co-authored with Georges Mink, she outlines not only the specificity of Baltic nomenklatura within the Soviet and Eastern European context, but also explains its survival and success in the new post-Soviet regime.

The research by Pettai focuses on behaviour of Baltic legislators, legislative performance of the Baltic parliaments (co-authored with Madise) and parliamentary candidates as the political class. His analysis on the political class consolidation proposes tripartite set of parameters (political experience, political cohesion and social diversity) and concludes that Estonia has been faster in political class consolidation in

Table 2.2. Research on Elites in the Baltic States

Countries Covered	Focus of Research	Author(s)
Estonia	Political Parties	Arter 1996
	Parliamentary Elites	Kuklys 2013b
	Political Leadership	Park 1994
	Ethnic Control and Elites	Pettai and Hallik 2002
	Parliamentary Elites	Ruus and Taru 2003
	Continuity of Elites	Steen and Ruus 2002
	Parliamentary and Ministerial Elites	Toomla 1999
Latvia	Political Parties	Ikstens 2011
	The 1990 Supreme Council	Jundzis 2000
	Political Elite Recruitment	Klāsons 2001
	Parliamentary Elites	Kuklys 2013a
	Soviet Elite	Levits 1987
	Political Elite	Steen 2011
	Ministers	Treijs 1998
Lithuania	Legal Consciousness of Power Elites	Babachinaitė et al. 1998
	Political Elite	Gaidys 1999
	Soviet Nomenklatura	Grybkauskas 2011; Ivanauskas 2011
	Political Elites	Janušauskienė 2011
	Political Elite Recruitment	Krupavičius and Žvaliauskas 2003
	Economic Values and Political Orientations of Elites	Masiulis 1997
	Business Elite	Matonytė 2001
	Parliamentary Elite	Matonytė 2003b
Baltic States	Soviet Nomenklatura	Antanaitis 2001
	Local Elites	Åström 2007
	Elites	Berglund and Duvold 2003
	Post-Communist Political Elites	Krupavičius 1996
	Elite Studies and Communism	Matonytė 2003a
	Communist and Post-Communist Elites	Matonytė and Mink 2003
	Behaviour of Legislators	Pettai 2005
	Consolidation of the Political Class	Pettai 2007
	Legislative Performance of the Baltic Parliaments	Pettai and Madise 2006
	Recruitment of Political Elites	Steen 1996
	Elites	Steen 1997a and 1997b
	Recirculation and Change of Elites	Steen 1997c
	Elites in Relation to Ethnic Minorities	Steen 2000, 2006, 2010
	Democratic Elitism	Steen with Kuklys 2010

Source: own selection.

comparison with Latvia and Lithuania.

The most comprehensive body of research on the Baltic elites by Steen includes not only parliamentary elites but also elites from other segments of society; the focus

of research is not only on recruitment, but also on the interpersonal trust, networks and values of elites. In any case, the issue of ethnicity and the ethnicity variable, especially in Estonia and Latvia, play an important role in explaining the recruitment and configuration of the Baltic elites.

Previously Steen (1997a) applied the theory of elite control and labeled Baltic countries 'the elite network states' (see a review on the elite transformation in Eastern Europe). More recently he (2010, with Kuklys) proposes conceptualising the political processes in the Baltic States from 1990 onwards as a development from ethnic democracy to liberal democracy, a process that passes through the stages of the ethno-elitist and ethno-liberal democracies. This contribution of Steen to the analysis of democratic elitism in multi-ethnic states allows to see political regimes as ever-changing, non-static entities. A more detailed description of this contribution is provided with the help of the figure below.

Figure 2. Framework for Analysis of Democracy in Multi-Ethnic States

Democratic approach	*Ethnic Policy*	
	Exclusion	Inclusion
Elitist	2) *Ethno-Elitist democracy ↑ →	**3) *Ethno-Liberal democracy** ↓
Participative	1) *Ethnic Democracy	4) *Liberal Democracy

Source: Steen with Kuklys 2010: 205.

The first and second cells in the Figure 2 refer to political regimes in which political participation is restricted to the indigenous ethnic majority. The members of a titular nation secure over-representation and dominant positions in the national government and civil service. In the participative form of the regime, the indigenous ethnic community is the subject of the political process. In the elitist shape of the regime ("ethno-elitist democracy"), the ethnic majority is regarded as an object for competing elites for support in elections (Steen with Kuklys 2010: 205-206). In both regimes, the main ethnic policy is one of exclusion.

The third cell refers to the regime that is labelled "ethno-liberal democracy". Here, the national elite makes concessions for the inclusion of ethnic minorities but

requires them to satisfy strict citizenship criteria (for instance, an advanced level of language proficiency). The fourth cell depicts the liberal democratic regime whose main features are bottom-up pluralism and inclusiveness. Different cultural and ethnic groups are bound by a common political identity and all enjoy open access to government and decision-making (Steen with Kuklys 2010: 206).

This analytical framework is of most relevance to the analysis of parliamentary recruitment in Estonia and Latvia. However, the authors do hope it could be of use in the analysis of political processes in other multi-ethnic states.

3. Comparative Method and the Longitudinal Data on the Baltic Parliamentary Elites

> "One of the problems of political elite studies is that they rely too heavily on observations made at one point in time."
> Seligman (1974: 314)

Differently from physics and many other natural sciences, there is no such thing as experimental political sociology. The comparative physics does not exist either, although scientists do compare the results of their experiments. To quote Dogan and Kazancigil (1994:2), "the comparative method is adopted exclusively in some fields of the social sciences". The comparative political sociology is one of them.

Comparisons employed in political sociology and other social sciences take a variety of forms, however, the term 'comparative method' has a standard meaning – "the comparison of large macrosocial units" (Ragin 1987:1) - and "refers to the methodological issues that arise in the systematic analysis of a small number of cases" (Collier 1993: 105). Certainly, there is a variation in the breadth of the concept. For instance, for Przeworski and Teune (1970: 50), the comparison of large macrosocial units is a not sufficient condition to qualify for a comparative research; a truly comparative research requires not only multiple levels of observation but also the multiple levels of analysis:

> "Comparative" studies were defined as those in which the influence of larger systems upon the characteristics of units within them is examined at some stage of analysis. Consequently comparative studies involve at least two levels of analysis. In this sense not all of the studies conducted across systems or nations are comparative, but all studies that are comparative are cross-systemic. If national social political, or economic systems constitute one of the levels of analysis, the study is a cross-national comparative study. If, however, the analysis is conducted exclusively at the level of nations, then according to this definition it is not comparative." (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 74)

This definition of comparative analysis by Przeworski and Teune is rather narrow, it excludes the possibility to conduct a comparative research relying exclusively on aggregate data and disqualifies the entire fields of social sciences as non-comparative (Norkus 2008: 112-113).[35]

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[35] Some of the examples named by Norkus would be holonational bibliography by Raoul Naroll (1972) and comparative sociology by Robert Marsh (1967).

The comparative method is often considered not the most advantegous method of all available research methods in the social sciences. Lijphart (1971), as well as Smelser (1976), regards it the third best method after the experimental and statistical ones and superior only to the case study. This happens because the comparative method is not capable to eliminate rival explanations through experimental control or to assess them through statistical control; its difficulty is characterised by "many variables but few cases". However, even the best methods cannot help if the collection of data requires enormous financial, temporal and other resources. In this situation the application of comparative method is the most appropriate: "But often, given the inevitable scarcity of time, energy, and financial resources, the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases" (Lijphart 1971: 685). Ragin (1987:15-16) even argues that the comparative method is superior over statistical one because: (1) "the statistical method is not combinatorial; each relevant condition typically is examined in a piecemeal manner", it makes difficult to investigate situations as wholes; (2) "applications of the comparative method produce explanations that account for every instance of a certain phenomenon" and is "especially well suited for the task of building new theories and synthesizing existing theories"; (3) "the boundaries of a comparative examination are set by the investigator" and the sampling rules for the tests of statistical significance are not necessary; (4) "it forces the investigator to become familiar with the cases relevant to the analysis". The comparative-historical analysis, as an application of comparative method, has an advantage over statistical analysis in investigating substantively important and large-scale outcomes (Mahoney and Terrie 2010: 739).

Furthermore, the application of the comparative method can be improved in four ways: by increasing the number of cases, reducing the property-space of analysis by combining variables, focusing on the key variables for the sake of a more parsimonious theory, and by employing a comparable-cases strategy (Lijphart 1971: 686-691; Lijphart 1975). Distinction between unit of analysis as a data category and the unit of analysis as a theoretical category is also an essential step of caution in the comparing procedure[36]. Some other contributions to the advancement of the

[36] For instance, Allardt (1966: 339-341) distinguishes between the data units and analytical units, Scheuch (1966: 164) between the units of observation and units of inference, Przeworski and Teune (1970: 49-50) between levels of observation and levels of analysis and Ragin (1987: 8-9) between observational unit and explanatory unit. According to Ragin (1987: 8), the unit of analysis is not a problem for most non-comparativists since their analysis and explanations proceed on one level;

comparative method are the "thick description" by Geertz (1994), guidelines against conceptual stretching and other forms of miscomparing by Sartori (1970; 1991), "disciplined configurative approach" by Verba (1967), Almond and Genco (1977) and, more recently, qualitative comparative analysis by Rihoux and Ragin (2009). The comparative method also profits from what Collier (1993: 108) calls "an intellectual cross-fertilization" - innovations in the experimental, statistical and case-study methods.[37]

To sum up, comparing is also about controlling (Sartori 1970; Smelser 1976) and the comparative method, or what Smelser (1976) labels "systematic comparative illustration", is "the method of testing hypothesized empirical relationships among variables on the basis of the same logic that guides the statistical method, but in which the cases are selected in such a way as to maximize the variance of the independent variables and to minimize the variance of the control variables" (Lijphart 1975: 164).

The chosen comparative strategy for this dissertation is the one of the "most similar systems" design (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 32). Out of five methods (canons) of scientific investigation proposed by John Stuart Mill - (1) the method of agreement, (2) method of difference, (3) joint method of agreement and difference, (4) method of residues, and (5) method of concomitant variations (Mill 1996: 388-406), this would be the method of difference[38]. It searches for patterns of invariance. The most similar systems design goes well with what Tilly (1984) calls individualising and variation finding strategies.

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comparativists, on the contrary, often analyse on one (individual) level and explain on another (the macro-social) level.

[37] These four analytically distinguished methods are linked and not completely separated. For instance, "within-case comparisons have in fact begun to blur the distinction between case studies and the comparative method" (Collier 1993: 116); Ragin (1987: 12) sees the comparative method as a case oriented strategy. Lijphart (1975: 160) argues that "there is no such unambiguous dividing line between the comparative and statistical methods" and treats the comparative method as a stepping stone for statistical analysis; the statistical method is seen as an approximation of the experimental method. In general, it seems that the quantitative research strategy is more inclined towards the experimental and statistical methods, whereas a qualitative research strategy goes better with the comparative method and the case study.

[38] We follow David Collier (1993: 117), who argues that "the most similar and most different systems designs correspond, respectively to John Stuart Mill's method of difference and method of agreement. Whereas Przeworski and Teune's label of "similar" and "different" refer to whether the cases are matched, as opposed to contrasting, on a series of *background* variables, Mill's labels of "difference" and "agreement" refer to whether the cases are contrasting, as opposed to matched, on the *dependent* variable". This analogy is, however, to some extent criticised by Charles C. Ragin who urges to distinguish between theoretical and empirical methods; he argues that the Mill's *indirect* method of difference [joint method of agreement and difference], not the method of difference, corresponds to the most similar systems design. Mill's method of difference "is a theoretical method and therefore not in the same class with such empirical methods as the method of agreement and the indirect method of difference" (Ragin 1987: 39).

Comparing elites also involves specific methods for elite identification (Parry 1980; Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987). The basic are three of them: positional, decisional and reputational; most often scholars choose exclusively one method for elite identification, however, there are some studies pursuing a hybrid stategy and applying a mixture of methods for elite identification. The positional method identifies elite persons according to the formal positions they occupy in the power structure. For instance, the prime minister and his/her cabinet are considered the executive elites, members of parliament are defined as legislative elites. The shortage of this method is that those who occupy formal positions of power (de jure) are not always those who have power informally (de facto). Therefore, in this situation, decisional and reputational methods can provide a complementary assistance: "The *reputational* method relies on experts who are asked to name the most powerful individuals in the community or other political system"; "the *decisional* method identifies elites by studying the decision-making process for important policy issues" (Hoffmann-Lange 2007: 912 & 913)[39]. The last two methods are rarely applied for studying national elites; however, even a greater rarity is a truly comparative research into national elites[40].

By choosing recruitment and transformation of parliamentary elites as an object of this doctoral research, we automatically opt for a positional method of elite identification. Parliament is a clearly defined political body; in a broad (institutional) sense, all members of parliament would belong to the parliamentary elite. In a narrower (long term political influence) sense, not all legislators can be considered a parliamentary elite; the parliamentary elite in a narrow sense would be only those legislators who affect the national political outcomes regularly and substantially.

With an aim to detect long-term trends in parliamentary recruitment of the Baltic states, my dissertation employs the longitudinal data[41]; differently from cross-sectional studies on elites having only one point of temporal observation, this allows me to monitor changes in parliamentary recruitment of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania over time which includes seven points of observation for every Baltic country.

[39] The difficulty faced by the reputational method is impossibility to compile a non-arbitrary and comprehensive list of experts; the shortage of decisional method is the limited set of policy issues.
[40] According to Hoffmann-Lange (2007: 920), until 2007 there were conducted only three truly comparative elite surveys, namely, those by Lerner and Gorden (1969), Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981) and Spence (1996).
[41] Some authors (Pierce 2008), treat longitudinal research even as a separate method, next to the experimental method, the comparative method and the single case study.

The dissertation uses qualitative (nominal) data and proceeds at three levels of analysis:

1. Individual level
2. Parliamentary political party family level
3. All-parliament level

We follow some of the instructions by Martz (1994), formulated for the improvement of comparability and conceptualisation in comparing most similar countries:

- "In order to implement a strategy of comparing similar countries and to generate meaningful theories, limit the spatial reach; /…/
- rather than looking for macro-theories, aim at middle-range theories, built on multivariate empirical analysis, and situate the analysis at middle-level generalizations;
- practise greater analytical eclecticism, and in particular introduce the cultural variable in the analysis together with the economic and institutional ones;
- in order to escape regional parochialism, link area research to global issues and trends, methodologically, theoretically and substantively." (Dogan and Kazancigil 1994: 8)

Although Przeworski and Teune (1970) are very sceptical about the usefulness of "most similar systems" design (they argue that in practice it is impossible to find systems that would be sufficiently similar and warns about the danger of overdetermination[42]), "such a criticism [of Przeworski] is not justified because the similar countries are not chosen on simple characteristics, but on the criteria of basic analogies, such as the sociological context or the socio-economic level"(Dogan and Kazancigil 1994: 9). It is a matter of perspective and the strength of the magnifying lens we approach the object under investigation.

We are convinced that the "most similar systems" design is a legitimate and most appropriate strategy of comparative inquiry for the Baltic States. The political and social developments in the most recent centuries allows us to view the Baltic States as a quasi-experiment: independent states with periods of democracy between the first and the second world wars; all three occupied by the Tsarist Russia before the First World War and by the Soviet Union from 1940 to 1991; and all three members of the European Union and NATO since 2004. In addition to similarities in the most recent

[42] The problem of overdetermination stemms from the issue of comparability: "Comparability is a quality that is not inherent in any given set of objects; rather it is a quality imparted to them by the observer's perspective" (Rustow 1968: 47).

history, similarities of the Baltic States in size and post-Communist economic development could be taken into account as well.[43]

3.1. Data Set on the Baltic Parliamentary Elites and Challenges of Classification

Our data set covers the past seven consecutive legislative terms in the Baltic States;

in Estonia: the last (1990) Supreme Council of Estonia and the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Riigikogu (elected in 1992, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011, respectively);

in Latvia: the last (1990) Supreme Council of Latvia and the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th Saeima (elected in 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010, respectively);

in Lithuania: the last (1990) Supreme Council of Lithuania and Seimas elected in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012.

It is based on the individual-level social and political background data for all MPs from the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliaments in the beginning of term (latecomers or substitutes are not included), altogether 2485 observations[44], where the unit of observation is a deputy/legislative term. This data is also available on a more aggregate level of observation where the unit of observation is a political party family/legislative term.

The self reported information by MPs, publications by parliaments and national electoral committees, catalogues "Who is who" in Estonian (Karu 1992; Kelder and Mustimets 1993; Isotamm and Ude 1995; Toomla 1999; Alaküla 2000), Latvian (Belokoņ Publishing House) and Lithuanian (published by Neolitas Ltd) served as the main sources of information in the process of data coding.

For the comparative purposes of this dissertation, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliamentary political parties have been classified according to the scheme of Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2006: 230-262). The post-1990 party election programs were taken as the main point of reference, but other sources of information, such as reports by the parliamentary information departments, the handbooks on

[43] As Norkus (2011a: 22) observes, the post-Communist transformation "increased the differences between the Baltic states". Still, in many respects Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remain the most similar countries in the region.

[44] 711 observations for Estonia, 801 observations for Latvia and 973 observations for Lithuania.

political parties by Bugajski (2002) and Szajkowski (2005) and the website “Parties and Elections in Europe” by Wolfram Nordsieck have been also consulted. The biggest puzzle to arise was the classification of the right wing parties, namely the Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP) and the movement “Estonian Citizen” (entered the Riigikogu in 1992) in Estonia and the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) and Union “For Fatherland and Freedom” (TB) in Latvia.

Instead of the terms „nationalistic“ or “national-conservative”, the scheme of Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2006) uses the categories “conservative” and “extreme right.” Since it foresaw exclusionary policies towards non-citizens among the Russian speaking population in Estonia, the ERSP was considered extreme right. The Movement “Estonian Citizen”, founded by a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and the minister of defence in the Estonian government-in-exile, Jüri Toomepuu, was aggressively anti-Communist and sought to “decolonise” Estonia by repatriating Soviet settlers to Russia. Our decision to code both of these political organisations as “extreme right” is supported by Andres Kasekamp, expert on extreme-right parties in Estonia, who classifies “Estonian Citizen” and the ERSP before its merger with a more pragmatic Pro Patria as extreme-right organisations (Kasekamp 2003: 401-414).

In Latvia, the Union “For Fatherland and Freedom” (TB) programs of 1993 and 1995 classified all those who came to Latvia after 17 June 1940 as “civil occupants” and as such granted them no political and land property rights and instead advocated for their repatriation, therefore, TB was classified “extreme right” (see also Pabriks and Purs 2001: 69). LNNK was slightly more moderate on these issues and thus was labelled “conservative”[45]. In the 1998 election, TB/LNNK (the two parties merged) ran with a much more moderate program than that of the TB in 1993 and 1995 and, therefore, was classified as conservative. In the 2010 election TB/LNNK formed an alliance with the party “Everything for Latvia!” (“Visu Latvijai!”), seeking “the elevation of kinship to the level of the whole nation”, fighting for the “Latvian Latvia” and led by its honorary chairman Visvaldis Lācis, former legionnaire of the Latvian *Waffen SS*. The Popular Movement for Latvia – Siegerist’s Party (TKL) – has been classified as extreme right not due to its electoral program but rather because of the party’s behaviour and the actions of its extremist leader, Joachim Siegerist (see Lieven 1999: 301 and Mudde 2000: 21).

[45] Relying on the analysis of party manifestos, Jānis Ikstens (2011: 45) found that TB was more to the right than LNNK also on economic issues.

The National Harmony Party (TSP), Equal Rights (L) and Socialist Party of Latvia (LSP) could be considered ethnic minority parties in Latvia (see Ikstens 2005), but it seems more accurate to classify the TSP as socialist/social democratic and the last two as communist.

The other challenge to classification has been groups of political parties with rather different ideologies running on the same electoral list and with one electoral program. In this case, an electoral list was treated as one political party and one ideological position.

3.2. Structure of the Dissertation

Taking into account the reviewed literature and the proposed theoretical framework, this dissertation investigates the patterns of structural and individual circulation among the Baltic parliamentary elites[46]. The structural elite circulation is analysed according to the following indicators: occupational background (chapter 5), pre-parliamentary political experience (chapter 6), education, gender and ethnicity (chapter 7). The chapter 8 deals with an individual elite circulation and the chapter 9 analyses the careers of the long-standing parliamentary representatives. The conclusion reviews the main findings of this work and places them into a perspective of political sociology.

The next chapter we move to is on the structure of opportunities for the Baltic parliamentary representatives.

[46] It is important to note that there is no Baltic parliamentary elite as such; there are Baltic parliamentary elites or the parliamentary elite of Estonia, the parliamentary elite of Latvia and the parliamentary elite of Lithuania. Of course, an inter-parliamentary institution like the Baltic Assembly, founded in 1991 – a gathering of selected MPs from national legislatures of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – is aimed at the creation of the Baltic parliamentary elite, however, without existence of the federal political structure of the Baltic states, its power is condemned to remain symbolic.

4. Structure of Opportunities for Baltic Legislators

4.1 Historical Background and Issue of Citizenship

Although in strictly ethno-linguistic terms nowadays there are only two Baltic nations - Latvia and Lithuania, it is common to think of the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania[47]. Since their incorporation into the Russian empire in the 18th century and especially since the 20th century, all three of them shared a similar historical path. The modern statehood of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania started with declaring independence in 1918 and the election of constituent assemblies in 1919 and 1920[48]. All three countries have been occupied and re-occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1944, all three of them have been internationally recognised as independent unitary states in 1991 and all three of them joined the European Union and NATO in 2004.

Before incorporation into the Tsarist Russia in the 18th century, Estonia was under the the Danish, German and Swedish rule. Latvia was exposed to the Germanic influences through being part of the Teutonic Order and the Swedish Empire. Lithuania (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) was exposed to Slavic influences through the union with Poland and conquests of territories that are nowadays part of Belarus and Ukraine. As a consequence of these varying influences, the Lutheran Church in Estonia and Latvia and the Catholic Church in Lithuania became the dominant religious and cultural actors. The traces of Lutheranism and Catholicism, in spite of spread secularisation, are distinguishable in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania of the 21st century[49].

Out of the many historical events and transformations most directly affecting the current Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian politics, the Soviet policies of Russification and industrialisation are worth mentioning. Lithuania, due to more agrarian mode of production (and relative backwardness of industry) and more numerous participation

[47] It could be reminded that for the German historiography the Baltic history and *das Baltikum* meant for a long time also two countries – Estonia and Latvia, which were the areas of German settlement. Since ruling elites in Lithuania were of Polish and not German origin, Lithuania used to be excluded from the analysis of the Baltic states (see Kasekamp 2010: x).

[48] Vincent E. McHale outlines seven similarities among the Baltic States in the beginning of the twentieth century, namely: “(1) prior colonial status; (2) pre-independence opportunities for local self-government and competition for representation in the Russian Duma; (3) divisive class, ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages of an overlapping nature; (4) radical democratic traditions; (5) international copying of political forms; (6) economic dislocations from war and revolution; and (7) external pressures of a geopolitical nature”(McHale 1986: 298).

[49] The differencies between post-Soviet Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are well explained by the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism thesis of Max Weber in the work of Mattusch (1997).

of Lithuanians in the structures of the Communist Party, has been able to withstand the policies of Moscow better in comparison with Latvia and Estonia – by the end of the collapse of the USSR, ethnic Lithuanians made around 80 per cent of all inhabitants of Lithuania which was about the same before the Second World War. Ethnic Latvians, from constituting 77 per cent of the country population in 1935, turned into 52 per cent in 1989. The share of ethnic Estonians in Estonia fell from 88.2 per cent in 1934 to 61.5 per cent in 1989. The Soviet economic policy of building large enterprises and importing labour force for them - among the losses due to the Second World War and deportations to Siberia, settlement of the retired Soviet officers and arrival of state, party and other personnel, low or declining birth rates among ethnic Latvians and ethnic Estonians – had a significant impact on the ethnic composition of populations in Latvia and Estonia (Misiunas and Taagepera 1993: 353-356, 358; Karklins 1994: 123-127; Dreifelds 1996: 143-156; Raun 2001: 234).

After regaining independence in 1991, the choice of the Estonian and Latvian political elites was granting citizenship automatically to those who had it before the Soviet occupation in June 1940 and their descendants.[50] The result was that a significant part of the population – almost one third of their inhabitants in 1991 - became disenfranchised[51] and turned the regimes into what was labelled an ethnic democracy (Stepan 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996; Smith 1996; Järve 2000 and 2005) or regime of ethnic control (Steen 1997; Pettai and Hallik 2002). The ethnic cleavage or, more precisely, the divide[52] between citizens and non-citizens has been crucial in shaping politics of post-1990 in Estonia in Latvia. The Latvian constitution with no provision for the basic human rights,[53] and the strict laws on citizenship[54] made the

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[50] It reduced the eligible electorate in Estonia from 1,164,000 to 661,000 (Mikkel and Pettai 2004: 335). According to Kalnins and Palonkorpi (2003), "in the end of the 1980's roughly 40 per cent of Latvia's population were neither citizens of Latvia nor their descendants".

[51] Naturalisation of persons having no legal connection to the interwar republic started in 1995 after the law on naturalisation was passed in July 1994. According to Pabriks and Purs (2001: 73), there were more than 600 thousand people without citizenship at that time. The number by Schmidt (2004: 116) and Kalnins and Palonkorpi (2003) is about 700 thousand people, it would amount to 27.7 per cent of 2529543 inhabitants (Statistical Yearbook of Latvia 1995: 61) in Latvia in 1995. The number by Dreifelds (1996: 173) amounts to 724 thousand stateless persons or 28.6 per cent of all inhabitants in Latvia. The data of Dorodnova (2003: 43) record 740231 non-citizens or 29.3 per cent of the total population in 1995.

[52] According to Deegan-Krause (2007: 539-540), who relies on the work by Bartolini and Mair (1990), the full cleavage, as a form of closure of social relationships, involves three elements: (1) a structural (e.g. demographic) difference, (2) an attitudinal difference, and (3) an institutional (political) difference. If a closure involves only two elements, we have a divide; if only one element is available, we have a difference.

[53] The chapter on the basic human rights has been incorporated into the Latvian Constitution in 1998.

cleavage more pronounced. Although naturalisation and liberalisation of citizenship policy reduced the numbers of non-citizens, about 6.9 per cent of the population in Estonia and 14.1 per cent in Latvia remain without any citizenship (Kuklys 2013b; Kuklys 2013a). Lithuania, differently from Estonia and Latvia, chose the liberal 'zero-option' in citizenship policy, meaning that everyone could apply without any preconditions and receive a passport of the Lithuanian citizen. Still, according to some citizenship analysts (Howard 2009: 176), Lithuania is the most similar to Estonia and Latvia out of all EU-member states in terms of other citizenship policies.

It must be mentioned that the restrictive decisions on citizenship by the Estonian and Latvian political elites were largely an outcome of the so-called doctrine of legal restorationism produced by the Citizens' Congresses in both countries. The Estonian Congress, which functioned as an alternative parliament to the Supreme Council of Estonia, was elected on 18 March 1990. The 499 members of Congress, representing 31 political organisations, were elected on 24 February 1990 by the people who were either citizens of the pre-war republic of Estonia or their descendants[55], comprising a total of 590,000 or 91 per cent of eligible electors (Taagepera 1993: 174). The Congress served as an important forum for the right wing opposition to the government controlled by the Popular Front (Park 1994: 145) and in fact legitimised and institutionalised what could be considered counter-elites. The Congress was dominated by the Estonian National Independence Party[56] and became increasingly marginalised from May 1990 onwards since political power was directed through the Supreme Council (Lagerspetz and Vogt 2004: 63). However, in August-September 1991, after the anti-Gorbachev coup in Moscow, the Congress regained its importance

[54] The Estonian citizenship law of January 1995 required at least five years of permanent residence, proficiency in the Estonian language, knowledge of the Constitution and the citizenship law, loyalty to the state of Estonia and permanent lawful income sufficient to support the applicant and his or her dependents (Article 6). In Latvia, in addition to the language requirement and basic knowledge of Latvian history and Constitution, the law of July 1994 included so called windows of naturalisation: potential applicants have been divided into groups according to age and status. "According to the law of 1994, during the year 1995, members of a citizen's family could apply for citizenship. From January 1, 1996 to 2000, people born in Latvia could apply; after 2001 people born outside Latvia could apply for citizenship. Additional priority was given to young people" (Pabriks and Purs 2001: 87). The windows of naturalisation were abolished in June 1998.

[55] Those who were neither Estonian citizens before June 1940 nor their descendants could register with Citizens' Committees and participate in the Estonian Congress but possessed only advisory rights. (Altogether 43 advisory representatives were elected.)

[56] The Estonian National Independence Party "was the first political party to be founded in Soviet Estonia in 1988 and might be considered the first real opposition party established in the entire Soviet Union" (Kasekamp 2003: 403). Party leaders were Estonian dissidents who had been actively involved in anti-Soviet activities long before Gorbachev started Perestroika.

and together with the Supreme Council formed a 60-member Constitutional Assembly (consisting of 30 delegates from each institution) designed to draft a new Constitution for the Republic of Estonia.

The Citizens' Congress in Latvia was elected in April 1990 "by more than 700,000 citizens who had signed in to citizens' committees that began to emerge in the latter part of 1989 in response to dubious attitude of the People's Front towards the concept of legal continuity of the Republic of Latvia" (Ikstens 2011: 40). Many of Congress members found their place later in the electoral union "For Fatherland and Freedom" (TB) that successfully participated in the Saeima elections in 1993 and 1995. Similarly as the Congress of Estonia, Citizens' Congress of Latvia attempted to provide an alternative to the last Supreme Council (however, without institutional success it had in Estonia) and relied on the so-called doctrine of legal restorationism. The doctrine held that Estonia and Latvia were not newly established states but rather the old republics illegally occupied by the Soviet Union. Therefore, sovereignty had to be restored to those from whom it had been taken, namely, the people who had been citizens of Estonia and Latvia before the Soviet occupation in June 1940.

4.2. Electoral Systems

Currently 101 members of the Riigikogu are elected in 11 or 12 electoral districts depending on the election, the candidates must be Estonian citizens no younger than twenty-one years old. Although political parties present a national list of electoral candidates, the nomination of a candidate is restricted to one electoral district. The magnitude of electoral districts vary in size, so far it ranged from 5 to 14 mandates (Mikkel and Pettai 2004: 333). The seats are allocated in three rounds. In the first round of seat allocation, personal mandates are awarded to those candidates who surpass the Hare quota for the electoral district (it is calculated for each electoral district by dividing the number of valid votes casts in the district by the number of mandates). In the second round, so-called district mandates are awarded by summing up all the votes cast for the members of a party in a given district. If the party surpasses the Hare quota, its candidate with the largest share of votes receives a mandate, provided that the party itself gets at least 5 per cent of the national vote and that the mandate receiver gets at least 10 per cent of the Hare quota. In the third round, the mandates not allocated in the previous two rounds are distributed to the parties (they must have passed the 5 per cent threshold) using a modified d'Hondt

method. The compensation mandates are distributed relying on the separate rank-ordered lists of candidates, compiled by political parties (Pettai 2004: 830). Over time, the number of personal mandates declined from 17 in 1992 to 14 in 2011[57]. For the same period, the number of compensation mandates gradually declined from 60 to 19 and the number of district mandates steadily grew from 24 to 68 (see National Electoral Committee 2012: 33).

Table 4.2.1. Electoral Systems in the Baltic States

Country	Estonia 1992-2011	Latvia 1993-2010	Lithuania 1992-2012
Type	PR: Hare/d'Hondt	PR: St Laguë	Mixed: SMD & PR-Hare
% of PR Seats	101/101	100/100	70/141
Electoral Districts, N	11+1[1]	5	71+1
District Magnitude	5 to 14	14 to 29	1 & 70
Ballot	Categorical	(+/-) unlimited	PR: semi-ordinal
Threshold, %	5	5[2]	5[3]
Turnout Threshold	N/A	N/A	25% for SMD, 40% for PR List
Success Requirement in SMD	N/A	N/A	Abs. majority/2nd round runoff[4]

Source: National Electoral Committee of Estonia, Central Electoral Commission of Latvia, Chief Electoral Commission of Lithuania and own completion.
[1] 1992: 12+1
[2] From 1995. In 1993: 4%
[3] From 1996. In 1992: 4% for normal political parties and 2% for ethnic minority parties
[4] In 2000: Plurality

In Estonia political party membership is restricted to Estonian citizens only (§ 48 of the Estonian Constitution). Since 1999 a political party must have at least 2000 members, before 1999 it was sufficient to have 1000 members (Lagerspetz and Maier 2010: 96). Electoral coalitions (apparentements) are forbidden since 1999. Parliamentary parties receive a considerable amount of money from the state and there are no spending limits on electoral campaigns.

As a consequence of the post-Communist lustration, until 2000 the lustration rules required that parliamentary candidates sign a statement claiming that they had not actively persecuted others in the Soviet period. In terms of language requirements, the Estonian law demanded that parliamentary candidates have advanced proficiency in the Estonian language. This law, criticised by international organisations as

[57] The lowest number of personal mandates (10) was awarded in 2007.

violation of human rights convention, was never extensively enforced. It was abolished in the late 2001 (Mikkel and Pettai 2004: 335-336).

Table 4.2.2. Length of Term, Party Lists Submitted and Elected, Political Parties and Their Families Represented in Estonian Legislatures

Estonian Parliament	Year of Election	Normal Length of Term	Party Lists Submitted to Election	Party Lists Elected	Parties in Parliament	Parliamentary Party Families
7th Riigikogu	1992	4 years	17	9	10	8
8th Riigikogu	1995	4 years	16	7	9	5
9th Riigikogu	1999	4 years	12	7	8	5
10th Riigikogu	2003	4 years	11	6	6	5
11th Riigikogu	2007	4 years	11	6	5	6
12th Riigikogu	2011	4 years	9	4	4	4

Source: National Electoral Committee of Estonia and own calculation.

Latvia, as Estonia and most of Eastern European states, applies a proportional electoral system for the election of national parliament. Electoral opportunities for 100 members of the Latvian Saeima are being provided by five constituencies the magnitude of which is determined by the number of voters residing in each constituency. The smallest and most stable constituency is Kurzeme, providing 14 seats for the Saeima (in 2010 it provided 13 seats). The Zemgale constituency has provided 15 parliamentary seats so far, except for the election in 1993 for which the figure was 16 seats. The magnitude of the Latgale constituency has gradually declined from 20 seats in 1993 to 16 seats in 2006 and 2010. The size of the Vidzeme constituency grew from 25 seats in 1995 to 27 seats in 2010. The most growing and largest is the constituency of Riga. It expanded from 24 seats in 1993 to 29 seats in 2006 and 2010.

Unlike the 1990 election to the Latvian Supreme Council, where individual candidates competed and a majority system was applied, elections to the Saeima are characterised by proportional representation and competition between political party lists. The ballot structure is partially preferential, the election results are calculated by a modified Saint-Laguë method.[58] Whether a candidate for the Saeima runs in all five constituencies or only in one of them, is decided by the political party. All candidates must be Latvian citizens no younger than 21 years old. In addition to disqualifications

[58] The modified Saint-Laguë formula relies on the 1.4 as an initiating divisor in the allocation of seats (Choe 2003: 40).

due to legally recognised incapacity, imprisonment or criminal conviction, restrictions of lustration are also enforced: all those who belong or have belonged to the salaried staff of the USSR, Latvian SSR or a foreign state security, intelligence or counter-intelligence services and those who have been active in certain organisations[59] after 13 January 1991 are not eligible to compete for a seat in Saeima. The highest level of proficiency in the Latvian language has also been an eligibility requirement until May 2002 (Schmidt 2010: 129).

Table 4.2.3. Length of Term, Threshold, Party Lists Submitted and Elected, Political Parties and Their Families Represented in Latvian Legislatures

Latvian Parliament	Year of Election	Normal Length of Term	Party Lists Submitted to Election	Party Lists Elected	Parties in Parliament	Parliamentary Party Families
5th Saeima	1993	3 years	23	8	8	8
6th Saeima	1995	3 years	19	9	13	7
7th Saeima	1998	4 years	21	6	6	4
8th Saeima	2002	4 years	20	6	6*	4
9th Saeima	2006	4 years	19	7	7**	4
10th Saeima	2010	4 years	13	5	8***	4

Source: Central Electoral Commission of Latvia and own calculations.
* If the Union of Greens and Farmers is counted as two and the Union of Political Organisations “For Human Rights in the United Latvia” as three political parties – National Harmony Party, Equal Rights and Latvian Socialist Party – the number of parliamentary parties would increase to eight.
** If the Union of Greens and Farmers is counted as two and the coalition of the Latvia’s First Party and Latvia’s Way as two parties– the number of parliamentary parties would increase to nine.
*** If the Union of Greens and Farmers is counted as three and the Harmony Centre as two political parties, the number of parliamentary parties would increase to eight.

Founding of a political party is reserved for Latvian citizens only, but non-citizens may belong to a political party as well if they do not exceed a half of all non-citizens in a given party.[60] Registration of a political party requires the party to have at least 200 members which is forty times more than what was required in the First Republic.[61]

After the abolishment of mixed electoral systems in Ukraine (2006) and Russia (2007), Lithuania belongs to the few countries in the region (together with Hungary and Macedonia) that employ a mixed electoral system. 70 legislators out of

[59] Those organisations are the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Communist Party of Latvia, the Working People’s International Front of the Latvian SSR, the United Board of Working Bodies, the Organisation of War and Labour Veterans, the All-Latvia Salvation Committee and its regional committees.
[60] For a long period after 1990, non-citizens were not allowed to belong to any political party (Schmidt 2004: 115).
[61] A group of any five persons was sufficient to register a political party (Bilmanis 1951: 343). According to Spekke, in order to register a political party, a group of seven citizens was required (Spekke 1957: 374).

Table 4.2.4. Length of Term, Threshold, Party Lists Submitted and Elected, Political Parties and Their Families Represented in Lithuanian Legislatures

Lithuanian Parliament	Year of Election	Normal Length of Term	Party Lists Submitted to Election*	Party Lists Elected*	Parties in Parliament	Parliamentary Party Families
Seimas	1992	4 years	17	5	11	7
Seimas	1996	4 years	24	5	14	8
Seimas	2000	4 years	15	4	16	9
Seimas	2004	4 years	15	6	9	7
Seimas	2008	4 years	16	7	10	7
Seimas	2012	4 years	18	7	8	6

Source: Chief Electoral Commission of Lithuania and own calculations.
* The multi-member district only.

total 141 are being elected through the party lists in one country-wide constituency. The candidates for the remaining seats run in the 71 single member districts. Double candidacies (party list and SMD) are allowed. The ballot structure is categorical, 70 seats from the country-wide constituency are being allocated according to the Hare electoral formula. All candidates must be Lithuanian citizens of no younger than 25 years old. In a compulsory questionnaire the candidates are supposed to indicate whether they collaborated with the Soviet KGB (and any other foreign secret service), however, in contrast to the Latvian case, previous collaboration with the Soviet secret service and other power structures of the USSR does not preclude someone from running for a parliamentary seat. The fact that a candidate has collaborated is used to inform the electorate and does not form a prohibitive constraint.

After January 2005 founding a new political party in Lithuania requires at least 1000 members (400 members have been sufficient prior to January 2005).

4.3. Political Party Families in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

History of the Baltic parliamentary democracy is much shorter and more discontinuous than that of many Western European polities. Parliamentary democracy of sovereign Baltic states starts after the First World War and could be divided into two periods: pre-Soviet (or interwar, since Baltic democracies were dismantled some years before the Soviet occupation in 1940) and post-Soviet.

The strongest parliamentary party families in the interwar Estonia and Latvia, Baltic countries with predominantly Lutheran heritage, were Socialists/Social Democrats (especially in the beginning) and Agrarians (see tables 4.3.1 to 4.3.3). The most important parliamentary party family in Lithuania was Catholic Christian Democrats often having an absolute majority in the legislature; Socialists/Social

Democrats in the Lithuanian parliaments were only a third force in strength which is explained by a less urban and more rural character of the Lithuanian society (Vardys 1978: 67). The Baltic parliamentary democracies, initially styled according to the French and Weimar constitutions and described as powerful legislatures with weak and unstable cabinets of ministers[62], were crushed by authoritarian regimes long before the Soviet occupation in 1940. The Lithuanian coup d'état of 1926 and the Estonian and Latvian takeovers of 1934 are explained as "Nationalist Agrarian reaction to economic difficulties and to the perceived deficiencies of democractic performance" (Vardys 1978: 68), which was rather a common trend in contemporary Europe. Indeed, our tables show the highest percentages of Agrarians in each of the last Baltic parliaments before the regime change, however, there are important cross-country differences to be highlighted. First, the abrupt coup in Lithuania was organised by young military officers (for the benefit of the Nationalist Union comprising 3.5 per cent of seats in the 1926 parlament[63]) and was not so much caused by economic difficulties whereas the protracted fall of democracies in Estonia and Latvia was more of a consequence of economic depression and was characterised by a less direct military involvement. Second, coups in Lithuania and Latvia were justified as preventive actions against the threat of Communists, whereas in the Estonian case "the pretext was the danger from domestic fascists" (Taagepera 1974: 408)[64].

The Baltic parliamentary party families in the post-Soviet period have only symbolic continuity with the party families of the first Republic. Many of the post-Soviet political parties in Baltic countries emerged out of anti-Soviet popular movements founded in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1988. Very few post-Soviet parliamentary parties could claim their origins dating back to the First Republic[65].

Estonia

Elections to the 1990 Supreme Council, conducted by single transferable vote (STV), were characterised by the fact that an overwhelming majority of candidates and

[62] The average life span of a cabinet in the period of parliamentary democracy varied from 8 months in Lithuania to 10 months in Latvia (see Vardys 1974: 402-403).
[63] Labeled in our table as Extreme Right.
[64] The regimes that emerged after the coups in the Baltic countries were classified by Georg von Rauch (1995) as authoritarian democracies in Estonia and Latvia and as presidential regime in Lithuania.
[65] These parliamentary political parties were: Rural Union in Estonia; Farmers' Union and Social Democratic Workers' Party in Latvia; Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Party, Peasants' Union, Nationalist Union and National Party "Young Lithuania" in Lithuania.

elected representatives belonged to more than one party or political movement. The Popular Front[66] won at least 41, antiindependence forces at least 26 (including 4 seats for Soviet military), reform communist Free Estonia and its rural allies at least 25

Table 4.3.1. Party Families and Percentage of Their Seats in Estonian Parliaments

Party Families	1920	1923	1926	1929	1932	1990	1992	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Communists	5	10	6	6	5	6.7						
Socialists/Social Democrats	29	20	24	25	22	8.6	11.9	5.9	16.8	5.9	9.9	18.8
Greens						5.7	1				5.9	
Agrarians	22	29	39	41	42	13.3			6.9	12.9	5.9	
Left Liberals	22	12	13	10		15.2	16.8	56.4	27.7	27.7	28.7	25.7
Right Liberals							1	18.8	24.8	18.8	30.7	32.7
Conservatives							28.7	12.9	17.8	34.7	18.8	22.8
Extreme Right							17.8					
Ethnic Minority	5	7	5	5	8	6.7		5.9	5.9			
Other	10	14	8	9	23	11.4	7.9					
No Party						7.6						
Liberals						5.7						
Christian Democrats	7	8	5	4		5.7						
Popular Front						13.3	14.9					

Source: For the 1st to the 5th Riigikogu adapted and modified from Parming (1975:11) and Raun (2001: 113). For the Post-Soviet Riigikogu data are taken from the Estonian National Electoral Committee, www.vvk.ee.
Note: The Riigikogu in the First Republic contained 100 legislators, in the Second Republic it comprises 101 MPs. The 1990 Supreme Soviet had 105 seats.

seats (Taagepera 1993: 176). Since majority of them had more than one political affiliation (we found that 105 deputies had 162 organisational affiliations), we considered it more meaningful to determine their ideological orientation by parliamentary factions their founded after election. There were all party families except Conservatives, Right Liberals and Extreme Right in the 1990 Supreme Council. The Left Liberals and Agrarians were the largest party groups.

The winner of the 1992 election, conducted under the personalized-PR, was conservative Homeland (Pro Patria) with 29 seats. They were followed by left liberal Secure Home (a newly established Coalition Party was a part of it) with 17 seats. The Popular Front won only 15 seats. It lost its function as an umbrella organisation by the time of election due to defection of three important political formations: social democrats, liberal democrats and agrarians.

[66] This would comprise 39 per cent of all parliamentary seats. Our figures for the Popular Front in the table 4.3.1 are much lower since they refer to the parliamentary factions formed after the 1990 election.

The 1995 parliamentary election saw Russian minority parties finally entering the Riigikogu and emergence and success of the right liberal Estonian Reform Party. The elections were won by the list of the Coalition Party and Rural Union (41 seats). The left liberal Centre Party – inheritor of the Popular Front – was allocated 16 seats in the Riigikogu.

The Centre Party celebrated a victory - it won 28 seats - in the 1999 elections, however, the President Lennart Meri proposed a prime minister from Homeland (Pro Patria) Alliance (18 parliamentary seats) which formed a new government with Reform Party (18 seats) and Moderates (17 seats).

The 2003 Riigikogu elections saw emerging a new conservative political party – Res Publica, propagating anti-corruption and political renewal. This new party not only entered the legislature but also was one of the two electoral winners gaining 28 parliamentary seats (the same number of seats was allocated to the Centre Party) and the post of prime minister. The newcomer party was joined by the right liberal Reform Party (19 seats) and agrarian People's Union (13 seats) in the government formation.

The 2007 and 2011 elections to the Riigikogu witnessed victories of the Reform Party as it won 31 and 33 seats respectively. Res Publica, after experiencing a meteoric rise in 2003, demonstrated a similarly abrupt fall in the following years and in the end merged with Pro Patria. The new organisation, named Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica, won 19 and 23 parliamentary seats in 2007 and 2011. The Centre Party, with 29 and 26 seats respectively, remained the largest opposition party.

To sum up, the number political parties and party coalitions competing in national elections gradually fell from 17 in 1992 to 11 political parties in 2003 and 2007[67]. The number of parliamentary parties (electoral lists) decreased from 9 in 1992 to 4 in 2011. These trends were interpreted as signs of party system consolidation. Some analysts saw "Scandinavianization of the Estonian party system - emergence of at most five to six stable major parties" (Raun 1997: 360) or even emergence of cartel party system in Estonia (Pettai and Kreuzer 1999; Sikk 2003, Mikkel and Pettai 2004). These generalisations have been confronted and challenged by the rapid emergence and electoral success of the Res Publica Party. Nevertheless, if we employ Laakso – Taagepera index, we see an obvious decrease in the effective number of electoral parties from 8.84 in 1992 to 4.78 in 2011. The effective number of

[67] Since 1999 single political parties participate in parliamentary elections, their electoral coalitions (apparentements) are forbidden.

parliamentary parties falls from 5.90 in 1992 to 3.84 in 2011. This allows us to conclude that over time Estonian political party system clearly moved toward consolidation.

If we turn onto a more aggregate – political party family – level of analysis, we observe that Socialists/Social Democrats and Left Liberals are present in all seven Estonian parliaments (see table 4.3.1). Conservatives and Right Liberals are part of all legislatures from 1992 onwards. Green and ethnic minority parties are successful in three of seven parliamentary elections.

Latvia

The number of parliamentary political parties in the Second Republic of Latvia is significantly lower than in the First Republic (5 to 13 compared with 22 to 27), however, the number of political party families seems to be rather similar.

Table 4.3.2. Party Families and Their Percentage of Seats in the Latvian Parliaments

Year of Election Party Family	1922	1925*	1928	1931	1990	1993	1995	1998	2002	2006	2010
Communists**			6	7	28.9	7	5				
Socialists/Social Democrats	38	37	30	21		13	6	30	25	23	29
Agrarians	25	28	29	34		12	16		12	18	22
Left Liberals	13	11	9	11		5	18				
Conservatives						15	8	41	53	49	41
Extreme Right						6	30				8
Ethnic Minority	15	16	18	19							
Christian Democrats***				6		6		8	10	10	
Liberals****						36	17	21			
Other Right Wing	9	9	8	2							
No Party					5.9						
Popular Front					65.2						

Source: For the 1st to the 4th Saeimas, adapted and modified from Bilmanis (1951: 342-343) and Spekke (1957: 374). For the Supreme Council of 1990 and 5th to the 10th Saeimas, Central Electoral Commission of Latvia and own classification.

Note: All parliaments contain 100 seats except for the one elected in 1990 – it had 201 seats.

* Due to unknown reasons percentage of seats amounts to 101 in the data source (Bilmanis 1951) consulted.

** Communists entered the 7th Saeima (1998) on the list of the National Harmony Party and the 8th Saeima (2002) as a part of the Union of Political Organisations "For Human Rights in the United Latvia".

*** In the election of 1995 Christian Democrats from KDS entered Saeima on the list of Agrarians.

**** In the election of 2006 Liberals entered the legislature together with Christian Democrats.

Not shown in the table above, the family of Greens is present in the Saeima of 1995 and 2002 as well, Regionalists are present in the Saeima of 1995. If one compares the variety of party families in the First and the Second Republic, Communists, Socialists/Social Democrats, Agrarians, Left Liberals and Christian Democrats are found in both periods. However, there are stake differences in the numerical strength of those party families: Socialists/Social Democrats, Agrarians and, especially, the right wing party families have a substantially different weight in the interwar and post-1990 legislatures. The dominance of the families from the right in the post-1990 Latvia is more than obvious not only in the parliament, but also in the government: from 1990 up to now out of all fifteen cabinets of ministers Socialists/Social Democrats have been recruited only twice.[68]

Lithuania

The number of political party families in the Second Republic of Lithuania is higher than in the First Republic (5-6 compared to 7-9). Party families of Communists, Socialists/Social Democrats, Agrarians, Extreme Right, Ethnic Minority and Christian Democrats are present in both Republics, of course, not always with the same numerical strength (the parliamentary strength of Agrarians, Christian Democrats and Ethnic Minority parties had substantially declined). Conservatives and Liberals are an exceptional feature of the Second Republic.

Table 4.3.3. Party Families and Their Percentage of Seats in the Lithuanian Parliaments

Year of Election Party Family	1922	1923	1926	1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Communists	6.4			4.5						
Socialists/Social Democrats	12.8	10.3	17.6		57.4	17.5	34	14.2	17.7	26.6
Agrarians	25.6*	20.5	28.2**			0.7	2.8	7.1	2.1	0.7
Left Liberals							19.9	7.8	0.7	
Conservatives						51.1	7.1	17.7	32.6	23.7
Extreme Right			3.5		2.8	1.5	1.4	0	0	
Ethnic Minority	6.4	17.9	9.4		2.8	0.7	1.4	1.4	2.1	5.8
Other/Independents			5.9		6.4	5.1	3.5	39	31.9	36.0
Liberals					1.4	10.9	25.5	12.8	12.8	7.2
Christian Democrats	48.7	51.3	35.3		7.8	12.4	4.3			
Popular Front				95.5	21.3					

Source: Švoba (1990: 103, 117) for the first three parliaments, Chief Electoral Commission of Lithuania for the last seven parliaments and own classification.
* Alliance of Peasants' Union and Socialists Democrats
** Peasants' Union and Farmers' Party

[68] In 1994 and 1998.

Post-1990 period compared

- The last Supreme Council of Lithuania has the largest share of activists from the anti-Communist Popular Front whereas the last Supreme Council of Estonia has the smallest percentage of members from this movement. The figures for Latvia are in-between
- Success of the former Communists in Lithuania
- Clear dominance of Liberals[69] and Conservatives in Estonia and Latvia
- Alternating dominance of Socialists/Social Democrats and Conservatives in Lithuania
- Disappearance of Liberals in Latvia in 2002 and vanishing of Christian Democrats in Lithuania in 2004
- Rise of the new political parties (some of them fighting corruption, preaching law and order and using anti-elitist rhetoric) in the Baltic parliaments: *Res Publica* in Estonia, *New Party* and *New Era* in Latvia and *New Union (Social Liberals)*, *Labour Party* and *Order and Justice* in Lithuania

The insignificance of Socialists/Social Democrats and left wing parties in general can be explained by ethnic democracy patterns in Latvia: the titular ethnic group takes care that ethnic minorities, most of them found in the left wing parties, are not taking over in politics.

The disappearance of Liberals in Latvia in 2002 and vanishing of Christian Democrats in Lithuania in 2004 goes together with strengthening of Latvian Christian Democrats and Lithuanian Liberals – this dialectical dynamics is explained by Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001): in the system where Christian Democrats are strong, Liberals are weaker; and where Liberals are strong, Christian Democrats are less powerful.

In addition to the absence of the explicit ethnic minority parties in the Latvian parliaments, non-existence of the parliamentary women's party must be noted as well. The ethnic minority parties in the Lithuanian parliaments are present since 1992, the Women's Party (in the person of Mrs. Prunskienė, the former prime minister of Lithuania 1990-1991) is present in the 1996 Seimas.

[69] In Estonia: dominance of Left Liberals and, later on, Right Liberals.

4.4. Remuneration and Benefits of Parliamentary Representatives

Legislative activity for a term of four years is a full-time job in all three Baltic national parliaments.

From January 2012 the monthly payment for an Estonian Parliament member is 3,380 euros[70]. The payment of MPs is linked to the salary of the President of Estonia, so that the Riigikogu member is compensated at 65 per cent of the president's salary. The President of Estonia is paid 5,200 euros, as is the President of the Riigikogu, Prime Minister and Chairman of the Supreme Court.

Member of the Riigikogu is prohibited to hold any other state office (§ 63 of the Constitution). The authority of MP is suspended upon his/her appointment as a member of Cabinet Ministers and is restored after resigning from the Cabinet (§ 64 of the Constitution).

Member of parliament in Latvia and Lithuania is a full-time job with a guaranteed salary that is thrice the monthly average in the country.

In accordance with the Anti-Corruption Law of Latvia, MPs may combine their work with other forms of employment, including teaching, scientific research, medical practice or other creative work (Article 19). In comparison with the average monthly and minimum pay in Latvia, the remuneration of parliamentary representative is very attractive: between 1995 and 2001 the average monthly wage of MP in Latvia was 3.3 – 3.9 times higher than the average monthly pay in the country and a basic monthly salary of MP between 1993 and 2003 was 6.8 – 10 times higher than a minimum monthly wage set up by the Latvian Government.[71] In 2008, the MP monthly salary was 2.6 times higher than the average monthly pay in the country. However, if it is compared with other members of the political, administrative and, especially, the business elite, this remuneration is much less attractive. Parliamentary representatives in the highest positions are clearly below top people in business and government: the monthly pay of the Speaker of the Parliament (1165 Lats or 1658 Euro[72]) is 7.7 times lower than that of the Head of the Riga Free Port, 6 times than President of the Latvian Bank, 5.6 times than President of Latvian Telecom and 4.8 times than

[70] Estonia replaced its national currency the Estonian kroon (EEK) with the euro in 2011 and thus became the first ex-Soviet state to join the eurozone

[71] Calculations are based on the data of Kancāne (2002: 52), Statistical Yearbook of Latvia (2003: 64) and Finance Department of Latvijas Saeima.

[72] The rate on the 28 August 2005: one Latvian lats (LVL) was worth 1.4229 Euro.

President of Latvian Railways; the Speaker is paid 2.1 times less than the President of the country, 1.9 times than the Prime Minister, 1.7 times than a Minister or the Mayor of the capital city.[73] However, Latvian legislators – in both ordinary and highest positions – are financially better off than top academics[74] and are best compared with career bureaucrats – by law MPs are financially qualified as civil servants of the 1st (highest) category. If 78 Lats or 111 Euro for representation, 20 Lats or 28.5 Euro for participating in both committee and sub-committee, 34 Lats or 48 Euro compensation for not having a business car, up to 282 Lats or 401 Euro for renting a flat in Riga (if the MP does not come from Riga) or 96 to 202 Lats (137 to 287 Euro) for transport expenditures (depending on the place of residence) to be added to the basic salary of MP,[75] an ordinary parliamentary representative of Latvijas Saeima comes close to the state secretary.[76] Nevertheless, parliamentary representatives cannot compare to civil servants in terms of career stability: full legislative (4 years) term and permanent position as civil servant have different stability perspectives, especially knowing that more than a half of Latvian MPs does not get re-elected (see analysis on legislative turnover in chapter 8).

The Lithuanian parliamentary representatives in the top positions, compared with their Latvian colleagues, seem to be better remunerated in relation to other high political and administrative positions: the Speaker of the Lithuanian parliament is paid less than the President of the country but as high as the Primer Minister or the Chairman of the Constitutional Court. The salary of the Speaker is higher than the one of Prosecutor General, President of the Board of the Lithuanian Bank and the Director General of the State Security Department. Ordinary parliamentary representatives are paid better than prosecutors and judges on the district level and mayors of towns with less than 50 thousand inhabitants. In addition to salaries, as in the case of Latvian MPs, Lithuanian legislators receive extra pay for the work in the factions, committees and sub-committees; they are entitled to a car without a driver, one average monthly

[73] Calculations are based on the data from *Diena*, 24 April 2004: 18-19; *Neatkariga Rita Avize*, 12 July 2004: 10.
[74] In 2004 a University Rector earned 630 Lats, a University Professor was paid 504 Lats (*Latvijas Republikas Saeimas un Ministru Kabineta Ziņotājs* 2004 (21): 162)
[75] In 2004 the basic salary of MP was 717 Lats, a head of Faction or Committee received 829 Lats and Vice-Speaker earned 1098 Lats. Source of information: Finance Department of the Latvijas Saeima.
[76] In 2003 a state secretary earned 992 Lats. The Cabinet regulation of 7 January 2003 stipulated that state secretaries, as well as cabinet ministers, would not receive extra payment in addition to their salary (Karnite 2004).

pay for office needs every month, travel money and, if an MP does not live in the capital city, a room in the hotel or an apartment for his/her family.

Since 2004, Lithuanian legislators are not paid for teaching and lecturing; since 2003 they are not allowed to combine a position of an MP with a seat in local council. Positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet Minister, according to the Article 60 of the Lithuanian Constitution, do not forbid and prevent from serving as an MP. Combining positions of an MP and Cabinet Minister turned into a common political practice in Lithuania.

In Latvia, on the contrary, it has become a normal political practice for MPs – if they get appointed to the posts in the Cabinet or become state ministers – to suspend their Saeima mandates and, after resigning as a member of the cabinet or a state minister, to renew his/her parliamentary mandate and come back to the Saeima. However, neither Parliamentary Rules of Procedure (Article 5.1), nor the Anti-Corruption Law (Article 19.1) prevent from combining the office of a member of parliament with the duties of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Cabinet Minister, State Minister or Parliamentary Secretary. The restriction here is a financial one: an MP is allowed to be remunerated for one office only.

In Estonia, similarly as in Latvia, MPs suspend their parliamentary authority if they become cabinet ministers and renew their Riigikogu mandates upon resignation from the cabinet. As prescribed in the Status of Member of Riigikogu Act (§ 5), the same procedure applies in case an MP (President of the Riigikogu) performs the duties of the President of Estonia. Member of Riigikogu is prohibited from holding any other office, be it public or civil service, municipality (mayor or a member of local council), private sector or a liberal profession such as law (§ 23 to § 28).

5. Occupational Background as a Link between Society and Parliament

5.1. Politics and Profession

The connection between politics and occupation is a widely accepted and well documented tradition of research into political elites (Best 1990: 49). It raises a question which occupations are most relevant in entering the political elite and asks – especially in the case of legislature – how representative (how similar or how different from the rest of society) the parliamentary elite is. Secondly, this research tradition also allows to focus on politics as occupation itself, it asks to what extent politics is a profession.

Although parliaments functioned well before the 20th century, politics itself as a full-time paid occupation turned out to be a very new phenomenon – the members of the 18th and the 19th century parliaments consisted of part-time and un-paid legislators. To use the conceptual vocabulary of Max Weber, the legislators of the 18th and the 19th century lived *for* politics, not *off* politics. The Weberian contrast is not exclusive, it is possible to live both off and for politics, however, a professional politician, in comparison with someone living full-time or part-time *for* politics[77], makes politics a permanent source of income (Weber 1988: 513).

In spite of turning into a full-time paid occupation, politics remains a special case in comparison with other occupations. Professionalisation means not only development from honorary position to a full-time paid occupation, but also the qualifying process during which a layman turns into a professional (Borchert 2003a: 149)[78]. The typical profession assumes education and training which ends up with a qualifying certificate (and license) permitting entrance into a certain occupation, however, this is not a case with politics. The university degree in political science does not make you automatically enter a parliament or any other group of professional politicians. A criterion of non-manual, full-time paid occupation is not sufficient condition to qualify politics as a profession. A profession also means a (1) specialised, systematic and scholarly training, (2) control of entry to the occupation through examinations, diplomas and titles, (3) monopoly for expert services in the labor

[77] Living exclusively for politics may sound more idealistic than living off politics, however, living for politics may simply refer to plutocratic recruitment – a government of those who have property and are rich.

[78] Political professionalisation includes three structural preconditions: "(1) a reliable source of income in politics, (2) a realistic chance of maintaining a job in politics or moving on to something more attractive and (3) a chance of a career, that is, of moving further up the ladder" (Borchert 2003b: 7-8).

market and (4) autonomy or freedom of control by the state, lay persons and other outsiders (Burrage, Jarausch and Siegrist 1990: 205). Due to insecurity, missing qualifying requirements and clear-cut structure of career advancement, politics is not a profession but a precare occupation (Best and Jahr 2006: 79). Politics in the 20th century did become more professional in comparison with the 19th century, however, it did not turn into a profession.[79] Full professionalisation of politics (politics as profession) is not possible due to the logic of conflicting processes of professionalisation (bureaucratisation) and democratisation. On the one hand, in the 20th century politics became a full-time paid vocation as a consequence of spread democratisation (democratised polities) and increased bureaucratisation; on the other hand, precisely this democratisation does not allow to upgrade politics to a fully-fledged profession (otherwise it would turn into some kind of civil service without electoral democracy).

The route to parliament and professional politics goes through a variety of occupations and some of them are more suited for politics than others. The historical analysis of Max Weber lists seven strata as recruitment pools for professional politicians: clergy, humanistically educated literati, court nobility, gentry, the university trained lawyers, journalists and political party officials (Weber 1988: 521-528). Not all of these occupational categories are of equal significance for all countries and all parliamentary periods, however, many of them are important sources of current parliamentary recruitment. There seem to be at least four criteria in explaining why some occupations are better suited for politics, namely (1) expenses, (2) time, (3) insecurity, and (4) skills of communication[80]:

> "In the first place, the expenses involved in seeking elective office are so high and the rewards so small that only those financially capable can afford the necessary sacrifices. Second, the amount of time required for holding public office, even if it does not mean full-time service, is so great that only occupationally "expendable" persons may be available for political recruitment. Third, the insecurity accompanying elective office is so high that only those who can readily return to their private occupations will venture into politics. Finally, the politician's role, in the electoral process as well as in

[79] In general, professions are a minority among occupations: "Perhaps no more than thirty or forty occupations are fully professionalized" (Wilensky 1964: 141). Secondly, the term 'profession' primarily refers to the development of occupations in the Anglo-American world: "Not a single continental [European] language either before or after the Second World War developed indigenously a term synonymous with or generally equivalent to the English term 'profession'"(Sciulli 2005: 915).

[80] Gordon Black (1970) singles out a skill at bargaining as a crucial condition for a professional politician.

elective office, calls for considerable communicative skills which, in part at least, can only be acquired in the course of preparation for and practice in a private occupation." (Eulau and Koff 1962: 507)

If we replace humanistically educated literati and court nobility with professors (teachers) and civil servants, a modified Weberian list of occupations would be the following: lawyers, journalists, political party officials, professors (teachers), civil servants and clergy[81]. Since we see an occupational representation in parliament as a delayed mirror of historical development in a society, we would add businesspersons/managers, medical doctors (under other liberal professions) and blue collar workers, although Weber (1988: 514) was not willing to recommend them due to indispensability of these occupations. Military, agriculture and judges/prosecutors as recruitment pools for legislators could be included as well (see Herzog 1975; Best and Cotta 2000).

The above explanation of occupational suitability for politics by Eulau and Koff (1962) points to the distinction between private and public, therefore, we see it meaningful to differentiate all our occupations according to this criterium by adding the public sector variable.

5.2. Occupational Profile of Legislators in Baltic Countries

The most trusted occupational groups in Europe and the USA are medical doctors and teachers; in a declining sequence, they are followed by military officers, policemen, priests, lawyers, journalists and managers. Politicians end this continuum with the lowest amount of trust (see Kaina 2008: 407)[82]. Therefore, we should not be surprised to see a downgrade in status of the representatives of most trusted occupations – medical doctors or teachers - in case they enter a legislature.

What are the most common occupational groups among Baltic legislators? The occupational data show (see table 5.2) that civil servants in Estonian parliaments and businessmen and managers in the Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures take the largest

[81] Paul Cairney (2007: 214) lists lawyers, professors (teachers), journalists and political party officials as 'politics-facilitating occupations' and divides them into *brokerage* (the first two) and *instrumental* (the last two) occupations.

[82] The survey sample included twelve Western European and six Central and Eastern European countries (the Baltic States were not included). In many respects the support for occupational groups in both WE and CEE countries was similar, except for the much lower trust in policemen among CEE countries: 49 per cent against 73 per cent for WE countries (see Kaina 2008: 407).

Table 5.2. Occupational Profile of Baltic Legislators (in per cent)*

Estonian MPs as…	1990	1992	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011	Mean
Teachers, Professors	14.3	16.8	18.8	21.8	13.9	12.9	7.9	15.2
Journalists, Writers	7.6	14.9	7.9	6.9	5.9	5.9	5.0	7.7
Party Employees	16.2	8.9	8.9	15.8	11.9	18.8	16.8	13.9
Civil Servants	13.3	20.8	25.7	25.7	36.6	33.7	43.6	28.5
Military	4.8	1.0	0	0	0	1.0	0	1.0
Clergy	1.9	5.0	2.0	1.0	0	0	0	1.4
Lawyers	1.9	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.4
Judges, Prosecutors	1.9	0	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8
Agriculture, Fishing	7.6	3.0	4.0	3.0	0	0	0	2.5
Blue Collar Workers	1.9	1.0	1.0	2.0	0	0	0	0.8
Managers, Business	16.2	9.9	19.8	13.9	20.8	15.8	15.8	16.0
Liberal Professions	10.9	9.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	3.0	2.0	6.2
Other	0	2.1	3.0	0	0	0	1.0	0.9
Public Sector	95.2	70.3	78.2	74.3	80.2	69.3	65.3	76.1

Latvian MPs as…	1990	1993	1995	1998	2002	2006	2010	Mean
Teachers, Professors	24.9	23.0	19.0	12.0	16.0	12.0	17.0	17.7
Journalists, Writers	7.5	7.0	7.0	7.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.6
Party Employees	13.9	15.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	9.0	11.0	11.7
Civil Servants	10.9	21.0	13.0	20.0	13.0	27.0	22.0	18.1
Military	3.0	0	0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0	0.9
Clergy	0.5	1.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	0	1.1
Lawyers	3.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	1.0	1.0	2.6
Judges, Prosecutors	1.0	2.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Agriculture, Fishing	0.5	3.0	6.0	3.0	2.0	0	0	2.1
Blue Collar Workers	2.0	0	1.0	0	1.0	0	0	0.6
Managers, Business	20.4	17.0	23.0	24.0	25.0	24.0	29.0	23.2
Liberal Professions	11.4	6.0	11.0	10.0	11.0	13.0	8.0	10.1
Other	1.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	0	0	1.0
Public Sector	88.1	68.0	61.0	60.0	51.0	58.0	54.0	62.9

Lithuanian MPs as…	1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	Mean
Teachers, Professors	34.6	35.5	25.5	16.3	13.5	14.2	17.3	22.4
Journalists, Writers	9.8	8.5	6.6	4.3	2.8	3.5	2.9	5.5
Party Employees	12.0	16.3	16.8	9.9	14.9	15.6	18.0	14.8
Civil Servants	3.8	7.8	22.6	17.0	19.1	20.6	20.1	15.9
Military	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clergy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.7	0.1
Lawyers	4.5	1.4	1.5	1.4	0.7	2.1	1.4	1.9
Judges, Prosecutors	3.0	1.4	2.2	0	1.4	1.4	0.7	1.4
Agriculture, Fishing	0.8	0.7	0	0	0	1.4	0.7	0.5
Blue Collar Workers	2.3	2.8	2.2	0	0	0.7	0	1.1
Managers, Business	15.0	17.0	8.0	41.1	36.2	25.5	28.1	24.4
Liberal Professions	14.3	8.5	14.6	9.2	11.3	14.9	8.6	11.6
Other	0	0	0	0.7	0	0	1.4	0.3
Public Sector	90.2	90.1	83.2	53.9	58.9	58.9	59.7	70.7

* All occupations except for public sector add up to 100 per cent. Source: Own data and calculations.

share among occupations on average. The businessmen and managers in Estonian Riigikogu, civil servants in the Latvian Saeima and teachers and professors in the Lithuanian Seimas come second. The political party employees comprise from 11.7 to 14.8 per cent on average. Liberal professions (law is not included) range from 6.2 per cent in Estonian parliaments to 11.6 per cent in Lithuanian legislatures. The proportion of journalists and writers in the Baltic parliaments fluctuates between 5.5 to 7.7 per cent on average.

From 1990 onwards military, clerical and agricultural occupations and occupations of a blue-collar worker and of a judge/prosecutor do not reach 3 per cent on average and play no role in the Baltic parliaments[83], therefore, they will not be included in our further comprehensive analysis. The lawyers in Baltic legislatures so far never exceeded 2.6 per cent on average, however, we will make an exception for them due to the historical importance and current prominence of lawyers in the parliaments of western democracies; in order to increase the number of cases we will continue our further analysis by merging lawyers with other liberal professions.

5.2.1. Teachers and Professors

Inspite of some fluctuations, there was an overall increase of teachers and professors in Western European parliaments of the twentieth century, especially from 1970 to 1989 when the proportion jumped from roughly eleven to eighteen percent (Cotta and Almeida 2007: 60). In the post-war Eastern Europe where parliaments were merely façade institutions, Konrád and Szelényi (1979) also saw the rise of intellectuals as a new power in the mature epoch of socialism after Brezhnevism and later emphasised the dominant position of intelligentsia in the post-Communist period (Konrad and Szelenyi 1991: 356).

The first post-Communist Latvian and especially Lithuanian parliaments (in the latter at least every third MP was a teacher or professor) showed a clear dominance of teachers and professors over other occupational groups. However, later – after the second parliamentary elections in Latvia and Lithuania and the fourth election in Estonia – the proportions of teachers and professors started to decline with every new

[83] Military occupation is even absent in the Lithuanian parliaments. The highest percentages of military in the 1990 legislatures of Estonia and Latvia are the last remnants of the Soviet authoritarian regime.

legislative term (see annex tables 5.2.1.1 to 5.2.1.3). This decrease could be interpreted as an outcome of the changing demands of the different stages of post-communist transformation. The initial phase of radical change in Eastern Europe is characterised by symbolic politics and dominance of visionaries and politicians of morals (Wasilewski 2001: 137). Teachers and professors are best suited for this stage of political development, intellectuals and artists "are the first to manifest public opposition to authoritarian rule" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1993: 49). Similar to Central Europe where in 1989 "intellectuals were at the forefront of the democratic transition" (Bozóki 1999: 5), intellectuals of the Baltic Republics played a major role by initiating social movements, proposing political programs and establishing political parties. One of the most prominent Baltic political figures in that transitional period was Vytautas Landsbergis, professor in musicology; he was the chairman of the Lithuanian parliament and head of the state, under leadership of whom Lithuania was the first of the Baltic Republics to proclaim its independence from the Soviet Union[84].

What patterns of recruitment do we observe among teachers and professors in the Baltic parliaments? The data on the political party families indicate that Left Liberals dominate among Estonian teachers, Conservatives lead among Latvian teachers and Socialists/Social Democrats prevail among Lithuanian teachers.

Teachers (professors) in the Baltic parliaments have very high educational credentials, 100 per cent of them[85] hold university or comparable degrees. Dominance of humanities and social sciences over natural and technical sciences on average is a typical feature of education among teachers (professors) in all Baltic parliaments.

Teachers and professors in Estonian parliaments distinguish themselves from their Latvian and Lithuanian colleagues in the highest proportions of women (17.6 per cent) and parliamentary incumbents (51.6 per cent), the largest shares of experience in local politics (46.3 per cent), leading a political party (33.3 per cent) and cabinet of ministers (7.4 per cent). They also comprise the highest percentages of those in local Soviets (10.2 per cent), nomenklatura (29.6 per cent) and CPSU (41.7 per cent).

Teachers (professors) in Latvian parliaments stand out with the highest percentage (22.1 per cent) of ethnic minorities, the lowest proportion of MPs coming from the public sector (90.6 per cent) and the lowest percentage of those in leading party positions (14.8 per cent). They distinguish themselves also with the highest

[84] Independence of the Republic of Lithuania was proclaimed on 11 March 1990.
[85] Except for parliamentarians in Latvia where 97 per cent of them hold university degrees.

percentages of those who were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the Soviet regime (9.4 per cent) and the lowest proportion of former dissidents (2 per cent). With the lowest proportion of incumbents (44.4 per cent) and long-standing parliamentarians (MPs serving at least three legislative terms), teachers and professors in Latvian parliaments seem to have the worst opportunities for parliamentary careers (1.4 mandates on average).

Teachers (professors) in the Lithuanian parliaments distinguish themselves with the largest proportion of MPs coming from public sector (100 per cent), the lowest percentage of ethnic minorities (8.3 per cent), the lowest experience in local politics (12 per cent), absence of cabinet ministers and the highest proportion of long-standing parliamentarians (38.8 per cent). They stand out also with the lowest percentage of those who were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the Soviet regime (6 per cent) and the highest proportion of former dissidents (5.5 per cent)

Teachers and professors in the Baltic parliaments, from 15.2 per cent in Estonia to 22.4 per cent in Lithuania on average, are comparable with the Western European parliaments not only in the size of proportions[86] but also in terms of declining trends after 1990. Declining trends in the Baltic States, as well as entire Eastern Europe (see Edinger 2010: 134), are attributed to the post-Communist transformation and its different tasks in different stages. The changes in the Western European parliamentary representation are not qualified as post-Communist transformation but we do not exclude a possibility to see a decline of teachers and professors in parliaments of Western Europe as a political elite transformation following the Eastern European track. This would imply a thesis of convergence in parliamentary recruitment: not only Eastern Europe follows Western Europe, but also Western Europe follows Eastern Europe.

5.2.2. Journalists and Writers

Similarly as teachers and professors, journalists and writers are a potential recruitment pool for visionaries and politicians of morals. Lennart Meri, Minister of Foreign

[86] Lithuania is especially comparable with France having almost 30 per cent of teachers and professors in the period between 1980 and 1989 and Denmark with almost 25 per cent between 1990-1999 (see Cotta and Almeida 2007: 66).

Affairs 1990-1992 and President of Estonia 1992-2001, and Dainis Īvāns, Chairman of the Latvian Popular Front 1988-1993 and the head Vice-Speaker of the Latvian Supreme Concil 1990-1992, are the most prominent Baltic political figures of that time having occupational background in writing and journalism.

The proportion of journalists and writers in the Baltic parliaments varies from 5.5 per cent in Lithuania to 7.7 per cent in Estonia. Latvia, having an average of 6.6 per cent, seems to have the most stable share of journalists and writers from parliament to parliament. Nevertheless, the Latvian Saeima, as well as other two Baltic legislatures, discloses a continuous decline in percentage of journalists and writers in comparison with the first post-Communist parliaments (see annex tables 5.2.2.1 to 5.2.2.3). Similarly as in the case of teachers and professors, this decline could be explained by the changing stages and their tasks of post-Communist transformation; the first stage of post-Communist transformation is followed by the second one, one type of politicians is replaced by another one.

Our data show that the Left Liberals occupy the largest proportion among journalists and writers in Estonian parliaments. Comparable positions in Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures are taken by Conservatives and Socialists/Social Democrats respectively.

Journalists and writers in the Baltic parliaments have lower educational credentials, their percentage with university or comparable degrees ranges from 83.7 per cent in the Lithuanian Saeima to 90.7 per cent in the Latvian Saeima. Dominance of humanities and social sciences over natural and technical sciences is a typical feature of education among journalists (writers) in all Baltic parliaments. Prevalence of humanities and social sciences was also observed among teachers (professors), however, the journalists' share of humanities and social sciences is 3.4 to 5 times larger than the one in technical and natural sciences. This could be explained by the 'nature' of a journalistic profession which requires more an advanced manipulation of words and symbols rather than a proficiency in calculating figures and usage of formuli.

Absence of cabinet experience[87] and of experience in the Soviet councils of ministers, low percentages of those coming from public sector (from 49.1 per cent in

[87] The only exception is made by the Lithuanian journalists (writers) – 1.9 per cent of them were members of cabinet of ministers before getting elected into parliament.

Lithuania to 63 per cent of MPs with journalistic background in Latvia) are other features of journalists (writers) in the Baltic parliaments.

The journalists from Estonian parliaments distinguish themselves from their Baltic counterparts in the highest percentages of doctoral degrees (9.1 per cent), local elective (41.8 per cent) and leading party (25.5 per cent) experience. Estonian journalists distinguish themselves in the largest share of pre-parliamentary political experience - a half of them held political posts before getting elected to legislature for the first time, whereas only 22.2 and 26.4 per cent of their Latvian and Lithuanian colleagues respectively did so. One third of Estonian journalists where involved in the Citizens' Committees in the period of struggle from independence from the USSR, this is a sharp contrast in comparison with Latvia in which parliaments none of the journalists were members of a similar organisation. Journalists and writers in Estonian parliaments have also the largest percentages of dissidents (12.7 per cent) and those whose parents experienced political repressions from Soviet authorities (7.3 per cent).

The journalists from Latvian parliaments stand out from their Baltic colleagues with the highest percentages of women (24.1 per cent) and ethnic minorities (22.2 per cent). The smallest proportion of parliamentary newcomers (61.1 per cent) and the largest proportion of incumbents (48.7 per cent), the largest percentages of long-standing MPs (serving at least three terms) and the highest mean number (1.7) of mandates are indicators that Latvian MPs with journalistic background are the most experienced in parliamentary affairs in comparison with their Estonian and Lithuanian counterparts. However, the Latvian MPs are least experienced in pre-parliamentary politics – almost four-fifths (77.8 per cent) of them had not been part of local councils, political party board or cabinet of ministers before getting elected to the Saeima. Absence of former dissidents is another characteristic of journalists and writers in Latvian parliaments.

The characteristics of journalists from Lithuanian parliaments are the largest percentage of experienced founders (25 per cent) and the largest proportions of Soviet experience compared to other Baltic counterparts: 9.4 per cent of them in the local Soviets, 13.2 per cent in leading the Communist Party, 34 per cent in nomenklatura and even 50.9 per cent membership in the Communist Party of Soviet Lithuania are typical features of journalists from Lithuanian legislatures. Explanation for this is that Lithuanians were in general more numerous and active in the Soviet republican political structures in comparison with their Baltic neighbours.

5.2.3. Political Party Employees

A rise of political party employees observed in the Western European parliaments after the Second World War (Cotta and Best 2000: 502) was absent in the Baltic countries. The full political party developments from cadre or elite party through the stages of mass and, later on, catch-all party to the cartel party described by Katz and Mair (1995) were missing either.

Employment in the political party in the Baltic Republics or a career of party politician was for almost half a century reserved exclusively for those involved in the structures of the Soviet Communist Party. The 1990 parliamentary elections and regained state independence in 1991 opened new opportunities for multi-party systems and careers of party politicians in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Employees of newly established and re-established political parties started to enter the Baltic parliaments; their proportion among legislators in the post-Communist period varies from 11.7 per cent in Latvia to 14.8 per cent in Lithuania which is close to the Eastern European average (see Edinger 2010: 134).

The data on party employees in the Baltic parliaments reveal cross-country differences with regard to political party families. The largest proportion of party employees in Estonian parliaments is found among Left Liberals; the highest percentages of political party employees are observed among Conservatives in Latvian parliaments and Socialists/Social Democrats in Lithuanian parliaments.

A common feature of party employees in the Baltic parliaments is a relatively low percentage of university degrees (about 88 per cent on average) and absence of pre-parliamentary cabinet experience[88].

Party employees in the Estonian parliaments distinguish themselves from their Baltic counterparts with the highest proportion of degrees in humanities and social sciences (52.4 per cent on average), the highest percentage of women (22.2 per cent) and rich pre-parliamentary political experience: more than a half (57.6 per cent) of party employees in Estonian parliaments held local elective position, more than a third (36.4 per cent) held two political offices before entering legislature. However, they have least parliamentary experience compared to their Baltic colleagues: the highest percentage of parliamentary newcomers (64.6 per cent) and the lowest percentage of parliamentary incumbents (34.1 per cent), lowest proportions of

[88] The exeptions are the 1995 and the 2010 Latvian Saeima and the 2012 Lithuanian Seimas having one party employee with experience as a cabinet minister.

longstanding legislators and absence of experienced founders, the shortest legislative tenure (1.5 years) and the smallest age difference between all MPs and newcomers indicate that party employees in Estonian parliaments had the worst chances to continue parliamentary careers.

Party employees in Latvian parliaments stand out with the highest percentages of degrees in law (13.2 per cent) and in technical and natural sciences (72.4 per cent), the highest proportion of ethnic minorities (18.8 per cent) and the lowest percentage of public sector employees (27.1 per cent). The highest proportions of experienced founders (20.6 per cent) and longstanding MPs (34 per cent) show that party employees in Latvian parliaments had more favourable conditions for parliamentary careers compared to their Baltic colleagues. Party employees in Latvian parliaments distinguish themselves not only with the highest share of the Soviet Communist Party members (one-third) but also with highest proportions of dissidents (11.5 per cent) and those who were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive apparat of the Soviet regime.

Party employees in Lithuanian parliaments distinguish themselves with the highest percentage of doctorates (17.2 per cent). Although they have the highest percentage of those who held leading party positions (50 per cent), in general party employees in Lithuanian parliaments have less pre-parliamentary political experience than their Baltic colleagues (one quarter came to parliament without any political experience, 61.1 per cent held one political office before getting elected to legislature). With the lowest percentage of parliamentary newcomers (53.5 per cent), the highest share of incumbents (46.9 per cent) and the longest tenure (1.9 terms on average), party employees in Lithuanian parliaments have very good opportunities for legislative careers. The highest percentages of local soviets' members (20.8 per cent on average), Soviet Communist party leaders (23.6 per cent) and representatives of nomenklatura (29.9 per cent) show that party employees were involved more in these Soviet structures than their Baltic counterparts.

The rising proportions of party employees in the last Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliaments (see annex tables 5.2.3.1 to 5.2.3.3) conform to the general trends of rising percentages of party politicians in legislatures of both Eastern (see Edinger 2010: 134) and Western Europe (see Fiers and Secker 2007: 144). There is no upper benchmark of party employees recommended for parliaments of democratic polities, however, one should not forget that the highest percentage in the

parliamentary history ever was observed in the Weimar Germany before Nazi takeover (see Cotta and Best 2000: 502)[89].

5.2.4. Civil Servants

Democracy theorists often see a legislature as an institution capable to counterbalance the power of the executive or bureaucracy. To employ a more historical perspective, "the elected parliaments were introduced in Europe for the fundamental purpose of cheking and controlling the absolutist (or semi-absolutist) monarchies which in the previous period had greatly expanded their powers thanks to the development of the large and pervasive bureaucracies of the modern state" (Cotta and Almeida 2007: 51). Therefore, absence of civil servants would be an expected finding in the parliaments of democratic polities. However, in reality this is not the case; in many European countries civil servants are an important source for legislative recruitment (see Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007). The Baltic parliaments are no exeption of this; in the Latvian Saeima and the Lithuanian Seimas civil servants comprise 18.1 and 15.9 per cent of all MPs respectively. In Estonia even more than an every fourth legislator has an occupational background in civil service (see annex tables 5.2.4.1 to 5.2.4.3).

Estonia clearly leads in high numbers of civil servants in parliaments not only among Eastern European[90] but also among Western European democracies. The only Western European democracy close to Estonia in terms of legislative recruitment of civil servants is Finnland, having almost 30 per cent of civil servants in its parliaments on average between 1987 and 1997 (see Ruostetsaari 2000: 66). It is possible to explain the large number of civil servants in Estonian parliaments by a geographical and linguistic proximity of Finland, interprete it as an indication of executive dominance over a legislature or a sign of the strong intervening state - a large number of civil servants among parliamentary representatives is seen as a consequence of "the developent of large-scale interventions of the state in the economy, the ever broader welfare policies and the great expansion of state

[89] In Germany "one in three MPs had previously been employed through his party at the first elections of the the Weimar Republic in 1919. This share reached a peak of 40 per cent at the 1932 elections" (Fiers and Secker 2007: 143).

[90] Slovenia is the only post-Communist country which could overcome Estonia: "Since the mid-1990s in Slovenia, or example, the majority of MPs have had backgrounds in higher administration" (Edinger 2010: 135).

bureaucracies after the Second World War" (Cotta and Almeida 2007: 56). The 20th century trends with "the growing state apparatus, increasingly led by technically trained, professional career administrators" (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981: 1) fully confirmed the prophecy of the emerging modern bureaucracy proclaimed by Max Weber in 1918 (Weber 1988: 320-321). The inescapable part of the prophecy or the side-effect of the emerging modern bureaucracy in the 20th century was the arrival of professional politicians. Max Weber differentiated between bureaucrats and politicians not in terms of constitutional separation of powers (executive vs. legislature) but rather in terms of two different logics of responsibility: impartiality vs. passion (Weber 1988: 524-525). Being concerned about the consequences of domination by civil servants over the weak Reichstag in imperial Germany, Weber was in favour of strengthening a parliament. In a parliament he saw a training ground for politicians with the capacity for leadership and an institution capable to control the administrative apparat (Beetham 1992: 113).

Inspired by the Weberian analytical distinction, Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981) proposed four types of possible relations between civil servants and parliamentary politicians.

1. "Policy versus Administration:
Politicians make policy; civil servants administer. Politicians make decisions; bureaucrats merely implement them."
2. "Facts versus Interests:
Both politicians and civil servants participate in making policy. Civil servants bring facts and knowledge; politicians, interests and values."
3. "Energy versus Equilibrium:
Both bureaucrats and politicians engage in policymaking, and both are concerned with politics. Whereas politicians articulate broad, diffuse interests of unorganized individuals, bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of organized clienteles. Politicians are passionate, partisan, idealistic, even ideological; bureaucrats are, by contrast, prudent, centrist, practical, pragmatic."
4. "Pure Hybrid." (Aberbach et al 1981: 4, 6, 9, 16)

The first type (Weberian distinction) separates civil servants and parliamentary politicians completely; the fourth type indicates an absence of differences between bureaucrats and politicians. The types 2 and 3 indicate some overlap or increasing convergence of bureaucracy and politics.

The Estonian and Latvian rules of parliamentary incompatibility favor the first type of relationship - Latvian and Estonian MPs give up their parliamentary mandates in case they take up posts of cabinet ministers. Lithuanian parliaments, on the contrary, opt for the hybrid relationship – there legislators combine their parliamentary offices with the positions of cabinet ministers. However, if we look at the large proportions of civil servants in the Baltic parliaments, the second and third types of relations between civil servants and politicians seem to be more corresponding to reality. In support of this, one should also bear in mind that the government with its ministries (not parliament) is the largest law initiator in the law-making process.

If we look at careers and recruitment patterns of civil servants in Baltic parliaments, our data disclose some similarities and many differencies among Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian legislators.

In terms of political party families, the Left Liberals dominate among Estonian civil servants and Conservatives prevail among Latvian and Lithuanian civil servants.

The university education of civil servants varies from 95.5 per cent in Lithuanian parliaments to 100 per cent in Latvian legislatures. Estonian and Latvian parliaments show a dominance of technical and natural sciences over humanities and social sciences among civil servants, however, if the election results in the 2007 and 2011 Riigikogu and the 2008 and 2012 Seimas will turn into stable trends, the Estonian and Lithuanian developments may follow the Latvian track which is described by the prevalence of humanities and social sciences among legislators with background in civil service. All Baltic legislators with experience as civil servants come from the public sector, and that is not surprising since civil service is by definition a public service.

Civil servants in Estonian parliaments distinguish themselves from their Baltic colleagues with the highest proportion of doctorates (20.3 per cent of those with university degrees), highest percentages of those having local elective experience (66.8 per cent) and those who held two political offices before the first time getting elected to parliament (33.2 per cent) and, at the same time, with the lowest proportions of women (16.8 per cent) and ethnic minorities (4 per cent). The civil servants in Estonian parliaments have better opportunities for parliamentary careers by being more experienced in the following dimensions compared to their Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts: the lowest proportion of parliamentary newcomers and the

highest percentage of incumbents, the highest percentages of experienced founders and longstanding MPs (serving at least three legislative terms), the highest mean number of successful elections and the largest difference in age between all civil servants and newcomers. Civil servants in Estonian parliaments have also the highest percentages of former members of the Soviet Communist party.

Civil servants in Latvian parliaments stand out with the highest percentage of those holding degrees in law (17.4 per cent) and in humanities and social sciences (52.9 per cent) compared to their Estonian and Latvian counterparts. Civil servants in Latvian parliaments have the lowest proportion of doctorates (10.1 per cent), although they have more MPs with university degrees (100 per cent) than their Baltic colleagues. Civil servants in Latvian legislatures have the highest proportion of former cabinet ministers and ethnic minorities out of all Baltic parliaments, however, they have the worst opportunities for parliamentary careers since they have the highest percentage of newcomers and the lowest share of incumbents among all Baltic legislators with experience in civil service. The highest percentages of those with experience in council of ministers (8.7 per cent), Supreme Soviet (11.6 per cent) and national nomenklatura (29.7 per cent) show that civil servants from Latvian parliaments have more continuity with the Soviet past compared to their counterparts from other Baltic parliaments.

Civil servants in the Lithuanian legislatures distinguish themselves from their counterparts in other Baltic parliaments by the highest proportion of technical and natural sciences (52 per cent), the highest percentage of MPs entering parliament without any political experience (29.7 per cent) and the highest share of women (28.4 per cent). A higher proportion of former members of the local soviets is an additional feature of civil servants in the Lithuanian parliaments.

5.2.5. Managers and Businessmen

Although Max Weber (1988: 514) and Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) did not consider businessmen (especially large-scale entrepreneurs) suitable for a full-time legislative activity, they are present and visible in many European and non-European parliaments.

Out of the three Baltic countries Latvia earned a reputation of having the strongest impact of so called 'oligarchs' on national politics (The Baltic Times 2010;

Baltic News Service 2011), however, it is Lithuania, not Latvia which has the highest proportion of businessmen and managers in parliaments (24.4 per cent compared to 23.2 percent on average). If we take separate legislatures, we find that Lithuania in the parliaments of 2000 and 2004 – there businessmen comprised 41.1 and 36.2 per cent of all legislators accordingly - had already achieved the levels of businessmen representation in the Ukrainian and Russian parliaments where 30 to 40 per cent of all deputies are businessmen and managers (Semenova 2008: 40; Semenova 2012: 548).

The notion of the term 'oligarchy' in the public discourse of the Baltic countries has little to do with the concept of Robert Michels (1966) referring to the bureaucratisation of the political parties or four kinds of oligarchy by Aristotle (1995: 83) for whom oligarchy meant a debased form of aristocracy. Oligarchy in the Baltics is understood rather as a political system serving the richest persons in the country; oligarchs are considered not simply large-scale entrepreneurs, but the large-scale entrepreneurs who mix business with politics. In other words, they combine their business activity with political positions in parliament and cabinet of ministers. The rules of incombatibility do not allow Baltic MPs to combine business activity with the office of parliamentary representative, however, a numerous presence of businessmen in the Latvian Saeima and Lithuanian Seimas raise the suspicion that for them a parliamentary office means a continuation of their business activity with other (political) means.

The Latvian political system is often described as the oligarchy of "(AŠ)2+AL" where AŠ are initials for Andris Šķēle and Ainārs Šlesers and AL initials for Aivars Lembergs (Oborune 2011). Andris Šķēle, founder and leader of the People's Party, three times Prime Minister of Latvia and three times elected to the national parliament, managed to privatise the largest and most successful enterprises of food industry. Ainārs Šlesers, chairman of the New Party and later on leader of the First Party, Minister of Transport (three times) and Minister of Economics, twice Deputy Prime-Minister and MP of Saeima four legislative terms, pursued his interests in transport business (Latvian railways, Riga free port and airport). Aivars Lembergs, mayor of Ventspils, former Ventspils district Soviet Communist Party secretary and Chairman of the Town Executive Committee, nominated by the Latvian Green Party

for the post of prime minister in 2006 and 2010[91]; his main domains of activity are shipping and oil transit[92]. In 2010 Andris Šķēle, Ainārs Šlesers and some other Latvia's leading businessmen run for the Latvian Saeima on the list of the political party "For a Good Latvia", however, a couple of months after the parliamentary seats have been won they did not need a party anymore, started to split and explained that "it would be easier for them to accomplish their objectives on their own" (The Baltic Times 2011a). The fight against oligarchs and political corruption was on agenda of Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, President of Latvia 1999-2007, however, its culmination was achieved in 2011 when the Latvian President Valdis Zatlers dissolved the 2010 Saeima[93] and announced new parliamentary elections.

The warning about oligarchic tendencies in the Lithuanian political system was expressed by Valdas Adamkus, President of Lithuania 1998-2003 and 2004-2009, in his last state of the nation address (Adamkus 2009: 8) and indicated by some social scientists (Genzelis 2009: 134; Bielinis in Rašimaitė 2011: 7)

The candidates' list of Lithuanian oligarchs is not as complete as in the case of Latvia but it would definitely include Viktor Uspaskich, the Russian born charismatic millionaire and member of the Lithuanian parliament from 2000 to 2005, from 2008 to 2009 and from 2012 onwards. His populist Labour Party, founded in 2003, demonstrated a meteoric rise in the 2004 Lithuanian parliamentary elections (39 seats out of 141). Upon demand of coalition partners, he refused to candidate for the post of prime minister as the chairman of the single winning party and "modestly" agreed to become minister of economics. Officially accused of mixing private and public interests, in June 2005 he gave up the position of minister and mandate of MP. As in May 2006 the Labour Party was charged with illegal income and unpayed taxes by the state prosecutors, Viktor Uspaskich escaped to Russia and gave up the post of the party chairman[94]. After return from hide of almost 1.5 years in Moscow, in November 2007 he regained the official position of party chairman, run successfully for a seat in

[91] He remained official candidate of the Green Party "even after he was subsequently arrested and charged with paying over five million lats in bribes to Latvian political parties and politicians in spring 2007" (Galbreath and Auers 2009: 345). In 2011 the High Court of England ordered to freeze his assets in the value of 135 million US dollars (The Baltic Times 2011c).

[92] Interests in media market should be mentioned as well, "The Ventspils group controls two of the three major Latvian daily newspapers – *Latvijas Avize* and *Neatkariga Rita Avize*" (Galbreath and Auers 2009: 344).

[93] This was the President's reaction to the refusal of Saeima to lift the immunity of MP Ainārs Šlesers charged with corruption.

[94] He continued of course to give political orders to his party comrades in Lithuania from there (once the party board held even a meeting and press conference in Moscow).

the Lithuanian Parliament in 2008 and 2012 and was elected to the European Parliament in 2009.

Another person who mixes business with politics is Ramūnas Karbauskis, the chairman of the Peasants‘ Party 1997-2001 and the chairman of the Lithuanian Peasants People‘s Union[95] since 2009. He was a member of the Lithuanian parliament from 1996 to 2004 and held a post of a deputy speaker of Seimas from 2000 to 2001. He is involved in the business of agriculture as the CEO of Agrokoncernas Ltd and its main shareholder.

The Lithuanian post-Soviet political system was influenced by Bronislovas Lubys, who was not only an MP (1990-1992), Deputy Prime Minister (1991-1992) and Prime Minister of Lithuania (1992-1993), but also the CEO and the main shareholder of fertilizers‘ factory *Achema*, president of one stevedoring company and the chairman of the Lithuanian Industrialists‘ Confederation. He did not lead any political party, but owned a daily newspaper, television and many radio stations (Eigirdas 2011: 19).

The culmination of oligarchic tendencies in Lithuania was the LEO LT (Lithuanian Electricity Organisation) project proposed in 2007 by the leading Lithuanian businessmen[96] and the Prime Minister Gediminas Kirkilas; it officially aimed at the creation of a ‘national investor’ for the new nuclear power plant[97]. Although the project lacked transparency[98] and was an obvious attempt to monopolise the energy market, in 2008 the Lithuanian parliament approved the agreement negotiated between the Government and *NDX Energija*[99]. With the time and more information available, the real intentions of this project became suspicious in the eyes of the society and resulted into petitions and protests. In 2009 the newly elected Lithuanian Seimas voted to liquidate the LEO LT.

Estonia does have large-scale enterepreneurs like Vjatcheslav Leedo and Nikolai Ossipenko (The Baltic Times 2011b) but they abstain from direct involvement in

[95] Original name in Lithuanian: Lietuvos valstiečių liaudininkų sąjunga.
[96] The privately owned company *NDX Energija*, part of the *VP Market Group*. Four out of eight richest persons in Lithuania in 2011 were the owners of the VP Market Group (Rašimaitė 2011: 7).
[97] The only nuclear power plant in Lithuania (in Ignalina) was to be closed in 2009 as a condition in the accession treaty between the EU and Lithuania.
[98] *NDX Energija* was selected without public competition, Seimas violated the rule of procedure (§3 of the chapter 67).
[99] The law was also signed, not vetoed by President Adamkus who warned about oligarchic trends in Lithuanian politics.

politics (they are not members of parliament or cabinet of ministers[100]). Absence of oligarchs in Estonia explained by the fact that "most of Estonia's larger enterprises were acquired by foreigners, which did not allow local businessmen to amass assets" (The Baltic Times 2011b). Privatisation in Estonia was handled at a much higher speed compared to Latvia and Lithuania, this prevented from monopoly of local businessmen.

Our data on the Baltic MPs indicate that Left Liberals are the largest party family among managers and businessmen in the Estonian Riigikogu; a similar role is taken by Conservatives in the Latvian Saeima and Socialists/Social Democrats in the Lithuanian Seimas. There is no surprise to find the largest shares of liberals and conservatives among businessmen, however, the dominance of social democrats[101] requires an additional explanation. The Socialists/Social Democrats in Lithuanian parliaments are to a large extent former Communists who preserved old social networks and took advantage of privatisation; in other words, they managed to transfer a political and social capital into a financial one (differently from Estonia and Latvia, the Communist Party of Lithuania was successfully transformed into the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, the 1992 electoral winner, which in 2001 merged with the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and acquired its name).

The university education of managers and businessmen varies from 88.4 per cent in Latvian parliaments to 97.3 per cent in Estonian legislatures (see annex tables 5.2.5.1 to 5.2.5.3). The dominance of technical and natural sciences over humanities and social sciences among managers is a common feature of all Baltic parliaments (this dominance is especially evident in the case of Latvia where the proportion of technical and natural sciences is almost three times larger than the one of humanities and social sciences).

Estonian managers and businessmen distinguish themselves in the largest proportion of university education (97.3 per cent) and the highest proportion of degrees in technical and natural sciences (69.1 per cent). They are the most experienced in local politics (60.5 per cent) and cabinet of ministers membership (6.1

[100] The entrepreneur Tiit Vähi is an exception of this, he was Prime Minister of Estonia twice: in 1992 and from 1995 to 1997.

[101] The largest number of businessmen in the 2000 Seimas were found in the Lithuanian Liberal Union, in the 2004 Seimas – in the the Labour Party which could be possibly considered a liberal party (in the European Parliament it belongs to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe), however, if we take all seven parliamentary terms, socialists/social democracts have most businessmen among Lithuanian political party families.

per cent); 12.3 per cent of them belonged to the Citizens' Committees. More than a half (57.9 per cent) of Estonian managers had at least one type of political experience before entering legislature for the first time.[102] The highest percentages of those with experience in local soviets (22.8 per cent), supreme soviets (7.9 per cent), the Communist Party (40.4 per cent) and political repressions with regard to parents (9.6 per cent) are also features of Estonian managers. This rich pre-parliamentary experience stands in sharp contrast with their parliamentary experience – two-thirds of managers and businessmen in Estonian legislatures are parliamentary newcomers and only 28.9 per cent are incumbents. The highest shares of female MPs (11.4 per cent) and public sector (54.4 per cent) are two more characteristics of managers in Estonian legislatures.

The managers and businessmen in Latvian parliaments distinguish themselves from their Baltic colleagues in the smallest proportions of university degrees (83.6 per cent) and humanities and social sciences (29.4 per cent). Low proportions of pre-parliamentary experience – both post-Soviet and Soviet – are other features of Latvian managers: only 25.7 per cent of them were members of the local councils, about three-fifths (60.1 per cent) came to parliament without any post-Soviet political experience. The Soviet experience provides low figures as well: 3.3 per cent for local soviets, 0.5 per cent for councils of ministers and dissidents, 14.2 per cent for nomenklatura and no experience in supreme soviets. However, in terms of the post-Soviet legislative experience managers and businessmen in Latvian parliaments are the most experienced; they have the largest proportion of parliamentary incumbents (34.5 per cent). The largest proportion of ethnic minorities (24 per cent) compared to Estonian and Lithuanian colleagues is another feature of Latvian managers and businessmen. The latter could be explained by the outcome of ethnic democracy in Latvia which reserved the state (civil service) and politics for ethnic Latvians and pushed many ethnic minorities into business and etrepreneurship (see Dreifelds 1996).

Managers and businessmen in Lithuanian parliaments stand out with the highest percentage of degrees in humanities and social sciences (49.3 per cent) and percentage of doctoral degrees (11.7 per cent which is almost two times more than among their Estonian and Latvian counterparts). The lowest percentages of those from public sector (26.4 per cent), with leading party (16.3 per cent) and cabinet of

[102] The figures for Latvia and Lithuania are only 32.2 and 36.4 per cent respectively.

ministers (3.8 per cent) experience, the highest percentage of former dissidents (5.4 per cent) and the lowest share of Soviet Communists (24.3 per cent) are special features of managers in Lithuanian parliaments.

If the Russian Duma and the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada are excluded, the Lithuanian and Latvian parliaments clearly lead in presence of businessmen and managers in legislatures of Eastern Europe. Out of western European parliaments after 1989, France with over 20 per cent (see Best and Gaxie 2000: 100) and Austria with 21.3 per cent are the closiest countries to Lithuania and Latvia. The only unsurpassed leader remains the Parliament of the United Kingdom where after the Second World War every third legislator has an occupational background in business (see Rush and Cromwell 2000: 476) and where the "Conservative Party still draws 56 per cent of its MPs from the sphere of business" (Best et al. 2001: 74). The persistence of business interests in the UK Parliament is historically explained by the "industrial and commercial interests seeking to have a direct impact on policy through Parliament, especially during the industrial revolution" (Rush and Cromwell 2000: 482). In this respect, the UK Parliament is more similar to the US Congress which enormous proportions of businessmen and other oligarchic trends allowed C. Wright Mills (1956) to develop a critical concept of 'power elite' and enabled Dye and Zeigler (1996) to describe American politics as an irony of democracy. However, one has to be careful in interpreting high numbers of businessmen in Eastern European and Anglo-American parliaments. In order to avoid a misleading comparison of "oranges and apples", one has to bear in mind that most MPs in the UK and US legislatures come from private sector, which is not the case in the Baltic (also Russian and Ukrainian) parliaments. Presence of large numbers of businessmen and liberal professions (especially lawyers) in Anglo-American legislatures comes close to a tradition of strong civil society seeking control of government (the state), whereas historical weakness of civil societies and heritage of the strong socialist state in Eastern Europe make business activity easier a part of the political domain. Post-socialist Eastern Europe is rather a system of 'political capitalism' (Staniszkis 1991) or a system ruled by 'grand coalition' of the former communist oligarchy, upper and upper-middle layers of state bureaucracy, and classes of managers (from big state companies and agricultural co-operatives) and entrepreneurs (Hankiss 1990: 240).

5.2.6. Lawyers and Other Liberal Professions

Lawyers own a special place among occupations in a society and a parliament. In a society, because law was "the first occupational field to professionalize anywhere in the world" (Sciulli 2009: 75).[103] In a parliament, because a large (in some – the largest) proportion of legislators has an occupational background in law. Eulau and Sprague (1964: 11) call lawyers "the high priests of politics". The largest percentages of lawyers in parliaments are found in the United States (Matthews 1984: 551; Rueschemeyer 1989: 310), however, importance of lawyers in the western European parliamentary recruitment is observed as well (see Best and Cotta 2000). Among valid explanations of this phenomenon are (1) the verbal/talking nature of this profession and (2) relative easiness (in comparison with other professional occupations) to move back to the lawyer's job after leaving a parliament[104]. Legislation is about discussing and drafting the laws, therefore, lawyers are much better prepared for this activity than representatives of other professions.

The Baltic parliaments, as well as other Eastern European legislatures[105], differ from western legislatures in having very low proportions of lawyers (between 2 and 3 per cent on average). Therefore, for the sake of our further analysis, we increased the number of cases by adding MPs with occupational background in law to the representatives of other liberal professions in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures. (On average, lawyers comprise 27.9 per cent, 20.5 percent and 14.1 per cent of all liberal professions in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures respectively.)

The data on parliamentary party families show that Right and Left Liberals have the largest proportions among Estonian liberal professions, Conservatives lead among Latvian and Lithuanian liberal professions.

The common feature of representatives of liberal professions in the Baltic parliaments (see annex tables 5.2.6.1 to 5.2.6.3) is a relatively large proportion of public sector (from 68.9 per cent in Estonia to 80.9 per cent in Lithuania).

[103] The English law got professionalised during the mid- or late nineteenth century (Abbott 1988: 247); medicine, science and engineering got professionalised in the beginning of the 20th century (Sciulli 2009: 75-76). In Germany lawyers had become professionalised in the late 1870s, followed by teachers in the first decade of the 20th century and engineers after 1918 (Jarausch 1990: 8).
[104] Some US scholars report findings that "solo and small firm lawyers, regardless of party, are more likely to seek or hold office than large firm lawyers" (McIntosh and Stanga 1976: 440).
[105] Especially the national legislatures of the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Russia.

Representatives of liberal professions in Estonian parliaments distinguish themselves from their Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts by the largest proportions of degrees in law (29.8 per cent) and humanities and social sciences (22.8 per cent) and the highest percentage of local political experience. With the highest percentage of parliamentary newcomers (67.2 per cent), the lowest percentage of incumbents (39.6 per cent) and 1.5 mandates on average, Estonian MPs are least experienced in parliamentary affairs. The largest proportions of former members of local soviets (9.8 per cent on average), national nomenklatura (26.2 per cent) and Communist party (41 per cent) show that they have been more involved in the Soviet structures than their Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts.

Lawyers and representatives of other liberal professions from Latvian parliaments stand out with the lowest percentage of university degrees (92.2 per cent) and the largest proportions of party leaders (30.1 per cent) and parliamentary incumbents (43.2 per cent).

Lawyers and representatives of other liberal professions from Lithuanian parliaments distinguish themselves with the highest proportions of university degrees (99.2 per cent) and doctorates (21.5 per cent), the highest percentages of degrees in medicine, natural and technical sciences (73.8 per cent). Compared to their Estonian and Latvian counterparts, they have least of pre-parliamentary political experience – almost a half of them did not have any political experience before entering legislature. However, with the lowest percentage of parliamentary newcomers (53.4 per cent) and the highest proportions of long-standing MPs (serving three or more terms with or without interruption), almost five years age difference between all MPs and newcomers and 1.9 mandates on average they are the most experienced in parliamentary affairs among lawyers and other liberal professions in the Baltic legislatures. They have not only the lowest proportion of former Communists (16 per cent), but also the largest percentages of Soviet dissidents (10.7 per cent) and those born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive apparat of the Soviet regime (19.8 per cent).

There are at least four explanations for low percentages of lawyers in the Baltic parliaments, namely: (1) supply, (2) incentives, (3) global trends in parliamentary recruitment, (4) society and state structure.

1. Supply side - too few lawyers in the Baltic societies. For instance, the dominance of lawyers in the U.S.A. parliaments could be explained by the fact that the U.S.A. have the largest legal profession in general - both in absolute numbers and in proportion to the population - in the world[106]. The regained independence of the Baltic States after the collapse of the USSR opened wider opportunities in teaching law and training lawyers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, however, we do not observe (yet) increase neither of lawyers nor those with legal education in the Baltic legislatures.

2. Incentives structure: an MP position is not attractive enough for the Baltic lawyers in terms of financial remuneration and career opportunities. Election to the parliament requires to stop working for their clients which is not the case in some other European countries with large proportion of lawyers in legislatures.[107]

3. Global trend: The last couple of decades show a world-wide trend of decreasing percentages of lawyers in parliaments (also in the United States) and the Baltic legislatures are simply part of this global trend (see Cotta and Best 2000: 501).

4. Scandinavian affinity: A more precise inspection of the parliamentary recruitment in the western European parliaments of the 20th century (see Best and Cotta 2000) discloses that Scandinavian countries – Denmark[108], Norway and Finnland – have strikingly similar (low) levels of lawyers in their parliaments. Hence, the Baltic parliaments may simply follow a Scandinavian way of legislative recruitment in this respect.

5.3. Concluding Remarks on Occupational Background of MPs: Left Liberals in Estonia, Conservatives in Latvia and Socialists/Social Democrats in Lithuania

The data on occupational representation in the Baltic parliaments allows us to distinguish, to a large extent, the transitional and post-transitional parliamentary elites. In general, on the basis of a decreasing recruitment of teachers and professors,

[106] In 1983, "there were more than four times as many lawyers per capita in the United States as there were Rechtsanwälte in West Germany or barristers and solicitors combined in England" (Rueschemeyer 1989: 291).
[107] For instance, Italian laws allow lawyers (as well as architects) to continue working for their clients while having taken up a seat in the lower house.
[108] For a contrasting comparison of the Danish and US legislatures see Pedersen 1972.

journalists and writers, public sector employees, and increasing recruitment of managers and businessmen, civil servants, one can roughly talk about structural circulation of parliamentary elites and transformation of their social profile. However, a more detailed inspection of the data provides us with evidence that in some cases there is a continuity (e.g. stable patterns in parliamentary representation of lawyers in Estonia and Lithuania) or a mere change without transformation (fluctuations in representation of lawyers and civil servants in Latvian parliaments or public sector employees in Estonian legislatures); and, if there is a transformation of patterns in occupational representation, it is limited to one country only (e.g. decline of liberal professions in the Estonian Riigikogu).

The higher percentages of civil servants in Estonian parliaments could be partly explained by the higher share of civil servants in Estonian society in comparison with societies of Latvia and Lithuania[109]; the higher percentage of businessmen in Lithuanian parliaments could be partly attributed to the higher birth rates of enterprises in Lithuania in comparison with birth rates of enterprises in Estonia and Latvia (Eurostat Yearbook 2011: 324). However, representation of occupations in a parliament is not a simple mirroring process of the developments in a society; as longitudinal and historically grounded studies on parliamentary representation (Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007) demonstrate, some changes in the occupational structure of society affect the parliamentary representation with a huge delay or, sometimes, occupational representation in parliament even follows a pattern which is rather independent from changes in a society (e.g. U-curve in representation of public sector in the European national parliaments).

Which occupations have been more suitable for parliamentary careers in the Baltic countries? Which professions produced most of professional legislators?

Our data show that these occupations are teachers and professors in Estonia and Lithuania and political party employees in Latvia – they have the highest average mean number of mandates and the largest percentage of MPs with tenure of at least three terms in the legislatures of the respective countries; the second relevant occupations are liberal professions (including lawyers) in Estonian and Lithuanian parliaments and writers/journalists in the Latvian legislature.

[109] If we take employees in the public administration and administrative and supportive service in 2011 as a proxy for civil servants, Estonia has the largest comparative percentage among the Baltic States (information from national statistical offices of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).

If we take the age of parliamentary newcomers as an indicator for beginning of legislative careers, we find that the youngest occupational groups are the political party employees in Estonian and Lithuanian parliaments, the second youngest being managers and businessmen in Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures. The explanation for this finding is that employment in a political party and a start of own business are less related to formal entrance requirements in comparison with other occupations, therefore, individuals of a younger age are able to enter these occupations earlier.

The oldest parliamentary newcomers in all three Baltic parliaments are journalists and writers, second oldest being teachers and professors. With some exceptions, writer's occupation is a life-long project bringing fruits in the mature stage of career (differently from careers in sports, it takes years or even decades to earn a reputation as a famous writer). Similarly, a university professorship is often received in the mature period of occupational advancement which means that a young age is rather an exeption than a rule.

Professions represent a social closure in themselves (Collins 1979), and the parliament even increases this social closure. For instance, in Baltic societies civil servants and managers constitute from 8.1 to 12.4 per cent of all working population (2000 Round of Population and Housing Censuses in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 2003: 45), whereas the combined average for civil servants and managers in the Baltic parliaments comprises from 40.3 per cent to 44.5 per cent (see table 5.2 in the beginning of this chapter). Hence, the Putnam's law of increasing disproportion is at work; the parliament displays its elitist nature by increasing overrepresentation of non-manual and more prestigous occupations. The same applies for the recruitment from public sector.

Cross-country differences in occupational backround among Baltic legislators clearly coincide with the lines of political party families, namely the largest political families in all occupational groups are Left Liberals in Estonia, Conservatives in Latvia and Socialists/Social Democrats in Lithuania.[110] This tallies well with the prominence of Liberals and Conservatives in the politics of Estonia and Latvia after 1990 and an exceptional success of the former Lithuanian Communist Party that managed to transform itself into a new political organisation in the post-Communist Lithuania.

[110] Except for the civil servants and liberal professions (including lawyers) in the Lithuanian parliaments.

6. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Baltic Legislators

A great amount of literature on established democracies emphasise the importance of previous political experience before getting elected to the parliament (Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007), amount and type of previous political experience are considered signs of political professionalisation of a given assembly (Fiers and Secker 2007: 137).

Our analysis focuses on the parliaments of the countries under transition which is defined as "the interval between one political regime and another" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1993: 6). In the case of the Baltic States after 1990, as well as of the entire Eastern Europe, we have to do not only with a political (which is relatively short[111]) but also with an economic and social transitions plus nation building (see Ágh 1998: 49-50; Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998: 18). The political transition was clearly over long before 2004 when all three Baltic States joined the European Union[112], however, we see it meaningful to incorporate into our research since our longitudinal analysis starts with the parliaments elected in 1990.

Although the new Eastern European democracies begin as "institutional *Tabula Rasa* of 1989" (Elster et al. 1998: 25), personally they have to rely on some cadres from the old regime (Keller 1999: 358)[113]. The Baltic States after 1990 are no exeption of this; therefore, we hypothesise that, the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures[114]. Secondly, knowing that the stages of democratic transition, transformation and consolidation have different tasks and institutional choices (Dahrendorf 1990; Wasilewski 2000), we ask whether parliamentarians in the transition phase are different from legislators in the phase of consolidation, and if yes, whether this means a parliamentary elite

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[111] According to Linz and Stepan (1996: 3), "A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*".

[112] In 2002, Thomas Carothers argued that we should talk not only about the end of transition in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, but even about the end of transition paradigm in political science.

[113] Except for East Germany. For reproduction of old elites see theses of Hankiss (1990) and Staniszkis (1991).

[114] At first glance this statement sounds rather trivial, however, our further analysis of pre-parliamentary political experience in the Baltics provides with an empirical variety.

transformation. Thirdly, relying on the fact that appointed politicians are more distanced from voters in comparison with elected politicians[115], we expect that MPs with cabinet experience will display more elitist characteristics (better educated and less women) than MPs with local elective and leading party positions.

Hypotheses:

1. The more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures.
2. Parliamentary elite tranformation: MPs in the starting legislative terms will be qualitatively different from legislators in the last parliaments.
3. Since appointed politicians are more distanced from voters in comparison with elected politicians, MPs with cabinet experience will display more elitist characteristics than MPs with local elective and leading party positions.

Since we are interested in professionalisation of politicians, we also ask which sort of pre-parliamentary political experience leads to the longest parliamentary tenure or, in other words, which pre-parliamentary political pathway increases the chances to become a professional legislator.

The following chapter screens and compares three types of pre-parliamentary political experience[116] – local elective positions, political party leadership and membership in the cabinet of ministers – according to seven parameters: (1) education, (2) democratic political experience, (3) occupation, (4) gender, (5) ethnicity, (6) non-democratic political experience and (7) age and seniority. For the sake of shortness, MPs with experience in local councils will be called *local politicians*, parliamentarians with experience in political party leadership will be named *political party leaders* and parliamentary representatives with cabinet experience will be labelled *cabinet ministers*.

[115] According to Putnam (1976: 39), “elected elites are typically more representative demographically than are other strategic elites”.
[116] According to Putnam (1976: 49), “political parties, bureaucracies, and local governments are the most common institutional channels into the political elite”.

Table 6.1. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Baltic Legislators (in per cent)

Estonian MPs as Previous	1990	1992	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Local Politicians	41.0	27.7	45.5	63.4	65.3	73.3	77.2
Political Party Leaders	27.6	45.5	42.6	25.7	15.8	17.8	19.8
Cabinet Ministers	3.0	5.0	8.9	9.9	22.8	15.8	16.8
Latvian MPs as Previous	1990	1993	1995	1998	2002	2006	2010
Local Politicians	18.9	14.0	17.0	37.0	29.0	45.0	39.0
Political Party Leaders	13.9	17.0	20.0	28.0	31.0	37.0	35.0
Cabinet Ministers	1.0	8.0	12.0	13.0	11.0	14.0	12.0
Lithuanian MPs as Previous	1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Local Politicians	4.5	11.3	32.8	49.6	46.1	47.5	54.7
Political Party Leaders	13.5	24.8	27.0	34.0	26.2	27.0	25.2
Cabinet Ministers	0	0.7	4.4	4.3	4.3	2.8	3.6

Source: Own data and calculations.

6.1. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Legislators in Estonia

6.1.1. Estonian MPs as Local Politicians

The importance of the local political background among Estonian parliamentary representatives increases with every legislative term. The differences in local political background are especially evident between the first three and the last four parliamentary terms. This raises a question whether we have a qualitative transformation of parliamentary elite or observe a simple numerical increase of MPs with the same characteristics.

The former local politicians are well educated, 97 per cent of them on average have university degrees. Although technical and natural sciences dominate the university education of local politicians (47.9 per cent against 44 per cent for humanities and social sciences on average), the proportion of technical and natural sciences declines with every legislative term (see annex table 6.1.1). The humanities and social sciences demonstrate an impressive continuous rise from 1990 onwards. In the 2011 term they reach a share of 57.5 per cent, leaving technical and natural sciences a proportion of 28.8 per cent. Hence, we observe a transformation of educational profile among local politicians.

The proportion of law degrees fluctuates between 6.5 and 19.2 per cent (overall average: 12.2 per cent), the share of doctorates jumps and goes down between 4.1 and

22.6 per cent (overall average for doctoral degrees is 12.4 per cent), however, in those two cases we cannot observe a transformation of educational profile.

The data on political experience also support parliamentary elite transformation thesis. The last four terms differ from the first three terms with a distinction that cabinet experience is gaining weight over the years and the importance of members of citizens' committees and party leaders decreases rather with every legislature. The share of one type political experience gains importance (total average: 57.6 per cent) and the last four parliaments are rather different from the first ones as well. The importance of three types of political experience decreases continuously, the level of two types of political experience in the last three parliaments is stabilised around 30 per cent.

Left Liberals constitute the largest proportion of Estonian local politicians (33.1 per cent), Right Liberals with 21.6 per cent on average come second. Left Liberals are clear leaders in 1990, 1995 and 1999, Conservatives lead in 1992 and 2003. In the last two legislatures Right Liberals comprise the largest proportion of local politicians.

Civil servants are the largest occupational group among local politicians (33.8 per cent), they are followed by managers (17.3 per cent) and political paty employees (14.3 per cent). Although the public service indicates a declining trend with each legislative term, the employees of public service still comprise a solid proportion of 75.2 per cent.

The proportions of women (16 per cent) and ethnic minorities (9.3 per cent) among MPs with local political background disclose rather rising trends, however, the differences between the first three and last four parliaments are not clear-cut.

The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. Out of varieties of new political experience, the leading party position dominates among Estonian local politicians: 23.8 per cent of them on average held leading positions in the political parties, 12.3 per cent in the cabinet of ministers, 14.3 per cent were active in the citizens' committees. In terms of the old (Soviet) political experience, 38.6 per cent of local politicians were members of the Communist party, 23.3 per cent were part of the national nomenklatura, 16.5 per cent were part of the local political

structures in the Soviet regime, 3 per cent of local politicians occupied leading positions in the Communist party, 2.3 per cent belonged to councils of ministers, 1.5 per cent were members of the supreme councils.

The data indicate that 5 per cent of local politicians were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime. The share of former dissidents among local politicians is 2.5 per cent.

The data on seniority of MPs (the mean number of mandates, percentage of newcomers and incumbents) show signs of elite transformation: the proportion of incumbents grows continuously, the share of newcomers declines; the parliamentary tenure starting with 1 mandate in 1990 reaches 1.9 mandates in 2011. Still, in spite of these developments, turnover of newcomers remains high and very few MPs have legislative careers. On average, 62.9 per cent of MPs with local political background are newcomers, incumbents comprise 34.6 per cent. The parliamentary tenure is only 1.5 legislative terms. Another indicator that many local politicians do not have careers is the age difference between all MPs (46.7 years) and parliamentary newcomers (45.1 years) which is 1.6 years on average. Experienced founders (MPs from the 1990 parliaments) – similarly to the parliamentarians with Soviet political experience – leave legislatures. However, the share of longstanding MPs (serving at least three terms) continuously grows and reaches the level of 21.8 per cent in the last parliament.

6.1.2. Estonian MPs as Political Party Leaders

The data on the political party leaders show that their share in the last three parliaments is much lower than their share in the first four legislatures. This is an unexpected and counterintuitive finding since all types of democratic political experience are expected to gain weight in the Baltic States after restoration of their independence (see the 1st hypothesis). The further inquiry aims to investigate whether we simply have a numerical decrease of political party leaders in the Riigikogu or we deal with a genuine transformation of the Estonian parliamentary elite.

The parliamentarians with experience as political party leaders are rather well educated, 91.9 per cent of them hold university degrees. The proportion of humanities and social sciences (42.5 per cent) comes close to the proportion of technical and

natural sciences (44.2 per cent); in the 1992, 2003 and 2011 legislative terms humanities and social sciences even dominate over degrees in technical and natural sciences (see annex table 6.1.2).

18.2 per cent of political party leaders finished legal education, the proportion of degrees in law fluctuates between 8.7 and 26.3 per cent. Almost one quarter of political party leaders holds doctoral degrees (23.8 per cent), however, the data show a rather continuous decrease in share of doctorates from 1990 to 2011.

Although Left Liberals comprise the largest proportion among party leaders on average (22.2 per cent) and Conservatives come second (18.7 per cent), the largest share holders vary from parliament to parliament: in 1990 it is the umbrella movement, in 1992 it is Conservatives, in 1995 it is Left Liberals. Right Liberals lead in 1999, 2003 and 2011, Social Democrats take over in 2007.

The variables of gender and ethnicity show signs of elite transformation, albeit in opposite directions; the proportions of female party leaders (14.1 per cent on average) are larger with every legislative term, the shares of ethnic minorities among party leaders decline and since 1999 are equal to nil.

The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. However, the exceptional decrease in numbers of political party leaders itself strongly rejects the proposed hypothesis and requires an additional explanation. The decrease in numbers of political party leaders is explained by the obvious consolidation of the Estonian political party system: if we employ Laakso – Taagepera index, we see a clear decrease in the effective number of electoral parties from 8.84 in 1992 to 4.78 in 2011; the effective number of parliamentary parties in Estonia falls from 5.90 in 1992 to 3.84 in 2011.

The largest group of party leaders – 48 per cent – have experience as local politicians, members of citizens' committees comprise 31.3 per cent. Cabinet experience has a lowest average which is 17.7 per cent. The last four parliaments seem to be different from the first three ones in terms of the level of political experience; local experience gains importance and the members of citizens'

committees disappear. These trends point to the transformation of parliamentary elite as well.

The largest proportion of party leaders (61.1 per cent) experienced two types of political positions before getting elected to the parliament for the first time, this trend gets stronger from 1995 onwards. More than one fifth (21.2 per cent) of party leaders were active in one type of political activity and less than one fifth (17.2 per cent) held three different political posts.

The former members of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) comprise 36.4 per cent of political party leaders, they are followed by national nomenklatura with 21.7 per cent and local politicians with 14.6 per cent. Other types of the old (Soviet) political experience are: 8.1 per cent for dissidents, 5.6 per cent for councils of ministers and 4 per cent for the supreme soviets. Even 15.2 per cent of MPs as political party leaders were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime.

The largest occupational group among Estonian party leaders are civil servants (25 per cent); they are followed by political party employees (22.4 per cent) and teachers and professors (18.4 percent). About four fifths (77.3 per cent) of party leaders were employed in the public sector right before getting elected to the Riigikogu.

The data on age and seniority of MPs (the mean number of mandates, percentage of newcomers and incumbents) show signs of elite transformation: the proportion of incumbents grows continuously, the share of newcomers declines; the parliamentary tenure starting with 1 mandate in 1990 reaches 2.5 mandates in 2011. On average, 56.1 per cent of MPs with background as party leaders are newcomers, incumbents comprise 48.5 per cent. Although the parliamentary tenure is 1.8 legislative terms and the age difference between all party leaders (45.4 years) and parliamentary newcomers (43.4 years) is only 2 years, some evidence for emerging parliamentary careers could be observed; for instance in the last term parliamentary tenure was 2.5 mandates, the age difference in the 1999 term was already 10.9 years. Experienced founders (MPs from the 1990 parliaments) – similarly to the parliamentarians with Soviet political experience – leave legislatures. However, the share of longstanding MPs (serving at least three terms) continuously grows and reaches the level of 44.4 per cent in the 2007 Riigikogu.

6.1.3. Estonian MPs as Cabinet Ministers

The continuously growing numbers and percentages of MPs as previous cabinet ministers clearly show a changing pattern of parliamentary recruitment. The last three legislative terms differ in numbers and percentages from the rest especially. In order to tell whether we deal here with elite transformation, it is required to explore the other aspects of parliamentary recruitment of former cabinet ministers.

In all legislative terms Estonian cabinet ministers demonstrate exceptionally high level of education – all of them graduated from universities, there are no differences between legislative terms (see annex table 6.1.3). The largest proportion among cabinet ministers are the degree holders in humanities and social sciences (41 per cent), technical and natural sciences come close to them with 34.9 per cent on average. Slightly more than one fifth (22.9 per cent) of cabinet ministers hold degrees in law, 18.1 per cent of cabinet ministers carry doctoral titles.

Local elective experience among cabinet ministers takes a share of 59 per cent, it seems to gain more weight with every legislative term. Experience in leading political party is observed among 42.2 per cent of cabinet ministers. Membership in Citizens' Committees comprises 8.4 per cent and, as expected, declines continuously.

The majority of cabinet ministers - 62.7 per cent – had two types of political experience before first time getting elected to the parliament. Those who were involved in three types of political activities constitute 21.7 per cent. (Only 14.5 per cent performed one pre-parliamentary political function.)

In terms of the old (Soviet) political experience, 36.1 per cent of cabinet ministers were members of the Communist Party, about one third (31.3 per cent) belonged to national nomenklatura and almost one quarter (22.9 per cent) was part of Soviet local councils. The Soviet parliamentary experience and experience in leading the Soviet Communist party amounts to merely 2.4 and 1.2 per cent respectively.

Soviet ministers comprise 13.3 per cent among the post-Soviet cabinet ministers of Estonia, the same percentage of post-Soviet ministers were born in the the politically repressed families (e.g. deported to Siberia) or in the families which members have been murdered by the Soviet regime. Surprisingly, there is no single former dissident among post-Soviet cabinet ministers of Estonia. We interpret this that these MPs with cabinet experience chose not to openly confront and challenge the Soviet authorities with sensitive issues, but to forget or ar least ignore the personal

and own family history as the only way to advance in the Soviet society; this type of parliamentarians was probably less idealistic and better adapted to the Soviet structure of career advancement. The most prominent example would the career of Edgar Savisaar, vice-president of the Riigikogu and minister and prime minister in the post-Soviet Estonia, who was born in prison in 1950, but this has not prevented him from joining the Communist Party and working in the Planning Committee of the Soviet Estonia from 1980 to 1988.

On the average, Left Liberals comprise the largest proportion of cabinet ministers (36.1 per cent), Conservatives with 21.7 per cent come second (in the 2007 term conservatives are the largest party family among cabinet ministers).

The largest professional group among cabinet ministers is the one of civil servants (75.9 per cent). Teachers (professors) comprise 9.6 per cent on average.

The data on public sector show some transformative developments. Although 86.7 per cent of cabinet ministers came from public sector, the last four parliaments demonstrate its declining proportion among cabinet ministers.

Women among cabinet ministers comprise 14.5 per cent, their proportion among ministers seems to be increasing. Ethnic minorities among cabinet ministers are almost absent (the only exception is the last two terms).

The data on age and seniority of MPs (the mean number of mandates, percentage of newcomers and incumbents) show signs of elite transformation: the proportion of incumbents grows continuously, the share of newcomers declines; the parliamentary tenure starting with 1 mandate in 1990 reaches 2.4 mandates in 2011. There are 51.8 per cent of parliamentary newcomers and 42.5 per cent of incumbents among cabinet ministers. The proportion of experienced founders declines, the share of long-standing MPs (serving at least three terms) shows an upward trend in the 2011 term reaching 47.1 per cent. An upward trend is observed in parliamentary tenures of MPs (it reaches 2.4 mandates in the last term), although the average tenure is only 1.9 legislative terms and the age difference between all cabinet ministers (47.8 years) and parliamentary newcomers (45.1 years) only 2.7 years.

6.1.4. Estonian MPs as Local Politicians, Political Party Leaders and Cabinet Ministers: A Comparison

All three groups of MPs – previous local politicians, political party leaders and cabinet ministers – show signs of parliamentary elite transformation with essential

difference being the increasing proportions of local politicians and cabinet ministers and decreasing percentages of political party leaders.

The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is also supported by the data on the political experience in the Soviet regime.

The evidence for the third thesis that MPs with cabinet experience will display more elitist characteristics than MPs with local elective and leading party positions is there, albeit thin and not solid. The variables on university education, gender and ethnicity indeed show that cabinet ministers are better educated, include fewer women and ethnic minorities than local politicians and political party leaders, however, local politicians come rather close in terms of university education and political party leaders are not far with regard to gender and ethnic representation.

The Estonian data reveal that local politicians, political party leaders and cabinet ministers – in spite of some common features - have different patterns of recruitment and careers. For instance, political party leaders and cabinet ministers are similar in absence of military and judges (prosecutors) in their ranks, however, cabinet ministers stand out by not recruiting journalists (writers), political party employees, clergy, lawyers, workers in the agricultural or industrial sector. Although civil servants are the largest occupational group among all three types of politicians, the cabinet ministers stand out from other two types of politicians with exceptionally high representation of civil servants and a larger percentage of public sector employees. The cabinet ministers also stand out in dominance of humanities over natural and technical sciences, in larger share of law degrees, older age and lower percentage of parliamentary newcomers. The larger percentages of Soviet nomenklatura, Soviet ministers and members of local Soviets are also observed among Estonian cabinet ministers. The dissidents among cabinet ministers are absent although cabinet ministers have a large share of those who were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime in comparison with local politicians. This finding tells that the only way to advance in the Soviet society was not to openly confront and challenge it with sensitive issues, but to forget or ar least ignore the personal and own family history.

Political party leaders stand out with their youngest age and the highest percentage of parliamentary incumbents and PhD holders. Political party leaders also have the largest percentage of members of citizens' committees, dissidents and those who were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive apparat of the Soviet regime.

Local politicians differ from other two types of politicians in the lowest mean number of legislative mandates, lowest percentage of law degrees, PhDs and parliamentary incumbents and the highest percentage of women, ethnic minorities, parliamentary newcomers and former members of the Soviet Communist Party.

The common feature of all three groups is the dominance of Left Liberals.

6.2. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Legislators in Latvia

6.2.1. Latvian MPs as Local Politicians

The importance of local political background in the recruitment of Latvian parliamentarians increases with every legislative term, although the Latvian MPs continue to be elected on the PR-list basis and do not have single member districts. The differences in local political background are especially evident between the first three and the last four parliamentary terms. This raises a question whether we have a qualitative transformation of parliamentary elite or observe a simple numerical increase of MPs with the same characteristics.

In terms of education, there are no significant differences among local politicians. 93.6 per cent of local politicians have university degrees, the average for six parliaments reaches 95.1 per cent, if the third term with 76.5 per cent is taken out.

There is a clear dominance of technical and natural sciences among local politicians (mean: 57.1 per cent), but no real differences between the first three and the last four terms. Those differences are, however, observed in the case of humanities and social sciences – the share of local politicians with degrees in humanities/social sciences is much higher in the last four parliaments (see annex table 6.2.1). Those types of differences are found in the case of law degrees as well, though in the opposite direction - the share of law degree holders among MPs with local political background declines with every legislative term till 2010. Nevertheless, it is safe to

conclude that numerical changes among parliamentarians with local political background are being accompanied by transformations of their educational profile.

The data on political experience also support parliamentary elite transformation thesis. The last four terms differ from the first three terms with a distinction that leading party position and cabinet experience are gaining weight over the years and the importance of members of the elite club “21” and citizens’ committees decreases with every legislature. The share of twofold or threefold political experience gains importance and the last four parliaments are rather different from the first ones as well.

In terms of the political party families, we observe a leadership of Socialists/Social Democrats (26.9 per cent on average), the second place is taken by Conservatives (21.5 per cent). The strong presence of Socialists/Social Democrats and Conservatives is the phenomenon of the last three or four legislative terms only, this supports the parliamentary elite transformation thesis.

The data on occupations have mixed evidence in support of parliamentary elite transformation. Increase of civil servants and businessmen/managers and decrease of teachers/professors and political party employees provide evidence for parliamentary elite transformation, the differences between the first three parliaments and the last four legislatures are rather visible. However, these differences are difficult to notice among liberal professions and public sector employees.

In general, if public sector is not taken into consideration, civil servants make the largest share among local politicians (24.3 per cent on average). They are followed by businessmen and managers (mean: 22.4 per cent) and teachers and professors (19.5 per cent on average), political party employees (14.3 per cent on average) and liberal professions (lawyers are not included) with an overall mean of 11 per cent. Judges and prosecutors come with a low mean of 2.4 per cent, lawyers and journalists (writers) are almost non existent among MPs with local political background.

The data on representation of women among MPs with local political background do not provide evidence for parliamentary elite transformation, the gender variable does not clearly support this thesis. However, the ethnic minority variable indicates that a larger share of ethnic minorities is a feature of the new parliamentary elite (the mean for the last four parliaments is clearly higher than the mean for the first three legislatures).

The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. Out of varieties of new political experience, the leading party position dominates among local politicians: 24.2 per cent of them on average held leading positions in the political parties, 11.4 per cent in the cabinet of ministers, 6.4 per cent belonged to the elite club “21” and 3.2 per cent were active in the citizens’ committees. In terms of the old (Soviet) political experience, 26 per cent of local politicians were members of the Communist party, 18.3 per cent were part of the local political structures in the Soviet regime, 15.1 per cent were part of the national nomenklatura, 5.5 per cent of local politicians occupied leading positions in the Communist party, 4.1 per cent were members of the supreme councils. Almost none (0.5 per cent) occupied governmental positions.

Almost 9 per cent of local politicians were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime. However, the share of former dissidents among local politicians is rather moderate (2.7 per cent).

The data on age and seniority (age of newcomers and all MPs, mean number of mandates and percentage of newcomers) disclose that MPs as local politicians do not have careers. On average, two thirds of MPs with local political background are parliamentary newcomers, a parliamentary tenure is shorter than two legislative terms. Another indicator that local politicians do not have careers is the age difference between all MPs and parliamentary newcomers which is 1.6 years on average. Experienced founders (MPs from the 1990 parliaments) – similarly to the parliamentarians with Soviet political experience – leave legislatures. However, the share of longstanding MPs (serving three terms with or without interruption) grows and reaches even 28.2 per cent in the last parliament.

6.2.2. Latvian MPs as Political Party Leaders

The importance of the leading party position – similarly as the importance of the local elective positions - in the recruitment of Latvian parliamentarians increases with

every legislative term and the differences in leading party position are also evident between the first three and the last four parliamentary terms. We ask again: do we deal with a qualitative transformation of parliamentary elite or a simple numerical increase of MPs with the same characteristics?

The data on education support the elite transformation thesis: the first three legislative terms rather differ from the last four terms in university education. 89.3 per cent of political party leaders have university degrees. If the 1995 term with 80 per cent university degree holders is taken out, the average for six parliaments reaches 90.3 per cent.

The changes in law, technical/natural sciences and humanities/social sciences accompany the numerical increase of political party leaders as well, the differences between the first three and the last three terms are rather visible. They also reveal that until 2010 the technical/natural sciences lose their importance and humanities/social sciences gain their weight in the recruitment of political party leaders. From 1998 onwards the doctoral degrees and law increase their importance in the recruitment of party leaders (see annex table 6.2.2).

The parliamentary elite transformation thesis is supported by the data on political experience. The first three parliaments differ from the last four legislatures, local elective positions and governmental experience gain weight and membership in the club ‘21’ and citizens’ committees lose their importance. Over time, political party leaders acquire richer experience, threefold political experience in the last parliaments has a much larger share than in the first three legislatures. Out of variety of political experience, the local elective positions occupy the largest share – 27 per cent on average – among political party leaders. There are 16.8 per cent of political party leaders with cabinet experience, 9.7 per cent belonged to the citizens’ committees and 4.6 per cent were members of the elite club “21”. However, if we focus on each legislative term separately, the dominance of the local elective experience is observed for the last four parliaments only. The first three parliaments are dominated by the political party leaders coming from the citizens’ committees. These differences also point to the direction of parliamentary elite transformation.

With regard to the political party families, Conservatives clearly dominate among political party leaders from 1998 onwards, the second place is taken by Christian Democrats in 1998 and 2002 and by Agrarians in 2006 and 2010.

The data on occupations provide sufficient evidence for the parliamentary elite transformation thesis, the differences between the first three and the last three terms are visible. Percentages of civil servants and party employees, businessmen and managers, teachers and professors show decreasing trends. Still, if public sector employees are excluded from analysis, political party employees are best represented among political party leaders (23.5 per cent on average). They are followed by civil servants (19.9 per vent on average) and businessmen and managers (18.4 per cent) and 13.8 per cent of those from liberal professions (lawyers are excluded). With regard to the lawyers, a declining trend of their representation is observed in the first three terms (from 7.1 per cent to 5 per cent) and, finally, their disappearance from 1998 onwards.

The gender variable supports the elite transformation thesis, representation of women among political party leaders in the first three parliaments differs from representation in the last four legislatures. If we turn to ethnic minority representation, we observe much higher percentages in the last two legislatures.

The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments. Of variety of old (Soviet) political experiences, 19.9 per cent of political party leaders were members of the Communist party, 14.8 per cent belonged to national nomenklatura, 8.2 per cent occupied leading positions in the Communist party, 4.6 per cent held governmental positions in the old regime and the same share belonged to the supreme councils. Only 4.1 per cent of current political party leaders were involved in the local political structures of the Soviet regime.

It is also worth mentioning that 7.7 per cent of political party leaders on average were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime and that 3.6 per cent were active in a dissident movement.

The data on age and seniority (age of newcomers and all MPs, mean number of mandates and incumbency) reveal rather visible differences between the first three and the last four parliaments. Although the share of parliamentary newcomers declines (54.8 per cent on average if the first parliament is excluded) and the share of long-standing MPs (serving three and more terms) reaches 29.7 per cent in the 2006 parliament, the opportunities for parliamentary careers are rather unfavourable: the

parliamentary tenure is 1.6 legislative terms on average and the age difference between all MPs and newcomers is 1.9 years.

6.2.3. Latvian MPs as Cabinet Ministers

The data on parliamentarians with cabinet experience do not provide clear differences between the first three and the last four legislatures. With regard to elite transformation, we could rather consider the last five terms that differ from the first two.

Educationally, there are no differences among cabinet ministers since they come with university degrees in all parliaments (see annex table 6.2.3). Cabinet ministers impress with their balance between humanities/social sciences (overall mean of 44.4 per cent) and technical/natural sciences (the average of 45.8 per cent). Humanities and social sciences dominate among cabinet ministers in 1998 and 2006, technical/natural sciences lead in 1993, 1995, 2002 and 2010.

The elite transformation thesis finds support in the data on political experience, though. The variables of the leading party position and local elective background disclose that the last four terms are obviously different from the first three terms. With regard to the twofold and threefold political experience the last four terms are also different from the first three ones. Out of different types of experiences in political area, the largest share – 45.8 per cent on average – of cabinet ministers were leaders of political parties, about one third (34.7 per cent) was elected to the local councils and 11.1 per cent belonged to the elite club "21". The surprising news is that none of the MPs with cabinet experience were members of the citizens' committees. This fact indicates that cabinet ministers - differently from local politicians and political party leaders – were not involved in the Latvian nation-building and processes of ethnic nationalism right after 1990.

In terms of the political party family affiliation, Conservatives dominate among MPs with cabinet experience in the last four legislatures, Liberals and the left wing Liberals lead in the second and third parliaments.

The elite transformation thesis is supported by the data on businessmen and managers, their share in the last four terms declines but is still considerably higher than in the first three terms. In general, if public sector is not taken into consideration, civil servants make the largest share among cabinet ministers (mean of 73.6 per cent),

they are followed by businessmen and managers (13.9 per cent on average) and military (4.2 per cent on average). Political party employees, teachers (professors), lawyers and other liberal professions are almost non-existent among the cabinet ministers. The cabinet ministers do not include journalists (writers), clergy, judges (prosecutors) and blue collar workers.

The elite transformation thesis does not work for representation of women – except for the last two parliaments, there are simply no female representatives among MPs with cabinet experience. However, the ethnic minority representation discloses differences between the first and last parliaments, ethnic minorities gradually leave the governmental posts.

The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is also supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments. Out variety of old (Soviet) political experiences, 29.2 per cent of cabinet ministers have been part of national nomenklatura and 27.8 per cent were members of the Communist party; 16.7 per cent of cabinet ministers occupied governmental positions in the old regime, 11.1 per cent on average had leading position in the Communist party and the same share on average belonged to the supreme councils. 6.9 per cent of the cabinet ministers were involved in the local political structures during the Soviet regime, 9.7 per cent were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime. However, none of the cabinet ministers experienced political persecution or were active in dissident movement! MPs with background as cabinet ministers probably saw that the only way to advance in the Soviet society was not to openly confront and challenge it with sensitive issues, but to forget or ar least ignore the personal and own family history. This finding (together with a finding that none of ministers belong to citizens' committees after 1990) allows to interperete that this type of parliamentarians was less idealistic and better adapted to the Soviet structure of career advancement. For example, Vilnis Edvīns Bresis and Alfrēds Čepānis, whose relatives have been politically repressed, became the first secretaries in the Communist Party Local Committees and have been in charge of the Council of Ministers in the end of 1980s.

The data on age and seniority (age of newcomers and all MPs, mean number of mandates) do not disclose the differences between the first three and the last four

parliaments, there are no clear indication for two generations of parliamentary elites. Although in the 2002 parliament it reaches 2.1 mean number of mandates and the share of newcomers goes down to 18 per cent, the careers of cabinet ministers do not differ much from local politicians and political party leaders: their career tenure is 1.6 mandates on average, the age difference between all MPs and newcomers is 1.5 years. The average turnover rate of 58.3 per cent (if all seven parliaments are counted) or 57.1 per cent (if the first legislature is excluded) of parliamentary newcomers among cabinet ministers is another unfavourable condition for parliamentary careers.

6.2.4. Latvian MPs as Local Politicians, Political Party Leaders and Cabinet Ministers: A Comparison

Two groups – local politicians and political party leaders– experienced a remarkable increase in their membership in the last four elections. This observation allowed us to formulate the thesis of parliamentary elite transformation which was in many aspects confirmed by the data on recruitment and careers.

Another thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures was also supported by the data on the political experience in the Soviet regime.

The third thesis that MPs with cabinet experience will display more elitist characteristics than MPs with local elective and leading party positions was confirmed by the variables on education and gender: cabinet ministers are clearly better educated and have clearly less women than local politicians and political party leaders.

Our data reveal that local politicians, political party leaders and cabinet ministers – in spite of many common features like very low shares of lawyers and non-inclusion of blue collar workers - have different patterns of recruitment and careers, disclosing their specific features and peculiar trends of development. For instance, the share of Conservatives is overwhelming in all groups except for the group of local politicians – there the Socialists/Social Democrats have a slight advantage over Conservatives.

MPs with local political background stand out with the highest legislative turnover rate (66.7 per cent) and the shortest parliamentary tenure (1.5 mandates).

They also show the highest percentage of ethnic minorities (24.2 per cent) and the largest share of those involved in the Soviet local political structures.

The political party leaders distinguish themselves with the lowest percentages of university education but, surprisingly, show the highest shares of PhD holders. The lowest percentage of public sector employees and the lowest membership shares in the club "21" are also features of the political party leaders.

Political party leaders stand out with the highest percentage (23.5 per cent) of the full-time party employees and the highest share of the members from the citizens' committees. They also have the largest shares of Soviet dissidents, therefore, it is not surprising that political party leaders have the smallest share of politicians involved in the national nomenklatura, the Communist party and Soviet local councils in comparison with MPs as cabinet ministers and local politicians.

MPs with cabinet experience distinguish themselves with the highest percentage of university degrees (100 per cent), with their balance of degrees in humanities/social sciences and technical/natural sciences and the lowest share of degrees in law. The highest percentage of civil servants (73.6 per cent) and the largest share of the elite club "21" members, the largest shares of the Soviet Communist party representatives, national nomenklatura members and those who occupied governmental positions in the Soviet regime are also features of MPs with cabinet experience.

MPs with cabinet experience stand out with the lowest share of parliamentary newcomers (58.3 per cent), absence of the members of citizens' committees, least friendliness towards recruitment of women and a surprising finding that ethnic minorities are better represented than women among them.[117] What is also surprising is the largest share of politicians born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime, and, at the same time, the absence of dissidents among cabinet ministers. Similarly to Estonia, this finding tells that the only way to advance own career in the Soviet society was not to openly confront and challenge it with sensitive issues, but to forget or ar least ignore the personal and own family history.

[117] Usual data for Latvia record that normally women are better represented than ethnic minorities in the cabinets of ministers (see Kuklys 2008).

6.3. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience of Legislators in Lithuania

6.3.1. Lithuanian MPs as Local Politicians

The importance of the local political background among Lithuanian parliamentary representatives increases with every legislative term. The differences in local political background are especially evident between the first three and the last four parliamentary terms. This raises a question whether we have a qualitative transformation of parliamentary elite or observe a simple numerical increase of MPs with the same characteristics.

The educational level of local politicians does not show transformative patterns (see annex table 6.3.1), university education remains on a rather similar level and amounts to 91.9 per cent on average. Almost one tenth (9.5 per cent) of local politicians hold doctorates, but clear patterns of change or continuity are not observed. Transformative patterns are, however, observed in the fields and types of university degrees. Although technical and natural sciences occupy a lion's share (62.5 per cent) among MPs with local political background, their percentages seem to decline from term to term. Law degrees (5.7 per cent on average) and humanities and social sciences (46.1 per cent on average), on the contrary, seem to be gaining in weight with each legislative term.

The data on political experience provides some evidence for the parliamentary elite transformation thesis. The last five terms differ from the first two terms. The share of one type political experience (70.1 per cent on average) declines before the last parliament. The level of two types of political experience is stabilised around 28.4 per cent.

Socialists/Social Democrats occupy the largest share (29 per cent) among local politicians. They are followed by Conservatives with 21.2 per cent.

Representation of gender and ethnic minorities among local politicians reaches the averages of 13.9 and 8.4 per cent respectively, the last Seimas shows a jump in representation of women and ethnic minorities.

The data reveal that more than half of local politicians (62.6 per cent) come from the public sector. The largest occupational group among local politicians is managers and businessmen (32.8 per cent), civil servants with 28.7 percent come second. They are followed by political party employees with 16.2 per cent. The data allow to observe certain transformative patterns in the occupational profile of Lithuanian local

politicians – it shows declining proportions in public sector, among managers and businessmen, journalists and writers and indicates declining percentages of teachers and professors (this trend conforms to the general parliamentary pattern of teachers and professors leaving Lithuanian parliaments)[118] and increase of civil servants and party employees from 2000 to 2012.

The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. Out of varieties of new political experience, the leading party position dominates among Lithuanian local politicians: 28.1 per cent of them on average held leading positions in the political parties, 3.5 per cent in the cabinet of ministers. In terms of the old (Soviet) political experience, 20 per cent of local politicians were members of the Communist party, 18.6 per cent were part of the national nomenklatura and the local political structures in the Soviet regime, 7.2 per cent of local politicians occupied leading positions in the Communist party, 0.3 per cent belonged to councils of ministers, 0.9 per cent were members of the supreme councils.

The data indicate that 5.5 per cent of local politicians were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive apparat of the Soviet regime. The share of former dissidents among local politicians is 3.2 per cent.

The data on seniority of MPs (the mean number of mandates, percentage of newcomers and incumbents) show signs of elite transformation: the proportion of incumbents grows continuously, the share of newcomers declines; the parliamentary tenure starting with 1 mandate in 1990 reaches 2.2 mandates in 2012. Still, in spite of these developments, turnover of newcomers remains high and very few MPs have legislative careers. On average, almost two thirds of MPs with local political background are newcomers (61.2 per cent), incumbents comprise 33.9 per cent. The parliamentary tenure is only 1.7 legislative terms. Another indicator that many local politicians do not have careers is the small age difference between all MPs (48.6 years) and parliamentary newcomers (46.4 years) which is 2.2 years on average.

[118] See the sub-chapter 5.2.1 on the recruitment of teachers and professors.

Experienced founders (MPs from the 1990 parliaments) – similarly to the parliamentarians with Soviet political experience – leave legislatures. However, the share of long-standing MPs (serving at least three terms) continuously grows and reaches the level of 39.5 per cent in the last parliament.

6.3.2. Lithuanian MPs as Political Party Leaders

There are no substantial numerical differences among the first three and the last four Lithuanian parliaments in terms of recruitment of political party leaders, although proportions of political party leaders among MPs have been continuously rising till 2000. The further analysis will show what kind of recruitment patterns are observed among political party leaders.

The Lithuanian data show that 93.5 per cent of political party leaders hold university degrees, 9.9 per cent of them studied law. Percentages of degree holders in technical and natural sciences (53.4 per cent) are slightly higher than of those in humanities and social sciences (50.9 per cent). Even 31 per cent of those who graduated from university hold doctoral titles, but their percentage until 2012 was continuously declining with every term.

Socialists/Social Democrats are the largest party family among political party leaders (22.6 per cent), the parties coded as ‘Other’ with 17.3 per cent come second.

The trends in recruitment of women (11.3 per cent) and ethnic minorities (8.5 per cent) are rather contradictory and disclose lots of ups and downs. It seems, however, that a general proportion of women among party leaders increases and percentage of ethnic minorities (till 2012) decreases.

About two-thirds of political party leaders (67.7 per cent) come from the public sector. The largest occupational group among party leaders are political party employees (29 per cent), teachers and professors with 21.8 per cent come second. Transformative patterns are observed in the public sector (continuous decline till 2012) and among civil servants (continuous increase of their proportions till 2000 but a continuous decline since 2004). Till 2000 party employees experienced a decline among party leaders but afterwards we observe an upward trend in their percentages until 2012.

Although one type of political experience takes a lion’s share (59.7 per cent), its percentages among party leaders continuously decline till 2012. Until 2008 every new

parliament brings more party leaders having two types of political experience (average of 38.3 per cent). Almost half of all party leaders (49.2 per cent) are parliamentary newcomers, but their percentages decline in the last four legislatures. The percentage of experienced founders also declines with every parliament. The proportion of incumbents (average of 41.9 per cent) has been growing in the last four parliaments. The same applies to the long-standing MPs (serving at least three legislative terms) – their share among party leaders reached 57.1 per cent in the last parliament. Still, in spite of increasing percentages of incumbents and long-standing MPs, relatively few party leaders have parliamentary careers – they serve in 1.9 legislatures on average, the age difference between all MPs (49.3 years) and parliamentary newcomers (46.4 years) is 2.9 years.

The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is supported by the data: MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments and MPs with new political experience become more numerous. Out of varieties of new pre-parliamentary political experience, the local political experience dominates among Lithuanian political party leaders: 39.1 per cent of them on average held local elective positions, 3.6 per cent were the cabinet ministers. In terms of the old (Soviet) political experience, 21 per cent of party leaders were members of the Communist party, 20.2 per cent were part of the national nomenklatura, 8.1 per cent belonged to the local political structures in the Soviet regime, 12.9 per cent of new party leaders occupied leading positions in the Communist party, 2.8 per cent belonged to councils of ministers, 4.4 per cent were members of the supreme councils.

The Lithuanian data indicate that 8.5 per cent of party leaders were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive apparat of the Soviet regime. The share of former dissidents among political party leaders is even 10.9 per cent.

6.3.3. Lithuanian MPs as Cabinet Ministers

Recruitment of previous cabinet ministers shows exceptional stability among Lithuanian MPs in the third, fourth and fifth terms. The further data analysis should

demonstrate whether these three terms have different recruitment patterns in other aspects.

Cabinet ministers are highly educated, 100 per cent of them graduated from universities. Almost half (46.4 per cent) of cabinet ministers studied humanities and social sciences, 39.3 per cent of them graduated with degrees in technical and natural sciences. Law degrees comprise an average of 17.9 per cent. Even 53.6 per cent of cabinet ministers hold doctoral titles.

The largest proportion of cabinet ministers (46.4 per cent) belongs to the political party family of Socialists/Social Democrats, 21.4 per cent of ministers are Conservatives. 42.9 per cent of cabinet ministers were previously elected to the local councils and 32.1 per cent lead political parties.

Recruitment of women and ethnic minorities follows different patterns among cabinet ministers: there are 14.3 per cent of women but no ethnic minorities among ministers.

Two occupational groups – civil servants and managers (businessmen) – occupy the largest proportions (each 32.1 per cent) among cabinet ministers, however, the percentage of civil servants clearly declines with every new parliament. Lawyers and other liberal professions together take 28.6 per cent. More than a half of ministers come from public sector (an average for all terms is 57.1 per cent).

Although one type of political experience takes a lion's share (42.9 per cent), its percentages among cabinet ministers continuously decline. Every new parliament brings more cabinet ministers having two types of political experience (average of 39.3 per cent). More than a half of cabinet ministers (57.1 per cent) are parliamentary newcomers, but their percentage declines continually till 2012. The proportion of incumbents (average of 44.4 per cent) has been growing in all parliaments until 2012. The same applies to the long-standing MPs (serving at least three legislative terms) – their share among cabinet ministers reached 50 per cent in the 2008 parliament. However, experienced founders are absent among cabinet ministers. Still, in spite of increasing percentages of incumbents and long-standing MPs, relatively few cabinet ministers have parliamentary careers – they served in 1.8 legislatures on average, the age difference between all MPs (53.4 years) and parliamentary newcomers (51.4 years) is only two years.

As expected, MPs with political experience in the Soviet regime depart from parliaments (with an exception of experience in local soviets). The largest proportions

of the old (Soviet) political experience are those of the Communist Party and nomenklatura, each of them takes 35.7 per cent among cabinet ministers; 28.6 per cent of cabinet ministers were part of the local political structures in the Soviet regime, 14.3 per cent of new cabinet ministers occupied leading positions in the Communist party, 10.7 per cent belonged to the Soviet councils of ministers, none of them was a member of the supreme councils.

Although one quarter (25 per cent) of MPs with cabinet experience were born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime, the share of former dissidents among ministers is equal to nil. The possible explanation for this finding is that this group of MPs saw for them the only way to advance in the Soviet society not to by openly confronting and challenging it with sensitive issues, but by forgeting or ar least ignoring the personal and own family history.

6.3.4. Lithuanian MPs as Local Politicians, Political Party Leaders and Cabinet Ministers: A Comparison

Out all three groups of Lithuanian MPs, only local politicians show clear signs of numerical increase; proportions of political party leaders and cabinet ministers remain rather stable.

The thesis that the more years pass after the system change, the higher share of MPs in the new regime will come to parliament with democratic political experience and the lower share of MPs with non-democratic experience will join new legislatures is also supported by the data on the political experience in the Soviet regime (with a few exceptions).

The evidence for the third thesis that MPs with cabinet experience will display more elitist characteristics than MPs with local elective and leading party positions is provided by the variables of university education and ethnicity, but not gender; cabinet ministers are better educated and have less ethnic minorities than local politicians and political party leaders, however, their include more women in comparison with local politicians and party leaders.

Common for all three groups – local politicians, party leaders and cabinet ministers – is leadership of Socialists/Social Democrats, dominance of public sector (from 57.1 to 67.7 per cent) and the fact that one type of pre-parliamentary political

experience (taking the largest portion so far) declines and two types of political experience continually gain in weight.

Local politicians are singled out for the largest proportion of degrees in technical and natural sciences, dominance of managers and businessmen, the largest proportion of newcomers and the lowest mean number of successful elections.

Political party leaders differ from the other two groups in the largest proportion of degrees in humanities and social sciences, largest proportions of political party employees, public sector and former dissidents. Political party leaders also have longer parliamentary careers since they have the lowest percentage of newcomers and the highest proportion of incumbents, the largest age difference between all MPs and parliamentary newcomers and the largest mean number of successful elections in comparison with local politicians and cabinet ministers.

Cabinet ministers are singled out for the largest proportion of degrees in law, clear dominance of humanities and social sciences over technical and natural sciences, for the largest percentage of civil servants and the highest average age at the entrance of parliament. The absence of teachers (professors) and workers from the agricultural sector, the largest proportions of Soviet political experience, the highest percentage of those born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime and, at the same time, absence of Soviet dissidents are also specific features of cabinet ministers. The latter finding, similarly to Estonia and Latvia, tells that the only way to advance in the Soviet society was not to openly confront and challenge it with sensitive issues, but to forget or ar least ignore the personal and own family history.

6.4. A Cross-Country Comparison: Baltic Legislators as Local Politicians, Political Party Leaders and Cabinet Ministers

Notwithstanding some cross-country differences – prevalence of Left Liberals among Estonian, Conservatives among Latvian[119] and Socialists/Social Democrats among Lithuanian parliamentarians, our data provided with sufficient evidence for the common patterns in pre-parliamentary political experience of the Baltic legislators.

[119] The exception is Latvian local politicians representing predominantly Socialists/Social Democrats.

The common features of Baltic local politicians are a clear prevalence of degrees in technical and natural sciences, dominance of civil servants[120], high (or the highest) percentage of ethnic minorities and high (or the highest) proportion of those who belonged to the local soviets during the Soviet regime, as compared with political party leaders and cabinet ministers.

The Baltic political party leaders distinguish themselves by the highest percentage of former dissidents and the lowest percentage of those with university education. The other features are prominence of party employees[121], low (or the lowest) proportions of parliamentary newcomers and high (or the highest) percentages of incumbents and the mean number of successful elections.

The Baltic cabinet ministers are characterised by higher level of education (100 per cent of them graduated from universities), balance or even dominance of degrees in humanities and social sciences over technical and natural sciences, prevalence of civil servants and high (or the highest) share of public sector employees, high or the highest age at the first entrance of parliament. Other features of the Baltic cabinet ministers are a lower share or even absence of ethnic minorities, high or the highest percentages of those with Soviet political experience (except for local soviet background in Estonia and Latvia) and absence of dissidents in spite of high or the highest percentage of those born in the families deported to Siberia or in the families which members have been murdered by the repressive organs of the Soviet regime.

[120] The exception is Lithuanian local politicians, 32.8 per cent of them are managers and businessmen, 28.7 per cent are civil servants.
[121] Except Estonia where party employees comprise 22.4 per cent and civil servants comprise 25 per cent.

6.5. Refining Analysis on Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience

Our above analysis of pre-parliamentary political experience was rather rough since it did not differentiate between those who had only one, two or three pre-parliamentary political functions (see table 6.2). We did this in order to maximise the number of observations per legislative term[122] and did not include certain sorts of pre-parliamentary experience[123]. If we refine our analysis and include all possibilities for

Table 6.2. Percentages of Pre-Parliamentary Political Functions

Estonian Legislators	1990	1992	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
One Function	39.8	30.7	40.6	47.5	53.5	56.4	60.4
Two Functions	28.0	35.6	30.7	26.7	25.7	27.7	24.8
Three and More Functions	8.6	5.0	5.9	6.9	4.0	2.0	3.0
Latvian Legislators	1990	1993	1995	1998	2002	2006	2010
One Function	30.8	32.0	31.0	43.0	44.0	48.0	49.0
Two Functions	4.5	6.0	11.0	14.0	12.0	18.0	13.0
Three and More Functions	0.5	0.0	1.0	4.0	3.0	5.0	4.0
Lithuanian Legislators	1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
One Function	16.5	35.5	48.2	51.8	40.4	44.0	51.8
Two Functions	0.8	0.7	8.0	14.9	17.0	16.3	14.4
Three and More Functions	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.7	0.0	0.7

Source: Own data and calculations.

pre-parliamentary political experience for Baltic legislators, we receive an analytical variety of fifteen pre-parliamentary paths:

Type 1. (Four possibilities):

(a) local politician,

230 observations for Estonia, 152 observations for Latvia and 242 observations for Lithuania;

(b) party leader,

42 observations for Estonia, 109 observations for Latvia and 148 observations for Lithuania;

[122] By doing this, we got in total 399 observations for Estonia, 219 observations for Latvia and 345 observations for Lithuania in the analysis of MPs as previous local politicians; 198 observations for Estonia, 196 observations for Latvia and 248 observations for Lithuania in the analysis of parliamentarians as former political party leaders; 83 observations for Estonia, 72 observations for Latvia and 28 observations for Lithuania in the analysis of legislators as former cabinet ministers.

[123] The membership in citizens' committees was not included in our previous analysis since it was Estonian and Latvian, but not the Lithuanian phenomenon. Aiming to pursue a truly Baltic comparison, we had to drop the membership in citizens' committees.

(c) cabinet minister,

12 observatons for Estonia, 31 observations for Latvia and 12 observations for Lithuania;

(d) member of citizens' committee,

45 observations for Estonia and 17 observations for Latvia.

Type 2. (Six possibilities):

(a) local politician + party leader,

60 observations for Estonia, 35 observations for Latvia and 91 observations for Lithuania;

(b) local politician + cabinet minister,

30 observations for Estonia, 8 observations for Latvia and 7 observations for Lithuania;

(c) party leader + cabinet minister,

17 observations for Estonia, 16 observations for Latvia and 4 observations for Lithuania;

(d) local politician + member of citizens' committee,

38 observations for Estonia and 6 observations for Latvia;

(e) party leader + member of citizens' committee,

44 observations for Estonia and 18 observations for Latvia;

(f) cabinet minister + member of citizens' committee,

5 observations for Estonia and 0 observations for Latvia.

Type 3. (Four possibilities):

(a) local politician + party leader + cabinet minister,

17 observations for Estonia, 17 observations for Latvia and 5 observations for Lithuania;

(b) local politician + party leader + member of citizens' committee,

17 observations for Estonia and 1 observations for Latvia;

(c) local politician + cabinet minister + member of citizens' committee,

1 observation for Estonia and 0 observations for Latvia;

(d) cabinet minister + party leader + member of citizens' committee,
0 observations for Estonia and 0 observations for Latvia.

Type 4. (One possibility):

local politician + party leader + cabinet minister + member of citizens' committee,
1 observation for Estonia and 0 observations for Latvia.

Descriptive Analysis of Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1

The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data show similar trends observed in the above analysis on local politicians, party leaders and cabinet ministers (see the sub-chapter 6.4):

- The highest share of degrees in technical and natural sciences, the highest percentage of ethnic minorities[124] and the highest proportion of those who belonged to the local soviets during Soviet regime are features of local politicians (type 1a).

- The political party leaders distinguish themselves by the highest percentage of former dissidents, the lowest percentage of those with university education[125] and the largest share of political party employees (type 1b).

- Cabinet ministers (type 1c) are better educated, have no dissidents but have a much higher share of civil servants and those from public sector than local politicians and political party leaders.

Except of some differences[126], these findings are in conformance with the findings summarised in the sub-chapter 6.4.

[124] Except for Lithuania where 8.7 per cent of MPs as previous local politicians have an ethnic minority background and 8.8 per cent of MPs as political party leaders belong to ethnic minorities.
[125] Except for Lithuania where 95.9 per cent of political party leaders have university degrees and 92.6 of per cent of local politicians finished education on the same level.

What is new in our refined analysis is the inclusion of membership in citizens' committees as a pre-parliamentary political experience (type 1d). It allows for a comparison of two countries only, since citizens' committees were an Estonian and Latvian, but not the Lithuanian phenomenon[127]. Estonian and Latvian legislators with experience in citizens' committees stand out with a lower share of university degrees, a clear prevalence of humanities and social sciences over technical and natural sciences, absence of ethnic minorities and absence not only of lawyers but also of those with degrees in law. The specific features of members from citizens' committees are the highest percentage of dissidents, the highest mean number of parliamentary mandates, the lowest share of parliamentary newcomers and the highest percentage of incumbents, also the highest percentage of long-standing MPs (serving at least three terms with or without interruption) compared to Estonian and Latvian legislators as previous local politicians, party leaders or cabinet ministers (types 1a, 1b and 1c). Certainly, there are some country differences – Estonian members of citizens' committees have much higher percentage of doctorates, civil servants and those with Soviet experience in comparison with their Latvian counterparts whereas Latvian members of citizens' committees have much higher shares of political party employees and liberal professions and lower percentage of those from the public sector.

Descriptive Analysis of Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2 and Type 3

The general trends among legislators with two pre-parliamentary political functions are following:

- Any combinations with governmental experience (types 2b, 2c, 2d and 2f) show the highest levels of education (100 per cent with university or comparable degrees), the prevalence of humanities and social sciences over technical and

[126] A couple of differences are worth mentioning here. First, the balance (or even prevalence) of humanities and social sciences is observed not among ministers but among party leaders of Estonia and Latvia. Secondly, the variables of gender and Soviet experience do not confirm the findings reported in the sub-chapter 6.1.4 since cabinet ministers of Estonia have the highest share of women and the lowest share of Soviet experience in comparison with Estonian local politicians and party leaders.
[127] For the role of the citizens' committees in the restoration of statehood in Estonia and Latvia in 1990, see the sub-chapter 4.1 of this dissertation.

natural sciences, the highest levels of civil servants' representation[128] and absence of Soviet dissidents.

- Combinations with membership in the citizens' committees (types 2d, 2e and 2f), show higher percentage of Soviet dissidents and, in most of the cases, the longer parliamentary tenure[129], lower share of parliamentary newcomers and the higher percentage of incumbents.

For those with three pre-parliamentary functions, analytically we have four possible combinations, however, due to the low number of cases we analyse two combinations (types 3a and 3b) only. The main feature of legislators with three political functions is the prevalence technical and natural sciences over humanities and social sciences[130] and absence of ethnic minorities.

Pre-Parliamentary Political Functions and Parliamentary Career

The attempt to provide a more refined analysis of pre-parliamentary pathways to Baltic legislatures showed an empirical variety of parliamentary recruitment. The main conclusion we draw is that out of four types of pre-parliamentary experience, the

Table 6.3. Pre-Parliamentary Political Functions and Parliamentary Tenure

Estonian Legislators with	Incumbents, %	Longstanding MPs, %	Terms, N
One Function	34.9	16.9	1.6
Two Functions	46.2	28.3	1.7
Three and More	51.9	29.6	1.7
Latvian Legislators with	Incumbents, %	Longstanding MPs, %	Terms, N
One Function	38.1	22.3	1.6
Two Functions	37.8	19.1	1.6
Three and More	35.3	17.6	1.6
Lithuanian Legislators with	Incumbents, %	Longstanding MPs, %	Terms, N
One Function	40.1	25.5	1.8
Two Functions	37.6	21.0	1.8
Three and More	20.0	0	1.2

Source: Own data and calculations.
Note: The above table covered seven legislatures in each of the Baltic countries from 1990 onwards. The MPs were classified as long-standing if they served at least three legislative terms.

[128] Except for the Lithuanian legislators having the 2b pre-parliamentary path.
[129] However, the absolutely longest parliamentary tenure not only among those with two pre-parliamentary functions but among all possible combinations is observed among Estonian MPs with experience as party leaders and cabinet ministers (type 2c) reaching 2.9 legislative terms.
[130] Except Lithuanian MPs.

membership in citizens' committees provides the best opportunity for a longer parliamentary career. This conclusion is limited to Estonian and Latvian legislators only, since citizens' committees did not occur in Lithuania. However, the Latvian and Lithuanian legislators are similar in another respect: the increase of pre-parliamentary political functions decreases the longevity of parliamentary career in Latvia and Lithuania (see table 6.3.). In other words, the increase of pre-parliamentary political functions (more than one pre-parliamentary political function) increases chances for professional legislators in Estonia, but not in Latvia and, especially, not in Lithuania.

This allows to conclude that, in spite of many common patterns in the Baltic pre-parliamentary experience, the cross-country differences in legislative recruitment remain strong and visible.

7. Other Acquired and Ascriptive Assets for Parliamentary Recruitment

7.1. Level and Type of Education

"Education, especially university education, distinguishes elites from nonelites throughout the world." Putnam (1976:58)

In democracies the share and importance of educational titles for the access to the political elites increased over the decades in the way the importance of nobility titles decreased. It seems that in the modern world educational titles serve as a replacement for the nobility ones: "Everything happens as if education titles were 'nobility' titles allowing for the access to most of the most leading and prestigious positions (Gaxie and Godmer 2007: 107)." In other words, hereditary credentials in the political elite recruitment have been replaced by merit-based degrees.

7.1.1. Estonia

After the Soviet regime, which wiped out the last remnants of nobility and favoured education as a mechanism for career advancement, higher education remains an asset for the career mobility in the Estonian society. Tertiary education is also an important asset for the parliamentary recruitment in Estonia – about 93 per cent of legislators on average attained university or comparable degrees. Importance of university education in the legislative recruitment (share of MPs with university education) grew

Table 7.1.1. Education of Estonian MPs (in per cent)

Parliament	MPs with Doctorate	MPs with University Education	Types of University Degrees		
			Law	Humanities & Social Sciences	Technical & Natural Sciences
1990	19.8	86.7	12.1	33.0	60.4
1992	30.0	89.1	12.2	50.0	44.4
1995	26.6	93.1	11.7	36.2	58.5
1999	26.8	96.0	6.2	41.2	55.7
2003	11.1	98.0	13.1	46.5	41.4
2007	15.3	97.0	12.2	49.0	39.8
2011	9.6	93.1	21.3	54.3	28.7
Average	19.9	93.3	12.7	44.3	47.0

Source: Own data and calculations.
Note: Percentages of doctorates, degrees in law, humanities and social siences, technical and natural sciences refer not to all MPs, but to MPs with university or comparable education.

from 86.7 per cent in 1990 to 98 per cent in 2003. The share of legal education among Estonian parliamentarians, differently from Western democracies where the largest part of MPs come with law degrees, averages 12.7 per cent.

Although technical and natural sciences dominate over humanities and social sciences in three out of seven Estonian legislatures, Estonian data confirm a general Eastern European trend described by the prevalence of degrees in engineering: 47 per cent of MPs on average are educated in technical and natural sciences and 44.3 per cent of legislators are trained in humanities and social sciences (see table 7.1.1). The highest percentage of technical and natural sciences and the lowest share of humanities and social sciences among legislators of the 1990 Supreme Council come to us as a great surprise. It seemed that the 1990 year was time of singing revolution and artists, not of engineers and technologists. However, it turns out that almost two-thirds of the legislators elected in 1990 came from technical and natural sciences.

If we turn our analysis to the political party families, out of all party families that were present in at least three legislatures, Agrarians demonstrate the highest educational credentials – 97.4 per cent of their MPs graduated from the university. They are followed by Right Liberals and Socialists/Social Democrats – 96.9 and 96.2 per cent of them respectively hold university or comparable degrees. Tertiary education was attained by 95 per cent of Left Liberals. Conservatives with 94.2 per cent are just above average. The lowest results are shown by the Ethnic Minority family – only 84.2 per cent of their legislators hold tertiary degrees.

In terms of law degrees, clear leaders are the Right Liberals with an average of 18.5 per cent of them having received an education in law. Socialists/Social Democrats, Conservatives and Ethnic Minority family with their 9.2, 10.1 and 6.3 per cent respectively are well below the average. Left Liberals with their 12.2 per cent are close to the total parliamentary average.

Humanities and social sciences are best represented among Conservatives and Right Liberals – 55.8 and 48.4 per cent respectively. Not far from average are Left Liberals and Socialists/Social Democrats – 43.9 and 40.8 per cent of them accordingly have degrees in humanities and social sciences. Ethnic Minority family and Agrarians with their 25 and 18.4 per cent, respectively, come clearly below the average.

The technical and natural sciences are the domain of the Greens, Ethnic Minority and the Agrarians – 90, 81.3 and 71.1 per cent of them, respectively, were trained in these fields. Socialists/Social Democrats with 52.6 per cent and Left Liberals with

48.7 per cent are slightly above the average. Only 37.9 per cent of Right Liberals and 35.7 per cent of Conservatives hold degrees in technical and natural sciences.

It was argued that doctoral degrees could be considered equivalents of the elitist grandes écoles in France or Oxford and Cambridge Universities in the United Kingdom in terms of structural distinction (Gaxie and Godmer 2007: 127). About one fifth of the Estonian legislators with university education hold doctoral degrees, although their percentage seems to be declining with every Riigikogu. The largest share of MPs with research credentials can be found among the Ethnic Minority party family with 31.6 per cent and the Socialists/Social Democrats with 29.1 per cent. Close to the parliamentary average are the Agrarians with 22.5 per cent and the Left Liberals with 17.9 per cent, whereas only 15.6 per cent of Right Liberals and 15.3 per cent of Conservatives hold doctoral degrees.

If we differentiate between ethnic Estonian and non-Estonian legislators in the entire period from 1990 to 2011, we observe a slightly higher share of university degrees (94.9 per cent), slightly lower share of degrees in law (12.5 per cent) and humanities and social sciences (37.5 per cent), and substantially higher share of degrees in technical and natural sciences (55.4 per cent) among non-Estonian MPs in comparison with ethnic Estonian MPs on average. Ethnic minority MPs have also a lower share of doctorates – 17.5 per cent on average.

7.1.2 Latvia

92.6 per cent of Latvian MPs having university degrees in the last six Saeimas is a clear advancement in comparison with 53.5 per cent average for the first four Saeimas.[131] The share of parliamentary representatives with degrees in law, after a continuous decline from 16.3 per cent in 1993 to 11.6 per cent in 2006, jumped to 19.6 per cent in 2010. The share of degrees in humanities and social sciences (from 33.3 to 47.8 per cent), as well as in technical and natural sciences (from 45.7 to 74.8 per cent), fluctuates from parliament to parliament, but technical and natural sciences clearly dominate humanities and social sciences in five out of seven parliaments. The second lowest percentage of degrees in humanities and social sciences in 1990 in comparison with the following legislatures comes as a great surprise: the period of

[131] There have been 62 per cent with the university or comparable degree in the 1922 Saeima, 55 per cent in the 1925 Saeima, 54 per cent in the 1928 Saeima and 43 per cent in the 1931 Saeima. (Source of information: Latvijas Republikas Saeima.)

national awakening in Latvia seemed to be characterised by public leadership and prominence of humanistic intellectuals and artists, but this public leadership did not translate into quantitative dominance in the first democratically elected parliament. However, if we compare Anti-Communist Umbrella Movement and Communists in the 1990 Supreme Council, differences between those two groups in humanities and social sciences are clear: Anti-Communists have more than two times higher percentage of legislators with degrees in humanities and social sciences than Communists (32.8 per cent against 15.9 per cent). The share of MPs with degree in law among Anti-Communists is also more than two times larger than among Communists (14.4 per cent for Anti-Communists compared to 6.3 per cent for Communists).

Table 7.1.2. Education of Latvian MPs (in per cent)

Parliament	MPs with Doctorate	MPs with University Education	Types of University Degrees		
			Law	Humanities & Social Sciences	Technical & Natural Sciences
1990	21.2	92.0	14.6	33.8	74.8
1993	18.5	92.0	16.3	44.6	50.0
1995	14.4	90.0	13.3	33.3	61.1
1998	3.2	94.0	12.8	45.7	45.7
2002	8.6	93.0	11.8	40.9	57.0
2006	12.6	95.0	11.6	47.4	50.5
2010	14.1	92.5	19.6	47.8	45.7
Average	13.2	92.6	14.3	41.9	55.0

Source: Own data and calculations.
Note: Percentages of doctorates, degrees in law, humanities and social siences, technical and natural sciences refer not to all MPs, but to MPs with university or comparable education.

It has been observed that in the late Soviet period population with tertiary degrees in Latvia split into two groups along the ethnic line: arts, humanities and agriculture being favoured by ethnic Latvians and technical sciences being chosen and dominated by ethnic minorities: in the mid-1980s, the largest shares of ethnic Latvians studied at the Academy of Music (83 per cent), the Academy of Agriculture (84 per cent) and the Pedagogical Institute of Liepāja (81 per cent). In the University of Latvia and the Politechnical Institute of Rīga, ethnic Latvians made up 55 and 36 per cent of all students accordingly. In the Institute of Civic Aviation only 1.4 per cent of the students were of ethnic Latvian origin (Zvidriņš and Vanovska 1992: 100).

The data from our parliamentary sample confirm this trend among MPs – the proportion of humanities and social sciences (35.2) is lower and the percentage of degrees in technical and natural sciences (71.1 per cent) is substantially higher among Latvian ethnic minority legislators compared to ethnic Latvian MPs. Ethnic minority legislators have also lower proportions of university degrees (89.1 per cent), lower percentages of doctorates (8.6 per cent) and law degrees (13.3 per cent).

Out of all party families that have been present at least in three parliaments, Liberals are the most educated – 98.6 per cent of them have university degrees, the second most educated being Conservatives (98.1 per cent on average). With the share among Agrarians of only 86.3 per cent with a degree, they are below the share of Communists (97.2 per cent) and Socialists/Social Democrats (88.9 per cent), but it is the Christian Democrats that have the smallest share of MPs with a university degree at 82.4 per cent.

The clear leaders in legal education are Liberals and Communists – 23.3 and 20 per cent of them respectively hold law degrees. Conservatives with 16.3 per cent and Socialists/Social Democrats with 12.5 per cent come close to the Saeima average. The lowest proportions are observed among Agrarians (4.3 per cent) and Christian Democrats (3.6 per cent).

Humanities and social sciences are a clear domain of Christian Democrats – more than three-quarters (78.6 per cent) of them hold degrees in humanities and social sciences. Conservatives with 47.3 per cent and Agrarians with 44.9 per cent are also above the Saeima average. The percentages of Socialists/Social Democrats (36.6 per cent) and Liberals (35.6 per cent) are below the average. The lowest proportion of humanities and social sciences is observed among Communists (31.4 per cent).

Technical and natural sciences are best represented among Socialists/Social Democrats having 63.4 per cent; they are followed by Agrarians with 60.9 per cent. The proportions among Liberals (46.6 per cent) and Conservatives (45.3 per cent) are below the Saeima average. The lowest percentage is observed among Christian Democrats – 28.6 per cent of them hold degrees in natural and technical sciences.

The largest proportion of doctorates is observed among Liberals (19.2 per cent); they are followed by Conservatives (13.3 per cent). The percentage among Agrarians (11.6 per cent) is below the parliamentary average. The lowest shares of doctoral degrees are found among Socialists/Social Democrats (7.1 per cent) and Christian Democrats (3.6 per cent).

7.1.3. Lithuania

The members of the Lithuanian parliaments are no less educated than parliamentarians in Estonia and Latvia – 94.2 per cent of them hold university degrees, more than a quarter of those who graduated from universities have doctoral titles (see table 7.1.3). The percentages of law degrees fluctuate from 3.7 to 13.4 per cent, but the last three parliaments show an increase of MPs with legal education. More than a half of legislators studied technical and natural sciences, less than a half graduated with degrees in humanities and social sciences.

The rise of degrees in humanities and social sciences and decline of degrees in technical sciences and natural sciences among Lithuanian parliamentarians are observed since 1992. This change we interprete as a departure from the Soviet type industrial society and a transformation into a new type of society where technologies play a lesser role in politics.

If we turn our analysis to the political party families, out of all party families that were present in at least three legislatures, Agrarians and Ethnic Minority party family have the highest educational credentials – 100 per cent of their legislators graduated from universities. Not far away from them are Liberals (98 per cent) and Left Liberals (97.5 per cent). Conservatives with 96.2 per cent and Socialists/Social Democrats with 93.6 per cent are rather close to the parliamentary average. The lowest percentages belong to the party families of Christian Democrats (82.4 per cent) and Extreme Right (87.5 per cent).

Table 7.1.3. Education of Lithuanian MPs (in per cent)

Parliament	MPs with Doctorate	MPs with University Education	Types of University Degrees		
			Law	Humanities & Social Sciences	Technical & Natural Sciences
1990	32.3	95.5	13.4	40.2	50.4
1992	41.3	89.4	7.1	38.1	61.9
1996	33.1	92.7	5.5	43.3	52.8
2000	22.2	95.7	3.7	48.1	56.3
2004	20.7	95.7	8.9	51.1	52.6
2008	16.5	94.3	12.0	51.9	47.4
2012	19.4	96.4	12.7	57.5	43.3
Average	26.5	94.2	9.0	47.2	52.1

Source: Own data and calculations.

Note: Percentages of doctorates, degrees in law, humanities and social siences, technical and natural sciences refer not to all MPs, but to MPs with university or comparable education.

The highest percentage of law degrees belongs to Liberals and Left Liberals (12.4 and 10.3 per cent respectively); they are followed by Conservatives (9 per cent). 5.3 per cent of Agrarians and 5 per cent of MPs from Ethnic Minority family studied law. None of Christian Democrats and Extreme Right graduated with law degrees ever.

In terms of humanities and social sciences, the clear leaders are Left Liberals (64.1 per cent); they are followed by Extreme Right (57.1 per cent) and Liberals (56.7 per cent). Ethnic Minority family (50 per cent) and Socialists/Social Democrats (49.1 per cent) are slightly above average, Conservatives (42.9 per cent) are slightly below the parliamentary average. The lowest percentages are those for Agrarians (26.3 per cent) and Christian Democrats (21.4 per cent).

Technical and natural sciences are the domain of Christian Democrats and Agrarians – 78.6 per cent and 73.7 per cent of them respectively are trained in this type of field. Socialists/Social Democrats with 60.5 per cent and Conservatives with 57.6 per cent follow them. Left Liberals (48.7 per cent) and Ethnic Minority family (45 per cent) are slightly below the parliamentary average. The lowest proportions are those observed among Extreme Right (42.9 per cent) and Liberals (34 per cent).

The highest percentages of doctoral titles are found among Extreme Right (42.9 per cent) and Christian Democrats (35.7 per cent). Proportions of doctorates among Conservatives (29.9 per cent) and Socialists (29.5 per cent) are slightly above the Seimas average. Liberals (21.6 per cent), Agrarians (21.1 per cent) and Left Liberals (17.9 per cent) are below the parliamentary average. MPs from Ethnic Minority family carry no doctoral titles.

If we differentiate between ethnic Lithuanian and non-Lithuanian legislators in the entire period from 1990 to 2012, we observe a higher proportion of university degrees (98.6 per cent), higher percentage of degrees in in law (9.6 per cent) and a lower proportion of degrees in humanities and social sciences (43.8 per cent) among non-Lithuanian MPs compared to ethnic Lithuanian MPs. The proportion of ethnic minority MPs with doctoral titles (11 per cent) is more than two times smaller.

7.1.4. A Cross-Country Comparison: Dominance of Engineering, not Law

In all three Baltic countries a similar percentage of legislators graduated from universities, in all three of them the lion's share among MPs is allocated not to the law degrees but to degrees in technical and natural sciences. In other words,

engineers, not lawyers dominate the educational background of Baltic legislators. To some extend this reminds us of technocrats as the new elite by Szalai (1995 and 1996); it conforms to the general educational profile of legislators in Eastern Europe (see Best and Edinger 2003) and is likely to remain for the near future. A good example of this provides Germany (see Lock 1998: 97); although East Germany re-joined West Germany more than twenty years ago, Bundestag members from East Germany are more similar to Russian Duma legislators than to their West German counterparts in large proportion of degrees in technical and natural sciences (Semenova 2008: 26). In other words, the Soviet Army left East Germany long ago, but engineers "stayed" in politics and this continues to affect the current parliamentary recruitment even two decades after.

The literature reports that decision-makers with a natural science background are much more committed to the technocratic ethos than those trained in the social sciences (Putnam 1977: 404). This implies more elitism and authoritarianism since the technocratic ethos is defined as "the application of apolitical expertise", antagonism "toward politicians, political institutions, and citizen involvement in government" and relative insensitiveness "to conflicting social interests and to issues of distributive justice" (Putnam 1977:404)[132].

A careful observer may notice that proportions of technical and natural sciences among Baltic legislators decline slowly over time, however, there is no trend of growing percentages in law degrees. What we observe is the rise of humanities and social sciences, albeit in rather small proportions.

Table 7.1.4. Education of Baltic Legislators, 1990-2012 (in per cent)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Doctorate	19.9	13.2	26.5
University Degrees	93.3	92.6	94.2
Law	12.7	14.3	9.0
Humanities & Social Sciences	44.3	41.9	47.2
Technical & Natural Sciences	47.0	55.0	52.1

Source: Based on tables 7.1.1, 7.1.2 and 7.1.3.
Note: Percentages of doctorates, degrees in law, humanities and social siences, technical and natural sciences refer not to all MPs, but to MPs with university or comparable education.

[132] One historical illustration for the exposure to authoritarianism among those with education in engineering could be the Reichstag of Weimar Republic, where 50 per cent of MPs with engineering background were NSDAP members compared to 11.8 per cent of those with degrees in law and 29.7 per cent of those in humanities (Jarausch 1990: 70).

The main cross-country differences are the largest percentage of doctoral titles and degrees in humanities and social sciences among Lithuanian legislators and the largest proportion of technical and natural sciences and law degrees among Latvian MPs. The largest percentage of doctoral titles can be explained by the highest proportion of teachers and professors in Lithuanian parliaments compared to the Estonian and Latvian legislatures. The explanation for the largest proportion of technical and natural sciences should be attributed to the fact that Latvian society was affected by the Soviet (and Russian) culture of industrialisation most of all three Baltic countries.

Political party families in the Baltic parliaments disclose some common patterns in education. The lowest proportion of university degrees is found among Christian Democrats[133]. The highest or one of the highest proportions of degrees in technical and natural sciences are observed among Agrarians in all three countries. Liberals[134] have the highest percentage of law degrees, this finding is in conformance with a historical connection between lawyers and the rise of political liberalism in the West (see Halliday and Karpik 1997). Liberals, in the case of Estonia and Latvia, have also the highest proportion of university degrees. This finding contrasts well with the lowest share of university degrees among Christian Democrats; it seems as if one extreme side (Liberals) represents an individualistic believe in human reason (Enlightment and secularisation as its side-effect) and the other one (Christian Democrats) represents a priority of collectivistic believe in God and a paternalistic orientation. In addition to this, the Baltic Christian Democrats provide us with a sharp contrast in degrees of technical and natural sciences: the Lithuanian Christian Democrats have the highest proportion (78.6 per cent) of technical and natural sciences out of all party families, whereas their Latvian counterparts with 28.6 per cent have the lowest proportion. This difference could be explained by the fact that Latvian (Protestant) Christian Democrats include priests and theologians who by definition have training in humanities, whereas Lithuanian (Catholic) Christian Democrats do not include a single priest or theologian.

To include an ethnic perspective, ethnic minority legislators in Baltic parliaments have lower proportions of degrees in humanities and social sciences and higher percentages of degrees in technical and natural sciences in comparison with ethnic

[133] This concerns only those party families that were present in parliament at least three terms, namely Christian Democrats of Latvia and Lithuania.
[134] Right Liberals in the case of Estonia.

majority MPs. The Baltic ethnic minority MPs have also lower proportions of doctoral titles. In Estonia and Latvia ethnic minority parliamentarians have lower percentages in university education and law degrees.

How different are recruitment patterns of those educated in law from those in humanities and social sciences or technical and natural sciences? The data for all three Baltic countries show that those educated in law are of the youngest age; they have the highest percentage of lawyers, judges (prosecutors) and those with a leading party position; they also have the highest percentage of long-standing legislators (serving at least three terms). With regard to the Soviet experience, they have the lowest percentage of former leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and the highest percentage of members of the Soviet Supreme Councils. Those with education in humanities and social sciences distinguish themselves with the highest percentage of women MPs and the largest share of teachers (professors) and journalists (writers). Legislators educated in technical and natural sciences differ from other two groups being of the oldest age and having the lowest percentage of women; they also have the highest percentage of liberal professions, managers and businessmen, and those with employment in the primary sector. These findings allow to conclude that legislators with education in law – despite of numerically low numbers in the Baltic legislatures - have the best chances to embark on legislative careers; that humanities and social sciences are the friendliest toward recruitment of women; and that technical and natural sciences offer the best opportunities for the recruitment of managers and businessmen.

The above findings apply to all three Baltic States without cross-country differences. However, some cross-country differences should be reported as well. For instance, Estonia and Latvia stand out from Lithuania with the lowest percentage of the Soviet ministers, the highest percentage of parliamentary incumbents and long-standing politicians (serving at least three legislative terms without interruption) among MPs educated in law and with the highest percentage of parliamentary newcomers and ethnic minorities among legislators with education in technical and natural sciences. Estonia and Lithuania differ from Latvia with the highest percentage of cabinet ministers and the former Communist party members among legislators educated in law, highest percentage of political party employees and the highest mean number of elections among parliamentarians educated in humanities and social sciences and the highest percentage of those with local elective background among

MPs educated in technical and natural sciences. Latvia and Lithuania differ from Estonia with the highest percentage of public sector employees among legislators educated in law.

High percentage of university degrees among Baltic legislators conforms to the general pattern of a much higher proportion of university degrees among MPs in parliaments of Eastern Europe (Best and Edinger 2003) in comparison with their counterparts in Western Europe (Cotta and Best 2000: 497). A very high proportion of university degrees among legislators also indicates a large share of highly educated population in general which was an important resource or cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) in the tripple transition from Communist regimes for countries of Eastern Europe, allowing many of them to achieve democratic consolidation faster than in Southern Europe and Latin America (see Schneider and Schmitter 2004) and quicker than transitologists and their theories have predicted (Merkel 2010). Intellectuals as a new class power in the mature epoch of socialism after Brezhnevism according to Konrád and Szelényi (1979) and the dominant position of intelligentsia[135] in the post-Communist period (Konrad and Szelenyi 1991: 356) would also emphasise the role of higher education in Eastern Europe.

The dominance of technical intelligentsia among Baltic legislators is attributed to the heritage of industrialisation and technical modernisation in the Soviet Socialist societies. As mentioned above, the percentage of technical degrees among Baltic MPs declines and it could be that at some point an educational background of Baltic parliamentarians will resemble a background of those from Western European legislatures. Alternatively, it could be that, in spite of declining trends, Baltic countries will continue an 'old' track of development with majority of legislators having background in technical and natural sciences. This track is not exceptionally Eastern European as the French political system is known for recruitment of engineers (Mény 1990: 265) and government by technicians defined as technocracy (Ridley 1966). Since "engineering (like law) is often considered an ideal education in Europe because it combines a training of the mind with practical application" (Riddley 1966: 43) and a modern government is a modern state co-ordinated by technocrats

[135] We are well aware of the historical distinction between intelligentsia and intellectuals, the former referring to the Russian or Eastern European cultural elites with their political-moral mission and the latter meaning rather a simple status group of professionals in Western Europe. It must be also mentioned that the definition of Eastern European intellectuals by Konrád and Szelényi is rather broad since it includes not only technical and humanistic intelligentsia but also the ruling communist elite.

(Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987: 176), one could easily arrive at the conclusion that technocracy is a rather universal modern phenomenon. However, we must remain cautious by observing that the definitions of technocrats by Szalai, Riddley, Dunleavy and O'Leary are very broad; they include not only engineers, but also economists and administrators. This means that if our Baltic data set would assign university degrees in economics and public administration (coded as degrees in social sciences) to the section of technical sciences, the 'technocratic' effect in the recruitment of the Baltic legislators would be even stronger. Our data do show that in all three Baltic countries parliamentarians educated in technical and natural sciences have the best chances to enter legislatures as managers and businessmen, nevertheless, we would like to remain with our decision to distinguish between economists and engineers, which is also advised by Bell (1973: 344) not to link economists with scientists, mathematicians and engineers as practitioners of "the new intellectual technology".

7.2. Gender

Across Europe, the female gender remains underrepresented in national parliaments. This is despite the fact that most of the continent has enjoyed universal suffrage since the end of the Second World War, and a liberal democratic form of governance remains popular in most of Europe. Women, not a minority in society, are always a minority in national representative bodies; it is not possible to find a national parliament which would have an adequate representation[136] or overrepresentation of women.[137]

The Baltic parliaments are no exception to this – women are underrepresented in the Estonian *Riigikogu*, the Latvian *Saeima* and the Lithuanian *Seimas*. In spite of the fact that the share of women in the Baltic legislatures has been increasing since 1990 and has already achieved the 23.7 per cent threshold for OSCE countries[138], this remains far from the Nordic threshold of 42 per cent.[139]

'An iron law of andrarchy' (Putnam 1976) has long been a typical feature of political elites and, in spite of some incremental gains in parliamentary representation

[136] Except for the national parliament of Andorra which had 50 per cent of women MPs in 2013.
[137] Sweden was close to achieving an adequate representation in 2006 with 47 per cent of female MPs in the Riksdag. Finland came second with 42 per cent of female MPs in 2007 (IPU Statistical Archive).
[138] Except for Latvia.
[139] Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments, 1 February 2013.

over the last decades, seems to remain a normality. Parliament continues to be an elite recruitment structure which favours males.

7.2.1. Findings from the Literature on the Parliamentary Recruitment of Women

The existing literature highlights three main groups of factors affecting parliamentary representation of women: (1) political/institutional, (2) historical/cultural and (3) socio-economic (Matland 1998; Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007).

Political/Institutional Influences

The electoral system is seen as the most important variable affecting parliamentary recruitment of women (Norris 1985). In the analysis of twenty-three democracies, Rule (1987) finds an electoral system as the single most important predictor of female legislative recruitment; Studlar and McAllister (2002) draw the same conclusion in their work on twenty industrialised democracies. Proportional representation (PR) provides the best chances for election of women, good opportunities under mixed electoral systems and the worst chances under straight majoritarian (first past the post) system (Rule 1987 and 1994; Kostadinova 2007; Paxton, Kunovich, Hughes 2007). The main explanation for this is that political party nominates a group of candidates in the PR system and only a single candidate in the single member district. In the first case, the party is more conscious of balancing its list, a woman candidate can be seen as an advantage in attracting additional votes. The second case involves a nomination procedure of the zero sum nature: women compete against the party interests represented by men, nomination of a female candidate means a displacement of a male competitor (Matland 1998; Paxton, Kunovich, Hughes 2007).

Friendliness of left-wing political parties toward inclusion of female candidates shows a similarity with ethnic minority recruitment. Left-oriented political parties adhere more to egalitarian ideals and are more inclined to support underrepresented groups (Caul 1999). They have more females as candidates and legislators (Putnam 1976: 38); the success of the left-wing party is "the strongest predictor of women's level of inclusion in a political elite" (Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007: 103).

Political parties with leftist values are also more likely to adopt gender quotas (Caul 2001) that are considered to positively influence the women's share in parliamentary representation (Hoecker 1998). Although "national gender quota laws

do not always generate significant increases in women’s represesentation” (Paxton, Kunovich, Hughes 2007: 269-270), the intention of them – be it legal or voluntary party quotas, aspirant or candidate quotas, gender-neutral quotas or simply reserved seats – is to facilitate women’s access to political power. Quotas represent what Dahlerup (2006) calls the fast track to equal representation of women and men and opposes the incremental track which is slow and mainly European. In addition to speeding up the process of access to parliament, the quantitative technique of quotas may induce a qualitative transformation in representation of women: “once the group reaches a certain size, critical mass theory suggests that there will be a qualitative change in the nature of group interactions, as the minority starts to assert itself and thereby transform the institutional culture, norms and values”(Norris and Lovenduski 2001: 2-3). However, findings by Norris and Lovenduski (2001) and Studlar and McAllister (2002) do not provide a clear evidence that women act more distinctively once their group reaches a certain size.

Studies on legislative turnover see high incumbency rates as obstacle for women’s access to parliament (Andersen and Thorson 1984; Darcy and Choike 1986; Matland and Studlar 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2005). Incumbent MPs tend to be male and have better connections to resources, they are likely to be re-elected at a significantly higher ratio than candidates without office. Increasing the number of female candidates is an important step toward better parliamentary representation of women. However, one arrives at a conclusion that “increasing the return rate of female incumbents can affect the level of female representation more than increasing the number of women candidates” (Darcy and Choike 1986: 237).

Some authors argue that “career chances of women improve the less powerful an institution is” (Verzichelli and Edinger 2005: 269). This type of argument implies that a stronger legislative representation of women could indicate a lower decision-making capacity of the parliament.

Historical/Cultural Impact

It seems that the earlier country has granted voting rights for women, the higher levels representation of women will achieve at present. For instance, in 1906 Finland was the first to grant voting rights for women in Europe, today female parliamentary representation there occupies a second place in Europe. This historical type of

explanation is being supported by Hoecker (1998), Reynolds (1999) und Siaroff (2000).

In the treatment of Siaroff (2000: 199), the historical explanation is connected to the religious/cultural one: the countries that earlier started granting political rights for women were Protestant countries. The study by Rule (1987) also emphasises a positive Protestant (non-Catholic) influence on the legislative recruitment of women.

Socio-economic Level of Development

Female labour force participation and their integration into the labour market are considered to have a significant, positive effect on the number of female legislators (Oakes and Almquist 1993: 76; Matland 1998: 116). However, in spite of this established link, some researchers warn not to forget that occupations are gender-specific and seen as traditional domains of males or females (Eccles 1994; Anker 1998). Therefore, "the important factor is not whether women in a society work but where they work" (Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007: 81). If legislative recruitment channelled through the occupational group dominated by females (e.g., teachers), women are likely to have better chances to get into a parliament. If the main area of parliamentary recruitment to be found in the occupational group dominated by males (e.g., managers, engineers, military officers) men will have easier access to legislature.

Higher education alone or through its connection with occupation (education as a prerequisite in certain occupations, e.g. law) has been and remains an important ladder in attaining social status of women. It is expected that countries with a larger share of higher education among women will have more female legislators than countries where women are less well educated (Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007: 81).

It is also important to note that socio-economic (women's share in the labour force) as well as institutional (PR electoral system) and cultural (cultural standing of women) factors apply to the developed (OECD) democracies, none of them has a significant effect in less developed countries (Matland 1998: 109).

Literature on the Recruitment of Women MPs in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

The female representation in Estonian parliaments and other political structures are discussed in the studies by Raitviir (2000; 2002) and Biin (2004); the issue of parliamentary representation of Baltic women is placed into a European and Anglo-

American perspective by Allik (2011). The works by Matonytė and collaborators (Krupavičius and Matonytė 2003; Matonytė 2003 and 2004; Matonytė and Novelskaitė 2004a and 2004b; Novelskaitė and Matonytė 2006; Matonytė 2007) provide a solid and systematic research into the parliamentary recruitment of female MPs in Lithuania. The comparable analysis on the recruitment patterns of Latvian female legislators is missing. There are some works (Ostrovska 1994; Zake 2002) dealing with general involvement of women in Latvian politics, but the only work partly related to the parliamentary recruitment of women is the one by Klāsons (2001). Regrettably, it is limited to one legislative term only.

7.2.2. Hypotheses and Analysis of Data

On average, over 17.7 per cent of female legislators in the last six parliaments of Estonia, 16 per cent in the last six parliaments of Latvia and 16.7 per cent in the last six legislatures of Lithuania are positive achievements in comparison with Riigikogu, Saeima and Seimas of the First Republic; Female MPs in the pre-war Riigikogu never constituted more than 3 per cent (Raun 1991: 133), the Lithuanian parliament would include 3 to 4 women per term while in the Latvian legislature women were almost not present.[140] 24.8 per cent of female legislators in the 2007 Riigikogu, 19 per cent in the last two Saeima and 24.5 per cent of female MPs in the last Seimas are the largest wins for women in the history of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliamentary elections. The current figures have already reached the average representation levels

Table 7.2.1. Female MPs in the Baltic Parliaments

Parliament	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th
Female MPs and the Year of Election	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)
ESTONIA 1990/92/95/99/2003/07/11	7.6 (8)	12.9 (13)	11.9 (12)	17.8 (18)	18.8 (19)	24.8 (25)	19.8 (20)
LATVIA 1990/93/95/98/2002/06/10	5.5 (11)	15 (15)	8 (8)	17 (17)	18 (18)	19 (19)	19 (19)
LITHUANIA 1990/92/96/2000/04/08/12	9 (12)	7.1 (10)	17.5 (24)	10.6 (15)	22 (31)	18.4 (26)	24.5 (34)

Source: Own data and calculations.

Note: The legislative bodies elected in 1990 were the Supreme Councils. The Estonian Riigikogu and the Lithuanian Seimas resumed their activities after the 1992 election, the Latvian Saeima started after the 1993 election.

[140] The only female legislator was elected to the Saeima of 1931 which was the last democratic parliament before the authoritarian takeover of Kārlis Ulmanis.

of many other western democracies[141] but they lag behind the Scandinavian and Soviet achievements.

One might argue that the Soviet Lithuanian Assemblies, one third of which deputies have been women, were even greater achievements in the political history. However, these assemblies were undemocratically organised façade institutions with a rather decorative and not a legislative function.

In general, the representation of women in the Estonian parliaments grew from 7.6 per cent in 1990 to 24.8 per cent in 2007. The Estonian Riigikogu was for three legislative terms led by the female head; two of three Presidium members of the 2011 Riigikogu were women legislators. In Latvia, parliamentary representation of women grew from 5.5 per cent in 1990 to 21 per cent in 2011. The Latvian Seima had female MPs as its speakers for three legislative terms. Three women out of five Saeima Presidium members in the 2002-2006 parliament also belong to the greatest wins in the Latvian parliamentary history. Since 1990 parliamentary representation advanced in the Lithuanian parliaments; the 2008 Seimas had its female speaker for the first time in the parliamentary history of Lithuania.

On the basis of literature above, we propose eight hypotheses for the recruitment analysis of women legislators in the Baltics:

1. The proportional system hypothesis:

Countries with proportional electoral systems will have more female legislators than those with majoritarian or mixed systems.

2. The candidate hypothesis:

The larger the pool of candidates, the better chances for women to enter a legislature.

3. The left party hypothesis:

Left wing parties have higher levels of female representation in comparison with other political parties.

[141] As of 1 February 2013, there were 42 per cent of women in the Scandinavian legislatures on average. The average for other European OSCE member countries was 21.9 per cent (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013).

4. The occupation and education hypothesis:

The level of female representation is affected positively if the main recruitment bases are not male-dominated occupation and education.

5. The turnover hypothesis:

The higher the legislative turnover, the better chances for women to enter a parliament.

6. The age and political experience hypothesis:

Women as newcomers will be older and have less political experience in comparison with their male colleagues.

7. The strength of institution hypothesis:

The less powerful a political institution, the higher level of women is represented in it.

8. The Protestant culture hypothesis:

The Protestant culture is friendlier toward inclusion of women into political elite than Catholic culture.

The Proportional System Hypothesis

If the proportional electoral systems of Estonia and Latvia and a mixed electoral system of Lithuania are compared, there is only a slight evidence in support of the proposed hypothesis which states that countries with proportional electoral systems will have more female legislators than those with majoritarian or mixed systems. The averages for the second to the seventh term (the first legislatures in all three countries have been excluded from analysis since the 1990 elections have been conducted according to the single transferable vote (STV) in Estonia and majority scheme in Latvia and Lithuania) are 17.7 per cent for Estonia, 16 per cent for Latvia and 16.7 per cent for Lithuania. If we compare election by election across countries, the Estonian and Latvian PR results show a higher level of female representation only in three of six parliaments in comparison with electoral outcomes of the Lithuanian mixed system.

However, the mixed electoral system of Lithuania offers an opportunity to compare a proportional system with a majoritarian one: roughly a half of the Lithuanian parliament – 70 legislators – is elected on the PR list, another half – 71 MPs – comes through single member (SMD) districts.

Table 7.2.2. Election of the Women MPs to the Lithuanian Seimas

Electoral	1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
Segment	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
PR	5	50	14	58.3	9	60	18	58.1	15	57.7	20	58.8
SMD	5	50	10	41.7	6	40	13	41.9	11	42.3	14	41.2
Total	10	100	24	100	15	100	31	100	26	100	34	100

Source: Own calculations.

The table above clearly shows that in almost all cases a higher share of women was elected through the party lists than through single member districts. This confirms the hypothesis that proportional representation is more favourable for the election of female MPs than a majority system.

The Candidate Hypothesis

The candidate hypothesis states that a larger pool of female candidates increases the probability that more females will enter a parliament.

The percentage of female candidates in Estonia climbed from 14 per cent in 1992 to 27.1 per cent in 2007. The share of women candidates in Latvia grew from 22.9 per cent in 1995 to 30.3 per cent in 2011. In Lithuania it grew from 11.8 per cent in 1992 to 31.7 per cent in 2012.

However, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data do not provide evidence that enlargement of candidates' pool directly affects the increase of legislators. In some cases we have the opposite – for instance, in the 2006 Latvian Saeima the share of women MPs grows in spite of a decrease in women candidates. One may conclude that there must be other factors influencing the rise and decline of female MPs.

The Left Party Hypothesis

The left party hypothesis emphasise that left-oriented political parties adhere more to egalitarian ideals and are more inclined to support underrepresented groups (Caul 1999), that they have more females as candidates and legislators and that the success

of the left-wing party is „the strongest predictor of women's level of inclusion in a political elite" (Christmas-Best and Kjær 2007: 103).

The Estonian data support this hypothesis to a large extent. With the exception of Popular Front in 1992 and Conservatives in 1999, the highest percentages of female MPs are found among Socialists/Social Democrats in 1990, 1995 and 2003

Table 7.2.3. Female Legislators within Party Families in Estonian Parliaments

	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Communists	0	0	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Social Dem.	2	22.2	3	25	1	16.7	3	17.6	2	33.3	3	30	4	21.1
Greens	0	0	0	0	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	16.7	---	---
Agrarians	1	7.1	---	---	---	---	0	0	2	15.4	2	33.3	---	---
Left Liberals	1	6.3	0	0	8	14	5	17.9	7	25	10	34.5	7	26.9
Right Liberals	--	---	0	0	2	10.5	5	20	3	15.8	7	22.6	5	15.2
Conservatives	--	---	1	3.4	1	7.7	4	22.2	5	14.3	2	10.5	4	17.4
Extreme Right	--	---	4	22.2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--	---
Ethnic Minority	0	0	---	---	0	0	1	16.7	---	---	---	---	--	---
Other	1	8.3	0	0	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--	---
No Party	1	12.5	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--	---
Umbrella Movement	2	14.3	5	33.3	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--	---
TOTAL	8	7.6	13	12.9	12	11.9	18	17.8	19	18.8	25	24.8	20	19.8

Source: Own data and calculations.

and Left Liberals in 2007 and 2011. The highest absolute numbers of women are also observed among leftist parliamentary parties – Socialists/Social Democrats in 1990 and Left Liberals from 1995 to 2011, with an exception being the Popular Front in 1990 and 1992 and Right Liberals in 1999.

The left party hypothesis states that the left wing parties have higher levels of female representation compared to other political parties. It is being challenged by the Lithuanian and, especially, Latvian data.

One of the most striking findings from the Latvian data is greater friendliness towards women among the families of the right wing than among Socialist/Social Democratic or Communist parties in Latvian parliaments. In absolute numbers, the greatest inclusion of female legislators among Anti-Communist Umbrella Movement in 1990, Liberals in 1993, Extreme Right in 1995 and Conservatives from 1998 onwards. In terms of the percentage of women inside of each party family, Socialists/

Table 7.2.4. Female Legislators within Party Families in Latvian Parliaments

	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Communists	1	1.7	2	28.6	0	0	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Social Dem.	---	---	2	15.4	1	16.7	2	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agrarians	---	---	0	0	2	12.5	---	---	1	8.3	2	11.1	4	18.2
Left Liberals	---	---	2	40	1	5.6	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Conservatives	---	---	3	20	1	12.5	7	17.1	15	28.3	15	30.6	14	34.1
Extreme Right	---	---	0	0	2	6.7	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	12.5
Liberals	---	---	4	11.1	1	5.9	5	23.8	---	---	---	---	---	---
Christian Dem.	---	---	2	33.3	--	---	3	37.5	2	20	2	20	---	---
Popular Front	10	7.6	---	---	--	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL	11	5.5	15	15	8	8	17	17	18	18	19	19	19	19

Source: Own data and calculations.

Social Democrats and Communists rank lowest in six out of seven Parliaments.[142] We do not have an explanation for this phenomenon, but there is no wonder if a separate party of female Social Democrats in this situation appears and contests in election. This was the case of the Social Democratic Organisation of Women which in the election of 1998 competed with Alliance of Latvian Social Democrats (LSA) and National Harmony Party (TSP). Parliamentary representation of Communists in 1995 and of the parties belonging to the Social Democratic family - TSP in 1998 and all other parties belonging to the Social Democratic family from 2002 onwards has been exclusively male: 5, 16, 25, 23 and 29 MPs from 1995 to 2010, respectively.

The Lithuanian data also demonstrate – both in absolute numbers and percentages within the party family – that Socialists/Social Democrats are not the friendliest when it comes to recruiting female legislators. On the contrary, in many cases the proportion of women among Conservatives and other parties is higher than among Social Democrats.

The other finding from Latvian data is that the above mentioned electoral list of the Social Democratic Organisation of Women consisted exceptionally of females with Latvian ethnicity and that all Communists in the parliament of 1995 and Socialists/Social Democrats in the parliaments from 1998 to 2010 were exclusively males an absolute majority of who came from ethnic (mostly Russian) minority.[143]

[142] The exception is the Saeima of 1995 where Socialists/Social Democrats have the highest share of women in comparison with percentages of female legislators among other party families.
[143] This does not apply to the Alliance of Latvian Social Democrats which in the parliament of 1998 had 2 female MPs and an absolute majority of their MPs (92.9 per cent or 13 out of 14 MPs) with Latvian ethnicity.

Table 7.2.5. Female Legislators within Party Families in Lithuanian Parliaments

	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2006		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Communists	1	16.7	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Social Dem.	---	---	3	3.8	4	16.7	6	12.8	4	20	4	16	10	27
Agrarians	---	---	---	---	0	0	0	0	3	50	1	33.3	1	100
Left Liberals	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	7.7	2	18.2	0	0	---	---
Conservatives	---	---	---	---	15	21.4	2	20	5	20	10	21.7	6	18.2
Extreme Right	---	---	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	---	---	---	---
Ethnic Minority	---	---	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0	3	37.5
Other	---	---	3	33.3	1	33.3	2	66.7	10	22.7	9	22	12	25.5
No Party	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4	28.6	---	---	---	---
Liberals	---	---	0	0	3	20	3	8.3	2	11.1	2	11.1	2	20
Christian Dem.	---	---	0	0	1	5.9	0	0	---	---	---	---	---	---
Popular Front	11	8.7	4	12.5	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL	12	9	10	7.1	24	17.5	15	10.6	31	22	26	18.4	34	24.5

Source: Own calculations.

To sum up, the left party hypothesis is confirmed only by Estonian data. In Latvia and, in majority of cases, in Lithuania the right wing political party families are friendlier toward recruitment of female MPs.

Occupation and Education Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that the level of female representation is affected positively if the main recruitment bases are not male-dominated occupation and education.

In all three countries female MPs are better educated than their male counterparts. This mirrors a generally higher educational level among women in comparison with educational level among men in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian societies (see the 2000 Round of Population and Housing Censuses in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). However, we are less concerned with the level of education than with the type of education. What is the main type of education and which gender dominates it? Do humanities and social sciences dominate over technical and natural sciences or vice versa?

The share of degrees in humanities and social sciences, as well as in technical and natural sciences, fluctuates between parliaments. However, technical and natural sciences clearly lead in three out of seven Estonian parliaments and in five out of seven legislatures in Latvia and Lithuania[144]. The data also provide evidence for the dominance of humanities and social sciences among women MPs in all seven

[144] See the above chapter on education.

parliaments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and prevalence of technical and natural sciences among men MPs. This means that technical and natural sciences, as male-dominated education, is not a favourable recruitment basis for female parliamentary representatives.

The study of law and lawyer's occupation deserve to be distinguished as especially suited for the legislator's office. This is due to the practice lawyers attain in debating and the relative ease (in comparison with other professional occupations) at which they move back to the lawyer's job after leaving parliament. The work of parliamentarians concerns designing new laws and lawyers are best trained for reading and writing the laws. The dominance of lawyers in parliaments is mainly considered a phenomenon of the U.S.A. (Matthews 1984). Nevertheless, some have noted the significance of lawyers in the Western European parliaments as well (Best and Cotta 2000). Baltic countries, however, follow an Eastern European pattern of development with low shares of lawyers in legislatures: since 1990 the lawyer's occupation among Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian MPs did not reach 4 per cent (the only exception is the Lithuanian parliament of 1990, where 7.5 per cent of MPs were lawyers). The shares of MPs holding law degrees are higher (9 per cent for Lithuania, 12.7 per cent for Estonia and 14.3 per cent for Latvia on average).

The percentages of law degrees among female MPs in Estonia and Latvia are slightly higher than those of male MPs (15.5 per cent compared to 12.1 per cent on average for seven elections in Estonia, 15 per cent compared to 12.2 per cent in Latvia), whereas female MPs in Lithuania have the same percentage of law degrees as their male counterparts (8.6 per cent).

The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data indicate that the vast majority of female MPs are higher civil servants and public sector employees. The teacher's profession is a second most popular occupation among female legislators in Latvia and Lithuania and third in Estonia. The percentage of civil servants and teachers (professors) among female MPs in Baltic parliaments is higher than their share among male counterparts; it ranges from 47.4 per cent on average in Estonia to 52 per cent in Lithuania, therefore, these jobs could be considered favourable recruitment bases for female politicians.

Across genders, the rate of women MPs coming from public sector is higher than the rate for men MPs in all three countries. Across countries, the public sector share among Lithuanian women MPs (79.6 per per cent) is higher than among their Latvian

counterparts (73.3 per cent), however, Estonian female MPs with 85.6 per cent show the highest level of public sector representation. This could be explained by the lowest general rate of public sector employees among all Latvian legislators and the highest percentage of public sector representatives among all Estonian MPs. The overall decline in the recruitment of public sector employees could be attributed to the dismantling of the socialist state and introduction of free market economy: this diminishes the share of public sector and expands the domain of the private one.

The Turnover Hypothesis

The hypothesis that the higher the legislative turnover the better chances for women to enter a parliament is challenged by our data: the first post-communist parliaments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have the highest shares of newcomers and the lowest percentages of women. Excluding the first parliament (1990) we see a higher rate of newcomers among women in 4/6 cases in Estonia and Latvia and in 3/6 cases in Lithuania. The women's share among newcomers is clearly lower than the men's percentage among parliamentary newcomers in all six Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures. However, the data also reveal the following pattern: the highest absolute numbers of women come to the legislatures of Latvia and Lithuania through the political party family with the highest absolute numbers of newcomers.

In Latvia the highest absolute numbers of newcomers have been brought to the parliament by Liberals (19 MPs) in 1993, Extreme Right (22 MPs) in 1995, Conservatives (21 MPs) and Social Democrats (21 MPs) in 1998, and Conservatives (30 MPs, 16 MPs and 21 MPs) in 2002, 2006 and 2010. Most of these party families brought the highest absolute numbers of women to those parliaments as well: Liberals brought 4 female MPs (22.2 per cent of all women in the parliament) in 1993, Extreme Right brought 2 female MPs (25 per cent) in 1995, Conservatives brought 7 women (41.2 per cent) in 1998, 15 women (83.3 per cent) in 2002, 15 women (83.3 per cent) in 2006 and 14 women (73.7 per cent) in 2010. Three of 4 of the Liberal females were newcomers; 1 of 2 of the extreme right females, majority of conservative women in 1998 and 2002 and a half in 2010 were newcomers.

In Lithuania the highest absolute numbers of newcomers have been brought to the parliament by Socialist/Social Democrats (67 MPs) in 1992, Conservatives (43 MPs) in 1996, Liberals (31 MPs) in 2000 and by the populist Labour Party and Liberal

Democrats (40 MPs, coded as 'Other') in 2004, Labour Party, Party "Order & Justice" and Party of National Awakening (24 MPs) in 2008, and the Labour Party (14 MPs) in 2012. Similarly as in Latvia, many of those party families recruited the highest absolute number of women to the parliament: Umbrella Movement brought 4 female MPs in 1992 (40 per cent), Conservatives brought 14 women (60.9 per cent) in 1996, Socialists/Social Democrats 6 female MPs in 2000 (40 per cent of all female legislators) and the populist Labour party and Liberal Democrats 10 female MPs (43.5 per cent) in 2004 and 12 female MPs (35.3 percent) in 2012. A half of those women from families of Conservatives and Socialists/Social Democrats have been newcomers and all female legislators from the populist Labour party and Liberal Democrats were for the first time elected to the Lithuanian parliament.

The Estonian data, contrary to the Latvian and Lithuanian data showing that the highest absolute numbers of women in legislatures are achieved through the political party family with the highest absolute numbers of newcomers (Kuklys 2008: 44), do not confirm the probability that a higher legislative turnover increases women's chances to get elected to the parliament - the thesis works only for Left Liberals in 1995 and partly in 1999. If we switch from the party family to all-parliament level, we observe a common Baltic paradox: the highest number and percentage of women is found in the Riigikogu with the lowest parliamentary turnover (in 2007) and the lowest number and share of female MPs is found in the assembly with the highest legislative turnover (in 1990). Hence, a higher parliamentary turnover does not necessarily mean a higher share of women in the legislature.

Age and Political Experience Hypothesis

The age and political experience hypothesis states that women as parliamentary newcomers will be older and have less political experience in comparison with their male colleagues.

Our data provide evidence that women newcomers have been older than men newcomers in all seven Estonian, in five out of seven Latvian and Lithuanian parliaments.

If pre-parliamentary political experience is differentiated into local elective posts, leading party positions and membership in the cabinet of ministers, Baltic women MPs are inferior to their male counterparts in all three types of political experience.

However, when it comes to parliamentary experience, women MPs lead over their male colleagues: in many Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliaments the mean number of mandates and the share of women MPs serving the third legislative term are higher than the mean number and the share among male MPs. This could be interpreted in the following way: yes, indeed, the women MPs are fewer and older but, differently from their male counterparts, they are more career-oriented and more determined to pursue legislative careers. In other words, it is more difficult to enter a parliament for women but, once they are in, they have better chances to become long-standing legislators in comparison with their male colleagues.

If cross-country comparisons are being made, Estonian women MPs are clearly more politically experienced before entering a legislature for the first time in comparison with their Latvian and Lithuanian colleagues, however, women MPs from Lithuania have a longer legislative tenure (1.8 terms) in comparison with the legislative experience of their counterparts from Estonia and Latvia (1.6 mandates on average).

The Strength of Institution Hypothesis

An argument that "career chances of women improve the less powerful an institution is" could be found in the literature (Verzichelli and Edinger 2005: 269). It implies that a stronger legislative representation of women could indicate a lower decision-making capacity of the parliament. If we assume that governments have more political power than parliaments[145] (governments dictate legislation agenda), comparison of female representation in cabinets of ministers and legislatives would serve in support of the argument above: the share of females in the cabinets is lower than the share of females in the parliaments. However, the differences are not significant and it seems that women in the cabinets are slowly catching up. From 2002 to 2003 almost one-third of the Estonian cabinet of ministers were women which was much higher than the parliamentary percentage. From December 2004 onwards, the share of women in the Latvian cabinet of ministers is larger than their share in the Latvian parliament. The Estonian women were the fastest to reach the 10 per cent representation level in the cabinet: in Estonia it was reached in October 1992, in Latvia it was achieved in

[145] The largest share (31 per cent) of the Lithuanian political elite members who agreed to participate in my survey claimed that the government is the centre of power in the Lithuanian political system (Kuklys 2000: 46).

September 1994, while Lithuanians reached it in December 1996. Still, if one compares the highest institutional positions, it seems that women have better chances to become a speaker of the parliament than a prime minister of the cabinet (so far, since 1990 the Baltic parliaments were led by women in Estonia and Latvia three times, in Lithuania this happened once. For the entire period, Estonia and Latvia did not have women as prime ministers, Lithuania had the female prime minister in the period from 1990 to 1991).

The strength of the institution argument can partly explain the appointment of Mrs. Kazimiera Prunskienė to the position of Prime Minister of Lithuania in 1990 (the only female head of government in the Baltic states) and election of Mrs. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga into the post of the President of Latvia in 1999 and 2003 and Ms. Dalia Grybauskaitė into the post of the President of Lithuania in 2009. The political power centre in the period from 1990 to 1992 was not in the Lithuanian government, but in the Lithuanian parliament. Latvia and Lithuania are not presidential, but parliamentary and semi-presidential republics, respectively. Both of these conditions imply better opportunities for women‘s entry into the political elite.

The largest female share out of all three Baltic parliaments belongs to the Estonian Riigikogu elected in 2007; the growth of women MPs in Estonia, as well as Latvia, seems to be over time more gradual and steadier than in Lithuania. In the parliamentary hierarchy, the Estonian and Latvian women made most advances: three out of five Presidium members of the Latvian Saeima in 2005 have been women, two of three Presidium members in the 2011 Estonian Riigikogu were women MPs.

The Protestant Culture Hypothesis

The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data support our hypothesis that the Protestant culture is friendlier toward inclusion of women into political elite in comparison with the Catholic one. Estonia and Latvia, where Evangelical Lutheranism was a dominant religion, granted active and passive voting rights earlier than Catholic Lithuania (1918 in comparison with 1921)[146]. After the 60 years of religious suppression and secularisation, the Weberian thesis of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism

[146] We should note, however, that women in the Latvian parliaments before the Second World War have been almost absent (the first and the only woman appears in the last parliament elected in 1931). The Lithuanian parliaments after the First World War, on the contrary, would always include some women.

is still applicable to the Baltic states[147]. In the Baltic legislatures of the post-1990 era the highest share of women MPs (24.8 per cent in 2007) belongs to Estonia. The average percentage of women MPs in the seven Baltic parliaments is the highest in Estonia (16.2 per cent) and the lowest in Latvia (14.5 per cent). Lithuania with 15.6 per cent lies in-between.

The Lithuanian society remains predominantly Catholic: according to the population census of 2001, 79 per cent of the Lithuanian inhabitants are Roman Catholics, the second largest religious group is Orthodox Believers making 4.1 per cent of the total population in Lithuania. In current Latvia, 34.2 per cent of population is Evangelical Lutherans; Roman Catholics with 24.1 per cent are the second and the Orthodox Believers with 17.8 per cent are the third largest religious community. In Estonia, Evangelical Lutherans comprise 13.6 per cent of the population; Orthodox Believers 12.8 per cent, other Christians (including Roman Catholics) - about 1.4 per cent.[148]

These data should be interpreted with caution since they do not differentiate between churchgoers and nominal (cultural) Catholics/Protestants. The 2005 Eurobarometer finds that only 49 per cent of the Lithuanian population "believe there is a God" (Social Values, Science & Technology 2005: 9)[149]; the figures for Latvia and Estonia are 39 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively. This allows to conclude not only that Estonia is the most secular society of the three Baltic states[150] but also that the Catholic Lithuania is not that far from the Lutheran Latvia[151]. One could possibly ask whether Lutheranism is more favourable in spreading secularisation than Catholicism; what our data suggests is that the degree of secularism in the Baltics

[147] The work by Katrin Mattusch (1997) documented that right after the collapse of the USSR the Estonian population showed the lowest degree of religiosity, conservatism and conformism and the highest degree of individualism, emancipation and self-responsibility, whereas the Lithuanian population, on the contrary, showed the highest degree of religiosity, conservatism and conformism and the lowest degree of individualism, emancipation and self-responsibility. The Latvian population fell somewhere in-between.

[148] The ethnic Estonian population is much more secular in comparison to Russian and other ethnic groups in Estonia (see Evans 1998: 62).

[149] The distinction between cultural and religious Catholicism is obvious in the other study: it indicates an increase of the Lithuanian Catholics from 46 to 66 per cent in the period 1990-1997, however, it also reports than only more than 10 per cent of Lithuania's self-professed Catholics attend Mass on a regular basis and 35 per cent come to church only during the great feasts (Streikus 2002: 158).

[150] According to the special Eurobarometer, Estonia is the most secular society not only in the Baltics but also in the entire Europe (Social Values, Science and Technology 2005: 9).

[151] There are no differences between the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia and the Catholic Church of Lithuania in terms of ordination of women: in both churches women are not allowed to serve as priests.

partly explains the differences in gender representation starting with 1990: the most secular Estonia has 16.2 per cent of women in all seven parliaments, the less secular Latvia and Lithuania have 14.5 and 15.6 per cent of women in their seven national parliaments, respectively.

7.3. Ethnicity

Underrepresentation of ethnic minorities has long been typical features of political elites and, in spite of some incremental gains in parliamentary representation over the last decades, seems to remain a normality. Parliament continues to be an elite recruitment structure which favours candidates from the titular-nation groups.

Europe is no exception, ethnic minorities remain underrepresented in the European national parliaments. This is despite the fact that most of the continent enjoys a liberal democratic form of governance. Ethnic minorities in the society tend to be minorities in a parliament (or political structure in general), however, exceptions of ethnic overrepresentation in some national parliaments do exist (Lijphart 1994: 122; Edinger and Kuklys 2007: 170).

Ethnic minorities, in comparison to their share of the total population, have been underrepresented in all three Baltic parliaments, and most especially in Latvia and Estonia. The literature documents empirical evidence that Estonia, as well as Latvia, discloses the highest parliamentary underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe (Edinger and Kuklys 2007: 170).

7.3.1. Findings from the Literature on the Parliamentary Recruitment of Ethnic Minorities

Parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities is being affected by (1) institutional arrangements (electoral systems, constitution, political party and citizenship laws) and, especially, (2) demographic and cultural influences.

Institutional Arrangements

Similar to the legislative recruitment of women, systems of proportional representation provide the best opportunities for the election of ethnic minorities into parliament (Zimmerman 1994; Lijphart 2004). This is especially applicable to the cases when minorities are geographically dispersed through the entire country.

A larger magnitude of districts (Shugart 1994) and lower electoral thresholds also make parliamentary entry for ethnic minority parties easier. However, existence and election of ethnic parties is not an aim in itself – mixed political parties are much more favourable to the ethnic minority integration and policy of conciliation (Bochsler 2006).

In addition to electoral systems, there are other institutional arrangements which affect the representation of ethnic minorities. For instance, some constitutions explicitly guarantee minimal parliamentary representation of certain ethnic minorities (article 59.2 of the Romanian Constitution). Other laws explicitly allow or forbid ethnic minorities to have their own political party. For instance, since 1995 establishing political parties on ethnic or religious basis is forbidden in Russia; Bulgaria – with an exception of the Turkish ethnic party – automatically disqualifies any ethnically oriented organisation from the election (Pan and Pfeil 2006: 92).

Since only citizens are entitled to elect and be elected to the national parliament, restrictive and tough citizenship policy may lead to the exclusion of ethnic minorities from political participation.

Demographic and Cultural Influences

The level of minority representation is conditioned by demographic and cultural characteristics of the ethnic minorities involved (Moser 2008). The share of ethnic minorities in population has a significant impact on the share of ethnic minorities in legislatures as well: the larger their share in a society, the more MPs ethnic minorities are likely to get.[152]

Literature on the Recruitment of Ethnic Minority MPs in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

In the context of works related to the ethnic aspects of politics in Estonia and Latvia (Smith 1996; Steen 1997; Pettai 1998; Järve 2000; Diatchkova 2005; Järve 2005), the analysis by Kolstø and Tsilevich (1997) deals most directly with parliamentary recruitment of ethnic minorities in Latvia. However, it is limited in that it covers only the first three legislative terms. The parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities

[152] This logic of probability, however, does not work in the case of women MPs: the share of women in the population remains more or less the same, however, the share of women legislators is slowly increasing over time.

in the Estonian parliaments is analysed in the works by Pettai and Hallik (2002), Edinger and Kuklys (2007) and Steen with Kuklys (2010). In the Lithuanian case, parliamentary recruitment of ethnic minorities receives some attention in the work by Matonytė (2003). Analyses of Krupavičius (2000) and Žvaliauskas (2000) deal with political party rather than parliamentary recruitment in Lithuania. The study on the representation of ethnic minorities by Kuklys (2008) includes six legislative terms in Latvia and five legislative terms in Lithuania.

7.3.2. Hypotheses and Analysis of Data

The proportion of ethnic minorities in the seven Estonian and Lithuanian legislatures is rather similar – 8.8 per cent and 7.6 per cent on average respectively, although the share of ethnic minorities in the Estonian society is about two times larger than the one in Lithuania (31 per cent and 16.3 per cent respectively). The Latvian parliaments comprise 18.5 per cent of ethnic minorities on average, however, the share of ethnic minorities in Latvian society is also larger – 39.5 per cent.[153]

Table 7.3.1. Ethnic Minority MPs in the Baltic Parliaments

Parliament	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th
Ethnic Minority MPs and the Year of Election	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)	% (N)
ESTONIA 1990/92/95/99/2003/07/11	22.9 (24)	1 (1)	6.9 (7)	5.9 (6)	5.9 (6)	8.9 (9)	9.9 (10)
LATVIA 1990/93/95/98/2002/06/10	31.3 (63)	12 (12)	8 (8)	16 (16)	19 (19)	20 (20)	23 (23)
LITHUANIA 1990/92/96/2000/04/08/12	11.3 (15)	7.1 (10)	5.1 (7)	9.9 (14)	6.4 (9)	4.3 (6)	9.4 (13)

Source: Own data and calculations.
Note: The legislative bodies elected in 1990 were the Supreme Councils. The Estonian Riigikogu and the Lithuanian Seimas resumed their activities after the 1992 election, the Latvian Saeima started after the 1993 election.

The share of ethnic minorities in six post-Communist Riigikogu – 6.4 per cent on average – is similar to the share of ethnic minorities in the interwar Riigikogu which was 6 per cent on average[154] with a substantial difference being that the interwar Estonian society had 11.8 per cent of ethnic minorities in 1934 and that Estonian

[153] The 2012 data. In 1989 the ethnic minorities in Latvia and ethnic minorities in Lithuania comprised 48 and 20 per cent of the total population respectively. The proportion of ethnic minorities in Estonia was 38.5 per cent.
[154] There were 5 per cent of ethnic minorities in the 1920, 1926 and 1929 Riigikogu, 7 per cent in the 1923 and 8 per cent in the 1932 Riigikogu (Arter 1996: 73).

society in 2010 had 31.2 percent (Statistics Office of Estonia). Russians were the largest ethnic minority in Estonia also before the Second World War, however, over time their share in Estonian society enlarged three times – from 8.2 per cent in 1934 to 25.5 per cent in 2010.[155] The less numerous German, Swedish and Jewish minorities of the interwar Estonia were replaced by Ukrainian and Byelorussian ethnicities in the Soviet and post-Soviet period. Since ethnic minorities in the current Estonian society make a larger share than in the pre-war period, the potential for a more numerous parliamentary representation in current legislatures is by far not exhausted. Ten ethnic minority MPs in the last Riigikogu could be a start in the increasing trend. However, we doubt whether in the near future it will reach the levels of minority representation in the Estonian Supreme Council of 1990 which was 22.9 per cent.

The percentage of ethnic minorities in the last four Latvian Saeimas achieved the level of the inter-war parliamentary representation, with a substantial difference being that in the First Republic most numerous parliamentary minorities had German and Jewish background, whereas most numerous ethnic minority MPs in the Second Republic are of Russian origin. However, none of the Saeimas – neither in the First nor in the Second Republic – achieved the level of the 1990 Latvian Supreme Council where ethnic minorities amounted to 31.3 per cent of all parliamentary representatives.

None of the Lithuanian parliaments – neither in the First, nor the Second Republic – achieved the level of ethnic minority representation (17.9 per cent) of the 1923 Seimas. Only Soviet Lithuanian assemblies of deputies had higher shares of ethnic minorities in 1955, 1971, 1974, 1980 and 1985 (Krupavičius 2000: 24). However, these were decorative and pro forma institutions rather than real legislative bodies. The parliaments of the First and the Second Republic are rather similar in terms of ethnic minority share with a substantial difference being that in the First Republic most numerous parliamentary minorities had Jewish and Polish background, whereas most numerous ethnic minority MPs in the Second Republic are of Polish and Russian origin.

On the basis of the reviewed literature, we propose five hypotheses for the recruitment analysis of ethnic minority MPs in the Baltics:

[155] In 1989 the share of ethnic Russians in Estonia was 30.3 per cent (Raun 1997: 336).

1. The proportional system hypothesis:
Countries with proportional electoral systems will have more ethnic minority legislators than those with majoritarian or mixed systems.

2. The candidate hypothesis:
The larger the pool of candidates, the better chances for ethnic minorities to enter a legislature.

3. The left party hypothesis:
Left wing parties have higher levels of ethnic minority representation in comparison with other political parties.

4. The citizenship and lustration hypothesis:
Softening the laws on citizenship and lustration will positively affect the parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities.

5. The previous regime hypothesis:
Ethnic minority legislators are likely to have more political experience associated with a previous regime than their ethnic majority counterparts.

The Proportional System Hypothesis

If the proportional electoral systems of Estonia and Latvia and a mixed electoral system of Lithuania are compared, there is no clear evidence in support of the proposed hypothesis which states that countries with proportional electoral systems will have more ethnic minority legislators than those with majority or mixed systems.

If the election of ethnic minority MPs is compared election by election, the larger share of ethnic minority legislators in Latvia is observed in all six terms in comparison to the electoral results for Lithuania. (It must be admitted though that we do not clearly show if this is purely due to the electoral system or also due to factors such as the share of ethnic minorities in a society and citizenry.) However, Estonia, having larger share of ethnic minorities in the society, shows slightly lower levels of

parliamentary representation in the Riigikogu (6.4 per cent) than the Lithuanian Seimas (7 per cent).

The mixed electoral system of Lithuania offers an opportunity to compare a proportional system with a majoritarian one: roughly a half of the Lithuanian parliament – 70 legislators – is elected according to the PR way, another half – 71 MPs – comes through single member (SMD) districts.

The results for the election of ethnic minority legislators do not support the proportional system hypothesis: the share of the elected ethnic minority MPs is larger in the PR segment only in two of six parliamentary elections.

Table 7.3.2. Election of the Ethnic Minority MPs to the Lithuanian Seimas

Electoral	1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
Segment	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
PR	5	50	3	42.9	8	57.1	4	44.4	3	50	8	61.5
SMD	5	50	4	57.1	6	42.9	5	55.6	3	50	5	38.5
Total	10	100	7	100	14	100	9	100	6	100	13	100

Source: Own calculations.

The Candidate Hypothesis

The candidate hypothesis states that a larger pool of ethnic minority candidates increases the probability that more ethnic minorities will enter a parliament.

The share of ethnic minority candidates has been increasing, reaching 16.2 per cent in 2002 for Latvia and 11.5 per cent in 2012 for Lithuania.[156] In Lithuania the share of ethnic minorities among candidates tends to coincide with the share of ethnic minorities in the Seimas. In contrast, the share of ethnic minorities among MPs in Latvia is larger than percentage of ethnic minorities among parliamentary candidates.

The Latvian and Lithuanian data do not provide evidence that enlargement of candidates' pool directly affects the increase of legislators. In some cases we have the opposite – for instance, in the 2006 Latvian Saeima the share of ethnic minority legislators grows in spite of a decrease in ethnic minority candidates. The 2010 Saeima election brought more ethnic minority MPs inspite of the smaller share of

[156] The Electoral Committee of Estonia does not provide information on the ethnicity of the electoral candidates. According to the Central Electoral Commission of Latvia, 36 out of 1019 candidates in 2002, 107 out of 1024 candidates in 2006 and 175 out of 1234 candidates in 2010 did not mention their ethnicity. The Central Electoral Commission of Lithuania states that during the 1996 election 543 candidates out of 1358 (40 per cent) and during the 2000 election 32 candidates out of 1271 (2.5 per cent) did not indicate their ethnicity. Here we include the valid percentages only.

minorities in candidates' pool compared to the 2002 and 2006 elections. One may conclude that there must be other factors influencing the rise and decline of ethnic minority MPs (e.g. the enlargement of the ethnic minority share in the electorate).

The Left Party Hypothesis

The left party hypothesis states that the left wing parties have higher levels of ethnic minority representation compared to other political parties.

Table 7.3.3. Ethnic Minority MPs in Estonian Parliaments

Elections	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
Party Families	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Communists	6	85.7	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---	---	---
Social Dem.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5.3
Greens	0	0	0	0	--	---	--	---	--	---	1	16.7	---	---
Agrarians	0	0	--	---	--	---	0	0	0	0	0	0	---	---
Left Liberals	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7.1	4	14.3	6	20.7	8	30.8
Right Liberals	---	---	0	0	1	5.3	0	0	1	5.3	2	6.5	1	3
Conservatives	---	---	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2.9	0	0	0	0
Ethnic Minority	7	100	--	---	6	100	4	66.7	--	---	--	---	---	---
Other	11	91.7	0	0	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---	---	---
Popular Front	0	0	1	2.1	--	---	--	---	--	---	--	---	---	---
TOTAL	24	22.9	1	1	7	6.9	6	5.9	6	5.9	9	8.9	10	9.9

Source: Own data and calculations.

Among the last seven legislatures, the 1990 Supreme Council of Estonia has the largest number of ethnic minority parliamentarians. Ethnic minority deputies came from the Communist, Ethnic Minority (regionalist "Virumaa" faction) and other ("Legal Continuity" and military officers') groups. The 1992 Riigikogu stands in sharp contrast to the Supreme Council: were it not for the election of Ants-Enno Lõhmus, the leader of Swedish Community in Estonia, the 1992 parliament would have had no representatives of ethnic minorities! This contrast captures Estonia at the beginning of 1990s as a consequence of legal restorationism and disenfranchisement of about 40 per cent of eligible voters.

The 1995 and 1999 terms finally saw ethnic minority parties entering the Riigikogu: the highest shares of parliamentary ethnic minorities expressed in absolute numbers and percentages are found among them. From 2003 to 2011, the clear leaders in minority recruitment were the Left Liberals (represented by the Estonian Centre Party), comprising from two-thirds to four-fifths of all ethnic minorities in each of the last three legislatures. Since the 2003 election, the Russian ethnic minority parties

have not been successful electoral actors and have disappeared altogether from parliament because they have not met the 5 per cent threshold. Knowing that ethnic Russians constitute fully 25.5 per cent of the total population in Estonia (Statistical Yearbook of Estonia 2011: 56), this could be interpreted as a consequence of fragmentation of the ethnic Russian community and the incapacity of its leaders to politically organise. On the other hand, the failure of ethnic minority parties in Estonia from 2003 onwards could be interpreted as a sign of the normalisation of relations between the Estonian majority and the Russian minority as Estonian parties continue to actively integrate ethnic Russians into their ranks (Pettai 2004: 832). According to Bochsler (2006), mixed political parties are much more favourable to ethnic minority integration and a policy of conciliation than are mono-ethnic parties.

The party family of Communists in all Latvian parliaments after 1990 consisted predominantly of ethnic minorities. Socialists/Social Democrats were the friendliest family for ethnic minorities in the last three parliaments, in the Saeima of 2002 turning out to be both the only party family to include ethnic minorities and to be dominated by them. In terms of absolute numbers, the picture is rather similar: Communists in the Supreme Council of 1990, in the Saeimas of 1993 and 1995 and Socialists/Social Democrats in all the Saeimas from 1998 to 2010 have the highest absolute numbers of MPs representing ethnic minorities.

Table 7.3.4. Ethnic Minorities in Latvian Parliaments

Elections	1990		1993		1995[a]		1998		2002		2006		2010	
Party Families	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Communists	50	86.2	4	57.1	3	60	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Social Dem.	---	---	3	23.1	2	33.3	13	43.3	19	76	18	78.3	23	79.3
Agrarians	---	---	0	0	0	0	---	---	0	0	1	5.6	0	0
Left Liberals	---	---	1	20	2	11.1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Conservatives	---	---	3	20	0	0	1	2.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Extreme Right	---	---	0	0	1	3.3	---	---	---	---	---	---	0	0
Liberals	---	---	1	2.8	0	0	2	9.5	---	---	---	---	---	---
Christian Dem.	---	---	0	0	--	---	0	0	0	0	1	10	---	---
Popular Front	9	6.9	---	---	--	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL	63	31.3	12	12	8	8	16	16	19	19	20	20	23	23

Source: Own data and calculations.

[a] According to Kolstø and Tsilevich (1997: 373), there were 9 ethnic minority MPs elected to the Saeima of 1995.

The ethnically Latvian countryside in contrast to multiethnic cities accounts well for the dominance of ethnic Latvians among Agrarians: Agrarian family is being

represented by farmers and farmers themselves are more likely to come from a countryside than a city.[157] MPs from the Agrarian family outnumber MPs from other families in posessing tractors and horses,[158] however, tractors and horses are not necessarily an indicator for Agrarian parties. Some MPs from the Green and Conservative parties own them as well.

As one could expect, Liberals do not own tractors or horses, however, Socialists/Social Democrats are divided along the ethnic line: some Social Democratic MPs of Latvian ethnicity have tractors or horses, but MPs of non-Latvian ethnicity do not own them at all. Tractors and horses, in absolute number of cases, is characteristic of male MPs but our data indicate that an exception of this 'rule' is also possible.

An absolute majority of legislators from all Saeimas of the Second Republic have been residing in urban areas before being elected to the parliament: from 87 per cent in 1993, 79 per cent in 1995 and 78 per cent in 1998 to 65 per cent in 2002 and 64 per cent in 2006. The share of Riga residents among urban MPs fluctuates between 67.2 to 78.5 per cent. In percentages for the whole parliament, the dominance of the capital city looks as follows: 56 per cent of all MPs from the 5th Saeima, 55 per cent MPs from the 6th Saeima, 54 per cent of MPs from the 7th Saeima, 51 per cent of MPs from the 8th Saeima and 43 per cent of MPs from the 9th Saeima have been living in Riga prior to election.[159] In all these parliaments, the share of capital city residents among Socialists/Social Democrats and Communists is stabilised around 40 per cent. Liberals (also left wing Liberals), Christian Democrats and 'old' Conservatives[160] in most legislatures have the share of Riga residents around 70 per cent. In general, Christian Democrats and Liberals are the 'most urban' party families in all post-1990 Saeimas.

[157] In 1989 almost one third of ethnic Latvians lived in cities, the rest – 69.4 per cent – lived in towns and rural areas (Karklins 1994: 124).

[158] There was no special aim to study the life-style and ownership of Latvian legislators in addition to their recruitment, although the data of the Latvian National News Agency (LETA) and Central Electoral Commission, officially available declarations of property and income could have served this purpose relatively well. Counting of tractors and horses came out as a by-product of an attempt to differentiate MPs from separate party families but elected on the same list. For example, this was a case with the list of Greens and Agrarians in the parliamentary election of 2002.

[159] In five of six elections to the Saeima the constituency of Riga had the largest number of seats assigned, however, this large number is marginal and very similar to the one in the constituency of Vidzeme.

[160] The conservative parties like Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) and Union "For Fatherland and Freedom"/LNNK (TB/LNNK) were labeled 'old' in comparison with People's Party (TP) and New Era Party (JL).

Knowing that Christian Democrats are the 'most Latvian' party and that ethnic Latvians remain an urban minority in many cities, on the one side, and that Socialists/Social Democrats and Communists are mostly non-Latvian parties and that ethnic minorities dominate cities in Latvia, on the other, we get an inversed picture on the population distribution along the urban and ethnic lines. However, if we compare the proportions of urban dwellers among ethnic minority and ethnic Latvian MPs independently of their political affiliation, the shares of ethnic minority legislators are larger than those of ethnic Latvian MPs in four out of five Saeimas.

Similarly to their Estonian and differently from their Latvian counterparts, the Socialists/Social Democrats of Lithuania is not the friendliest party family in recruiting ethnic minorities. The flow of ethnic minority representatives into Lithuanian parliaments is channelled through the Ethnic Minority family – the highest percentages of MPs not belonging to the titular nation are found there. In terms of absolute numbers, Communists in 1990, Ethnic Minority in 1992, 2008 and 2012, Conservatives and Socialists/Social Democrats in 1996, Socialists/Social Democrats in 2000 and the parties coded as 'Other' in 2004 are leading there.

Table 7.3.4. Ethnic Minority MPs in Lithuanian Parliaments

Term	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
Party Family	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Communists	5	83.3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Social Dem.	--	--	3	3.7	3	12.5	7	14.6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agrarians	--	--	--	--	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Left Liberals	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	14.3	1	9.1	--	--	--	--
Conservatives	--	--	--	--	3	4.3	0	0	1	4	1	2.2	1	3
Extreme Right	--	--	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	--	--	--	--
Ethnic Minority	--	--	4	100	1	100	2	100	2	100	3	100	8	100
Other	--	--	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	10	2	4.9	4	8.5
No Party	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liberals	--	--	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christian Dem.	--	--	1	9.1	0	0	0	0	--	--	--	--	--	--
Popular Front	10	7.9	2	6.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	15	11.3	10	7.1	7	5.1	14	9.9	9	6.4	6	4.3	13	9.4

Source: Own calculations.

The 'most Estonian' parliamentary party families in Estonia are Extreme Right and Agrarians – they do not include ethnic minority MPs. The 'most Latvian' party family is not so much, to our surprise, the Extreme Right but the families of Agrarians and

Christian Democrats: in all Latvian parliaments before 2006 they consist exclusively of ethnic Latvians.

As in Latvian parliaments, the 'most Lithuanian' party family in the Lithuanian legislatures is Agrarians. However, instead of Christian Democrats, the Lithuanian Agrarians share the monopoly of 'ethnic purity' with the Extreme Right and Liberals.

In Lithuania ethnic minority parties have the highest share of ethnic minorities in the parliament. This pattern is also evident in the case of Estonia, however, only till 2003. In Latvia, due to absence of explicit ethnic minority parliamentary parties, minorities come through communist (first three terms) and socialist/social democratic (last four terms) parties.

The Citizenship and Lustration Hypothesis

This hypothesis states a probability that softening the laws on citizenship and lustration will enlarge the ethnic minority share in the electorate and, through this, will positively affect the number of ethnic minority representatives in parliament.

After regaining independence in 1991, the citizenship policies affected about one third of the Estonian and Latvian population (mainly persons of Russian and other Slavic origin who moved to Estonia and Latvia in the Soviet period) and narrowed the eligible electorate by around 40 per cent. Secondly, the requirements of advanced proficiency in the Estonian and Latvian languages were in place before late 2001 in Estonia and mid-2002 in Latvia. Thirdly, the post-communist lustration laws that were rather mild in Estonia and Lithuania, banned from running for a parliament in Latvia a considerable share of persons: all those who have belonged to the salaried staff of the USSR, Latvian SSR or a foreign state security, intelligence or counter-intelligence services and those who have been active in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Communist Party of Latvia, the Working People's International Front of the Latvian SSR, the United Board of Working Bodies, the Organisation of War and Labour Veterans, the All-Latvia Salvation Committee and its regional committees after 13 January 1991. Although all these laws have been written for all inhabitants of Latvia independently of their ethnicity, the new legislation primarily targeted Russian-speaking ethnic minority: its largest group came to Latvia with the Soviet occupation and participation in the power structures of the USSR for them was much more attractive than for ethnic Latvians. The USSR was a Russian-speaking state and the Russian ethnic minority felt almost like a majority in the Latvian SSR.

The extreme downfall of ethnic minorities' share in Estonian parliaments from 22.9 per cent in 1990 to 1 per cent in 1992 is accounted by the actions of electorate disenfranchisement in 1991. Since 1992 the share of ethnic minorities grows reaching 9.9 per cent in the last Estonian Riigikogu. These changes are mainly due to the enlargement of the electorate through naturalisation; abolishing the requirements of advanced proficiency in the Estonian languages after late 2001 could have possibly contributed to this process as well.

The decrease of ethnic minorities in the Latvian legislatures from almost one third in 1990 to 8 per cent in 1995 and the increase of them since parliamentary election of 1998 could be partly explained by actions of disenfranchisement in 1991, start of naturalisation in 1995 and liberalisation of citizenship laws in 1998. The newly-naturalised citizens voted mainly for the Alliance "For Human Rights in the United Latvia" (Survey of Newly Naturalised Citizens 2001:8) which has been and is a union of parties for ethnic minorities. One should notice that in the beginning the share of naturalisation applications was much lower than in the years afterwards and that in some cases – especially from 2006 onwards - the number of naturalised persons exceeds the number of applications for naturalisation.

The naturalisation of citizens in Estonia is characterised by ups and downs in numbers of naturalised persons. It achieved its peak in 1994 and 1996, reaching 22,474 and 22,773 naturalised citizens respectively. Around 2004 and 2005 the rates of naturalisation increased again which is attributed to Estonia's accession to the European Union in 2004. Within the period from 1992 to 2008, Estonia naturalised almost 150 thousand persons; the share of stateless persons in Estonia fell from one-third of the population in 1992 to 6.5 per cent in 2011.

The naturalisation process in Latvia had also its peaks and falls. The growing naturalisation rates in 1999 and 2000 are attributed to the liberalisation of Latvian citizenship laws in 1998; similarly as in Estonia, the peak in naturalisation rates from 2004 to 2006 is explained by the accession of Latvia to the European Union in 2004. From 1995 to 2007, Latvia naturalised almost 130 thousand persons which is a lower figure in comparison with Estonia. The percentage of officially registered non-citizens of Latvia of 29.3 per cent of the total population in 1995 decreased to 14.1 per cent in 2011 (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2012).

The full numbers of persons affected by the lustration laws are not available. However, the most prominent Latvian ethnic minority politician Tatyana Ždanok,

banned from the Saeima since 1993, was allowed to run in the first election for the European Parliament in 2004, was elected and in 2009 re-elected.

The Previous Regime Hypothesis

The previous regime hypothesis stated a probability that ethnic minority (especially Russophone) legislators are likely to have more political experience associated with a previous regime than their ethnic majority counterparts. This proposed hypothesis relies on the assumption that many Russian-speaking minorities – Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians came voluntarily to the Baltic republics as a part and consequences of the Soviet policies. For them, differently from indigenous Baltic population, the Soviet regime and Soviet authorities must have been not alien and foreign, but rather normal. Therefore, we would expect ethnic minority MPs to be more experienced in Soviet politics than ethnic majority legislators.

Our data disclose membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the dominant (and declining, as for all other types) experience among the Baltic ethnic minority and ethnic majority legislators. The share of former Communists among ethnic minority MPs is larger in all seven Estonian, in four out of seven Latvian and two out of seven Lithuanian parliaments. In terms of leading party positions, ethnic minority representatives are leading in five out of seven Latvian and four out of seven Lithuanian parliaments (albeit in one of seven Estonian parliaments). The Estonian ethnic minority MPs have lower percentages of Soviet parliamentary positions (in four of seven legislative terms) and no experience in the council of ministers. The Latvian ethnic minority MPs have lower percentages of local, governmental and parliamentary positions (in comparison with majority MPs), the Lithuanian ethnic minority legislators do not have experience in the Soviet governmental and parliamentary positions at all. One may expect that the share of former dissidents is lower among ethnic minority than ethnic majority MPs, however, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data strike with the findings that there is no single dissident among ethnic minority legislators.

One easily observes the trend that the Lithuanian ethnic majority MPs have more experience in the Soviet power structures than Estonian and Latvian ethnic majority representatives. This could be explained by the general fact that ethnic Lithuanians have been more numerous and more willing to enroll the Communist Party in comparison with ethnic Estonians and ethnic Latvians: from 1970 to 1988 ethnic

Lithuanians constituted at least two-thirds of all members of the Lithuanian Communist Party, ethnic Estonians comprised 51.3 per cent of all members of the Estonian Communist Party in the same period, while ethnic Latvians have never achieved even a half of all members of the Latvian Communist Party (Antanaitis 2001: 179-185; Pabriks and Purs 2001: 49). Being more numerous in the Communist Party, Lithuanians could have had more influence on the Soviet policies and a possibility to counteract the decisions from Moscow.

The Integration Perspective

Ethnic minority parties are considered an important instrument for expression of ethnic minority interests, however, large ethnic minority parties, in case of diverging interests and aims in comparison with ethnic majority parties, may prevent from ethnic minority integration and may have a destabilising effect on the political system. Therefore, mixed political parties are much more favourable to the ethnic minority integration and policy of conciliation (Bochsler 2006). Following this argument, we would assume that fewer ethnic minority MPs from the ethnic parties and more ethnic minority MPs from 'normal' political parties are signs of advanced integration.

The two largest ethnic minorities of Lithuania – the Polish ethnic minority (6 per cent of the total population) and the Russian ethnic minority (5 percent of the total population) reveal different patterns of political representation after 1990. In the beginning, the Poles are more numerous than Russians, however, in the latter parliaments the Russians outnumber the Poles. The 2012 parliamentary elections brought more Poles than Russians to the Lithuanian Seimas again. The Poles tend to get into parliament through their own ethnic parties – the Union of Lithuanian Poles (Lietuvos lenkų sąjunga) and the Polish Electoral Action (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija); the Russians, inspite of the existence of Russian political organisations, choose a rather conventional way into the Lithuanian Seimas – on the list of Social Democrats or Labour Party. The Poles made use of the lower electoral threshold for ethnic minorities in the 1992 election, the Russians - did not.

The Latvian parliaments from 1990 onwards do not include ethnic political parties. The Russians (29.6 per cent of the total population), Byelorussians (4.1 per cent of the total population), Ukrainians (2.7 per cent of the total population) and other ethnic minorities enter the Latvian legislature on the lists of the left wing

organisations. Due to the fact that these leftist political parties hardly include representatives of the Latvian ethnicity, they turn into quasi-ethnic minority parties.

The Estonian parliament includes ethnic minority (mainly Russian) parties in the beginning of the period starting in 1990. Later on (from 2003 onwards) ethnic minorities start to enter the legislature exclusively on the lists of the left liberal, right liberal or conservative parties.

Following these data one may conclude that Estonia and Lithuania[161] show more signs of political integration in comparison with Latvia.

7.4. Concluding Remarks: Ethnic Minority Female MPs as Double Minority

Our Baltic data reveal that in the majority of cases female MPs come from ethnic majorities and that ethnic minority legislators almost always are males[162]. If one looks at the share of ethnic minorities among women MPs and the share of women among ethnic minority MPs, one observes that they are lower than parliamentary averages for ethnic minorities and women in the Baltic countries[163]. The data also conform to the common trend that ethnic minorities in a society are also ethnic minorities in a parliament and that women – majority in a society – are a minority in a parliament. However, we are also interested how many double minorities – ethnic minority female MPs – are elected to the Baltic parliaments and how similar or how different are their recruitment patterns from 'simple minority' and majority legislators?

Double minority legislators – seven MPs in the Estonian parliaments, five MPs in the Latvian legislatures and six MPs in the Lithuanian parliaments – served in the last two decades after 1990[164]. Most of them spent only one legislative term in the parliament except two legislators in Estonian parliaments and one legislator in the Latvian parliaments who served two legislative terms.

The low numbers of double minority MPs disclose that double minorities have a more difficult and more complicated way into a parliament in comparison with

[161] Exception is the Lithuanian Poles.
[162] The Estonian data show that the share of women among ethnic minority MPs is lower than among ethnic majority MPs (13.2 per cent against 15.8 per cent) – a similar pattern is observed among legislators in Latvia and Lithuania (Kuklys 2008: 58).
[163] Except for Estonia from 2003 onwards.
[164] Ethnic minority female MPs are present in five of seven Estonian parliaments but only in three of seven Latvian and Lithuanian legislatures. In the Saeimas of 2006 of 2010 that have the highest share of women – 19 per cent - out of all Latvian legislatures ever, there is no even a single female legislator with an ethnic minority background.

'simple minority' – ethnic minority or female – legislators. It conforms to the general trend of "dual disadvantage of minority women" (Bird 2010: 151) and also indicates that double minorities – in comparison with simple parliamentary minorities and majorities – do not have legislative careers. Usually they appear only once in a national parliament and vanish in the next election.

In a situation which requires to give priority to only one – female or ethnic – minority, ethnic minority MPs seem to win over female parliamentarians: the national legislatures of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania before the Second World War and legislatures of 1990 are good examples of this.[165] However, if we turn our analysis to the supranational level, the results seem to be opposite: women legislators from Estonia (one-third and a half of all Estonian MEPs), Latvia (22.2 and 37.5 per cent from all Latvian MEPs) and Lithuania (38.5 and 25 per cent from all Lithuanian MEPs) in the 2004 and the 2009 European Parliaments respectively clearly show a priority of women recruitment over ethnic minority representation. The share of women MEPs is also higher than the percentage of women in national parliaments of Baltic countries.

As the further analysis (chapter 9) shows, the ethnic minority background is an asset for Baltic parliamentarians - it slightly increases the chances for serving in parliament three or more legislative terms (see tables 9.2.2 to 9.2.4). Education (the law degree) and the female gender are assets for Latvian and Lithuanian legislators as well – MPs with this background stay in parliament longer. However, the combination of both ascriptive categories – ethnic minority and female gender – is not an asset but rather a serious disadvantage for a parliamentary career.

[165] Barack Obama's victory against Hillary Clinton in the presidential nomination by the Democratic Party in the USA reveals a similar pattern on a different level.

8. Individual Elite Circulation and Turnover of the Baltic Parliamentary Representatives

Circulation of elites – both individual and structural – has been a central theme in elite analysis from its very origin (Mosca 1939; Pareto 1986) - turnover of the personnel of the formal institutions of government (circulation of elites) is taken there as an explanatory variable for the change and stability of a political order (Bottomore 1993: 44). The concern of classical elite theorists as well as the current ones working on western democracies[166] seems to be a low individual turnover of elites. We can find a passage, where circulation of elites is compared with "the river, flooding and breaking its banks", but this happens because of the too slow elite circulation which causes revolutions (Pareto 1966: 250).

One of concerns of this dissertation, as well as of the scholars working on democracies of Eastern Europe (Best and Edinger 2003; Crowther and Matonyte 2007), however, is about high individual turnover of parliamentary elites and its potential consequences. In order to tell if the elite turnover is high or low and what it indicates, a more precise scale of measurement is required. For the measurement of individual turnover among parliamentary elites, we will use a benchmark suggested and applied by Heinrich Best, Christopher Hausmann and Karl Schmitt (2000: 184-185) in the analysis of parliamentary recruitment in Germany.

Figure 3. Levels of Elite Circulation

Extent of Elite Circulation	Indication of
95%	Complete or near to complete changes of political order (regime discontinuity)
40% - 60%	(1) Restricted systemic changes (e.g. changes of the electoral system) (2) Volatile elite structures linked to the transformation of the party system at large
20% - 40%	Normal level of exchange
< 20%	Trend towards development of oligarchical structures

Source: Adapted from Best, Hausmann, Schmitt (2000: 184 –185).

[166] See Matland and Studlar 2004; Somit, Wildenmann, Boll and Römmele 1994.

From 1990 onwards turnover of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian parliamentary representatives declines[167] and an every consecutive parliamentary election brings more experienced MPs. However, a general level of legislative turnover, as in other countries of Eastern Europe,[168] remains high for each election taken separately and amounts to the 55.5 percent of newcomers for the last six terms in Estonia, 54.5 per cent in Latvia[169] and 52.8 per cent on average in Lithuania. The mean number of successive mandates – another indicator for elite circulation – rises in all three countries, however, the average of 1.6 for Estonia and Latvia and 1.7 for Lithuania is significantly lower than a western European average of 2.5 mandates (Cotta and Best 2000: 505).

Since the figure above suggests that the most normal level of elite exchange is between 20 and 40 per cent, it is clear that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as other Eastern European countries, with their higher elite turnover do not fall into this category.

The main question is: How could this high turnover be explained? For how long could it continue? What does it indicate? What are its causes and potential consequences?

The literature suggests that a high elite circulation indicates (1) restricted systemic changes and (2) volatile elite structures (Best, Hausmann, Schmitt 2000: 184-185) and (3) signifies a political crisis (Putnam 1976: 65). A high legislative turnover could be caused by (4) electoral system, (5) electoral volatility, (6) double listing of candidates, (7) frequency of elections and (8) voluntary exits such as dissatisfaction with being a legislator, desire to retire or pursue a private career (Matland and Studlar 2004: 87). On the side of potential consequences, a high circulation of MPs might be interpreted as (9) greater chances for a system's innovativeness and flexibility in terms of policy, (10) greater opportunities in attaining elite status, and (11) the lower average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness (Putnam 1976: 65-67).

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[167] Exceptions: The Estonian Riigikogu of 1999 and 2003, the Latvian Saeima of 1998 and 2010 and the Lithuanian Seimas of 2000.

[168] Legislative turnover in post-communist Eastern Europe fluctuates at the level between 50 and 75 per cent which is almost two times higher than in most democracies of Western Europe (Best and Edinger 2003: 6).

[169] If the parliament of 1990 with the 92.5 per cent rate of newcomers (see Dreifelds 1996: 66) is included, the average for all seven terms would be 59.9 per cent. In case we treat absolutely all MPs elected in 1990 as newcomers, the turnover achieves the level of 61 per cent.

8.1. Legislative Turnover in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

The legislative turnover is connected to circulation of elites which was the core of elite theory from the very beginning (see Pareto 1986). Turnover rates indicate to what extent we observe a renewal or continuity of legislative elites and – in case of political party families – whether some party families bring more parliamentary newcomers than others.

Estonia

The average share of parliamentary newcomers in Estonia for the last six elections is 55.5 per cent, this is slightly below the Eastern European average (57.8 per cent) for the last four parliaments: there were 68.8 per cent of parliamentary newcomers in the second, 54.1 per cent in the third, 53.9 per cent in the fourth and 54.3 per cent in the fifth post-Communist parliaments of Eastern Europe on average (Edinger 2010: 145). If we look for incumbency rates, we observe that only 37.3 per cent of the Riigikogu members on average get re-elected. Surprisingly enough, the share of Estonian newcomers is higher than average share of newcomers in the Latvian and Lithuanian parliaments, in spite of the fact that the Estonian party system is considered the most stable and consolidated and having the lowest electoral volatility among the Baltic States (see Pettai and Kreuzer 1999; Pettai 2010).

Table 8.1. Parliamentary Newcomers: Estonia

Election	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
Party Families	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Communists	7	100	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Social Dem.	9	100	8	66.7	2	33.3	10	58.8	4	66.7	2	20	9	47.4
Greens	6	100	0	0	---	---	---	---	---	---	6	100	---	---
Agrarians	14	100					2	28.6	7	53.8	1	16.7		
Left Liberals	16	100	14	82.4	29	50.9	22	78.6	14	50	16	55.2	10	38.5
Right Liberals	---	---	0	0	11	57.9	6	24	11	57.9	19	61.3	14	42.4
Conservatives	---	---	23	79.3	2	15.4	10	55.6	29	82.9	5	26.3	5	21.7
Extreme Right	---	---	18	100	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Ethnic Minority	7	100	---	---	5	83.3	4	66.7	---	---	---	---	---	---
Other	12	100	8	100	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
No Party	8	100	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Liberals	6	100	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Christian Dem.	6	100	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Popular Front	14	100	10	66.7	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL	105	100	81	80.2	49	48.5	54	53.5	65	64.4	49	48.5	38	37.6

Source: Own data and calculations.

If we move onto the political party family level, the largest shares of parliamentary newcomers are observed among Extreme Right and Other (Independent Royalists) in 1992, Ethnic Minority in 1995, Left Liberals in 1999, Conservatives in 2003, Greens in 2007 and Social Democrats in 2011. The largest absolute numbers of newcomers came with Conservatives in 1992 and 2003, Left Liberals in 1995 and 1999, and Right Liberals in 2007 and 2011. Conservatives, Left and Right Liberals were also electoral winners in the above indicated years. Hence, our data clearly demonstrate that the largest number of newcomers comes with the winners of the parliamentary elections.

If one differentiates between ethnic minority and ethnic majority legislators, one finds that a higher turnover is observed among ethnic minority MPs.

High legislative turnover in Estonia provides higher accessibility of the elite and its permeability by non-elites. In comparison with countries having low legislative turnover, politicians in Estonia have better chances to acquire elite status. High legislative turnover can be interpreted as greater chances for political system's innovativeness and flexibility in terms of policy, but also an indication of the lower average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness and a sign of political crisis (Putnam 1976: 65-66).

It was observed, that „turnover within an elite institution tends to decline as the institution ages" (Putnam 1976: 65-66). In comparison with the first post-independence election, legislative turnover rates in Estonia declined indeed, however, they still remain high in comparison with legislative rates in western democracies. Countries in Western Europe stabilised their legislative turnover rapidly after the Second World War (see Best and Cotta 2000; Cotta and Best 2007), however, Estonia, as well as Latvia and Lithuania, twenty years after regime change continues throwing away a large share of its legislators in every election. This makes us wonder what keeps the political system together and whether the political system functions under conditions of a permanent crisis.

Latvia

From 1990 onwards turnover of Latvian parliamentary representatives declines and an every consecutive parliamentary election brings more experienced MPs: the share parliamentary newcomers fell from 68 per cent in 1993 to 58 and 52 per cent in 1998 and 2002 respectively, finally reaching a "western" level of 38 per cent in 2006.

Table 8.2. Parliamentary Newcomers: Latvia

Election	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
Party Families	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Communists	58	100	4	57.1	3	60	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Social Dem.	---	---	9	69	1	16.7	21	70	12	48	8	34.8	15	51.7
Agrarians	---	---	12	100	13	81.3	---	---	5	41.7	11	61.1	13	59.1
Left Liberals	---	---	4	80	13	72.2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Conservatives	---	---	8	53.3	1	12.5	21	51.2	30	56.6	16	32.7	21	51.2
Extreme Right	---	---	6	100	22	73.3	---	---	---	---	---	---	5	62.5
Liberals	---	---	19	52.8	4	23.5	8	38.1	---	---	---	---	---	---
Christian Dem.	---	---	6	100	---	---	7	87.5	6	60	3	30	---	---
Popular Front	131	100	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL	201	100*	68	68	57	57	58	58	52	52	38	38	54	54

Source: Own data and calculations.

* If the logic of our data coding is neglected and parliamentary experience in non-democratic regime is counted as well, the share of newcomers for the Latvian Supreme Council amounts to 92.5 per cent (see Dreifelds 1996: 66).

The share of newcomers among Latvian party families is constantly above 40 per cent except for the Liberals in 1995 and 1998, Conservatives and Social Democrats in 1995 and 2006 and Christian Democrats in 2006. The highest absolute numbers of newcomers have been brought to the parliament by Liberals in 1993, Extreme Right in 1995, Conservatives and Social Democrats in 1998, and Conservatives in 2002, 2006 and 2010. Most of these party families brought the highest absolute numbers of women to those parliaments as well.

Lithuania

Percentage of newcomers among Lithuanian party families is constantly above 30 per cent except for the Christian Democrats and Ethnic Minority in 1996, Conservatives in 2000 and 2012 and the Extreme Right in 2004, Socialists/Social Democrats in 2004 and 2008 and Liberals (also Left Liberals) from 2004 to 2012. The highest absolute numbers of newcomers have been brought to the parliament by Socialist/Social Democrats (67 MPs) in 1992, Conservatives (43 MPs) in 1996, Liberals (31 MPs) in 2000, by the populist Labour Party and Liberal Democrats (40 MPs, coded as ‘Other’) in 2004 and by Other in 2008 and 2012. Similarly as in Latvia, many of those party families recruited the highest absolute number of women to the parliament.

Table 8.3. Parliamentary Newcomers: Lithuania

Election	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
Party Families	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Communists	6	100	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Social Dem.	---	---	67	83.8	10	41.7	26	55.3	4	20	3	11.5	12	32.4
Agrarians	---	---	---	---	0	0	3	75	3	50	1	33.3	---	---
Left Liberals	---	---	---	---	---	---	25	100	2	18.2	0	0	---	---
Conservatives	---	---	---	---	43	61.4	1	10	9	36	15	33.3	6	18.2
Extreme Right	---	---	3	75	2	100	1	33.3	0	0	---	---	---	---
Ethnic Minority	---	---	3	75	0	0	2	66.7	1	50	2	66.7	6	75
Other	---	---	7	77.8	1	33.3	2	66.7	40	90.9	23	56.1	22	46.8
No Party	---	---	1	100	3	75	2	66.7	8	57.1	2	100	3	100
Liberals	---	---	0	0	12	80	31	86.1	3	16.7	6	30	2	20
Christian Dem.	---	---	7	70	4	23.5	2	33.3	---	---	---	---	---	---
Popular Front	127	100	13	40.6	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL	133	100	101	71.6	75	54.7	95	67.4	70	49.7	52	36.9	51	36.7

Source: Own calculations.

8.2. Searching for Explanations of High Legislative Turnover

Turnover of newcomers and incumbency turnover can be to some extent explained by the electoral turnout (see table 8.5.). The highest correlation between electoral turnout and turnover of newcomers is found in Lithuania (for all seven legislative terms), somewhat lower (and not significant) in Estonia and Latvia.

Table 8.4. Electoral Turnout in the Baltic States (in per cent)

Estonia	1990	1992	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Turnout	78.2	67.8	68.9	57.4	58.2	61.0	62.9
Latvia	1990	1993	1995	1998	2002	2006	2010
Turnout	81.3	89.9	71.9	71.9	71.2	62.3	62.6
Lithuania	1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Turnout	71.7	75.2	52.9	58.2	45.9	48.6	52.9

Source: National Electoral Committee of Estonia, Central Electoral Commission of Latvia, Chief Electoral Commission of Lithuania and Wolfram Nordsieck.

Table 8.5. Electoral Turnout and Turnover of Newcomers and Incumbents

Pearson Correlation	Turnover of Newcomers, All Seven Terms	Turnover of Incumbents, Last Six Terms
Estonia	0.687	-0.154
Sig. (two-tailed)	0.088	0.771
Latvia	0.685	-0.715
Sig. (two-tailed)	0.090	0.111
Lithuania	0.813*	-0.669
Sig. (two-tailed)	0.026	0.146

* Significant at 0.05 level. Source: Own calculations.

Incumbency turnover, what is not exactly the opposite of the turnover of newcomers, could be considered a complementary perspective in studying elite circulation. The Baltic States, differently from some countries or political parties[170], do not make any legal barriers for re-election of parliamentary incumbents, nevertheless, only less than a half of incumbents get re-elected. This is much below the incumbency levels in many Western democracies (see Matland und Studlar 2004: 93).

Table 8.6. Incumbency Turnover in the Baltic Parliaments (in per cent)

Parliament	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th
Estonia	19.8	43.6	40.6	28.7	44.6	46.5
Latvia	32.0	38.0	33.0	39.0	53.0	40.0
Lithuania	28.4	36.5	26.2	41.1	52.5	49.6

Source: Own data and calculations.

As the table 8.5. shows, parliamentary incumbency correlates negatively with electoral turnout in all Baltic countries (especially in Latvia and Lithuania).

The other possible explanations have been mentioned in the literature above and we would like to check to what extent they are plausible.

Restricted Systemic Changes

The first turnover thesis states that restricted systemic changes, such as transformation of the electoral systems, account for a high turnover of parliamentary representatives. There were substantial changes in the electoral systems of the Baltic States in the period before 1993 indeed: in 1992 Estonia and in 1993 Latvia introduced the PR system; in 1992 Lithuania introduced a mixed electoral system (70 seats in the PR segment and 71 seats in the SMD). However, in the period since 1993 onwards no substantial changes were observed.[171] Nevertheless, the stability of electoral systems in the Baltic States did not result into stabilisation of elite turnover and a remarkable decrease of parliamentary newcomers.

[170] Since 1949 the Constitution of Costa Rica prevents deputies from serving two successive terms, an MP may run again for an Assembly seat after sitting out one term. Political party examples include the German Greens rotating their members of Bundestag from 1983 to 1987, the Italian Communist Party replacing most of its legislators after two or three terms and the British Labour party in 1980s practising mandatory reselection of sitting MPs (Matland and Studlar 2004: 98-99).

[171] Some changes to report were abolishment of lower threshold for ethnic minority parties since 1996 in the PR segment and introduction of plurality in the SMD segment for the 2000 election in Lithuania.

Volatile Elite Structures (Supply-Side Volatility)

According to the data on Eastern European democracies by Richard Rose (2009: 51), "of the total volatility, more than five-sixths has been due to the actions of party elites creating, abandoning, or merging parties". Among countries of Eastern Europe in the period from 1993 to 2007, Latvia had the highest electoral volatility which was to 100 per cent[172] explained by the behaviour of political elites creating new parliamentary parties with an every legislative election; Lithuania with 97 per cent was not far from Latvia; Estonia with 66 per cent was below not only the Baltic, but also the Eastern European average (Rose 2009: 52)[173].

The seemingly chaotic behaviour of the Baltic party elites, sometimes labelled 'political tourism', has its rather clear organisational patterns. The analysis by Pettai (2010), Pettai, Auers and Ramonaitė (2011), distinguish six types of political parties according to their organisational behaviour and origins: (1) unchanged, (2) alliance, (3) merger, (4) post-alliance, (5) fission and (6) brand-new. The first type of party refers to the situation where politicians remain affiliated with their current party. The types two, three and four refer to different situations of party reconfiguration involving a majority of politicians from certain parties. The type five is called fission, "a collective affiliation strategy in which a minority group of politicians breaks away from an established party to form a new party", and the type six is labelled brand-new party, the strategy which "involves previously unaffiliated individuals creating a brand-new party" (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003: 79).

Using the provided analytical distinctions in party behaviour, we can observe that Estonian party elites, distinguished for their practices of party mergers, show over time an increasing trend in party loyalty which in 2011 reached 100 per cent, meaning that no changes in party restructuring have taken place. Latvian party elites, having a reputation for preference in creating brand-new parties, slowed down this stategy and in the 2010 election opted overwhelmingly for alliances. The Lithuanian party elites, characterised by alliances and post-alliances and absence of mergers and fissions in the beginning of the transition period, started increasingly to practise party mergers and creation of brand-new parties (see Pettai, Auers and Ramonaitė 2011: 153). The observed trends allow to conclude that Estonian elites reached party consolidation,

[172] On average, 60 to 72 per cent of electoral volatility in Eastern Europe is attributed to the elite behaviour; the rest is explained by the changing preferences of voters (Rose 2009: 52).
[173] I have divided the figures of Rose (2009: 52) on Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – 200, 193 and 132 per cent respectively – by two.

whereas the Lithuanian elites clearly increased their party de-consolidation; the volatility of the Latvian party elite structure continues to remain high. A partial explanation for the behaviour of Baltic party elites is suggested by Allan Sikk:

"The principle of modern representative democracy is largely based on the principle of electoral accountability – the parties in power have to act in line with the will of people because otherwise they will be voted out of office. However, if the stakes in politics are high but steadily declining, the power holders may be tempted to make maximum use of their time in office by pursuing unaccountable or outright corrupt policies and not care too much for the negative electoral effects resulting from it. The maximum achievable utility from one term in office can even outweigh the expected total utility of future terms." (Sikk 2006: 166)

Crisis

The third statement discloses that a high elite turnover signifies a political crisis (see above). Although an increased legislative turnover might mean a simple generational change – one generation of legislators leaving and the other coming and should not be necessarily seen as a trigger causing a political crisis or regime change, in many cases a rising parliamentary turnover follows and accompanies a political crisis or regime change. Hence, legislative turnover may serve as a kind of 'seismometer'. This approach finds a sufficient empirical support in the data on the regime changes in Germany and France: the Nazi takeover in 1933 and return to power of Charles de Gaulle in 1958 go together with a highly increased parliamentary turnover. Our Latvian and Lithuanian data on the First Republic confirm the crisis/regime change thesis as well: parliamentary democracy in Latvia and Lithuania ends up with the Seimas or Saeima in which the number of newcomers rises after the gradual decline in previous legislatures. Both parliaments of Latvia and Lithuania serve as good predictors of the regime change: having increased numbers of newcomers finish their activities with coup d'Etat in 1934 and 1926 respectively, signifying a replacement of democratic regimes with authoritarian ones in the Baltic States.

The data on Estonian parliaments, however, do not support the proposed hypothesis: the last Riigikogu before the coup d'Etat in 1934 has 26.1 per cent of parliamentary newcomers which is the lowest legislative turnover rate of all Estonian parliaments in the First Republic ever. In other words, it does not predict the switch from democracy to authoritarianism in Estonia. A partial explanation for this could be that the regime change in Estonia, differently from Lithuania and Latvia, was

introduced by constitutional means (Taagepera 1974: 408): in October 1933, 72.7 per cent of voters participating in the Referendum voted for the new Constitution transforming the head of the state from a servant of parliament into a powerful and independent executive having the right to issue laws by decree (Raun 2001:117). It was a pre-emptive authoritarianism that "did not result from a direct take-over by rightist forces" (Parming 1975: 5). Estonian authoritarianism was mild not only in the Baltic but also in the European context of that time (Raun 2001: 122; Raun 1997: 340).

Table 8.7. Newcomers in the Baltic Parliaments of the First Republics

Estonia	1919	1920	1923	1926	1929	1932
Newcomers, %	100	66.1	63.8	43.4	34.9	26.1
Latvia	1920	1922	1925	1928	1931	
Newcomers, %	100	45	33	29	37	
Lithuania	1920	1922	1923	1926		
Newcomers, %	100	46.7	31.6	53.3		

Source: Toomla 1999, www.saeima.lv, www.lrs.lt and own calculations.
Note: The Constitutional Assembly of 1919 in Estonia and the Constitutional Assemblies of 1920 in Latvia and Lithuania were treated as consisting of parliamentary newcomers only.

What strikes in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian data is the relatively normal level of parliamentary elite circulation in the First Republic in comparison with a generally high level of circulation in the Second Republic: the level between 30 and 40 per cent fits into the normal pattern of most Western European democracies after 1945 and would be desirable for the regimes of the Baltic States after 1990. However, after collapse of the Soviet Union the Baltic States produce almost 60 per cent of new parliamentary representatives on average. Since "high turnover is associated with periods of crisis, while low turnover is associated with institutional stability and political tranquillity" (Putnam 1976: 65), we arrive at a valid question: are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as other Eastern European countries, in the state of permanent crisis? If yes, which mechanism then keeps the state and society together? This is not an exceptional Baltic phenomenon, "paradoxical configurations like regime stability without elite consolidation" (Best 2007b: 24) perfectly fit the patterns of developments among Eastern European parliamentary elites. Still, a satisfactory explanation is to be found.

Electoral System: SMD vs PR

The fourth thesis explains a high legislative turnover by the type of electoral system. The literature suggests that turnover in majoritarian systems is lower than in proportional representation (Matland and Studlar 2004: 107). Our Baltic data do not allow for a cross-country comparison, since both Estonia and Latvia have PR systems and Lithuania conducts its parliamentary elections in a mixed system. Hence, the PR and SMD segments can be compared only in the case of Lithuania.

Table 8.8. Election of Parliamentary Newcomers in Lithuania (N)

Election	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
PR List	52	43	49	33	27	26
SMD	49	32	47	37	28	25

Source: Own calculations.

Although the differences between results in the PR and SMD segments are negligible, the Lithuanian data clearly show that in many (four out of six) cases the legislative turnover is higher in the PR segment. This suggests that SMD provides for a lower legislative turnover.

Electoral Volatility

The fifth thesis attributes the high legislative turnover to a high electoral volatility meaning that voters change their preferences radically from election to election.

The figures on electoral volatility in the Baltic countries differ depending on the sources and method of calculation[174] (table 8.9.), however, it is obvious from all three sources that Estonia has the lowest electoral volatility and that Latvia and Lithuania have the most similar levels of electoral volatility.

Table 8.9. Electoral Volatility in the Baltic States (in per cent)

Countries	Calculated by:	Kreuzer & Pettai 2003	Rose 2009	Kuklys*
Estonia		40.4	150	33.1
Latvia		74.2	200	40.8
Lithuania		72.9	195	47.5

* Calculations are based on the table 8.10 and annex tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3.

[174] Firstly, calculations by Rose, Kreuzer and Pettai are based on the political parties, whereas the figures by Kuklys rely upon political party families. Secondly, the number of legislative terms covered is different in all three sources. Thirdly, Rose refuses to divide his percentages by two, which is rather a standard (see Bartolini and Mair 1990) in volatility calculation.

To continue the further analysis with own data, one can conclude that electoral volatility accounts for the half of parliamentary newcomers (total average of 47.5 per cent in Lithuania; the results for Latvia and Estonia are 40.8 and 33.1 per cent respectively). It means that a high legislative turnover in the Baltic States is caused from 52.5 to 66.9 per cent by other factors than electoral volatility. Estonia has the highest legislative turnover, even though its electoral volatility is the lowest among the Baltic States.

Table 8.10. Electoral Volatility (%), based on Political Party Families in Parliaments

Estonia	1990-1992	1992-1995	1995-1999	1999-2003	2003-2007	2007-2011
Volatility	49	63.4	28.7	22.9	22.9	11.9
Latvia	1990-1993	1993-1995	1995-1998	1998-2002	2002-2006	2006-2010
Volatility	93	37.5	69	26	6	13
Lithuania	1990-1992	1992-1996	1996-2000	2000-2004	2004-2008	2008-2012
Volatility	78.7	65.9	53.8	50.4	19.2	16.7

Source: Own calculations based on the annex tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3.

Double Listing of Candidates

Latvian and Lithuanian electoral systems allow a double listing of candidates: Latvian candidates may run in all five constituencies simultaneously, Lithuanian candidates may be placed on the nation-wide party list in the multi-member district and run in the single member district at the same time. The opportunities for double listing are worst in Estonia: there nominated candidates, on the contrary, are allowed to run in one electoral district only, however, some candidates put on the nation-wide list have a chance to get elected in the third round of election. Following this logic, the legislative turnover should be lower in Estonia than in other two Baltic countries, however, Estonia has the highest legislative turnover of all three Baltic States.

Frequency of Elections

Parliamentary elections in the Baltic States are held every four years.[175] Since 1993 Estonia and Latvia had one premature election (in 1995)[176], Lithuania so far held elections regularly every four years. If we distribute legislative turnover not per term

[175] In Lithuania since 1992, in Estonia since 1995 and in Latvia since 1998.

[176] The second premature parliamentary election took place in Latvia in 2011, however, these data are not included in our analysis.

but per year, the annual legislative turnover in Lithuania would be 13.2 per cent, in Estonia 15 per cent and in Latvia 17.3 per cent.

Greater Opportunities in Attaining Elite Status

A higher legislative turnover provides greater opportunities in attaining the elite status and, with this, better prospects for democracy (see Somit, Wildenmann, Boll and Römmele 1994). High turnover was seen as political stabilising not only by Dwaine Marvick (1968), but also by Pareto and Mosca who "believed that, within limits, high turnover prevents the build-up of frustration among potential challengers of the regime, by allowing them to be coopted, however briefly, into positions of leadership" (Putnam 1976: 67).

The elite status thesis, with a modifying inclusion of gender perspective, is confirmed as well: the highest numbers of female legislators in Latvia and Lithuania have been brought by the parties with the highest numbers of legislative newcomers (Kuklys 2008: 45).

The Lower Average Level of Elite Experience, Expertise and Effectiveness

This explanation connects a high legislative turnover with the lower average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness. Our data do not provide with measurements of expertise and effectiveness[177] of MPs, however, if we take a mean number of elections as a proxy for legislative experience, we can observe a relationship between a legislative turnover and elite experience. The Baltic data confirm indeed that, except for Estonia in 1995 and Latvia in 1998, the high legislative turnover goes together with the low level of parliamentary experience (mean number of elections).

Table 8.11. Legislative Experience of Baltic MPs: Mean Number of Elections

Estonia	1990	1992	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
Elections	1	1.2	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.1
Latvia	1990	1993	1995	1998	2002	2006	2010
Elections	1	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.9	2.1	1.9
Lithuania	1990	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Elections	1	1.3	1.6	1.5	1.8	2.2	2.5

Source: Own data and calculations.

[177] A possible proxy for the legislative effectiveness could be the percentage of passed laws of the total number of law drafts proposed by an MP, however, we have this type of data only for Lithuania.

Turnover among Ethnic Minorities

If one compares shares of newcomers among ethnic minority and MPs belonging to the titular nation, implications for stability are more visible among ethnic minority representatives in Latvia: in four out of six Latvian Saeimas the share of newcomers among ethnic majority legislators has been higher than among ethnic minority MPs. In Estonia, we observe the opposite trend: in five out of six Riigikogu the share of newcomers is higher among ethnic minority than ethnic majority MPs. The Lithuanian data show a situation in-between: in a half (three of six) of parliaments a higher legislative turnover is found among ethnic Lithuanian legislators.

Path Dependence

In spite of the obvious differences in turnover between MPs in Eastern and Western Europe, there are a couple of striking similarities on a less aggregate level. A comparison between post-1945 Western and post-1989 Eastern European countries makes it clear that Eastern European countries follow a pattern of political development of some consolidated democracies in Western Europe. This is recorded by political development of the third wave democracies Portugal and Spain after 1975, having 64.1 and 57.8 per cent (the EurElite data, Best and Cotta 2000) of parliamentary newcomers for the first 5 terms respectively. In addition, the difference in age of all MPs and parliamentary newcomers in Portugal - a rather exceptional Western European case – is 1.9 years which coincides with an Eastern European average. Portugal and Spain are similar to Eastern European countries in a long survival of post-war authoritarian political regimes as well. None of the Western European countries of the 20th century except Portugal and Spain could be compared with Eastern European societies in that respect. This evidence allows to conclude that the longer the period of regime discontinuity (length of the non-democratic regime), the longer it will take to stabilise the parliamentary turnover in the new democracy.[178]

[178] Cotta and Verzichelli (2007: 471) argue that "the crucial factor is probably the quality of discontinuity more than its length". For the Baltic countries this would mean a more precise differentiation among authoritarian regimes in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania before the Soviet occupation in 1940.

8.3. Conclusion

Out of variety of explanations, the path dependence and the supply-side volatility seem to provide the most convincing explanations for the high turnover among Baltic legislators. This means that the long previous period of non-democratic regime will keep the legislative turnover in new Baltic democracies at a relatively high level for some time till they reach the 'western' levels of parliamentary turnover[179] and that the volatile elite structures (party elites switching, abandoning and creating new political parties) will continue contributing to the high legislative turnover as well.

On the other hand, it may be that the Baltics, which is no exeption from Eastern Europe in terms of legislative turnover, provides the established democracies of Western Europe with a perspective of their near future: "Insofar, Eastern and Central Europe provides the West with an image of its own future, including the corrupting consequences of political career insecurity, such as tendency towards to a 'grab and run' mentality" (Best 2007b: 30-31). The changes in the political party systems of Italy, Austria, Netherlands and some other countries of Western Europe after 1990 could point to this direction and could provide with a thesis of a convergence between European East and West.

[179] We have to note that legislative turnover was already below 40 per cent in Estonia in 2011, in Latvia in 2006 and in Lithuania in 2008 and 2012, however, it is to be seen whether these are events by chance or a start of the long term trends.

9. Careers of Long-Standing Parliamentarians

> "In modern democracies of any type other than the Swiss, politics will unavoidably be a career."
>
> Schumpeter (1979: 285)

> "Insofar is the post-communist setting unique and exceptional in the history of European representative democracies: democratisation without an extension of suffrage (but with an empowerment of the electorate) combines here with a deprofessionalisation to the political elite."
>
> Best (2007b: 28)

Occupational sociology defines a career as "succession of related jobs, hierarchical in prestige, with ordered directions for an individual to pass through them in a predictable sequence", however, also indicates "strong career patterns in some occupations, weak career patterns in other occupations, and an absence of career patterns in a few occupations" (Taylor 1968: 266). Politics or a parliamentary job in advanced western democracies falls somewhere between the last two patterns. It is marked not only by occupational mobility (change of employers and institutions[180]) which is normal for university professors, CEOs and similar occupational positions, but also, differently from them, by the absence of the last (third) stage of the occupational career if we follow the division of occupational career by Form and Miller (1949: 318) into (1) initial, (2) trial and (3) stable phases.

Parliamentary careers are characterised by their insecurity which is normally associated with jobs "for semiskilled, unskilled, and domestic workers" (Taylor 1968: 270). This career insecurity, due to much higher legislative turnover and higher electoral volatility, is even stronger among legislators of Eastern Europe in comparison with their counterparts in the stable western democracies.

Still, inspite of high legislative turnover and electoral volatility, we find a nucleus of career parliamentarians comprising from about a sixth to a third of all legislators per term in the Baltic parliaments (see table 9.1). These findings can be interpreted as an indicator of increasing parliamentary institutionalisation (see Polsby 1968) and a favourable condition for parliamentary socialisation of representative elites.

[180] As a consequence of the constantly increasing occupational mobility, Arthur and Rousseau (1996) see the "boundaryless" careers as a new dominant principle of employment.

Table 9.1. Percentage of MPs Serving at Least Three Legislative Terms

Parliament	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th
Estonia	14.9	22.8	17.8	23.8	26.7
Latvia	16.0	24.0	20.0	29.0	28.0
Lithuania	16.1	14.9	22.0	34.8	43.9

Source: Own data and calculations.

The following analysis is structured into three parts. Firstly, it applies the Putnam's law of increasing disproportion to the backgrounds of the long-standing legislators and reviews the careers of the most experienced parliamentarians. Secondly, it demonstrates the importance of the political party switching for the careers of long-standing legislators. Thirdly, it explores to what extent the positions of the most experienced legislators overlap with the posts of those at the top of parliamentary hierarchy.

9.1. Applying the 'Law of Increasing Disproportion'

The law of increasing disproportion by Putnam (1976: 33) states that "the higher the level of political authority, the greater the representation for high-status groups". With a small modification – replacing the level of political authority with the number of legislative terms – we could apply this law to the analysis of long-standing legislators in the Baltic States. In doing so, we would expect the MPs serving three legislative terms to be more educated and include fewer women and ethnic minorities compared with MPs serving one or two parliamentary terms; we would expect the MPs serving four terms to be more educated and include fewer women and ethnic minorities compared with MPs serving three parliamentary terms; further, we would expect the MPs serving five terms to be more educated and include fewer women and ethnic minorities compared with MPs serving four parliamentary terms; and so on.

9.1.1. Estonia

Based on the last seven parliaments, on average, a member of the Estonian parliament is 47.1 years old and serves 1.6 legislative terms. Since as a newcomer she or he enters the legislature at an average of 45.4 years, the average age difference between newcomers and established members is only 4.5 years. This indicates that very few MPs continue their careers as professional legislators. One-fifth of MPs on average

(based on the last five parliaments) serve three legislative terms. What are the legislators who made their way to the parliamentary elite? What kind of social and political characteristics do they have?

Legislators with experience in three parliamentary terms number a total of 72 MPs who are on average 52.3 years old. The largest party families among them are Left Liberals and Conservatives (26.4 per cent each), 23.6 per cent represent Right Liberals. Almost all of these long-standing legislators - 95.8 per cent - have a university degree.

The largest share of long-standing legislators with three parliamentary terms – a half - consists of those who had been members of local councils prior to their election to parliament. Leading party politicians constitute 34.7 per cent and members of the Estonian Congress 30.6 per cent. Cabinet ministers make up 16.7 per cent of the total.

The largest occupational group among long-standing parliamentarians is that of teachers and professors (27.8 per cent), followed by higher civil servants (16.7 per cent). All in all, 83.1 per cent of long-standing MPs came from the public sector.

In terms of Soviet political experience, 16.7 per cent of long-standing legislators were members of the local Soviets; 2.8 per cent were Communist party leaders; 6.9 per cent and 5.6 per cent, respectively, belonged to the Supreme Soviet and council of ministers; 31.9 per cent were part of the republican nomenklatura; 45.8 per cent were simple CPSU members; 6.9 per cent were dissidents. The collective portrait of long-standing legislators also includes 13.9 per cent of women and 6.9 per cent of ethnic minorities.

Applying the modified law by Putnam, we would expect that legislators serving four legislative terms would be more educated and include fewer women and ethnic minorities compared with MPs serving three parliamentary terms. The group of legislators serving four terms consists of 25 MPs (28 per cent of whom are Right Liberals, 24 per cent are Socialists/Social Democrats, and Left Liberals and Conservatives each comprise 20 percent). The Putnam law of increasing disproportion works well in the case of age, education, occupation, ethnicity and two types of political experience: the age of MPs with four legislative terms reaches 54.8 years, the share of those with university degrees increases to 100 per cent, the share of those in the public sector and that of higher civil servants increases to 88 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. Declining trends are observed among those with local political experience (24 per cent), former dissidents (4 per cent) and nomenklatura (36 per

cent). However, this law is challenged by ethnic minorities (8 per cent) and, especially, by gender perspective – women constitute one-fifth of MPs with four terms, and this is higher than the share of women among MPs serving three terms. Moreover, if we move to the group of MPs with five legislative terms (there are six such MPs in total), the share of women increases to 50 per cent.

The variables of age, occupational and political experience indicate that Putnam's law of increasing disproportion continues to function at the level of legislators serving five parliamentary terms (there are six such MPs in total): average age reaches 55.8 years; all legislators come from the public sector; five of six were civil servants prior to election. There are no former leading members of the Communist Party and no former dissidents among these most experienced legislators. Ethnic minorities are also not represented. Absence of local democratic political experience among the most experienced legislators comes as a great surprise since its importance for the parliamentary recruitment has substantially increased with every Riigikogu (see the chapter on the pre-parliamentary political experience).

Who are these most experienced legislators? There are three Estonian parliamentarians who served six legislative terms: Andres Tarand (Estonian Social Democratic Party), Edgar Savisaar (Centre Party) and Mart Laar (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union). Their political careers are briefly described below:

Andres Tarand started his parliamentary career at fifty years of age and had experience as a member of the Estonian Congress. Educated in climatology and geography (PhD), he abandoned the post of the Director of the Botanical Gardens at the University of Tartu in 1990 and entered the Supreme Council of Estonia. He served as Minister of Environment (1992-1994), Prime Minister of Estonia (1994-1995) and Chairman of the Estonian Social Democratic Party (1996-2001). From 2004 to 2009 he served as a member of the European Parliament.

Edgar Savisaar, one of the best-known Estonian politicians, embarked on his legislative career in 1990 at forty years of age and came with previous experience as a cabinet minister, a Popular Front leader and member of the Estonian Congress. Educated in history and philosophy (PhD), Edgar Savisaar was first elected to parliament in 1990. He served as the Prime Minister of Estonia (1990-1992), Interior Minister (1995), Minister of Economics and Communications (2005-2007) and Vice-President of the Parliament (1992-1995). He was the Mayor of Tallinn from 2001 through 2004 and has held this position again since 2007. Edgar Savisaar is the leader of the Centre Party.

Mart Laar, one of the most famous politicians of Estonia, began his parliamentary career in 1990 at thirty years of age and has had political experience as a member of the Estonian Congress. He was educated as a historian and was appointed to the position of Prime Minister of Estonia in 1992 at the

age of 32 and led the Estonian government until 1994. He was again the Prime Minister of Estonia from 1999 to 2002. In 2005 Mart Laar received his PhD from the University of Tartu. He has been a Chairman of the Union of the Pro Patria and Res Publica since 2007.

The data above indicate that an absolute majority of long-standing parliamentarians – at least two-thirds of those who have served three, four or five legislative terms – come from Liberal and Conservative party families. This dominance of Liberals and Conservatives among long-standing legislators correlates well with the continuous neo-liberal course of Estonian governments that has been pursued in the newly-independent Estonia.

Led by Mart Laar, Pro Patria (also Pro Patria Union, later - The Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica) was the major Estonian conservative party, strongly oriented towards the nation. Laar claimed that before becoming prime minister in 1992, the only book he had read on economics was *Free to Choose* by Milton Friedman (see Belien 2005). Hybrid privatisation, the flat tax and banking reform (i.e., encouraging bankruptcies when banks were suspected of being under mafia influence) were innovations implemented under Laar. The Reform Party, founded by Siim Kallas, at the time the president of Estonia's Central Bank and now the Vice-President of the European Commission, is the main representative of Right Liberals in Estonia. Abolishment of the corporate income tax in January 2000 is one example of the party's successful neo-liberal policies (Lagerspetz and Vogt 2004: 67). Since appearing for the first time in 1995 and receiving the second highest number of votes in that election, the Reform Party has maintained and even increased its popularity, evidenced by its victory in the 2007 parliamentary elections. The main representative of the Left Liberals – the Estonian Centre Party – does not fit the mould of neo-liberal policy-makers. The Centre Party has an "image as a representative of the silent majority of ordinary people forgotten by the political establishment" (Lagerspetz and Vogt 2004) and is also popular among Russian speakers; however, these programmatic differences did not preclude the Centre Party from joining the Reform Party in the governing coalition in 2005. (Edgar Savisaar, the charismatic and authoritarian leader of the Centre Party, was Minister of Economics and Communications from 2005 to 2007).

Radical economic reforms and strict monetary policy by Liberals and Conservatives, together with economic growth in the country, have earned Estonia the

reputation of "Baltic Tiger". Due to this, the country replaced the national currency with the euro in 2011 and thus became the first ex-Soviet state to join the eurozone.

9.1.2. Latvia

The data on the seven Latvian parliaments show that, on average, a Latvian legislator is 46.8 years old and serves 1.6 parliamentary terms. Since an average age of parliamentary newcomer in Latvia is 45.8 years (the age difference between all MPs and newcomers is only one year), we conclude that conditions for parliamentary careers are unfavourable (and less favourable than in Estonia).

If we examine long-standing Latvian MPs (N=74) serving three terms, the share of political experience would be larger but still rather similar to that of all MPs: 29.7 per cent of longstanding MPs had local experience; 28.4 per cent had experience in leading the party; and 12.2 per cent had experience as cabinet ministers before entering the parliament. What is very different is the share of MPs with membership in Citizens' Committees – 9.5 per cent compared with 5.2 per cent of all MPs. Another difference is the level of long-standing MPs who had no political experience before entering parliament: 40.5 per cent compared with 48.7 per cent of all MPs.

If those MPs (N=29) who served four terms are considered, the diminishing role of all sorts of political experience, except for membership in the Citizens' Committees, would persist: 24.1 per cent for local, 20.7 per cent for leading the party and 3.4 per cent for governmental experience. The level of Citizens' Committee experience would "grow" to 13.8 per cent and the share of those with no political experience would remain similar to that among all MPs: 48.3 per cent compared with 48.7 per cent for all MPs from seven parliaments on average.

If the group of experienced legislators (N=10) serving five terms is extracted from the whole, the decreasing proportions of local elective (20 per cent) and leading party positions (20 per cent) and absence of those with cabinet experience come together with the increasing proportion of those having participation in the Citizens' Committee (20 per cent) and those having no pre-parliamentary political experience (50 per cent).

The other variables – education, age, ethnicity and Soviet political experience – also show that the Putnam law of increasing disproportion is at work. Increasing share of those with university degrees, older age, declining percentages of ethnic minorities and those from the Soviet Communist establishment and increasing shares of Soviet

dissidents and those whose families experienced repressions of the Soviet regime are characteristics if one moves from MPs serving three terms to legislators serving four and five terms. This process is also characterised by the rise of Conservatives and increasing shares of managers (businessmen) and, especially, political party employees and decline of teachers (professors), civil servants and public sector. Legislators serving the fifth term are 54.6 years old and hold a university degree; only a half of them come from public sector.

The most experienced legislators are Dzintars Ābiķis (served seven terms[181]), Anna Seile and Jānis Lagzdiņš (served six terms).

Dzintars Ābiķis started his parliamentary career at the age of 38 years. Educated in geography, he taught at the secondary school in the capital city. Shortly before 1990 he was employed in the Popular Front of Latvia. In 1990 Dzintars Ābiķis was elected to the Supreme Council of Latvia. He was two times elected to the Saeima as a member of the liberal party "Latvia's Way", three times as a member of the conservative "People's Party". To the last parliament he was elected on the list of the union "Unity".

Anna Seile embarked on her legislative career at 51 years of age. After graduation from a university, she worked as a teacher of geography and geologist. Her last employment before she entered a parliament in 1990 was a deputy director for research in the forest reserve. In 1992 she received her PhD in geography. In 1995 Anna Seile left the Green Party and was elected the head of the conservative Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK). After the Latvian National Independence Movement merged with the Union "For Fatherland and Freedom" (TB), she was elected three times to Saeima on the list of the conservative TB/LNNK.

Jānis Lagzdiņš started his parliamentary career at the age of 38 years. Educated in law, he worked as a lawyer before entering the Supreme Council of Latvia in 1990. He was two times elected to the Saeima as a member of the liberal party "Latvia's Way" and three times as a member of the conservative "People's Party".

Our data demonstrate that two political party families, the Liberals and Conservatives, constitute the largest shares of long-standing legislators. Liberals and Conservatives have the highest mean number of mandates. (The highest absolute mean number of mandates for all post-1990 Latvian parliaments belongs to the Liberals in 1995 and the Conservatives in 2006, each with 2.4.) Liberals have the largest share of experienced founders (those who continue their legislative careers from 1990 onwards) in all the parliaments to which they have been elected, and Conservatives

[181] If the Saeima elected in 2011 is included, Dzintars Ābiķis serves the eight legislative term.

have the second highest share for those parliaments in which Liberals are present. However, in the last three parliaments, the Conservatives were the clear leaders, as they had the largest share of experienced founders and members serving at least three terms.

Conservatives in many cases have been linked with the Congress of Citizens, while Liberals have been associated with the Club "21". The Congress of Citizens, similar to the one in Estonia, emerged in the national rebirth and liberation processes of Latvia and sought to become an alternative to the Latvian Supreme Council of 1990. Much more radical and nationalistic than the Popular Front, the Congress of Citizens in Latvia failed to achieve the institutional success enjoyed by the neighbouring Congress of Citizens in Estonia. However, in spite of institutional failure, members of the Citizens' Congress in Latvia continued their political involvement individually and became an important group among the most experienced parliamentary representatives.

The connection between Liberals and the Club "21" in Latvia has been very strong, as many Liberals who entered any Latvian parliament after 1990 had belonged to this club. Although Liberals cooperated with Conservatives in the Cabinet of Ministers, the program of Club "21" was to oppose the non-compromising citizenship politics of the Congress of Citizens. Small in numbers and closely related to elitist Latvian Liberals, the Club "21" seemed to overcome party boundaries and developed into an open forum for top politicians, businessmen, intellectuals and artists. It included former Communist nomenklatura as well as members of the Latvian Diaspora from Western democracies. Representatives of ethnic minorities were a part of the Club as well.

As has been argued by Steen (1997: 354), as an elite forum or an institution for inter-elite cooperation, the Club "21" was a purely Latvian phenomenon, and nothing similar has been observed in Estonia or Lithuania.

In 2002, Latvian Liberals endured the same political fate as the reform-oriented Liberals in Poland in 2001: they vanished from the parliamentary landscape.[182] However, if one defines "political elite" as appointed or elected persons who hold strategic positions in state authorities and affect national political outcomes regularly

[182] In 2006 some of them were elected to Saeima on the joint list with Christian Democrats.

and substantially, Latvian Liberals continue to be a part of the elite. Many of them occupy the highest administrative positions in the Latvian state authorities.

9.1.3. Lithuania

The data on the seven Lithuanian parliaments show that, on average, a Lithuanian legislator is 49.1 years old and serves 1.7 parliamentary terms. Since an average age of parliamentary newcomer in Lithuania is 46.9 years (the age difference between all MPs and newcomers is 2.2 years), we conclude that conditions for parliamentary careers are slightly more favourable than in Latvia but less favourable than in Estonia.

If we examine the long-standing Lithuanian legislators (N=105) serving three terms, the share of pre-parliamentary political experience would be larger (except for experience as a cabinet minister) but still rather similar to that of all MPs: 36.2 per cent of long-standing MPs held local elective positions, one-third (33.3 per cent) held a leading party position and 1.9 per cent were cabinet ministers. Percentages for the university education, degrees in law and social sciences and humanities, proportion of women, dissidents and politically repressed parents would be slightly higher in comparison with the average for all legislators from all seven parliaments.

If we compare long-standing legislators serving three terms with those who served four terms (N=50) and those who served five legislative terms (N=22), we observe that the Putnam's law of increasing disproportion is at work. With every additional legislative term, the age and the percentages for degrees in humanities and social sciences, experience as a cabinet minister and the Soviet experience of having political repressed parents continue to rise; the percentages of university degrees and ethnic minorities, the shares of local elective experience and experience as a manager (businessman) and civil servant continue to decline. The share of women legislators is rather stable (between 16 and 18 per cent) and the largest percentages of political party families fall into two comparable groups of Social Democrats and Conservatives (fluctuating between 29.5 to 40.9 per cent), however, if we look at the legislators serving six terms, we observe the rising shares of female legislators (comprising one-fourth of them) and representatives of the Socialists/Social Democrats (five of eight MPs).

The careers of the eight most experienced Lithuanian MPs (having served or serving six terms) are briefly described below:

Česlovas Juršėnas was elected to the Supreme Council of Lithuania at the age of 52 years. Beforehand, educated as a journalist not only at the University but also at the Communist Party school, he worked for various newspapers, in the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party as an instructor and the head of the department for newspapers, television and radio. Česlovas Juršėnas was the head of the Lithuanian parliament from 1992 to 1996 and in 2004, the chairman of the Democratic Labour Party from 1996 to 2001. He served as the vice-chairman of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party from 2001 to 2004, after 2004 he occupies the position of a vice-chairman of this political party.

Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis was born in the family of politically repressed parents. Trained as a surgeon and a historian, he was involved in the dissident activity before the Lithuanian state regained its independence. In 1990, at the age of 39 years, he started his parliamentary career. The political positions held: Chairman of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party from 1999 to 2001, Vice-Speaker of Seimas from 2001 to 2004, the vice-chairman of the Social Democratic Party 1989-1999, in 2001 and from 2008 onwards.

Kęstutis Glaveckas, holding professorship in economics at the University of Vilnius, entered the Supreme Council of Lithuania in 1990 as the candidate of the Communist Party at the age of 41 years. He was Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party 1989-1990, Vice-Chairman of the Lithuanian Centre Union 1998-2000 and Chairman of the Lithuanian Centre Union in 2000. In 2003 he was elected the vice-chairman of the Centre and Liberal Union.

Irena Šiaulienė, after graduation with a PhD in history and having held associate professorship in the institution of higher education, started her parliamentary career in 1992 at the age of 37 years. From 1990 to 2001 she was a member of the Democratic Labour Party, served as a vice-head of this organisation; from 2001 onwards she enrolls the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party.

Rasa Juknevičienė started her parliamentary career at the age of 32 years. Trained as a paediatrician, she entered a parliament for the first time in 1990. The political positions held: Vice-speaker of Seimas from 1999 to 2000, vice-head of the Fatherland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) from 1999 onwards and minister of defence from 2008 to 2012.

Gediminas Kirkilas, after graduating from the Communist Party school, worked as an instructor of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was a secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party. He entered Seimas for the first time in 1992 at the age 41 years. From 1991 to 1996 Kirkilas was the first vice-chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, from 2001 to 2007 – vice-chairman of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party. The other positions held: Chairman of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party 2007-2009, Minister of Defence from 2004 to 2006, Prime Minister of Lithuania from 2006 to 2008.

Algimantas Salamakinas, after having worked as a turner and chairman of the company supervisory board, embarked on his legislative career at the age of 40 years. He was a member of the Lihuanian Communist Party, later was elected a vice-chairman of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party. He is one of the very few legislators without a degree in higher education.

Emanuelis Zingeris started his legislative career at the age of 33 years. Educated as philologist, he held the position of the Director of the Lithuanian Jewish Museum before he entered for the first

time a parliament. He is also a founder of the national Gaon Jewish Museum and the Honorary Chairman of the Lithuanian Jewish Community.

As has been mentioned in the chapters above, the specific features of Lithuania were a succesful transformation of the Lithuanian Soviet Communist Party into a Social Democratic Party and the Lithuanian political system described by the alternating electoral success between the Socialists/ Social Democrats and Conservatives. The Lithuanian Social Democrats, lead by Algirdas Brazauskas, a physically strong and well-built former first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, and the Conservatives, lead by Vytautas Landsbergis, a musicology professor of an extra-ordinary speech talent and irony, were the tempting examples inviting for a Paretian (or Machiavellian) analysis of alternation between lions and foxes. Even after these two political superfigures left the Lithuanian national scene some time ago, electoral alternation between the Social Democrats and Conservatives continues further allowing for some scholars (Norkus 2011b) to argue that Lithuania in this respect should be better compared not with Estonia and Latvia but with Poland and Hungary.

As the data demonstrated, the majority of the long-standing Lithuanian legislators belong to the rivalry camps of Social Democrats and Conservatives, however, this does not mean that membership in one political party is sufficient for a legislative career. As the sub-chapter below shows, at least two political parties are a precondition for a long-term legislative career not only in Lithuania, but also in other two Baltic States.

9.2. Political Party Switching as a 'Requirement' for Long-Standing Legislators

Among countries of Eastern Europe in the period from 1990 to 2007, Latvia had the highest electoral volatility which was to 100 per cent[183] explained by the behaviour of political elites creating new parliamentary parties for every legislative election; the electoral volatility in Lithuania and Estonia was explained by the behaviour of political elites to 96 and 66 per cent, respectively (Rose 2009: 149-152).

These findings are supported by our data on legislative recruitment. A member of the Latvian Saeima changes 1.4 political parties and 1.2 party families on average,

[183] On average, 60 per cent to 72 per cent of electoral volatility in Eastern Europe is attributed to the elite behaviour; the rest is explained by the changing preferences of voters (Rose 2009: 152).

however, a longer legislative tenure 'requires' to change more political parties and party families. The number of political parties rises from 2.2 on average for legislators having served three terms to 2.9 on average for legislators with four terms. (The averages of party families for the same groups are lower: 1.6 and 2.0, respectively). The largest numbers of party and party family change (3.3 political parties and 2.2 party families) are observed among the most professional Latvian MPs serving five terms.

The data on Estonia show the lowest rates of party change which is 2.3 for legislators serving five legislative terms. The Lithuanian data – an average of 2.9 political parties – demonstrate a situation in-between. Still, the Lithuanian and even Estonian political party change rates are not that far from the Latvian ones[184]. In all Baltic cases this means political professionalisation at the cost of the high electoral volatility.

The figures for mobility between parties and party families are different for MPs with an ethnic minority background and MPs belonging to a titular nation, however, the cross-country differences are too large and the common Baltic patterns are not observed. For instance, the ethnic minority MPs with three terms of parliamentary experience in the Latvian Saeima changed parties an average of 2.5 times and party families an average of 1.4 times. Ethnic Latvian MPs with the same legislative experience changed parties on average 2.2 times and party families on average 1.7 times. The higher party and lower party family mobility among ethnic minority MPs is also observed among legislators having served four terms in a parliament: on average, ethnic minority MPs changed parties 3.3 times and party families 1.5 times, compared with 2.7 times for parties and 2.1 times for party families for their counterparts of ethnic Latvian origin.

The Lithuanian data, on the contrary, show the opposite trends: the higher party and the lower party family mobility is observed among ethnic Lithuanian MPs, the ethnic minority legislators in the Lithuanian Seimas show a lower party but higher party family mobility.

[184] We should keep in mind that our data on the Baltic parliamentary elites record the political party and political party family affiliations of legislators only every four years. What happens within each legislative period lasting four years is not recorded, thus, the rates of party and party family change among MPs could be possibly even higher.

Table 9.2.1. Political Party and Party Family Switching Among Legislators (Average)

Parliaments	Estonia, 1990-2011		Latvia, 1990-2010		Lithuania, 1990-2012	
	Party Change	Party Family Change	Party Change	Party Family Change	Party Change	Party Family Change
All MPs	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.4	1.2
MPs with 3 Terms	2.0	1.5	2.2	1.6	1.9	1.5
MPs with 4 Terms	2.3	1.9	2.9	2.0	2.5	1.8
MPs with 5 Terms	2.3	2.0	3.3	2.2	2.9	1.7

Source: Own data and calculations.

The ethnic Estonian legislators in the Riigikogu demonstrate both a higher party and party family mobility in comparison with ethnic minority MPs.

The importance of the political party switching for the careers of the long-standing Baltic MPs could be better seen if the political party change variable is placed among other variables for structural elite circulation. As the tables below show, the Estonian parliamentarians are 9.7 times, the Lithuanian legislators 23.6 times and the Latvian MPs even 41.2 times more likely to stay in parliament for three or more legislative periods if they change their political parties. The political party change increases the chances of staying in parliament much greater than any other variable in presented equations. For example, the second highest effects observed in the respective equations are experience of having politically persecuted parents or being deported to Siberia among Estonian MPs (they have 7.9 times greater odds),

Table 9.2.2. Predictors for Careers of Long-Standing Estonian Legislators

Predictors	*B*	SE	Exp(*B*)
Law Degree	0.039	0.510	1.039
Local Elective Position	0.139	0.350	1.149
Cabinet Minister	1.076*	0.493	2.934
Member of Citizens’ Committee	0.423	0.430	1.526
Female Gender	-0.028	0.475	0.973
Ethnic Minority	0.158	0.717	1.171
Soviet Nomenklatura	0.303	0.393	1.353
Soviet Dissident	-0.552	0.829	0.576
Political Persecution or Exile of Parents	2.077**	0.655	7.981
Managers, Businessmen	-0.820	0.525	0.440
Teachers, Professors	0.466	0.459	1.594
Political Party Employees	-0.056	0.544	0.945
Political Party Change	2.277***	0.445	9.748
Political Party Family Change	0.456	0.485	1.578
Nagelkerke pseudo-R^2		0.36	

Note: Binary Logistic Regression. Dependent variable is long-standing MPs serving three or more terms without interruption.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 9.2.3. Predictors for Careers of Long-Standing Latvian Legislators

Predictors	*B*	SE	Exp(*B*)
Law Degree	0.421	0.493	1.523
Member of Citizens' Committee	0.532	0.714	1.702
Female Gender	0.273	0.508	1.313
Ethnic Minority	0.179	0.430	1.196
Leading Position in the Soviet Communist Party	1.788*	0.899	5.975
Soviet Nomenklatura	-0.248	0.677	0.781
Member of the Soviet Communist Party	-0.208	0.453	0.812
Political Persecution or Exile of Parents	0.485	0.595	1.624
Public Sector	-0.299	0.451	0.741
Civil servants	0.933	0.613	2.542
Managers, Businessmen	-0.654	0.510	0.520
Teachers, Professors	-0.041	0.482	0.959
Political Party Employees	-1.042	0.647	0.353
Political Party Change	3.719***	0.483	41.226
Political Party Family Change	-0.490	0.463	0.613
Nagelkerke pseudo-R^2		0.46	

Note: Binary Logistic Regression. Dependent variable is long-standing MPs serving three or more terms without interruption.
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

Table 9.2.4. Predictors for Careers of Long-Standing Lithuanian Legislators

Predictors	*B*	SE	Exp(*B*)
Law Degree	0.565	0.488	1.760
Degree in Humanities or Social Sciences	0.187	0.299	1.205
Female Gender	0.884*	0.385	2.421
Ethnic Minority	0.444	0.506	1.559
Local Position in the Soviet Regime	0.402	0.580	1.495
Soviet Nomenklatura	-0.233	0.505	0.792
Soviet Dissident	1.104	0.679	3.016
Political Persecution or Exile of Parents	0.490	0.511	1.633
Managers, Businessmen	-0.315	0.401	0.730
Teachers, Professors	0.197	0.370	1.218
Political Party Employees	0.510	0.442	1.665
Political Party Change	3.162***	0.400	23.623
Political Party Family Change	-0.341	0.384	0.711
Nagelkerke pseudo-R^2		0.38	

Note: Binary Logistic Regression. Dependent variable is long-standing MPs serving three or more terms without interruption.
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

leading position in the Soviet Communist Party among Latvia legislators (it increases chances 5.9 times) and experience as Soviet dissident among Lithuanian parliamentarians (they are 3 times more likely to remain in parliament). The extremely high effect of the political party change is explained by the fact that our data on party change includes not only individual but also collective actions of parliamentarians (mergers and fissions); the latter accounts for the largest share of

political party switching among MPs. The high effect of party change and its variation across Baltic countries are attributed not only to electoral volatility but also to the level of party system institutionalisation (see Kreuzer and Pettai 2009: 271).

Interestingly enough, the change of political party families has a negative effect on the chances to continue a legislative career for Latvian and Lithuanian MPs. In contrast, the effect of political party family change is positive in the Estonian case, however, the effect is very low in comparison with the effect of political party change.

Hence, in order to become a long-standing legislator it makes sense to change a political party but not a party family.

9.3. The Parliamentary Elite: the Most Experienced Legislators or Those at the Top of Institutional Hierarchy?

In the beginning of this dissertation (chapter 1.3) we have provided two definitions of the parliamentary elite: the broad one and the narrow one. According to the broad (institutional) definition, all legislators belong to the parliamentary elite; the narrow definition treats a parliamentary elite only those legislators who affect the national political outcomes regularly and substantially. In this part of the dissertation we are concerned with our narrow definition which obviously requires a more precise operationalisation: are those legislators who affect the national political outcomes regularly *and* substantially (1) the most experienced (long-standing) MPs, (2) MPs at the top of the parliamentary hierarchy, (3) most productive lawmakers (persons with the highest number of law drafts registered), (4) most often speakers (speech deliverers and talk-givers), or all four in one?

Intuitively, we would be certain that the most experienced (long-standing) legislators serving six or seven terms are the parliamentary elite, however, only one long-standing Baltic legislator (Česlovas Juršėnas from Lithuania) in the period of more than two decades would fulfil the second criterion which is the top of the parliamentary hierarchy (speaker or the president of parliament, see table 9.3). The explanation for this result is that the highest positions in the parliamentary hierarchy are occupied not according to the criteria of legislative tenure and parliamentary experience but rather following the logic of the political power (electoral results) structure. Secondly, it could be that a too high level of parliamentary professionalisation (over-profesionalisation or specialisation) leads to a process of

self-exclusion from the parliamentary elite in the narrow sense; in other words, with an extremely high professionalisation we get long-standing legislators who affect national political outcomes regularly but *not* substantially. However, if in our search for the legislators who "affect the national political outcomes regularly *and* substantially" we lower the yardstick for parliamentary experience, a number of parliamentary speakers increases obviously. If the number of legislative terms is reduced to three parliaments, all the five presidents of the Estonian parliaments fulfil this criterion; in Lithuania, five of seven parliamentary speakers serve three legislative terms; in Latvia, a half (four of eight) of parliamentary speakers reach the experience level of three legislative terms.

Alternatively, one could also lower the level of parliamentary hierarchy by including the vice-presidents or vice-speakers of legislatures. By doing this, we come to the result showing that 77.8 per cent of the vice-presidents of the Estonian Riigikogu, 57.6 per cent of the vice-speakers of the Lithuanian parliaments and 36.8 per cent of the vice-speakers of the Latvian Saeima serve at least three terms. Thus, whether we analyse data on speakers or vice-speakers, we have evidence for the largest overlap between the highest positions in the parliamentary hierarchy and legislative tenure in the case of Estonia and the smallest overlap in the case of Latvia. This means that Estonia provides the best chances for the emergence of the parliamentary elite in a narrow sense and that these chances are worst in Latvia. The latter comes to some extent as a great surprise since it was Latvia (not Estonia or Lithuania) which had the Club 21 as the unique elite forum in 1990s (see Steen 1997a) and, therefore, the best opportunities for the elite formation.

Table 9.3. Heads of Baltic Parliaments from 1990 onwards

Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
1. Arnold Rüütel, 1990-1992	1. Anatolijs Gorbunovs, 1990-1993 & 1993-1995	1. Vytautas Landsbergis, 1990-1992 & 1996-2000
2. Ülo Nugis, 1992-1995	2. Ilga Kreituse, 1995-1996	2. Česlovas Juršėnas, 1992-1996 & 2004
3. Toomas Savi, 1995-1999 & 1999-2003	3. Alfrēds Čepānis, 1996-1998	3. Artūras Paulauskas, 2004-2006
4. Ene Ergma, 2003-2006, 2007-2011 & 2011-present	4. Jānis Straume, 1998-2002	4. Viktoras Muntianas, 2006-2008
5. Toomas Varek, 2006-2007	5. Ingrīda Ūdre, 2002-2006	5. Arūnas Valinskas, 2008-2009
	6. Indulis Emsis, 2006-2007	6. Irena Degutienė, 2009-2012
	7. Gundars Daudze, 2007-2010	7. Vydas Gedvilas, 2012 – present
	8. Solvita Āboltiņa, 2010-2011 & 2011- present	

Source: Riigikogu, Saeima and Seimas.

Since the main output of the parliamentary activity are the laws passed and since debates and discussions remain an important part of parliamentary life (see Polsby 1992), the third (legislative productivity) and fourth (number of speeches) criteria are worth considering as well.

The most productive lawmakers are in the absolute majority of cases the heads of parliamentary committees, but some speakers or vice-speakers of parliament usually belong to the group of the most productive lawmakers as well[185]. Secondly, this type of data raises a valid question whether a nominal productivity (names with the registered law drafts) coincides with a real productivity (MPs who invested most of hours into a particular law or laws).

The highest number of speeches in most of the cases belongs to the long-standing legislators serving four or five parliamentary terms. Only a few speakers or vice-speakers are among them.

[185] Here our analysis of legislative productivity and number of speeches relies on the statistical data from the Lithuanian Seimas in the period from 1992 to 2012.

Conclusion

The dissertation, as the first comparative longitudinal study of the post-Communist parliamentary elites from all three Baltic countries, is an important contribution to the understanding of the transformation of the Baltic elites. It employs the original longitudinal data (that, differently from studies on elites with one point of observation, provides seven points of observation for each of the Baltic countries) and applies the analytical concepts of individual and structural elite circulations. Differently from many one-country studies in the area, this dissertation on three countries contributes to reasearch into the Baltic elites by attempting to make it more comparative and systematic. Finally, its findings provide insights and give impulses for the inquiry into the Eastern European parliamentary elites and research on the post-Commmunist transformations.

As the main body of literature observed above (Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell 1952; Putnam 1976; Keller 1991) indicated, a real transformation of elites happens not only when new elite members come to power but when their characteristics are of different social quality in comparison with previous elites. In other words, only structural elite circulation is a sufficient condition for transformaton of elites.

This dissertation on the Baltic parliamentary elites from twenty-one legislatures provides evidence not only for individual but also for structural elite circulation. Individual elite circulation in the Baltics (chapter 8), largely explained by the supply-side volatility and path-dependence (length of the Soviet regime), shows cross-country variation in extent and frequency but not in the manner of elite change. Structural elite circulation in many aspects means, notwithstanding some findings for continuity and changes without transformation, the transformation of social and political profiles of parliamentary representatives in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (see chapters 5 to 7).

The declining representation of teachers and professors, those educated in technical and natural sciences, those with doctorates and the Soviet political experience was interpreted as a transformation of social and political profiles of the Baltic parliamentary representatives. The increasing representation of women, ethnic minorities, those educated in humanities and social sciences, managers and businessmen, long-standing legislators and those with democratic pre-parliamentary experience was understood as a transformation of social and political profiles of

parliamentary representatives as well. However, our longitudinal data allowed to observe not only steadily increasing or gradually declining certain social categories but also to distinguish between different political generations of the Baltic parliamentary elites which is to a large extent explained by the literature on elite change and post-Communist transformations (see chapter 2).

As transformative patterns, the two generations of Baltic parliamentary elites are observed not only in the dimension of pre-parliamentary democratic political experience (especially in the local elective and the leading political party backgrounds) but also in occupation (decline of percentages of teachers and professors and rise of managers and businessmen), gender (growing percentages of women legislators) and legislative experience (decline of parliamentary newcomers and rise of long-standing legislators). On the political party level, this division into two generations of elites more or less coincides with the rise of brand-new and electorally successful political parties[186], allowing for an analytical division into 'traditional' political parties and new political organisations with anti-elitist rhetoric and indicating a socio-economic division of their electorates into two Lithuanias, two Latvias and two Estonias[187].

Transformative changes without a possibility to clearly distinguish between the first and the second generation of elites are observed in education (decline of degrees in technical and natural sciences and increase of degrees in humanities and social sciences), ethnic representation (increase of ethnic minority MPs[188]) and Soviet experience (declining percentages of Soviet dissidents and those with the Soviet Communist party or nomenklatura background).

Majority of our variables for the structural elite circulation points to the clearly observable cross-country differences indicating trends that occupational, pre-parliamentary political and other backgrounds among Baltic legislators tend to coincide with the lines of political party families, namely the largest political families in many occupational groups and the groups with pre-parliamentary political

[186] Here we mean not only *Res Publica* in Estonia, *New Era* in Latvia and *New Union (Social Liberals)* in Lithuania, but also the *New Party* in Latvia, *Labour Party* and the Party *Order and Justice* in Lithuania.

[187] The culmination of the conflict between the old and new (transitional and post-transitional) elites in the Baltics was a successful impeachment process against Rolandas Paksas, the President of Lithuania and the leader of the Party *Order and Justice* in 2004.

[188] In Estonia and Latvia. The ethnic minority representation in the Lithuanian parliaments fluctuates without clear transformative patterns.

experience: Left Liberals in Estonia, Conservatives in Latvia and Socialists/Social Democrats in Lithuania. This tallies well with the prominence of Liberals and Conservatives in the politics of Estonia and Latvia after 1990 and an exceptional success of the former Lithuanian Communist Party that managed to transform itself into a new political organisation in the post-Communist Lithuania. Still, one should observe that differently from Lithuania, where a part of parliamentary elites become executive elites in the alternating order between the left wing and the right wing political blocs, due to the remaining patterns of ethnic democracy (whether in Smooha's sense or in the understanding of Linz and Stepan) the alternation of ministerial cabinets in Estonia and Latvia happens within the right wing camp only since the ostracised parties of the leftist opposition in both countries largely overlap with the groups of ethnic minorities. Our analysis on the structural circulation of parliamentary elites does report the steadily increasing representation of ethnic minorities, however, it does not make a full impact yet on the government formation in the Huntingtonian sense of democracy which is understood as an alternation between position and opposition (see Huntington 1993).

What we learn about the Baltic parliamentary elites is that, in comparison with the first legislatures, their second generation less resembles traditional elites and is more similar to general population (for instance, it includes many more women and fewer of those with doctoral degrees). On the one hand, this allows to be interpreted as a positive outcome of democratisation reducing the distance between elites and non-elites; democracy does not need legislators as heroes but as politically active and initiative persons acting on behalf of their citizens. On the other hand, de-heroisation of legislators or replacement of extraordinary politicians with ordinary politicians might also mean, as some social scientists observe, that "the elite is less concerned about becoming part of the history and more pre-occupied about the interior of his own private house"[189]. The danger of this trend is not that history ceases to be the graveyard of elites (here we paraphrase one of the most known statements by Pareto (1966: 249) that "history is a graveyard of aristocracies"), but that the lower quality of elites might become a rule rather than an exception. This is a legitimate concern, since the parliamentary elites (along with party and ministerial elites) of sufficiently high

[189] Interview with the Lithuanian philosopher Bronislovas Genzelis (see Rašimaitė 2010). A couple of years ago in one of his interviews Arvydas Šliogeris, the most prominent Lithuanian philosopher, claimed that the members of the current political elite are too similar to ordinary people.

quality are one of the five conditions for the success of democracy or “the democratic method” (Schumpeter 1979: 290). The institutional explanation for these trends and differences between transitional and post-transitional Baltic elites could be following:

> “Once institutions become established, they may attract those who prefer safety and security to challenge and change. Social rigidity and conservatism thus may result despite the circulation of elite individuals. It is not that co-opted elites tend in time to choose mediocre men – as Pareto supposed – but that the men who present themselves as candidates may be more mediocre at a later period.” (Keller 1991: 249)[190]

Paradoxically, but the period of ‘more mediocre’ post-transitional elites coincides with the phase of the most professional Baltic legislators ever. In spite of the still high supply-side volatility, our data on the Baltic parliamentary elites allow to observe the upward trends of political professionalisation among legislators in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Each of the Baltic parliaments has already slowed down their legislative turnover to the level of established western democracies at least once and the level of the most experienced legislators in the last parliaments was higher than a quarter in Estonia and Latvia and over forty percent in Lithuania (see chapter 9). These findings can be also interpreted as an indicator of parliamentary institutionalisation in the sense of Polsby (1968) and a favourable condition for parliamentary socialisation of representative elites.

Considering the predictors for the careers of the long-standing Baltic legislators, it is obvious that ethnic minority background and political persecution or exile of parents in the Soviet time slightly increase the chances for serving in parliament three or more legislative periods (see tables 9.2.2 to 9.2.4). Membership in the Citizens’ Committees increases the odds of staying in the Estonian or Latvian parliament at least 1.5 times. The law degree and female gender increase but the Soviet nomenklatura background decreases the chances for legislative careers among Latvian and Lithuanian parliamentarians. Of pre-parliamentary occupations, the position of a teacher or professor among Estonian MPs, the post of a civil servant among Latvian legislators and employment in the political party among Lithuanian legislators increase the chances for legislative careers. However, the strongest predictor for the

[190] This observation by Suzanne Keller allows to have not only individual elite circulation without structural circulation but also the change of their attitudes without the replacement of elite individuals which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

careers of long-standing parliamentarians in all three Baltic countries remains the variable of political party change.

Quality of parliamentary elites, inspite of the ambitious aims of the elite theorists to produce a scientific and value-free (positivistic) approach, has a strong normative load. In other words, while pursuing an empirical research on elites (how the parliamentary elite looks like), we cannot avoid the question of how the parliamentary elite *should* look like or the question "What are the personal features, practical skills, and linkages to society that our parliamentarians *ought* to possess?" (Patzelt 1999: 266) Following Karl Jaspers (1982) who further developed Max Weber's distinction between the 'ethic of ultimate ends' and the 'ethic of responsibility' (Weber 1988: 551), parliamentary elites should be the practitioners of ethics of social responsibility or "consequentialists"- they should be capable to judge "the morality of actions according to their consequences" (Tucker 1999: 185).

Our normative answer in the context of the analysis in structural elite circulation would be following: the parliamentary elite should include more lawyers and fewer businessmen; it should have more experienced legislators and fewer parliamentary newcomers. Or, to apply the four-fold typology and terms by James D. Barber (1971) based on the two criteria – (1) legislative activity and (2) willingness to come back to parliament, legislatures should have more *Lawmakers* (characterised as "high in activity, high willingness to return") and fewer *Spectators* ("low in activity, high in willingness to return"), *Advertisers* ("high in activity, low willingness to return") and *Reluctants* ("low in activity, low in willingness to return"). Our data on the increasing share of the long-standing legislators in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania allows to expect that the group of lawmakers in the Barber's sense grows and becomes larger in the Baltic parliaments.

Further Research

This dissertation has by no means exhausted all possible aspects and methods of inquiry into transformation of the Baltic parliamentary elites. With a further aim to move from descriptive analysis to investigation of substantive representation, this dissertation on recruitment and careers of parliamentary elites could be complemented by questionnaires and interviews with elite members. This would allow for a more in-depth understanding of legislative roles (see Best and Vogel 2012) and legislative

representation (whether MPs act as delegates, bound by strict mandates, or as trustees that are free from specific instructions).[191] Secondly, the research on the transformation of the Baltic parliamentary elites could be advanced by investigation of their beliefs, values and attitudes – this would reveal whether parliamentary elites are more democratic than ordinary citizens and to what extent transitional elites are different from post-transitional ones (see Peffley and Rohrschneider 2007). Thirdly, it would profit from the advancements in political psychology by including the analysis of personality traits as determinants of parliamentary recruitment (see Best 2011).

[191] Of all three Baltic countries, Lithuania would be especially suitable for this type of investigation, since roughly a half of its parliamentary representatives is elected in the PR segment (acting as potential trustees or representatives of the entire country?) and roughly another half in the single member districts (potential delegates or representatives of their constituency only?).

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List of Variables[192]

Idnr	Identification number
Name	Family name, first name
Birthpla	Place of birth
Party	Political party affiliation
Yearelec	Year of election
Nrelect	Number of democratic election (the 1st democratic election = 1)
Partfam	Parliamentary party family[193] at time of election:
	Communists
	Socialists/Social Democrats
	Greens
	Agrarians
	Liberals
	Left Liberals
	Right Liberals
	Christian Democrats
	Conservatives
	Extreme Right
	Ethnic Minority
	(Anti-communist) Umbrella Movement
	Other

[192] Adapted and modified from the EurElite project on the Eastern European parliamentary elites lead by Prof. Heinrich Best and Dr. Michael Edinger.
[193] Except for the last two categories, the party family classification here relies on the work by Gallagher, Laver & Mair (2006).

Education

Univ Educat	University or comparable education
Law	Law degree
HuSocEcon	Humanities, social sciences, economics, theology
TechNatMed	Technical and natural sciences, medicine, architecture
PhD	Doctorate

Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience

Local Elect	Local/regional political background: local/regional politics, local elective position (municipality) before and/or at first democratic election; incl. also appointed mayors
Lead Party	Leading party position: legislators with leading position in party organisation, national or local, incl. party youth and women's organisations before and/or at first democratic election
Govern Post	Governmental positions: cabinet and comparable positions before and/or at first democratic election
Citizens Com	Member of Citizens' Committee (for Estonia and Latvia only)
None Above	None of the political functions mentioned above
One Above	One of the political functions mentioned above
Two Above	Two of the political functions mentioned above
Three or More	Three or more of the political functions mentioned above

Occupations of Legislators Immediately Before the First Term

Teacher Prof	Teachers and professors, all sorts
Journ Writer	Journalists and other writers, incl. publishers and editors
Party Empl	Full-time, paid political party employees as well as other political organisation employees, all types - including trade unions

Civil Servants	Higher and lower administrative level civil servants, excluded are military, judges, professors and clergymen (cabinet ministers are included)
Military	Military persons, all levels
Priests	Priests, clergy
Lawyers	Lawyers
Judge Prosec	Judges, prosecutors included if independent judicial organ
Agri Fisher	Primary sector, agriculture, fishermen
Blue Collar	Blue collar-workers, industrial sector
Manage Busi	Managers (managers of state-owned industries included) and those from business
Liberal Jobs	Liberal professions other than the law (e.g. medical doctors, architects, engineers – even if they are employed in the public sector)
Public Sector	Public sector employees, all levels paid by public institutions, state owned companies included

Age and Seniority

Mandates	Mean number of legislatures an MP was elected to
Newcomers	Members entering as newcomers, only newly elected without previous legislative careers in the national democratically elected parliament
Incumbents	A legislator who was elected to a previous parliament
Age	Age at time of election
Age Newcom	Age of a parliamentary newcomer at time of election
Exp Founder	Experienced Founders ("Survivors"): MPs who were members of the founding session of the democratic parliament and who "survived" during the next terms (without any interruption)
Core Group	Long-standing MPs serving in three or more consecutive legislatures (without any interruption)
Core Group 2	Long-standing MPs serving in three or more legislatures (with and without interruption)

Variables for the Soviet Experience

Local Soviet	Local/regional political background: local / regional politics, local elective position (municipality) during the *Soviet regime*; incl. also appointed mayors
Com Leader	Leading position in the Communist Party or satellite organisation: legislators with leading position in "state party" or satellite party organisation, national or local, incl. Communist mass organizations such as youth and women's organisations. Members of the secretariats at the regional level and the 1st and 2nd secretaries at the local level are also included
Sov Minister	Governmental positions: members of councils of ministers, deputy ministers and comparable positions of various types during the Soviet period
Supr Soviet	Any parliamentary experience at national or federal level during the non-democratic period
Nomenklatura	Any national nomenklatura position in the Soviet regime
Com Party M	(Simple) membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Dissidents	Activity in oppositional/dissident movement and/or political persecution during the Soviet period
Repr Parents	Exile, political persecution or murder of legislator's parents

Other Variables

Female MPs	Female legislators
Ethn Minority	MPs not belonging to the titular nation
Club 21	Members of the *Club 21* (for Latvia only)

Annex Table 1. Estonian Parliamentary Parties/Electoral Coalitions[a] by the Party Families and Years of Successful Election, 1990-2011

Coded as	**Estonian Name (English Translation)**	**Elections**
Communists	Communist Faction	1990
Socialists/Social Democrats	Social Democratic Faction	1990
Socialists/Social Democrats	Mõõdukad (Moderates)	1992, 1995, 1999, 2003
Socialists/Social Democrats	Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond (Social Democratic Party)	2007, 2011
Greens	Green Faction	1990
Greens	Eesti Rohelised, Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised (Estonian Greens)	1992, 2007
Agrarians	Rural Deputies and Rural Centre Party	1990
Agrarians	Eesti Maarahva Erakond (Estonian Rural People's Party)	1999
Agrarians	Eestimaa Rahvaliit (People's Union of Estonia)	2003, 2007
Left Liberals	Kindel Kodu (Secure Home)	1992
Left Liberals	Eesti Keskerakond (Estonian Centre Party)	1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011
Left Liberals	Koonderakond ja Maarahva Ühendus (Coalition Party and Rural Union)	1995
Right Liberals	Koonderakond (Coalition Party)	1999
Right Liberals	Eesti Ettevõtjate Erakond (Estonian Entrepreneurs' Party)	1992
Right Liberals	Eesti Reformierakond (Estonian Reform Party)	1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011
Conservatives	Isamaa (Pro Patria)	1992
Conservatives	Rahvuslik Koonderakond 'Isamaa' ja Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei (Coalition of 'Pro Patria' and ERSP)	1995
Conservatives	Parempoolsed (Right-Wingers)	1995
Conservatives	Isamaaliit (Pro Patria Union)	1999, 2003
Conservatives	Ühendus Vabariigi Eest-Res Publica (Union for the Republic-Res Publica)	2003
Conservatives	Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit (Union of Pro Patria & Res Publica)	2007, 2011
Extreme Right	Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei (Estonian National Independence Party)	1992
Extreme Right	Eesti Kodanik (Estonian Citizen)	1992
Ethnic Minority	Virumaa	1990
Ethnic Minority	Meie Kodu on Eestimaa (Our Home is Estonia)	1995
Ethnic Minority	Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei (Estonian United People's Party)	1999

Ethnic Minority	Cooperation	1990
Other	Equal Rights	1990
Other	Sõltumatud Kuningriiklased (Independent Royalists)	1992
Liberals	Liberal Democratic Faction	1990
Christian Democrats	Christian Democratic Faction	1990
Umbrella Movement	People's Centre Group	1990
Umbrella Movement	Rahvarinne (Popular Front of Estonia)	1992

[a] Due to multiple political affiliations of electoral candidates for the 1990 Supreme Council, it was impossible to determine their ideological orientation; therefore, we chose the parliamentary factions that were built shortly after election.

Annex Table 2. Latvian Parliamentary Parties/Electoral Coalitions by the Party Families and Years of Successful Election, 1990-2010

Coded as	**Latvian Name (English Translation)**	**Elections**
Communists	Līdztiesība (Equal Rights)	1990, 1993
Communists	Latvijas sociālistiskā partija (Latvian Socialist Party)	1995
Socialists/Social Democrats	Saskaņa Latvijai – atdzimšana tautsaimniecībai (Harmony for Latvia – Revival for Economy)	1993
Socialists/Social Democrats	Tautas saskaņas partija (National Harmony Party)	1995, 1998
Socialists/Social Democrats	"Saskaņas centrs" ("Harmony Centre")	2006, 2010
Socialists/Social Democrats	Latvijas sociāldemokrātu apvienība (Alliance of Latvian Social Democrats)	1998
Socialists/Social Democrats	Politisko organizāciju apvienība "Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā (Union of Political Organisations "For Human Rights in the United Latvia")	2002, 2006
Agrarians	Latvijas zemnieku savienība (Latvian Farmers' Union)	1993
Agrarians	Latvijas zemnieku savienības, Kristīgo demokrātu savienības un Latgales demokrātiskās partijas apvienotais saraksts (A United List of Latvian Farmers' Union, Union of Christian Democrats and Democratic Party of Latgale)	1995
Agrarians	Latvijas vienības partija (Latvian Unity Party)	1995
Agrarians	Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība (Union of Greens and Farmers)	2002, 2006, 2010
Left Liberals	Demokrātiskā centra partija (Democratic Centre Party)	1993
Left Liberals	Demokrātiskā partija "Saimnieks" (Democratic Party "Master")	1995
Conservatives	Latvijas nacionālās neatkarības kustība (Latvian National Independence Movement)	1993

Conservatives	Latvijas nacionālās neatkarības kustība un Latvijas zaļā partija (Latvian National Independence Movement & Green Party)	1995
Conservatives	Apvienība "Tēvzemei un brīvībai"/LNNK (Union "For Fatherland and Freedom"/LNNK)	1998, 2002, 2006
Conservatives	Tautas partija (People's Party)	1998, 2002, 2006
Conservatives	Jaunais laiks (New Era)	2002, 2006
Conservatives	Vienotība (Unity)	2010
Conservatives	Par Labu Latviju (For a Good Latvia)	2010
Extreme Right	Nacionālā apvienība "Visu Latvijai!" - "Tēvzemei un brīvībai"/LNNK (National Alliance "Everything for Latvia!" – "For Fatherland and Freedom"/LNNK)	2010
Extreme Right	Apvienība "Tēvzemei un brīvībai" (Union "For Fatherland and Freedom")	1993, 1995
Extreme Right	Tautas kustība Latvijai – Zīgerista partija (Popular Movement for Latvia – Siegerist's Party)	1995
Liberals	Savienība "Latvijas ceļš" (Union "Latvia's Way")	1993, 1995, 1998
Christian Democrats	Kristīgo demokrātu savienība (Union of Christian Democrats)	1993
Christian Democrats	Jaunā partija (New Party)	1998
Christian Democrats	Latvijas pirmā partija (Latvia's First Party)	2002
Christian Democrats	Latvijas pirmā partija/ Savienība "Latvijas ceļš" (Coalition of Latvia's First Party and Union "Latvia's Way")	2006
Umbrella Movement	Latvijas tautas fronte (Latvian Popular Front)	1990

Annex Table 3. Lithuanian Parliamentary Parties/Electoral Coalitions by the Party Families and Years of Successful Election, 1990-2012

Coded as	**Lithuanian Name (English Translation)**	**Elections**
Communists	Lietuvos komunistų partija (Lithuanian Communist Party)	1990
Socialists/Social Democrats	Lietuvos demokratinė darbo partija (Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party)	1992, 1996, 2000
Socialists/Social Democrats	Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party)	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012
Agrarians	Lietuvos valstiečių partija (Lithuanian Peasants' Party)	1996, 2000
Agrarians	Valstiečių ir naujosios demokratijos partijų sąjunga (Union of Peasants' Party and New Democracy Party)	2004
Agrarians	Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga (Union of Peasants and Greens)	2008, 2012
Left Liberals	Naujoji sąjunga – socialliberalai	2000, 2004,

	(New Union – Social Liberals)	2008
Liberals	Lietuvos centro judėjimas (Lithuanian Centre Movement)	1992
Liberals	Lietuvos centro sąjunga (Lithuanian Centre Union)	1996, 2000
Liberals	Lietuvos liberalų sąjunga (Lithuanian Liberal Union)	1996, 2000
Liberals	Liberalų ir centro sąjunga (Liberal and Centre Union)	2004, 2008
Liberals	Lietuvos liberalų sąjūdis (Movement of Lithuanian Liberals)	2008, 2012
Christian Democrats	Lietuvos krikščionių demokratų partija (Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party)	1992, 1996, 2000
Christian Democrats	Lietuvos krikščionių demokratų sąjunga (Christian Democratic Union)	1992, 1996, 2000
Christian Democrats	Moderniųjų krikščionių demokratų sąjunga (Union of Modern Christian Democrats)	2000
Conservatives	Tėvynės sąjunga - Lietuvos konservatoriai (Fatherland Union – Lithuanian Conservatives)	1996, 2000, 2004
Conservatives	Tėvynes sąjunga – Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai (Fatherland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats)	2008, 2012
Conservatives	Nuosaikiųjų konservatorių sąjunga (Union of Moderate Conservatives)	2000
Extreme Right	Nepriklausomybės partija (Independence Party)	1992
Extreme Right	Lietuvių nacionalinė partija "Jaunoji Letuva" (Lithuanian National Party "Young Lithuania")	1996, 2000
Extreme Right	Lietuvos tautininkų sąjunga (Lithuanian Nationalist Union)	1992, 1996
Extreme Right	Lietuvos laisvės sąjunga (Lithuanian Liberty Union)	2000
Ethnic Minority	Lietuvos lenkų sąjunga (Union of Lithuanian Poles)	1992
Ethnic Minority	Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija (Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles)	1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012
Ethnic Minority	Lietuvos rusų sąjunga (Union of Lithuanian Russians)	2000
Other	Lietuvos moterų partija (Lithuanian Women‘s Party)	1996
Other	Lietuvos demokratų partija (Lithuanian Democratic Party)	1996
Other	Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių sąjunga (Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees)	1992, 1996
Other	Naujosios demokratijos partija (Party of New Democracy)	2000
Other	Darbo partija (Labour Party)	2004, 2008, 2012
Other	Liberalų demokratų partija (Liberal Democratic Party)	2004
Other	Partija „Tvarka ir teisingumas" (Party „Order & Justice")	2008, 2012
Other	Tautos prisikėlimo partija (Party of National Revival)	2008
Other	Politinė partija „Drąsos kelias" (Political Party „Way of Bravery")	2012
Umbrella Movement	Lietuvos sąjūdis (Lithuanian Movement)	1990, 1992

Annex Table 5.2.1.1. Teachers and Professors in Estonian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	15	100	17	100	19	100	22	100	14	100	13	100	8	100
Law	2	13.3	2	11.8	3	15.8	1	4.5	1	7.1	2	15.4	2	25
HuSocEcon	8	53.3	11	64.7	9	47.4	12	54.5	9	64.3	5	38.5	3	37.5
TechNatMed	8	53.3	6	35.3	10	52.6	11	50	5	35.7	6	46.2	3	37.5
PhD	9	60.0	14	82.4	13	68.4	16	72.7	6	42.9	8	61.5	5	62.5
Local Elect	4	26.7	2	11.8	7	36.8	13	59.1	10	71.4	9	69.2	5	62.5
Lead Party	7	46.7	9	52.9	6	31.6	6	27.3	3	21.4	3	23.1	2	25
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	9.1	2	14.3	2	15.4	2	25
Citizens Com	10	66.7	6	35.3	5	26.3	6	27.3	3	21.4	3	23.1	2	25
None Above	2	13.3	7	41.2	7	36.8	6	27.3	3	21.4	3	23.1	2	25
One Above	7	46.7	5	29.4	6	31.6	8	36.4	5	35.7	4	30.8	2	25
Two Above	4	26.7	3	17.6	5	26.3	4	18.2	4	28.6	5	38.5	3	37.5
Three/More	2	13.3	2	11.8	1	5.3	4	18.2	2	14.3	1	7.7	1	12.5
Female MPs	3	20.0	3	17.6	3	15.8	5	22.7	3	21.4	1	7.7	1	12.5
Public Sector	15	100	17	100	18	94.7	22	100	14	100	11	91.7	7	87.5
Age	45.5		50.0		50.4		51.9		50.0		53.2		55.1	
Age Newcom	45.5		50.3		45.3		50.4		51.7		55.0		na	
Mandates	1		1.4		1.8		2.0		1.9		2.2		3.1	
Newcomers	15	100	11	64.7	7	36.8	11	50.0	6	42.9	4	30.8	0	0
Incumbents	0	0	6	35.3	11	57.9	9	40.9	6	42.9	8	61.5	8	100
Exp Founder	na	na	6	35.3	4	21.1	4	18.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	4	21.1	6	27.3	2	14.3	4	30.8	5	62.5
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	4	21.1	8	36.4	4	28.6	5	38.5	6	75
Ethn Minority	2	13.3	0	0	4	21.1	4	18.2	2	14.3	2	15.4	2	25
Local Soviet	3	20	2	11.8	3	15.8	3	13.6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Com Leader	1	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	1	6.7	1	5.9	2	10.5	0	0	0	0	1	7.7	1	12.5
Nomenklatura	7	46.7	6	35.3	7	36.8	7	31.8	3	21.4	1	7.7	1	12.5
Com Party M	11	73.3	9	52.9	11	57.9	7	31.8	4	28.6	2	15.4	1	12.5
Dissidents	0	0	1	5.9	1	5.3	1	4.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	1	6.7	2	11.8	3	15.8	0	0	1	7.1	1	7.7	1	12.5

Annex Table 5.2.1.2. Teachers and Professors in Latvian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	47	94	23	100	18	94.7	12	100	16	100	12	100	17	100
Law	8	17	3	13	4	22.2	1	8.3	1	6.3	2	16.7	4	23.5
HuSocEcon	18	38.3	11	47.8	9	50	10	83.3	9	56.3	5	41.7	9	52.9
TechNatMed	25	53.2	11	47.8	5	27.8	2	16.7	9	56.3	8	66.7	8	47.1
PhD	23	48.9	10	43.5	9	50	2	16.7	5	31.3	4	33.3	8	47.1
Local Elect	9	18	4	17.4	3	15.8	6	50	6	37.5	7	58.3	6	35.3
Lead Party	5	10	3	13	2	10.5	1	8.3	2	12.5	2	16.7	7	41.2
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	1	5.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Citizens Com	2	4	0	0	1	5.3	1	8.3	1	6.3	0	0	1	5.9
None Above	21	42	16	69.6	14	73.7	6	50	9	56.3	4	33.3	6	35.3
One Above	16	32	7	30.4	3	15.8	4	33.3	5	31.3	7	58.3	8	47.1
Two Above	0	0	0	0	2	10.5	2	16.7	2	12.5	1	8.3	3	17.6
Three/More	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Club 21	5	10	4	17.4	4	21.1	3	25	0	0	1	8.3	0	0
Female MPs	5	10	3	13	2	10.5	2	16.7	4	25	3	25	5	29.4
Public Sector	49	98	20	87	19	100	9	75	14	87.5	8	66.7	16	94.1
Age	47		50.7		50.3		46.1		47.4		49.1		54.5	
Age Newcom	47		53		51.3		45.5		46.2		49		57.3	
Mandates	1		1.5		1.8		1.8		1.4		2		1.9	
Newcomers	50	100	12	52.2	9	47.4	8	66.7	11	68.8	2	16.7	9	52.9
Incumbents	na	na	11	47.8	9	47.4	4	33.3	5	31.3	8	66.7	7	41.2
Exp Founder	na	na	11	47.8	6	31.6	3	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	6	31.6	3	25	1	6.3	2	16.7	6	35.3
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	6	31.6	3	25	1	6.3	2	16.7	6	35.3
Ethn Minority	11	22	1	4.3	1	5.3	2	16.7	6	37.5	7	58.3	5	29.4
Local Soviet	4	8	3	13	2	10.5	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	1	5.9
Com Leader	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	3	6	1	4.3	5	26.3	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	9	18	3	13	4	21.1	2	16.7	1	6.3	1	8.3	0	0
Com Party M	33	66	11	47.8	9	47.4	3	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dissidents	0	0	1	4.3	2	10.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	4	8	5	21.7	4	21.1	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.1.3. Teachers and Professors in Lithuanian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	46	100	50	100	35	100	23	100	19	100	20	100	24	100
Law	4	8.7	3	6	1	2.9	1	4.3	2	10.5	3	15	5	20.8
HuSocEcon	18	39.1	20	40	19	54.3	17	73.9	15	78.9	16	80	17	70.8
TechNatMed	26	56.5	29	58	15	42.9	8	34.8	6	31.6	4	20	10	41.7
PhD	30	65.2	35	70	25	71.4	16	69.6	9	47.4	12	60	14	58.3
Local Elect	0	0	0	0	3	8.6	6	26.1	7	36.8	5	25	5	20.8
Lead Party	4	8.7	11	22	8	22.9	11	47.8	6	31.6	7	35	7	29.2
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
None Above	42	91.3	39	78	24	68.6	8	34.8	9	47.4	10	50	14	58.3
One Above	4	8.7	11	22	11	31.4	13	56.5	7	36.8	8	40	8	33.3
Two Above	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	8.7	3	15.8	2	10	2	8.3
Female MPs	2	4.3	5	10	6	17.1	3	13	5	26.3	5	25	9	37.5
Public Sector	46	100	50	100	35	100	23	100	19	100	20	100	24	100
Age	46.4		53.5		52.3		50.5		47.7		47.9		55.9	
Age Newcom	46.4		54.7		52.3		46.9		48.6		42.3		59.5	
Mandates	1		1.3		1.9		2		2.2		2.7		3	
Newcomers	46	100	34	68	13	37.1	11	47.8	7	36.8	7	35	4	16.7
Incumbents	na	na	16	32	18	51.4	10	43.5	10	52.6	12	60	14	58.3
Exp Founder	na	na	16	32	10	28.6	4	17.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	10	28.6	7	30.4	5	26.3	10	50	10	41.7
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	10	28.6	8	34.8	6	31.6	11	55	12	50
Ethn Minority	4	8.7	4	8	4	11.4	1	4.3	2	10.5	1	5	2	8.3
Local Soviet	3	6.5	4	8	1	2.9	2	8.7	2	10.5	1	5	2	8.3
Com Leader	4	8.7	4	8	2	5.7	1	4.3	1	5.3	1	5	2	8.3
Sov Minister	1	2.2	1	2	1	2.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	2	4.3	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	8	17.4	12	24	6	17.1	4	17.4	3	15.8	2	10	4	16.7
Com Party M	12	26.1	22	44	10	18.6	6	26.1	4	21.1	3	15	5	20.8
Dissidents	4	8.7	3	6	3	8.6	1	4.3	0	0	0	0	1	4.2
Repr Parents	4	8.7	3	6	4	11.4	0	0	0	0	1	5	1	4.2

Annex Table 5.2.2.1. Journalists and Writers in Estonian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	5	62.5	12	80	6	75	7	100	6	100	6	100	5	100
Law	0	0	2	16.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HuSocEcon	5	100	9	75	6	100	5	71.4	5	83.3	5	83.3	4	80
TechNatMed	1	20	2	16.7	0	0	2	28.6	1	16.7	1	16.7	1	20
PhD	1	20	3	25	1	16.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local Elect	1	12.5	3	20	2	25	4	57.1	5	83.3	5	83.3	3	60
Lead Party	3	37.5	6	40	4	50	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Citizens Com	3	37.5	6	40	4	50	2	28.6	1	16.7	1	16.7	1	20
None Above	2	25	4	26.7	1	12.5	2	28.6	1	16.7	1	16.7	2	40
One Above	3	37.5	7	46.7	4	50	3	42.9	4	66.7	4	66.7	2	40
Two Above	2	25	4	26.7	3	37.5	2	28.6	1	16.7	1	16.7	1	20
Female MPs	1	12.5	0	0	1	12.5	1	14.3	1	16.7	1	16.7	1	20
Public Sector	7	87.5	6	40	3	37.5	4	57.1	4	66.7	4	66.7	3	60
Age	44		51		50.9		53.1		54		58		57.6	
Age Newcom	44		50.9		50.7		51.4		51.5		58		50	
Mandates	1		1.1		1.8		1.6		1.3		2.3		2.8	
Newcomers	8	100	13	86.7	3	37.5	5	71.4	4	66.7	0	0	1	20
Incumbents	na	na	2	13.3	5	62.5	2	28.6	2	33.3	4	66.7	4	80
Exp Founder	na	na	2	13.3	1	12.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	1	12.5	2	28.6	0	0	2	33.3	4	80
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	1	12.5	2	28.6	0	0	2	33.3	4	80
Ethn Minority	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	14.3	2	33.3	2	33.3	1	20
Local Soviet	0	0	0	0	1	12.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Com Leader	0	0	0	0	1	12.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	1	12.5	1	6.7	1	12.5	1	14.3	1	16.7	1	16.7	1	20
Com Party M	4	50	6	40	4	50	2	28.6	2	33.3	2	33.3	2	40
Dissidents	1	12.5	4	26.7	1	12.5	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	1	12.5	3	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.2.2. Journalists and Writers in Latvian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	14	93.3	7	100	7	100	7	100	5	83.3	5	83.3	5	83.3
Law	0	0	0	0	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HuSocEcon	13	92.9	5	71.4	5	71.4	6	85.7	5	100	5	100	4	80
TechNatMed	1	7.1	3	42.9	2	28.6	2	28.6	2	40	1	20	1	20
PhD	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local Elect	1	6.7	0	0	0	0	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lead Party	3	20	0	0	1	14.3	0	0	1	16.7	2	33.3	3	50
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Citizens Com	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
None Above	10	66.7	7	100	6	85.7	6	85.7	5	83.3	4	66.7	3	50
One Above	4	26.7	0	0	1	14.3	1	14.3	1	16.7	2	33.3	3	50
Two Above	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Three/More	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Club 21	2	13.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	16.7
Female MPs	2	13.3	3	42.9	1	14.3	2	28.6	2	33.3	2	33.3	1	16.7
Public Sector	13	86.7	5	71.4	5	71.4	5	71.4	2	33.3	2	33.3	2	33.3
Age	44.3		47.3		52.7		54.9		46.7		54.8		51.2	
Age Newcom	44.3		49.8		62		55.3		40.5		82		42.3	
Mandates	1		1.1		2		2.3		2		2.8		1.8	
Newcomers	15	100	6	85.7	1	14.3	3	42.9	4	66.7	1	16.7	3	50
Incumbents	na	na	1	14.3	4	57.1	4	57.1	2	33.3	5	83.3	3	50
Exp Founder	na	na	1	14.3	1	14.3	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	1	14.3	4	57.1	2	33.3	2	33.3	2	33.3
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	1	14.3	4	57.1	2	33.3	2	33.3	2	33.3
Ethn Minority	5	33.3	1	14.3	1	14.3	1	14.3	2	33.3	1	16.7	1	16.7
Local Soviet	1	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Com Leader	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	1	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	2	13.3	0	0	0	0	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Com Party M	10	66.7	3	42.9	3	42.9	3	42.9	1	16.7	1	16.7	0	0
Dissidents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	1	6.7	0	0	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.2.3. Journalists and Writers in Lithuanian Parliaments

	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	11	84.6	10	83.3	7	77.8	6	100	3	75	4	80	4	100
Law	1	9.1	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HuSocEcon	9	81.8	7	70	5	71.4	4	66.7	3	100	3	75	4	100
TechNatMed	1	9.1	3	30	2	28.6	2	33.3	0	0	1	25	0	0
PhD	0	0	1	10	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	25
Local Elect	0	0	1	8.3	2	22.2	1	16.7	0	0	2	40	1	25
Lead Party	1	7.7	2	16.7	2	22.2	2	33.3	0	0	2	40	1	25
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
None Above	12	92.3	9	75	4	44.4	3	50	4	100	2	40	3	75
One Above	1	7.7	3	25	5	55.6	3	50	0	0	3	60	0	0
Two Above	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	25
Female MPs	1	7.7	0	0	1	11.1	1	16.7	2	50	0	0	0	0
Public Sector	7	53.8	9	75	6	66.7	1	16.7	2	50	1	20	0	0
Age	45.9		51.2		54.6		48.2		53		49.2		55	
Age Newcom	45.9		51.5		58		44.7		48		44		60.5	
Mandates	1		1.3		1.8		2		2.3		2		1.5	
Newcomers	13	100	8	66.7	5	55.6	3	50	2	50	4	80	2	50
Incumbents	na	na	4	33.3	4	44.4	3	50	2	50	1	20	1	25
Exp Founder	na	na	4	33.3	3	33.3	1	16.7	1	25	1	20	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	3	33.3	2	33.3	1	25	1	20	0	0
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	3	33.3	2	33.3	1	25	1	20	0	0
Ethn Minority	1	7.7	1	8.3	1	11.1	1	16.7	0	0	1	20	1	25
Local Soviet	2	15.4	3	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Com Leader	3	23.1	3	25	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	4	30.8	6	50	3	33.3	1	16.7	1	25	1	20	2	50
Com Party M	7	53.8	10	83.3	4	44.4	2	33.3	1	25	1	20	2	50
Dissidents	1	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	1	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.3.1. Political Party Employees in Estonian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	14	82.4	7	77.8	8	88.9	12	75	11	91.7	17	89.5	15	88.2
Law	1	7.1	1	14.3	1	12.5	0	0	2	18.2	2	11.8	3	20
HuSocEcon	7	50	1	14.3	3	37.5	6	50	7	63.6	10	58.8	10	66.7
TechNatMed	6	42.9	5	71.4	5	62.5	6	50	2	18.2	5	29.4	3	20
PhD	1	7.1	1	14.3	1	12.5	0	0	0	0	1	5.9	0	0
Local Elect	6	35.3	2	22.2	3	33.3	10	62.5	8	66.7	14	73.7	14	82.4
Lead Party	4	23.5	7	77.8	5	55.6	7	43.8	4	33.3	8	42.1	9	52.9
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Citizens Com	0	0	5	55.6	3	33.3	4	25	1	8.3	1	5.3	0	0
None Above	6	35.3	2	22.2	2	22.2	1	6.3	2	16.7	3	15.8	1	5.9
One Above	6	35.3	1	11.1	2	22.2	8	50	7	58.3	9	47.4	9	52.9
Two Above	2	11.8	5	55.6	5	55.6	7	43.8	3	25	7	36.8	7	41.2
Three/More	0	0	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Female MPs	2	11.8	2	22.2	0	0	4	25	3	25	8	42.1	3	17.6
Public Sector	17	100	3	33.3	5	55.6	8	50	8	66.7	9	47.4	8	47.1
Age	47.7		42.8		49.1		43.9		40		36.4		37.7	
Age Newcom	47.7		42.8		48		40.3		32.2		34.9		34.4	
Mandates	1		1		1.6		1.4		1.8		1.6		2.1	
Newcomers	17	100	9	100	4	44.4	12	75	5	41.7	12	63.2	5	29.4
Incumbents	na	na	0	0	4	44.4	4	25	6	50	5	26.3	9	52.9
Exp Founder	na	na	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	0	0	2	12.5	1	8.3	4	21.1	2	11.8
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	0	0	2	12.5	2	16.7	4	21.1	3	17.6
Ethn Minority	6	35.3	0	0	0	0	1	6.3	0	0	1	5.3	0	0
Local Soviet	10	58.8	0	0	2	22.2	1	6.3	1	8.3	0	0	1	5.9
Com Leader	9	52.9	0	0	1	11.1	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	1	5.9
Sov Minister	1	5.9	0	0	1	11.1	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	1	5.9
Supr Soviet	4	23.5	1	11.1	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	15	88.2	0	0	4	44.4	3	18.8	2	16.7	0	0	1	5.9
Com Party M	15	88.2	1	11.1	5	55.6	5	31.3	2	16.7	0	0	1	5.9
Dissidents	0	0	2	22.2	1	11.1	1	6.3	1	8.3	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.3.2. Political Party Employees in Latvian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	27	96.4	14	93.3	7	63.6	10	90.9	9	81.8	9	100	10	90.9
Law	3	11.1	1	7.1	0	0	2	20	1	11.1	0	0	3	30
HuSocEcon	3	11.1	4	28.6	1	14.3	2	20	3	33.3	3	33.3	2	20
TechNatMed	16	59.3	7	50	4	57.1	6	60	5	55.6	5	55.6	7	70
PhD	2	7.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	11.1	2	20
Local Elect	6	21.4	6	40	4	36.4	4	36.4	4	36.4	3	33.3	3	27.3
Lead Party	10	35.7	5	33.3	7	63.6	5	45.5	5	45.5	5	55.6	9	81.8
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	1	9.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	9.1
Citizens Com	3	10.7	2	13.3	3	27.3	2	18.2	2	18.2	1	11.1	0	0
None Above	3	10.7	4	26.7	1	9.1	1	9.1	2	18.2	2	22.2	1	9.1
One Above	11	39.3	9	60	6	54.5	9	81.8	7	63.6	5	55.6	8	72.7
Two Above	4	14.3	2	13.3	3	27.3	1	9.1	2	18.2	2	22.2	1	9.1
Three/More	0	0	0	0	1	9.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	9.1
Club 21	2	7.1	1	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Female MPs	1	3.6	2	13.3	0	0	1	9.1	2	18.2	1	11.1	1	9.1
Public Sector	13	46.4	3	20	3	27.3	2	18.2	2	18.2	1	11.1	2	18.2
Age	44.6		49.4		39.5		44		49.9		49.7		44.8	
Age Newcom	44.6		47.6		38.9		46		45.8		47.5		37.1	
Mandates	1		1.4		1.5		2.4		2.6		2.9		2.2	
Newcomers	28	100	9	60	7	63.6	2	18.2	4	36.4	2	22.2	7	63.6
Incumbents	na	na	6	40	4	36.4	5	45.5	6	54.5	6	66.7	3	27.3
Exp Founder	na	na	6	40	2	18.2	2	18.2	2	18.2	1	11.1	1	9.1
Core Group	na	na	na	na	2	18.2	3	27.3	4	36.4	3	33.3	2	18.2
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	2	18.2	4	36.4	5	45.5	4	44.4	3	27.3
Ethn Minority	11	39.3	2	13.3	0	0	0	0	1	9.1	3	33.3	1	9.1
Local Soviet	3	10.7	3	20	1	9.1	1	9.1	1	9.1	0	0	1	9.1
Com Leader	9	32.1	1	6.7	1	9.1	0	0	1	9.1	1	11.1	1	9.1
Sov Minister	2	7.1	1	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	3	10.7	1	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	15	53.6	2	13.3	1	9.1	1	9.1	1	9.1	2	22.2	2	18.2
Com Party M	18	64.3	4	26.7	1	9.1	2	18.2	2	18.2	3	33.3	2	18.2
Dissidents	3	10.7	2	13.3	2	18.2	1	9.1	1	9.1	1	11.1	0	0
Repr Parents	4	14.3	5	33.3	1	9.1	2	18.2	2	18.2	1	11.1	2	18.2

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.3.3. Political Party Employees in Lithuanian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	14	87.5	17	73.9	20	87	13	92.9	20	95.2	20	90.9	24	96
Law	2	14.3	1	5.9	1	5	1	7.7	1	5	1	5	2	8.3
HuSocEcon	9	64.3	7	41.2	8	40	8	61.5	10	50	9	45	15	62.5
TechNatMed	5	35.7	11	64.7	11	55	5	38.5	10	50	10	50	8	33.3
PhD	3	21.4	6	35.3	4	20	1	7.7	2	10	2	10	4	16.7
Local Reg	4	25	2	8.7	9	39.1	6	42.9	10	47.6	13	59.1	12	48
Lead Party	9	56.3	13	56.5	12	52.2	7	50	9	42.9	12	54.5	10	40
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
None Above	4	25	8	34.8	6	26.1	3	21.4	6	28.6	3	13.6	6	24
One Above	11	68.8	15	65.2	13	56.5	9	64.3	11	52.4	13	59.1	16	64
Two Above	1	6.3	0	0	4	17.4	2	14.3	4	19	6	27.3	3	12
Female MPs	1	6.3	0	0	2	8.7	3	21.4	7	33.3	4	18.2	5	20
Public Sector	14	87.5	19	82.6	15	65.2	10	71.4	11	52.4	8	36.4	14	56
Age	48.8		49		46.1		44.7		47.1		46.8		47.5	
Age Newcom	48.8		46.9		41.3		42.2		47.7		37		41.7	
Mandates	1		1.3		1.4		1.9		2		2.5		2.8	
Newcomers	16	100	17	73.9	13	56.5	5	35.7	10	47.6	7	31.8	9	36
Incumbents	na	na	6	26.1	9	39.1	8	57.1	8	38.1	15	68.2	14	56
Exp Founder	na	na	6	26.1	1	4.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	1	4.3	3	21.4	6	28.6	7	31.8	11	44
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	1	4.3	3	21.4	7	33.3	10	45.5	12	48
Ethn Minority	4	25	2	8.7	1	4.3	2	14.3	0	0	0	0	2	8
Local Soviet	12	75	10	43.5	2	8.7	1	7.1	2	9.5	1	4.5	2	8
Com Leader	11	68.8	10	43.5	2	8.7	3	21.4	3	14.3	2	9.1	3	12
Sov Minister	3	18.8	1	4.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	5	31.3	3	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	13	81.3	14	60.9	4	17.4	3	21.4	3	14.3	2	9.1	4	16
Com Party M	13	81.3	14	60.9	4	17.4	3	21.4	3	14.3	2	9.1	4	16
Dissidents	1	6.3	2	8.7	2	8.7	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	0	0	1	4.3	1	4.3	1	7.1	2	9.5	1	4.5	1	4

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.4.1. Civil Servants in Estonian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	14	100	20	95.2	25	96.2	26	100	36	97.3	34	100	42	95.5
Law	2	14.3	2	10	4	16	1	3.8	8	22.2	5	14.7	9	21.4
HuSocEcon	5	35.7	10	50	6	24	8	30.8	13	36.1	16	47.1	20	47.6
TechNatMed	8	57.1	8	40	15	60	17	65.4	15	41.7	13	38.2	14	33.3
PhD	3	21.4	7	35	7	28	8	30.8	5	13.9	6	17.6	4	9.5
Local Elect	9	64.3	10	47.6	15	57.7	18	69.2	24	64.9	24	70.6	35	79.5
Lead Party	3	21.4	8	38.1	13	50	7	26.9	7	18.9	4	11.8	7	15.9
Govern Post	3	21.4	5	23.8	9	34.6	7	26.9	16	43.2	12	35.3	12	27.3
Citizens Com	7	50	7	33.3	6	23.1	3	11.5	5	13.5	4	11.8	2	4.5
None Above	1	7.1	3	14.3	3	11.5	4	15.4	1	2.7	3	8.8	2	4.5
One Above	5	35.7	7	33.3	9	34.6	11	42.3	22	59.5	19	55.9	30	68.2
Two Above	7	50	10	47.6	9	34.6	9	34.6	12	32.4	11	32.4	10	22.7
Three/More	1	7.1	1	4.8	4	15.4	2	7.7	2	5.4	1	2.9	2	4.5
Female MPs	0	0	3	14.3	3	11.5	4	15.4	6	16.2	9	26.5	9	20.5
Public Sector	14	100	21	100	26	100	26	100	37	100	34	100	44	100
Age	43.1		40.2		46.5		48.4		49.2		49.8		46.8	
Age Newcom	43.1		39.9		45		45.1		46.2		44.9		43.1	
Mandates	1		1.1		1.5		1.9		1.8		2.1		1.9	
Newcomers	14	100	18	85.7	15	57.7	10	38.5	25	67.6	13	38.2	20	45.5
Incumbents	na	na	3	14.3	11	42.3	13	50	9	24.3	17	50	15	34.1
Exp Founder	na	na	3	14.3	3	11.5	2	7.7	3	8.1	2	5.9	1	2.3
Core Group	na	na	na	na	3	11.5	5	19.2	7	18.9	6	17.6	9	20.5
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	3	11.5	6	23.1	9	24.3	8	23.5	10	22.7
Ethn Minority	2	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5.9	4	9.1
Local Soviet	8	57.1	2	9.5	8	30.8	4	15.4	4	10.8	2	5.9	3	6.8
Com Leader	3	21.4	0	0	1	3.8	1	3.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	3	21.4	1	4.8	4	15.4	3	11.5	2	5.4	0	0	1	2.3
Supr Soviet	3	21.4	1	4.8	3	11.5	1	3.8	1	2.7	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	8	57.1	2	9.5	9	34.6	11	42.3	10	27	5	14.7	8	18.2
Com Party M	10	71.4	5	23.8	14	53.8	11	42.3	15	40.5	11	32.4	7	15.9
Dissidents	0	0	3	14.3	1	3.8	0	0	1	2.7	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	1	7.1	3	14.3	5	19.2	4	15.4	3	8.1	1	2.9	1	2.3

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.4.2. Civil Servants in Latvian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	20	90.9	21	100	13	100	20	100	13	100	27	100	22	100
Law	3	15	3	14.3	1	7.7	3	15	1	7.7	6	22.2	7	31.8
HuSocEcon	6	30	13	61.9	5	38.5	13	65	8	61.5	17	63	11	50
TechNatMed	15	75	9	42.9	8	61.5	5	25	5	38.5	8	29.6	5	22.7
PhD	2	10	5	23.8	1	7.7	0	0	1	7.7	4	14.8	1	4.5
Local Elect	14	63.6	0	0	1	7.7	10	50	2	15.4	16	59.3	8	36.4
Lead Party	1	4.5	3	14.3	0	0	8	40	6	46.2	13	48.1	8	36.4
Govern Post	2	9.1	7	33.3	7	53.8	9	45	7	53.8	11	40.7	10	45.5
Citizens Com	2	9.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
None Above	6	27.3	13	61.9	6	46.2	4	20	3	23.1	3	11.1	5	22.7
One Above	13	59.1	6	28.6	6	46.2	7	35	6	46.2	11	40.7	10	45.5
Two Above	3	13.6	2	9.5	1	7.7	7	35	3	23.1	10	37	5	22.7
Three/More	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	10	1	7.7	3	11.1	2	9.1
Club 21	0	0	9	42.9	3	23.1	3	15	0	0	1	3.7	0	0
Female MPs	1	4.5	3	14.3	2	15.4	8	40	2	15.4	8	29.6	5	22.7
Public Sector	22	100	21	100	13	100	20	100	13	100	27	100	22	100
Age	42.3		45.6		44.5		46.7		51.4		48.3		47.5	
Age Newcom	42.3		43.4		40.7		47.8		42.3		46.7		48.5	
Mandates	1		1.2		1.8		1.5		2		1.5		1.7	
Newcomers	22	100	16	76.2	6	46.2	13	65	4	30.8	18	66.7	11	50
Incumbents	na	na	5	23.8	6	46.2	5	25	5	38.5	7	25.9	9	40.9
Exp Founder	na	na	5	23.8	3	23.1	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	3	23.1	2	10	1	7.7	2	7.4	2	9.1
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	3	23.1	2	10	3	23.1	4	14.8	5	22.7
Ethn Minority	3	13.6	2	9.5	2	15.4	3	15	2	15.4	1	3.7	0	0
Local Soviet	8	36.4	3	14.3	0	0	1	5	1	7.7	1	3.7	0	0
Com Leader	5	22.7	5	23.8	3	23.1	1	5	2	15.4	1	3.7	0	0
Sov Minister	3	13.6	4	19	1	7.7	1	5	2	15.4	1	3.7	0	0
Supr Soviet	4	18.2	6	28.6	3	23.1	2	10	1	7.7	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	15	68.2	7	33.3	5	38.5	5	25	4	30.8	3	11.1	2	9.1
Com Party M	17	77.3	10	47.6	5	38.5	3	15	2	15.4	1	3.7	1	4.5
Dissidents	2	9.1	1	4.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	2	9.1	2	9.5	1	7.7	1	5	1	7.7	1	3.7	0	0

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.4.3. Civil Servants in Lithuanian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	5	100	9	81.8	30	96.8	23	95.8	26	96.3	27	93.1	28	100
Law	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4.3	4	15.4	5	18.5	4	14.3
HuSocEcon	3	60	3	33.3	13	43.3	8	34.8	14	53.8	13	48.1	15	53.6
TechNatMed	2	40	6	66.7	17	56.7	14	60.9	14	53.8	12	44.4	12	42.9
PhD	3	60	4	44.4	6	20	2	8.7	4	15.4	0	0	1	3.6
Local Elect	1	20	4	36.4	19	61.3	16	66.7	16	59.3	21	72.4	22	78.6
Lead Party	0	0	2	18.2	4	12.9	6	25	9	33.3	9	31	6	21.4
Govern Post	0	0	1	9.1	3	9.7	2	8.3	2	7.4	1	3.4	0	0
None Above	4	80	5	45.5	8	25.8	7	29.2	9	33.3	7	24.1	6	21.4
One Above	1	20	5	45.5	20	64.5	11	45.8	9	33.3	13	44.8	16	57.1
Two Above	0	0	1	9.1	3	9.7	5	20.8	9	33.3	9	31	6	21.4
Three/More	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Female MPs	2	40	3	27.3	8	25.8	4	16.7	9	33.3	7	24.1	11	39.3
Public Sector	5	100	11	100	31	100	24	100	27	100	29	100	28	100
Age	47.6		42.4		45.7		46.6		49.2		49.2		52.5	
Age Newcom	47.6		42.4		45.8		44.5		50.1		45.3		50.2	
Mandates	1		1.2		1.3		1.4		1.5		1.9		2	
Newcomers	5	100	9	81.8	24	77.4	17	70.8	18	66.7	12	41.4	14	50
Incumbents	na	na	2	18.2	6	19.4	7	29.2	8	29.6	15	51.7	12	42.9
Exp Founder	na	na	2	18.2	1	3.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	1	3.2	3	12.5	3	11.1	4	13.8	8	28.6
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	1	3.2	3	12.5	4	14.8	5	17.2	8	28.6
Ethn Minority	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4.2	2	7.4	2	6.9	5	17.9
Local Soviet	3	60	2	18.2	4	12.9	5	20.8	8	29.6	4	13.8	5	17.9
Com Leader	2	40	2	18.2	5	16.1	5	20.8	4	14.8	1	3.4	0	0
Sov Minister	1	20	0	0	4	12.9	2	8.3	2	7.4	1	3.4	1	3.6
Supr Soviet	2	40	0	0	2	6.5	1	4.2	1	3.7	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	3	60	3	27.3	5	16.1	6	25	7	25.9	2	6.9	2	7.1
Com Party M	4	80	7	63.6	9	29	7	29.2	7	25.9	2	6.9	1	3.6
Dissidents	0	0	1	9.1	1	3.2	0	0	1	3.7	1	3.4	0	0
Repr Parents	1	20	2	18.2	4	12.9	1	4.2	2	7.4	2	6.9	2	7.1

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.5.1. Managers and Businessmen in Estonian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	16	94.1	9	90	20	100	14	100	21	100	15	93.8	15	93.8
Law	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7.1	0	0	1	6.7	2	13.3
HuSocEcon	3	18.8	3	33.3	5	25	5	35.7	8	38.1	4	26.7	8	53.3
TechNatMed	13	81.3	8	88.9	17	85	9	64.3	13	61.9	10	66.7	6	40
PhD	3	18.8	0	0	2	10	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local Elect	10	58.8	4	40	10	50	8	57.1	12	57.1	12	75	13	81.3
Lead Party	3	17.6	5	50	7	35	1	7.1	2	9.5	2	12.5	2	12.5
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7.1	4	19	1	6.3	1	6.3
Citizens Com	6	35.3	3	30	2	10	2	14.3	0	0	1	6.3	0	0
None Above	2	11.8	2	20	4	20	4	28.6	7	33.3	2	12.5	2	12.5
One Above	7	41.2	4	40	13	65	8	57.1	10	47.6	12	75	12	75
Two Above	3	17.6	4	40	3	15	2	14.3	4	19	2	12.5	2	12.5
Female MPs	1	5.9	0	0	1	5	2	14.3	2	9.5	3	18.8	4	25
Public Sector	17	100	10	100	15	75	5	35.7	9	42.9	4	25	2	12.5
Age	48.2		44.7		48.4		45.6		46.6		46.4		45.8	
Age Newcom	48.2		42.4		45.8		45.4		46.1		46.7		45.4	
Mandates	1		1.3		1.6		1.5		1.3		1.5		1.9	
Newcomers	17	100	7	70	10	50	9	64.3	16	76.2	12	75	5	31.3
Incumbents	na	na	3	30	5	25	5	35.7	4	19	4	25	7	43.8
Exp Founder	na	na	3	30	3	15	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	3	15	1	7.1	2	9.5	3	18.8	1	6.3
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	3	15	1	7.1	2	9.5	3	18.8	2	12.5
Ethn Minority	3	17.6	0	0	2	10	0	0	1	4.8	0	0	0	0
Local Soviet	8	47.1	4	40	8	40	3	21.4	2	9.5	1	6.3	0	0
Com Leader	1	5.9	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	4	23.5	1	10	3	15	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	7	41.2	2	20	6	30	4	28.6	4	19	2	12.5	0	0
Com Party M	12	70.6	6	60	14	70	6	42.9	6	28.6	2	12.5	0	0
Dissidents	1	5.9	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	3	17.6	1	10	3	15	1	7.1	1	4.8	1	6.3	1	6.3

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.5.2. Managers and Businessmen in Latvian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	27	65.9	15	88.2	21	91.3	23	95.8	24	96	20	83.3	23	79.3
Law	0	0	2	13.3	1	4.8	2	8.7	0	0	0	0	1	4.3
HuSocEcon	7	25.9	6	40	4	19	6	26.1	6	25	6	30	10	43.5
TechNatMed	21	77.8	10	66.7	19	90.5	15	65.2	18	75	14	70	15	65.2
PhD	1	3.7	2	13.3	1	4.8	1	4.3	2	8.3	3	15	1	4.3
Local Elect	3	7.3	0	0	3	13	7	29.2	8	32	10	41.7	16	55.2
Lead Party	1	2.4	1	5.9	4	17.4	8	33.3	9	36	7	29.2	6	20.7
Govern Post	0	0	1	5.9	1	4.3	2	8.3	3	12	2	8.3	1	3.4
Citizens Com	1	2.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
None Above	36	87.8	15	88.2	16	69.6	12	50	11	44	10	41.7	10	34.5
One Above	5	12.2	2	11.8	6	26.1	9	37.5	10	40	11	45.8	16	55.2
Two Above	0	0	0	0	1	4.3	1	4.2	2	8	1	4.2	2	6.9
Three/More	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	8.3	2	8	2	8.3	1	3.4
Club 21	2	4.9	2	11.8	1	4.3	1	4.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Female MPs	2	4.9	1	5.9	1	4.3	3	12.5	3	12	2	8.3	2	6.9
Public Sector	41	100	6	35.3	6	26.1	5	20.8	5	20	4	16.7	5	17.2
Age	46.6		44.9		45.2		42.4		43.2		45.4		47.2	
Age Newcom	46.6		42.7		46.3		41.8		40.6		46.6		45.4	
Mandates	1		1.2		1.4		1.4		1.8		1.9		1.8	
Newcomers	41	100	14	82.4	15	65.2	19	79.2	14	56	11	45.8	16	55.2
Incumbents	na	na	3	17.6	8	34.8	4	16.7	11	44	12	50	11	37.9
Exp Founder	na	na	3	17.6	1	4.3	1	4.2	1	4	1	4.2	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	1	4.3	3	12.5	4	16	5	20.8	6	20.7
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	1	4.3	3	12.5	4	16	5	20.8	7	24.1
Ethn Minority	16	39	1	5.9	1	4.3	4	16.7	3	12	5	20.8	13	44.8
Local Soviet	2	4.9	0	0	1	4.3	0	0	1	4	0	0	2	6.9
Com Leader	0	0	1	5.9	4	17.4	1	4.2	1	4	1	4.2	1	3.4
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	1	4.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	7	17.1	3	17.6	9	39.1	1	4.2	1	4	2	8.3	3	10.3
Com Party M	35	85.4	7	41.2	10	43.5	5	20.8	5	20	2	8.3	2	6.9
Dissidents	0	0	1	5.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	0	0	3	17.6	1	4.3	2	8.3	1	4	0	0	1	3.4

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.5.3. Managers and Businessmen in Lithuanian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	20	100	21	87.5	10	90.9	54	93.1	48	94.1	34	94.4	36	92.3
Law	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2.1	2	5.9	2	5.6
HuSocEcon	6	30	6	28.6	6	60	24	44.4	25	52.1	20	58.8	23	63.9
TechNatMed	14	70	18	85.7	5	50	34	63	26	54.2	19	55.9	15	41.7
PhD	4	20	2	9.5	3	30	4	7.4	8	16.7	3	8.8	2	5.6
Local Elect	0	0	6	25	6	54.5	35	60.3	25	49	16	44.4	25	64.1
Lead Party	1	5	0	0	2	18.2	16	27.6	8	15.7	5	13.9	7	17.9
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5.2	3	5.9	1	2.8	2	5.1
None Above	19	95	18	75	5	45.5	20	34.5	24	47.1	18	50	13	33.3
One Above	1	5	6	25	4	36.4	24	41.4	19	37.3	14	38.9	19	48.7
Two Above	0	0	0	0	2	18.2	12	20.7	7	13.7	4	11.1	7	17.9
Three/More	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3.4	1	2	0	0	0	0
Female MPs	1	5	0	0	2	18.2	3	5.2	5	9.8	5	13.9	5	12.8
Public Sector	16	80	19	79.2	2	18.2	6	10.3	8	15.7	5	13.9	7	17.9
Age	43.8		49.1		44.1		45.9		48.6		49.7		51.8	
Age Newcom	43.8		49.6		41.3		45.7		46.1		44.5		46.6	
Mandates	1		1.2		1.3		1.1		1.6		2		2.4	
Newcomers	20	100	20	83.3	9	81.8	52	89.7	26	51	13	36.1	15	38.5
Incumbents	na	na	4	16.7	2	18.2	3	5.2	21	41.2	20	55.6	17	43.6
Exp Founder	na	na	4	16.7	1	9.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	1	9.1	0	0	2	3.9	9	25	13	33.3
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	1	9.1	0	0	4	7.8	10	27.8	19	48.7
Ethn Minority	3	15	1	4.2	0	0	7	12.1	5	9.8	1	2.8	3	7.7
Local Soviet	1	5	7	29.2	2	18.2	9	15.5	9	17.6	5	13.9	5	12.8
Com Leader	1	5	3	12.5	0	0	6	10.3	4	7.8	3	8.3	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	2.8	0	0
Supr Soviet	0	0	1	4.2	1	9.1	0	0	2	3.9	2	5.6	0	0
Nomenklatura	6	30	13	54.2	2	18.2	13	22.4	11	21.6	5	13.9	4	10.3
Com Party M	8	40	17	70.8	2	18.2	12	20.7	11	21.6	5	13.9	3	7.7
Dissidents	2	10	2	8.3	2	18.2	1	1.7	2	3.9	2	5.6	2	5.1
Repr Parents	1	5	1	4.2	0	0	1		2	3.9	3	8.3	3	7.7

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.6.1. Lawyers and Other Liberal Professions in Estonian Parliaments

Parliament	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	13	100	11	84.6	7	77.8	8	100	8	100	5	100	5	100
Law	2	15.4	3	27.3	3	42.9	2	25	2	25	2	40	3	60
HuSocEcon	0	0	2	18.2	1	14.3	3	37.5	2	25	3	60	2	40
TechNatMed	11	84.6	6	54.5	3	42.9	3	37.5	4	50	0	0	0	0
PhD	0	0	2	18.2	1	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local Elect	5	38.5	3	23.1	3	33.3	4	50	5	62.5	4	80	4	80
Lead Party	5	38.5	4	30.8	3	33.3	2	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	12.5	1	20	1	20
Citizens Com	5	38.5	4	30.8	2	22.2	2	25	1	12.5	0	0	0	0
None Above	2	15.4	6	46.2	4	44.4	2	25	3	37.5	1	20	1	20
One Above	2	15.4	3	23.1	2	22.2	4	50	3	37.5	3	60	3	60
Two Above	5	38.5	4	30.8	3	33.3	2	25	2	25	1	20	1	20
Female MPs	0	0	3	23.1	1	11.1	2	25	3	37.5	1	20	1	20
Public Sector	13	100	9	69.2	8	88.9	5	62.5	6	75	1	20	0	0
Age	46.6		48.1		51.6		52		48.5		46.4		40.4	
Age Newcom	46.6		49		54		39		48.8		43.5		33	
Mandates	1		1.2		1.6		2		1.4		2.2		2.2	
Newcomers	13	100	10	76.9	6	66.7	2	25	6	75	2	40	2	40
Incumbents	na	na	3	23.1	3	33.3	5	62.5	2	25	3	60	3	60
Exp Founder	na	na	3	23.1	2	22.2	1	12.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	2	22.2	1	12.5	1	12.5	2	40	2	40
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	2	22.2	1	12.5	1	12.5	2	40	2	40
Ethn Minority	4	30.8	1	7.7	1	11.1	0	0	1	12.5	0	0	1	20
Local Soviet	1	7.7	1	7.7	1	11.1	1	12.5	1	12.5	1	20	0	0
Com Leader	0	0	1	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	0	0	0	0	1	11.1	1	12.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	2	15.4	3	23.1	5	55.6	4	50	1	12.5	1	20	0	0
Com Party M	5	38.5	4	30.8	6	66.7	5	62.5	2	25	2	40	1	20
Dissidents	0	0	1	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	0	0	1	7.7	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.6.2. Lawyers and Other Liberal Professions in Latvian Parliaments

	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	23	79.3	8	80	14	100	12	100	15	100	14	100	9	100
Law	6	26.1	4	50	4	28.6	2	16.7	4	26.7	1	7.1	2	22.2
HuSocEcon	2	8.7	1	12.5	3	21.4	1	8.3	2	13.3	3	21.4	3	33.3
TechNatMed	19	82.6	3	37.5	8	57.1	9	75	10	66.7	10	71.4	6	66.7
PhD	3	13	0	0	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local Elect	3	10.3	2	20	2	14.3	4	33.3	5	33.3	6	42.9	4	44.4
Lead Party	8	27.6	4	40	5	35.7	3	25	4	26.7	5	35.7	2	22.2
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	2	14.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Citizens Com	6	20.7	3	30	3	21.4	2	16.7	2	13.3	2	14.3	0	0
None Above	10	34.5	3	30	6	42.9	5	41.7	7	46.7	4	28.6	5	55.6
One Above	10	34.5	5	50	4	28.6	5	41.7	5	33.3	7	50	2	22.2
Two Above	2	6.9	2	20	4	28.6	2	16.7	3	20	3	21.4	2	22.2
Three/More	1	3.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Club 21	3	10.3	0	0	2	14.3	2	16.7	0	0	3	21.4	0	0
Female MPs	0	0	2	20	0	0	0	0	5	33.3	3	21.4	3	33.3
Public Sector	28	96.6	9	90	11	78.6	12	100	8	53.3	10	71.4	3	33.3
Age	45		47		46		43.1		43.9		56.4		48.2	
Age Newcom	45		49.2		46.9		43.7		42.7		52.5		42.4	
Mandates	1		1.5		1.4		2.2		1.9		2.9		1.8	
Newcomers	29	100	5	50	10	71.4	3	25	9	60	2	14.3	5	55.6
Incumbents	na	na	5	50	3	21.4	7	58.3	4	26.7	9	64.3	4	44.4
Exp Founder	na	na	5	50	2	14.3	1	8.3	1	6.7	1	7.1	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	2	14.3	2	16.7	4	26.7	3	21.4	3	33.3
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	2	14.3	4	33.3	4	26.7	7	50	3	33.3
Ethn Minority	7	24.1	0	0	2	14.3	3	25	2	13.3	2	14.3	2	22.2
Local Soviet	1	3.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Com Leader	1	3.4	0	0	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	1	3.4	1	10	2	14.3	0	0	1	6.7	1	7.1	0	0
Nomenklatura	1	3.4	0	0	1	7.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Com Party M	15	51.7	3	30	5	35.7	1	8.3	0	0	1	7.1	0	0
Dissidents	1	3.4	1	10	1	7.1	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	2	6.9	3	30	2	14.3	2	16.7	2	13.3	1	7.1	0	0

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 5.2.6.3. Lawyers and Other Liberal Professions in Lithuanian Parliaments

	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	25	100	14	100	22	100	15	100	17	100	23	95.8	14	100
Law	6	24	2	14.3	2	9.1	2	13.3	2	11.8	3	13	3	21.4
HuSocEcon	5	20	2	14.3	4	18.2	3	20	2	11.8	7	30.4	1	7.1
TechNatMed	15	60	11	78.6	17	77.3	12	80	15	88.2	15	65.2	11	78.6
PhD	1	4	3	21.4	3	13.6	6	40	6	35.3	5	21.7	4	28.6
Local Elect	1	4	3	21.4	6	27.3	6	40	7	41.2	8	33.3	8	57.1
Lead Party	3	12	4	28.6	7	31.8	5	33.3	5	29.4	3	12.5	3	21.4
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	2	9.1	1	6.7	1	5.9	2	8.3	2	14.3
None Above	21	84	7	50	9	40.9	3	20	5	29.4	13	54.2	3	21.4
One Above	4	16	7	50	11	50	12	80	11	64.7	9	37.5	9	64.3
Two Above	0	0	0	0	2	9.1	0	0	1	5.9	2	8.3	2	14.3
Female MPs	5	20	2	14.3	5	22.7	1	6.7	3	17.6	5	20.8	3	21.4
Public Sector	24	96	13	92.9	19	86.4	11	73.3	14	82.4	16	66.7	9	64.3
Age	42.9		49.1		48.7		52.4		54.8		51.8		58.7	
Age Newcom	42.9		50.9		45.4		46.1		51.1		42.4		48.7	
Mandates	1		1.4		1.8		2		2.2		2.3		3.3	
Newcomers	25	100	9	64.3	9	40.9	7	46.7	7	41.2	10	41.7	3	21.4
Incumbents	na	na	5	35.7	7	31.8	6	40	7	41.2	10	41.7	10	71.4
Exp Founder	na	na	5	35.7	4	18.2	2	13.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	4	18.2	4	26.7	5	29.4	5	21.7	8	57.1
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	4	18.2	5	33.3	7	41.2	10	41.7	10	71.4
Ethn Minority	3	12	2	14.3	1	4.5	2	13.3	0	0	1	4.2	0	0
Local Soviet	2	8	1	7.1	1	4.5	2	13.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Com Leader	1	4	0	0	1	4.5	1	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6.7	1	5.9	0	0	1	7.1
Supr Soviet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	3	12	1	7.1	2	9.1	3	20	1	5.9	2	8.3	1	7.1
Com Party M	6	24	1	7.1	3	13.6	3	20	2	11.8	4	16.7	2	14.3
Dissidents	1	4	4	28.6	2	9.1	3	20	2	11.8	1	4.2	1	7.1
Repr Parents	4	16	3	21.4	6	27.3	3	20	2	11.8	4	16.7	4	28.6

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.1.1. Estonian MPs as Local Politicians

Parliaments	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	41	95.3	27	96.4	46	100	62	96.9	65	98.5	73	98.6	73	93.6
Law	6	14.6	3	11.1	3	6.5	4	6.5	8	12.3	9	12.3	14	19.2
HuSocEcon	11	26.8	14	51.9	15	32.6	20	32.3	28	43.1	39	53.4	42	57.5
TechNatMed	25	61	12	44.4	32	69.6	40	64.5	30	46.2	25	34.2	21	28.8
PhD	5	12.2	6	22.2	6	13	14	22.6	6	9.2	8	11	3	4.1
Lead Party	14	32.6	16	57.1	17	37	15	23.4	8	12.1	10	13.5	15	19.2
Govern Post	1	2.3	1	3.6	6	13	7	10.9	14	21.2	11	14.9	10	12.8
Citizens Com	16	37.2	10	35.7	7	15.2	8	12.5	5	7.6	7	9.5	4	5.1
One Above	20	46.5	6	21.4	22	47.8	39	60.9	42	63.6	48	64.9	52	66.7
Two Above	15	34.9	17	60.7	17	37	18	28.1	20	30.3	24	32.4	23	29.5
Three	8	18.6	5	17.9	6	13	7	10.9	4	6.1	2	2.7	3	3.8
Female MPs	4	9.3	5	17.9	7	15.2	10	15.6	7	10.6	18	24.3	13	16.7
Teacher Prof	4	9.3	2	7.1	7	15.2	13	20.3	10	15.2	9	12.2	5	6.4
Journ Writer	1	2.3	3	10.7	2	4.3	4	6.3	5	7.6	5	6.8	3	3.8
Party Empl	6	14	2	7.1	3	6.5	10	15.6	8	12.1	14	18.9	14	17.9
Civil Service	9	20.9	10	35.7	15	32.6	18	28.1	24	36.4	24	32.4	35	44.9
Public Sector	42	97.7	22	78.6	36	78.3	49	76.6	51	77.3	49	66.2	51	65.4
Military	1	2.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clergy	1	2.3	2	7.1	1	2.2	1	1.6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lawyers	1	2.3	2	7.1	1	2.2	2	3.1	2	3	2	2.7	2	2.6
Judge Prosec	2	4.7	0	0	0	0	1	1.6	1	1.5	1	1.4	1	1.3
Agri Fisher	3	7	1	3.6	2	4.3	2	3.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue Collar	1	2.3	1	3.6	1	2.2	2	3.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manage Busi	10	23.3	4	14.3	10	21.7	8	12.5	12	18.2	12	16.2	13	16.7
Age	46		43.8		50.2		47		47.1		46.7		45.5	
Age Newcom	46		42.1		49.3		45.5		46		43.7		41.3	
Mandates	1		1.3		1.3		1.4		1.4		1.7		1.9	
Newcomers	43	100	20	71.4	33	71.7	43	67.2	44	66.7	37	50	31	39.7
Incumbents	na	na	8	28.6	8	17.4	19	29.7	20	30.3	31	41.9	35	44.9
Exp Founder	na	na	8	28.6	5	10.9	3	4.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	3	6.5	3	4.7	6	9.1	14	18.9	15	19.2
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	3	6.5	5	7.8	7	10.6	15	20.3	17	21.8
Liberal Jobs	4	9.3	1	3.6	2	4.3	2	3.1	3	4.5	2	2.7	2	2.6
Ethn Minority	9	20.9	1	3.6	2	4.3	5	7.8	4	6.1	8	10.8	8	10.3
Local Soviet	22	21	5	17.9	17	37	8	12.5	7	10.6	4	5.4	3	3.8
Com Leader	7	6.7	0	0	3	6.5	0	0	1	1.5	0	0	1	1.3
Sov Minister	2	4.7	0	0	3	6.5	1	1.6	2	3	0	0	1	1.3
Supr Soviet	4	9.3	0	0	2	4.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	18	17.1	1	3.6	16	34.8	20	31.3	18	27.3	10	13.5	10	12.8
Com Party M	32	30.5	9	32.1	34	73.9	27	42.2	26	39.4	16	21.6	10	12.8
Dissidents	2	4.7	5	17.9	2	4.3	1	1.6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	5	4.8	2	7.1	6	13	3	4.7	2	3	1	1.4	1	1.3

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.1.2. Estonian MPs as Political Party Leaders

Parliaments	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	26	89.7	40	87	40	93	23	88.5	16	100	18	100	19	95
Law	4	15.4	8	20	7	17.5	2	8.7	3	18.8	4	22.2	5	26.3
HuSocEcon	11	42.3	18	45	14	35	9	39.1	8	50	7	38.9	10	52.6
TechNatMed	14	53.8	16	40	21	52.5	12	52.2	5	31.3	7	38.9	5	26.3
PhD	11	42.3	14	35	8	20	5	21.7	2	12.5	1	5.6	2	10.5
Local Elect	14	48.3	16	34.8	17	39.5	15	57.7	8	50	10	55.6	15	75
Govern Post	2	6.9	3	6.5	8	18.6	5	19.2	7	43.8	5	27.8	5	25
Citizens Com	16	55.2	20	43.5	14	32.6	10	38.5	1	6.3	1	5.6	0	0
One Above	5	17.2	12	26.1	12	27.9	3	11.5	3	18.8	4	22.2	3	15
Two Above	16	55.2	29	63	24	55.8	16	61.5	10	62.5	12	66.7	14	70
Three/More	8	27.6	5	10.9	6	14	7	26.9	3	18.8	2	11.1	3	15
Female MPs	2	6.9	6	13	5	11.6	4	15.4	3	18.8	5	27.8	3	15
Teacher Prof	7	24.1	9	19.6	6	14	6	23.1	3	18.8	3	16.7	2	10
Journ Writer	3	10.3	6	13	4	9.3	1	3.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
Party Empl	4	13.8	7	15.2	5	11.6	7	26.9	4	25	8	44.4	9	45
Civil Service	3	10.3	8	17.4	13	30.2	7	26.9	7	43.8	4	22.2	7	35
Public Sector	28	96.6	32	69.6	34	79.1	20	76.9	13	81.3	12	66.7	14	70
Clergy	0	0	3	6.5	2	4.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lawyers	1	3.4	2	4.3	1	2.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agri Fisher	3	10.3	2	4.3	2	4.7	1	3.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue Collar	1	3.4	1	2.2	1	2.3	1	3.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manage Busi	3	10.3	5	10.9	7	16.3	1	3.8	2	12.5	2	11.1	2	10
Age	47.9		44.6		46.2		46.8		45.5		42.4		42.6	
Age Newcom	47.9		44.2		44.8		35.9		37.8		37.1		35.9	
Mandates	1		1.2		1.7		2.3		2.4		2.3		2.5	
Newcomers	29	100	35	76.1	20	46.5	8	30.8	4	25	7	38.9	8	40
Incumbents	na	na	11	23.9	23	53.5	17	65.4	10	62.5	11	61.1	10	50
Exp Founder	na	na	11	23.9	8	18.6	5	19.2	1	6.3	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	8	18.6	10	38.5	6	37.5	7	38.9	8	40
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	8	18.6	11	42.3	6	37.5	8	44.4	8	40
Liberal Jobs	4	13.8	2	4.3	2	4.7	2	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethn Minority	1	3.4	1	2.2	1	2.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local Soviet	9	31	6	13	8	18.6	3	11.5	2	12.5	0	0	1	5
Com Leader	5	17.2	1	2.2	1	2.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	2	6.9	1	2.2	3	7	2	7.7	2	12.5	0	0	1	5
Supr Soviet	5	17.2	1	2.2	2	4.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	13	44.8	6	13	10	23.3	6	23.1	4	25	1	5.6	3	15
Com Party M	20	69	15	32.6	19	44.2	8	30.8	6	37.5	2	11.1	2	10
Dissidents	0	0	9	19.6	3	7	3	11.5	1	6.3	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	4	13.8	8	17.4	7	16.3	4	15.4	3	18.8	2	11.1	2	10

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.1.3. Estonian MPs as Cabinet Ministers

Parliaments	1990		1992		1995		1999		2003		2007		2011	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	3	100	5	100	9	100	10	100	23	100	16	100	17	100
Law	0	0	1	20	2	22.2	1	10	6	26.1	4	25	5	29.4
HuSocEcon	2	66.7	2	40	2	22.2	4	40	11	47.8	6	37.5	7	41.2
TechNatMed	1	33.3	1	20	5	55.6	5	50	6	26.1	6	37.5	5	29.4
Ph.D.	1	33.3	1	20	2	22.2	2	20	3	13	3	18.8	3	17.6
Local Elect	1	33.3	1	20	6	66.7	7	70	14	60.9	10	62.5	10	58.8
Lead Party	2	66.7	3	60	8	88.9	5	50	7	30.4	5	31.3	5	29.4
Citizens Com	1	33.3	1	20	1	11.1	1	10	2	8.7	1	6.3	0	0
One Above	0	0	1	20	0	0	0	0	4	17.4	2	12.5	5	29.4
Two Above	2	66.7	3	60	4	44.4	7	70	15	65.2	12	75	9	52.9
Three/More	1	33.3	1	20	4	44.4	3	30	4	17.4	2	12.5	3	17.6
Female MPs	0	0	1	20	1	11.1	1	10	4	17.4	2	12.5	3	17.6
Teacher Prof	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	20	2	8.7	2	12.5	2	11.8
Civil Servants	3	100	5	100	9	100	7	70	16	69.6	11	68.8	12	70.6
Public Sector	3	100	5	100	9	100	9	90	19	82.6	13	81.3	14	82.4
Manager Busi	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	4	17.4	1	6.3	1	5.9
Age	43.3		45		44.6		48		46.6		51.2		49.4	
Age Newcom	43.3		45.8		44		50		43.8		52.7		43	
Mandates	1		1.2		1.3		1.9		1.6		2.3		2.4	
Newcomers	3	100	4	80	7	77.8	4	40	16	69.6	3	18.8	6	35.3
Incumbents	na	na	1	20	2	22.2	5	50	6	26.1	12	75	8	47.1
Exp Founder	na	na	1	20	1	11.1	1	10	1	4.3	0	0		
Core Group	na	na	na	na	1	11.1	2	20	3	13	4	25	7	41.2
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	1	11.1	2	20	4	17.4	5	31.3	8	47.1
Liberal Jobs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4.3	1	6.3	1	5.9
Ethn Minority	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6.3	1	5.9
Local Soviet	2	66.7	1	20	4	44.4	4	40	4	17.4	2	12.5	2	11.8
Com Leader	1	33.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	2	66.7	1	20	3	33.3	2	20	2	8.7	0	0	1	5.9
Supr Soviet	1	33.3	0	0	1	11.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	3	100	1	20	3	33.3	6	60	5	21.7	4	25	4	23.5
Com Party M	3	100	3	60	6	66.7	5	50	6	26.1	5	31.3	2	11.8
Dissidents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	1	33.3	2	40	2	22.2	2	20	2	8.7	1	6.3	1	5.9

Annex Table 6.2.1. Latvian MPs as Local Politicians

	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	37	97.4	13	92.9	13	76.5	35	94.6	27	93.1	44	97.8	37	94.9
Law	9	24.3	4	30.8	3	23.1	6	17.1	3	11.1	4	9.1	6	16.2
HuSocEcon	8	21.6	2	15.4	1	7.7	15	42.9	6	22.2	17	38.6	16	43.2
TechNatMed	22	59.5	8	61.5	9	69.2	16	45.7	22	81.5	27	61.4	21	56.8
PhD	4	10.8	2	15.4	2	15.4	2	5.7	2	7.4	5	11.4	4	10.8
Lead Party	2	5.3	1	7.1	3	17.6	10	27	7	24.1	16	35.6	14	35.9
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	2	11.8	7	18.9	4	13.8	7	15.6	5	12.8
Citizens Com	4	10.5	0	0	1	5.9	1	2.7	1	3.4	0	0	0	0
One Above	33	86.8	13	92.9	12	70.6	23	62.2	20	69	28	62.2	24	61.5
Two Above	4	10.5	1	7.1	4	23.5	10	27	6	20.7	12	26.7	11	28.2
Three/More	1	2.6	0	0	1	5.9	4	10.8	3	10.3	5	11.1	4	10.3
Club 21	4	10.5	3	21.4	3	17.6	3	8.1	0	0	1	2.2	0	0
Female MPs	2	5.3	3	21.4	0	0	5	13.5	2	6.9	4	8.9	5	12.8
Teacher Prof	9	23.7	4	28.6	3	17.6	6	16.2	6	20.7	7	15.6	6	15.4
Journ Writer	1	2.6	0	0	0	0	1	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Party Empl	6	15.8	6	42.9	4	23.5	4	10.8	4	13.8	3	6.7	3	7.7
Civil Service	14	36.8	0	0	1	5.9	10	27	2	6.9	16	35.6	8	20.5
Public Sector	32	84.2	11	78.6	10	58.8	27	73	17	58.6	31	68.9	22	56.4
Lawyers	1	2.6	0	0	0	0	1	2.7	0	0	0	0	1	2.6
Judge Prosec	1	2.6	1	7.1	1	5.9	1	2.7	1	3.4	0	0	0	0
Agri Fisher	0	0	1	7.1	2	11.8	1	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manage Busi	3	7.9	0	0	3	17.6	7	18.9	8	27.6	10	22.2	16	41
Liberal Jobs	2	5.3	2	14.3	2	11.8	3	8.1	5	17.2	6	13.3	3	7.7
Age	43.3		50.2		44.3		44.7		47		49.9		50.3	
Age Newcom	43.3		50.4		41		44.4		44.8		48.5		49.4	
Mandates	1		1.5		1.4		1.4		1.8		1.6		1.9	
Newcomers	38	100	7	50	13	76.5	27	73	15	51.7	27	60	19	48.7
Incumbents	na	na	7	50	4	23.5	7	18.9	12	41.4	16	35.6	18	46.2
Exp Founder	na	na	7	50	3	17.6	2	5.4	1	3.4	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	3	17.6	3	8.1	4	13.8	6	13.3	7	17.9
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	3	17.6	4	10.8	5	17.2	8	17.8	11	28.2
Ethn Minority	4	10.5	3	21.4	2	11.8	8	21.6	11	37.9	11	24.4	13	33.3
Local Soviet	17	44.7	7	50	5	29.4	4	10.8	2	6.9	1	2.2	4	10.3
Com Leader	2	5.3	1	7.1	3	17.6	1	2.7	2	6.9	2	4.4	1	2.6
Sov Minister	1	2.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	2	5.3	2	14.3	2	11.8	1	2.7	1	3.4	1	2.2	0	0
Nomenklatura	13	34.2	2	14.3	4	23.5	3	8.1	3	10.3	6	13.3	2	5.1
Com Party M	22	57.9	7	50	7	41.2	8	21.6	6	20.7	5	11.1	2	5.1
Dissidents	3	7.9	0	0	1	5.9	1	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	6	15.8	6	42.9	2	11.8	3	8.1	1	3.4	0	0	1	2.6

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.2.2. Latvian MPs as Political Party Leaders

Parliaments	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	26	92.9	14	82.4	16	80	25	89.3	29	93.5	35	94.6	31	88.6
Law	6	23.1	3	21.4	4	25	5	20	3	10.3	4	11.4	7	22.6
HuSocEcon	7	26.9	3	21.4	5	31.3	8	32	14	48.3	18	51.4	8	25.8
TechNatMed	14	53.8	10	71.4	10	62.5	12	48	14	48.3	16	45.7	18	58.1
PhD	8	30.8	3	21.4	3	18.8	0	0	1	3.4	3	8.6	7	22.6
Local Elect	2	7.1	1	5.9	3	15	10	35.7	7	22.6	16	43.2	14	40
Govern Post	1	3.6	2	11.8	3	15	6	21.4	6	19.4	9	24.3	6	17.1
Citizens Com	5	17.9	3	17.6	5	25	2	7.1	3	9.7	1	2.7	0	0
One Above	21	75	11	64.7	10	50	14	50	18	58.1	17	45.9	19	54.3
Two Above	6	21.4	6	35.3	9	45	10	35.7	10	32.3	15	40.5	12	34.3
Three/More	1	3.6	0	0	1	5	4	14.3	3	9.7	5	13.5	4	11.4
Club 21	1	3.6	2	11.8	1	5	2	7.1	0	0	2	5.4	1	2.9
Female MPs	1	3.6	2	11.8	0	0	6	21.4	4	12.9	6	16.2	4	11.4
Teacher Prof	5	17.9	3	17.6	2	10	1	3.6	2	6.5	2	5.4	7	20
Journ Writer	3	10.7	0	0	1	5	0	0	1	3.2	2	5.4	3	8.6
Party Empl	10	35.7	5	29.4	7	35	5	17.9	5	16.1	5	13.5	9	25.7
Civil Servants	1	3.6	3	17.6	0	0	8	28.6	6	19.4	13	35.1	8	22.9
Public Sector	18	64.3	12	70.6	10	50	13	46.4	14	45.2	20	54.1	21	60
Clergy	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	2	6.5	1	2.7	0	0
Lawyers	2	7.1	1	5.9	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manage Busi	1	3.6	1	5.9	4	20	8	28.6	9	29	7	18.9	6	17.1
Liberal Jobs	6	21.4	3	17.6	4	20	3	10.7	4	12.9	5	13.5	0	0
Age	46.3		46.4		45.9		43.1		46.1		49.9		48.5	
Age Newcom	46.3		41.1		46.7		42		43.2		49.7		44.3	
Mandates	1		1.4		1.6		1.4		1.8		1.9		1.8	
Newcomers	28	100	10	58.8	12	60	21	75	13	41.9	17	45.9	19	54.3
Incumbents	na	na	7	41.2	6	30	5	17.9	15	48.4	16	43.2	14	40
Exp Founder	na	na	7	41.2	3	15	1	3.6	1	3.2	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	3	15	2	7.1	3	9.7	8	21.6	6	17.1
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	3	15	3	10.7	4	12.9	11	29.7	8	22.9
Ethn Minority	3	10.7	1	5.9	1	5	2	7.1	2	6.5	5	13.5	5	14.3
Local Soviet	1	3.6	3	17.6	0	0	1	3.6	1	3.2	1	2.7	1	2.9
Com Leader	2	7.1	2	11.8	4	20	1	3.6	3	9.7	2	5.4	2	5.7
Sov Minister	2	7.1	2	11.8	1	5	1	3.6	2	6.5	1	2.7	0	0
Supr Soviet	4	14.3	2	11.8	2	10	0	0	1	3.2	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	5	17.9	3	17.6	5	25	3	10.7	4	12.9	6	16.2	3	8.6
Com Party M	11	39.3	7	41.2	8	40	2	7.1	4	12.9	4	10.8	3	8.6
Dissidents	3	10.7	2	11.8	2	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	4	14.3	5	29.4	2	10	1	3.6	2	6.5	1	2.7	0	0

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.2.3. Latvian MPs as Cabinet Ministers

Parliaments	1990		1993		1995		1998		2002		2006		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	2	100	8	100	12	100	13	100	11	100	14	100	12	100
Law	0	0	0	0	3	25	1	7.7	0	0	3	21.4	4	33.3
HuSocEcon	1	50	3	37.5	3	25	7	53.8	5	45.5	9	64.3	4	33.3
TechNatMed	1	50	5	62.5	7	58.3	5	38.5	6	54.5	4	28.6	5	41.7
PhD	0	0	2	25	2	16.7	0	0	0	0	2	14.3	1	8.3
Local Elect	0	0	0	0	2	16.7	7	53.8	4	36.4	7	50	5	41.7
Lead Party	1	50	2	25	3	25	6	46.2	6	54.5	9	64.3	6	50
Citizens Com	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
One Above	1	50	6	75	8	66.7	4	30.8	4	36.4	3	21.4	5	41.7
Two Above	1	50	2	25	3	25	5	38.5	4	36.4	6	42.9	3	25
Three/More	0	0	0	0	1	8.3	4	30.8	3	27.3	5	35.7	4	33.3
Club 21	0	0	5	62.5	2	16.7	1	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Female MPs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	21.4	1	8.3
Teacher Prof	0	0	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Journ Writer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Party Empl	0	0	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8.3
Civil Service	2	100	7	87.5	7	58.3	9	69.2	7	63.6	11	78.6	10	83.3
Public Sector	2	100	7	87.5	9	75	10	76.9	8	72.7	12	85.7	10	83.3
Military	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7.7	1	9.1	1	7.1	0	0
Lawyers	0	0	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agri Fisher	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manage Busi	0	0	1	12.5	1	8.3	2	15.4	3	27.3	2	14.3	1	8.3
Liberal Jobs	0	0	0	0	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Age	49.5		45.4		46.8		46.6		55.2		48.4		48.2	
Age Newcom	49.5		43		45.8		46.7		62.5		46.3		48.5	
Mandates	1		1.3		1.4		1.3		2.1		1.5		1.9	
Newcomers	2	100	6	75	8	66.7	10	76.9	2	18.2	10	71.4	4	33.3
Incumbents	na	na	2	25	4	33.3	3	23.1	7	63.6	3	21.4	6	50
Exp Founder	na	na	2	25	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	1	8.3	1	7.7	1	9.1	3	21.4	0	0
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	1	8.3	1	7.7	2	18.2	3	21.4	3	25
Ethn Minority	1	50	2	25	2	16.7	2	15.4	1	9.1	0	0	0	0
Local Soviet	1	50	2	25	0	0	0	0	2	18.2	0	0	0	0
Com Leader	2	100	2	25	3	25	0	0	1	9.1	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	2	100	3	37.5	2	16.7	2	15.4	2	18.2	1	7.1	0	0
Supr Soviet	2	100	2	25	2	16.7	1	7.7	1	9.1	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	2	100	3	37.5	6	50	3	23.1	3	27.3	2	14.3	2	16.7
Com Party M	2	100	7	87.5	7	58.3	1	7.7	1	9.1	1	7.1	1	8.3
Dissidents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	2	100	2	25	1	8.3	1	7.7	1	9.1	0	0	0	0

Annex Table 6.3.1. Lithuanian MPs as Local Politicians

Parliaments	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	6	100	11	68.8	42	93.3	64	91.4	61	93.8	61	91	72	94.7
Law	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.6	4	6.6	5	8.2	8	11.1
HuSocEcon	3	50	1	9.1	13	31	26	40.6	34	55.7	31	50.8	38	52.8
TechNatMed	3	50	10	90.9	30	71.4	42	65.6	39	63.9	37	60.7	37	51.4
PhD	0	0	1	9.1	6	14.3	5	7.8	6	9.8	5	8.2	7	9.7
Lead Party	1	16.7	1	6.3	10	22.2	23	32.9	22	33.8	21	31.3	19	25
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	5.7	2	3.1	2	3	4	5.3
One Above	5	83.3	15	93.8	35	77.8	46	65.7	42	64.6	45	67.2	55	72.4
Two Above	1	16.7	1	6.3	10	22.2	21	30	22	33.8	22	32.8	20	26.3
Three/More	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4.3	1	1.5	0	0	1	1.3
Female MPs	2	33.3	0	0	6	13.3	4	5.7	9	13.8	9	13.4	18	23.7
Teacher Prof	0	0	0	0	3	6.7	6	8.6	7	10.8	5	7.5	5	6.6
Journ Writer	0	0	1	6.3	2	4.4	1	1.4	0	0	2	3	1	1.3
Party Empl	4	66.7	2	12.5	9	20	6	8.6	10	15.4	13	19.4	12	15.8
Civil Service	1	16.7	4	25	19	42.2	16	22.9	16	24.6	22	32.8	22	28.9
Public Sector	6	100	13	81.3	36	80	35	70	39	60	41	61.2	45	59.2
Lawyers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.5	1	1.3
Agri Fisher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1	1.3
Manage Busi	0	0	6	37.5	6	13.3	35	50	25	38.5	15	22.4	25	32.9
Liberal Jobs	1	16.7	3	18.8	6	13.3	6	8.6	7	10.8	7	10.4	7	9.2
Age	46		48.8		45.5		45.5		48.3		50.2		52.5	
Age Newcom	46		48.1		44.4		44.9		49.0		46.0		48.5	
Mandates	1		1.1		1.2		1.2		1.6		2		2.2	
Newcomers	6	100	15	93.8	39	86.7	59	84.3	33	50.8	25	37.3	34	44.7
Incumbents	na	na	1	6.3	6	13.3	10	14.3	27	41.5	37	55.2	34	44.7
Exp Founder	na	na	1	6.3	1	2.2	1	1.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	1	2.2	3	4.3	6	9.2	14	20.9	24	31.6
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	1	2.2	3	4.3	8	12.3	19	28.4	30	39.5
Ethn Minority	2	33.3	1	6.3	1	2.2	7	10	5	7.7	3	4.5	10	13.2
Local Soviet	6	100	8	50	5	11.1	14	20	15	23.1	8	11.9	12	15.8
Com Leader	4	66.7	2	12.5	2	4.4	8	11.4	5	7.7	3	4.5	1	1.3
Sov Minister	0	0	0	0	1	2.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	0	0	0	0	2	4.4	0	0	1	1.5	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	5	83.3	10	62.5	5	11.1	16	22.9	14	21.5	6	9	8	10.5
Com Party M	5	83.3	11	68.8	9	20	15	21.4	15	23.1	7	10.4	7	9.2
Dissidents	0	0	1	6.3	3	6.7	2	2.9	2	3.1	2	3	1	1.3
Repr Parents	0	0	2	12.5	4	8.9	1	1.4	3	4.6	4	6	5	6.6

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.3.2. Lithuanian MPs as Political Party Leaders

Parliaments	1990		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	17	94.4	31	88.6	33	89.2	46	95.8	35	94.6	36	94.7	34	97.1
Law	1	5.9	3	9.7	2	6.1	2	4.3	4	11.4	5	13.9	6	17.6
HuSocEcon	10	58.8	14	45.2	15	45.5	28	60.9	15	42.9	18	50	18	52.9
TechNatMed	9	52.9	18	58.1	17	51.5	23	50	21	60	17	47.2	16	47.1
PhD	6	35.3	17	54.8	12	36.4	12	26.1	8	22.9	7	19.4	10	29.4
Local Elect	1	5.6	1	2.9	10	27	23	47.9	22	59.5	21	55.3	19	54.3
Govern Post	0	0	0	0	1	2.7	3	6.3	3	8.1	1	2.6	1	2.9
One Above	17	94.4	34	97.1	26	70.3	25	52.1	13	35.1	17	44.7	17	48.6
Two Above	1	5.6	1	2.9	11	29.7	20	41.7	23	62.2	21	55.3	17	48.6
Three/More	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6.3	1	2.7	0	0	1	2.9
Female MPs	1	5.6	0	0	3	8.1	5	10.4	7	18.9	5	13.2	7	20
Teacher Prof	4	22.2	11	31.4	8	21.6	11	22.9	6	16.2	7	18.4	7	20
Journ Writer	1	5.6	2	5.7	2	5.4	2	4.2	0	0	2	5.3	1	2.9
Party Empl	9	50	13	37.1	12	32.4	7	14.6	9	24.3	12	31.6	10	28.6
Civil Service	0	0	2	5.7	4	10.8	6	12.5	9	24.3	10	26.3	6	17.1
Public Sector	16	88.9	28	80	27	73	28	58.3	23	62.2	23	60.5	23	65.7
Lawyers	0	0	0	0	1	2.7	1	2.1	1	2.7	0	0	1	2.9
Judge Prosec	0	0	1	2.9	1	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2.9
Agri Fisher	0	0	1	2.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue Collar	0	0	1	2.9	1	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manage Busi	1	5.6	0	0	2	5.4	16	33.3	8	21.6	4	10.5	7	20
Liberal Jobs	3	16.7	4	11.4	6	16.2	4	8.3	4	10.8	3	7.9	2	5.7
Age	49.6		49.3		49.0		46.9		48.6		48.8		53.8	
Age Newcom	49.6		48.0		44.4		44.2		46.2		44.5		50.5	
Mandates	1		1.3		1.7		1.6		2.0		2.4		2.9	
Newcomers	18	100	25	71.4	14	37.8	32	66.7	14	37.8	13	34.2	6	17.1
Incumbents	na	na	10	28.6	21	56.8	13	27.1	19	51.4	21	55.3	20	57.1
Exp Founder	na	na	10	28.6	5	13.5	3	6.3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	5	13.5	9	18.8	6	16.2	12	31.6	14	40
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	5	13.5	9	18.8	9	24.3	17	44.7	20	57.1
Ethn Minority	4	22.2	3	8.6	2	5.4	4	8.3	2	5.4	2	5.3	4	11.4
Local Soviet	7	38.9	3	8.6	0	0	1	2.1	4	10.8	2	5.3	3	8.6
Com Leader	9	50	8	22.9	3	8.1	3	6.3	3	8.1	2	5.3	4	11.4
Sov Minister	3	16.7	1	2.9	0	0	1	2.1	1	2.7	0	0	1	2.9
Supr Soviet	6	33.3	4	11.4	1	2.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	9	50	13	37.1	6	16.2	7	14.6	6	16.2	3	7.9	6	17.1
Com Party M	10	55.6	13	37.1	6	16.2	8	16.7	6	16.2	3	7.9	6	17.1
Dissidents	2	11.1	6	17.1	7	18.9	4	8.3	3	8.1	3	7.9	2	5.7
Repr Parents	1	5.6	3	8.6	4	10.8	4	8.3	2	5.4	3	7.9	4	11.4

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs in the respective legislature, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.3.3. Lithuanian MPs as Cabinet Ministers

Parliaments	1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Univ Educat	1	100	6	100	6	100	6	100	4	100	5	100
Law	0	0	1	16.7	0	0	1	16.7	2	50	1	20
HuSocEcon	1	100	2	33.3	3	50	4	66.7	1	25	2	40
TechNatMed	0	0	3	50	3	50	2	33.3	1	25	2	40
PhD	1	100	4	66.7	2	33.3	3	50	2	50	3	60
Local Elect	0	0	0	0	4	66.7	2	33.3	2	50	4	80
Lead Party	0	0	1	16.7	3	50	3	50	1	25	1	20
One Above	1	100	5	83.3	2	33.3	2	33.3	1	25	1	20
Two Above	0	0	1	16.7	1	16.7	3	50	3	75	3	60
Three/More	0	0	0	0	3	50	1	16.7	0	0	1	20
Female MPs	1	100	1	16.7	0	0	1	16.7	1	25	0	0
Journ Writer	0	0	1	16.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Party Empl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	20
Civil Service	1	100	3	50	2	33.3	2	33.3	1	25	0	0
Public Sector	1	100	5	83.3	3	50	3	50	2	50	2	40
Lawyers	0	0	1	16.7	0	0	0	0	1	25	1	20
Manage Busi	0	0	0	0	3	50	3	50	1	25	2	40
Liberal Jobs	0	0	1	16.7	1	16.7	1	16.7	1	25	1	20
Age	53		56		50.2		51.2		53.8		56.6	
Age Newcom	53		55.8		46.5		50		50		52	
Mandates	1		1.2		1.3		1.7		2.5		2.6	
Newcomers	1	100	5	83.3	4	66.7	3	50	1	25	2	40
Incumbents	na	na	1	16.7	2	33.3	3	50	3	75	3	60
Exp Founder	na	na	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Core Group	na	na	na	na	0	0	1	16.7	2	50	2	40
Core Group 2	na	na	na	na	0	0	1	16.7	2	50	2	40
Ethn Minority	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local Soviet	0	0	1	16.7	2	33.3	2	33.3	1	25	2	40
Com Leader	0	0	2	33.3	1	16.7	1	16.7	0	0	0	0
Sov Minister	0	0	2	33.3	1	16.7	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supr Soviet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	0	0	3	50	2	33.3	2	33.3	1	25	2	40
Com Party M	0	0	3	50	2	33.3	2	33.3	1	25	2	40
Dissidents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repr Parents	1	100	2	33.3	1	16.7	1	16.7	1	25	1	20

Annex Table 6.5.1. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1a (in per cent)

MPs as Local Politicians	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010	Lithuania 1990-2012
University Education	97	94	92.6
Law Degree	11.2	20.4	3.6
Humanities & Social Sciences	45.7	31.7	42.4
TechNatMed	46.6	61.3	68.8
PhD	9.9	10.6	8.5
Women	19.1	11.2	11.2
Ethnic Minority	10.9	27	8.7
Teachers, Professors	8.3	21.1	7
Journalists, Writers	6.5	1.3	2.1
Political Party Employees	13	13.2	14.9
Civil Servants	33	17.1	28.1
Military	0.4	0	0
Priests	0.4	0	0
Lawyers	4	2	0
Judges, Prosecutors	2.2	3.3	0
Agriculture	3	2.6	1.2
Blue-Collar Workers	0.4	0	0
Managers, Businessmen	21.3	21.7	32.2
Liberal Professions	3.5	10.5	13.6
Public Sector	73	69.1	63.6
Age	46.9	46.8	49.1
Parliamentary Mandates	1.5	1.6	1.6
Newcomers	63.9	65.8	63.6
Incumbents	31.4	37.8	32.5
Experienced Founders	1.9	10.9	1.3
Core Group	10.3	16	14.4
Core Group 2	11.8	22.6	18
Local Soviets	13.9	22.4	22.3
Communist Party Leadership	3.5	7.2	8.7
Council of Ministers	1.7	0.7	0.4
Supreme Soviet	1.3	5.9	1.2
Nomenklatura	22.6	17.8	21.9
Communist Party Member	40	33.6	24.4
Dissident	0	3.3	0
Parents Repressed	4.8	10.5	5.4

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.5.2. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1b (in per cent)

MPs as Political Party Leaders	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010	Lithuania 1990-2012
University Education	90.5	84.4	95.9
Law Degree	15.8	21.7	8.5
Humanities & Social Sciences	55.3	45.7	50
TechNatMed	34.2	44.6	55.6
PhD	26.3	18.5	43
Women	16.7	15.6	3.4
Ethnic Minority	2.4	7.3	8.8
Teachers, Professors	17.1	14.3	30.4
Journalists, Writers	9.8	9.5	5.4
Political Party Employees	26.8	28.6	35.1
Civil Servants	7.3	8.6	1.4
Military	0	0	0
Priests	4.9	3.8	0
Lawyers	0	1	2
Judges, Prosecutors	0	0	2
Agriculture	2.4	0	0.7
Blue-Collar Workers	0	0	1.4
Managers, Businessmen	29.3	21.9	6.1
Liberal Professions	2.4	10.5	14.9
Public Sector	64.3	44	69.6
Age	41.8	45.8	50.9
Parliamentary Mandates	1.6	1.6	2
Newcomers	64.3	62.4	43.9
Incumbents	37.8	37.5	52.7
Experienced Founders	0	5.7	13.7
Core Group	20	14.3	33
Core Group 2	20	18.2	42.3
Local Soviets	4.8	0	6.1
Communist Party Leadership	7.1	10.1	18.2
Council of Ministers	0	1.8	4.7
Supreme Soviet	4.8	1.8	7.4
Nomenklatura	14.3	14.7	28.4
Communist Party Member	31	22.9	30.4
Dissident	2.4	5.5	10.8
Parents Repressed	21.4	5.5	10.1

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.5.3. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1c (in per cent)

MPs as Cabinet Ministers	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010	Lithuania 1990-2012
University Education	100	100	100
Law Degree	58.3	12.9	0
Humanities & Social Sciences	16.7	45.2	33.3
TechNatMed	25	48.4	66.7
PhD	16.7	9.7	75
Women	25	3.2	16.7
Ethnic Minority	0	22.6	0
Teachers, Professors	16.7	0	0
Journalists, Writers	0	0	8.3
Political Party Employees	0	0	0
Civil Servants	83.3	77.4	41.7
Military	0	9.7	0
Priests	0	0	0
Lawyers	0	3.2	0
Judges, Prosecutors	0	0	0
Agriculture	0	3.2	0
Blue-Collar Workers	0	0	0
Managers, Businessmen	0	6.5	8.3
Liberal Professions	0	0	41.7
Public Sector	100	90.3	91.7
Age	44.8	49.1	55.3
Parliamentary Mandates	1.4	1.6	2
Newcomers	66.7	58.1	50
Incumbents	27.3	36.7	50
Experienced Founders	0	6.7	0
Core Group	9.1	16.7	27.3
Core Group 2	9.1	20.8	27.3
Local Soviets	0	0	16.7
Communist Party Leadership	0	9.7	25
Council of Ministers	0	16.1	25
Supreme Soviet	0	12.9	0
Nomenklatura	0	35.5	33.3
Communist Party Member	9.1	41.9	33.3
Dissident	0	0	0
Parents Repressed	0	9.7	58.3

Annex Table 6.5.4. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 1d (in per cent)

MPs as Members of Citizens' Committees	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010
University Education	86.4	82.4
Law	0	0
Humanities & Social Sciences	57.9	71.4
TechNatMed	42.1	35.7
PhD	36.8	7.1
Women	4.4	0
Ethnic Minority	0	0
Teachers, Professors	20.5	17.6
Journalists, Writers	18.2	0
Political Party Employees	2.3	29.4
Civil Servants	34.1	0
Military	2.3	0
Priests	0	0
Lawyers	0	0
Judges	0	0
Agriculture	4.5	11.8
Blue-Collar Workers	0	0
Managers	11.4	5.9
Liberal Professions	4.5	35.3
Public Sector	84.4	64.7
Age	48.5	46.1
Parliamentary Mandates	2.1	2.1
Newcomers	48.9	47.1
Incumbents	57.6	50.0
Exp Founders	45.5	10.0
Core Group	57.1	37.5
Core Group 2	66.7	62.5
Local Soviet	8.9	0
Communist Party Leadership	0	0
Council of Ministers	0	0
Supreme Soviet	15.6	0
Nomenklatura	20	0
Communist Party Membership	31.1	5.9
Dissident	17.8	29.4
Parents Repressed	0	29.4

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.5.5. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2a (in per cent)

MPs as Local Politicians & Political Party Leaders	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010	Lithuania 1990-2012
University Education	95	88.6	89
Law Degree	15.8	6.5	9.9
Humanities & Social Sciences	43.9	22.6	53.1
TechNatMed	45.6	74.2	51.9
PhD	8.8	9.7	8.6
Women	11.7	8.6	23.1
Ethnic Minority	3.3	31.4	8.8
Teachers, Professors	11.7	17.6	9.9
Journalists, Writers	6.7	0	2.2
Political Party Employees	36.7	20.6	20.9
Civil Servants	25.0	23.5	33
Military	0	0	0
Priests	3.3	0	0
Lawyers	1.7	0	0
Judges, Prosecutors	0	0	0
Agriculture	0	0	0
Blue-Collar Workers	0	0	0
Managers, Businessmen	10	17.6	29.7
Liberal Professions	5	17.6	4.4
Public Sector	68.3	68.6	65.9
Age	44	50.7	46.7
Parliamentary Mandates	1.5	1.4	1.8
Newcomers	66.7	74.3	54.9
Incumbents	35.2	23.5	36.7
Experienced Founders	5.6	0	0
Core Group	16.3	9.1	15.7
Core Group 2	16.3	9.1	21.3
Local Soviets	16.7	11.4	9.9
Communist Party Leadership	5	0	4.4
Council of Ministers	0	0	0
Supreme Soviet	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	13.3	8.6	6.6
Communist Party Member	35	8.6	5.5
Dissident	5	0	12.1
Parents Repressed	3.3	5.7	6.6

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.5.6. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2b (in per cent)

MPs as Local Politicians & Cabinet Ministers	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010	Lithuania 1990-2012
University Education	100	100	100
Law Degree	6.7	0	28.6
Humanities & Social Sciences	50	62.5	71.4
TechNatMed	43.3	37.5	0
PhD	6.7	0	28.6
Women	3.3	0	0
Ethnic Minority	6.7	12.5	0
Teachers, Professors	3.3	0	0
Journalists, Writers	0	0	0
Political Party Employees	0	0	0
Civil Servants	56.7	87.5	0
Military	0	0	0
Priests	0	0	0
Lawyers	0	0	28.6
Judges, Prosecutors	0	0	0
Agriculture	0	0	0
Blue-Collar Workers	0	0	0
Managers, Businessmen	23.3	12.5	71.4
Liberal Professions	10	0	0
Public Sector	63.3	87.5	0
Age	49	44.9	56.3
Parliamentary Mandates	1.5	1.3	2
Newcomers	60	75	42.9
Incumbents	33.3	25	57.1
Experienced Founders	0	0	0
Core Group	10	0	28.6
Core Group 2	13.3	0	28.6
Local Soviets	26.7	12.5	57.1
Communist Party Leadership	0	0	0
Council of Ministers	0	0	0
Supreme Soviet	0	0	0
Nomenklatura	36.7	0	57.1
Communist Party Member	36.7	0	57.1
Dissident	0	0	0
Parents Repressed	0	12.5	0

Annex Table 6.5.7. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2c (in per cent)

MPs as Political Party Leaders & Cabinet Ministers	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010	Lithuania 1990-2012
University Education	100	100	100
Law Degree	29.4	25	75
Humanities & Social Sciences	47.1	56.3	25
TechNatMed	23.5	31.3	25
PhD	35.3	25	50
Women	41.2	12.5	50
Ethnic Minority	0	0	0
Teachers, Professors	0	6.3	0
Journalists, Writers	0	0	0
Political Party Employees	0	0	0
Civil Servants	100	87.5	75
Military	0	0	0
Priests	0	0	0
Lawyers	0	0	25
Judges, Prosecutors	0	0	0
Agriculture	0	0	0
Blue-Collar Workers	0	0	0
Managers, Businessmen	0	0	0
Liberal Professions	0	6.3	0
Public Sector	100	93.8	75
Age	50.2	53.4	49.5
Parliamentary Mandates	2.9	1.6	1.3
Newcomers	23.5	56.3	75
Incumbents	68.8	40	25
Experienced Founders	23.5	6.7	0
Core Group	57.1	7.7	0
Core Group 2	64.3	15.4	0
Local Soviets	35.3	25	25
Communist Party Leadership	0	25	25
Council of Ministers	35.3	43.8	0
Supreme Soviet	0	25	0
Nomenklatura	35.3	50	25
Communist Party Member	64.7	31.3	25
Dissident	0	0	0
Parents Repressed	64.7	18.8	0

Annex Table 6.5.8. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2d (in per cent)

MPs as Local Politicians & Members of Citizens' Committees	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010
University Education	100	100
Law	15.8	16.7
Humanities & Social Sciences	47.4	66.7
TechNatMed	42.1	16.7
PhD	13.2	50
Women	10.5	0
Ethnic Minority	13.2	0
Teachers, Professors	18.4	50
Journalists, Writers	10.5	0
Political Party Employees	5.3	16.7
Civil Servants	34.2	33.3
Military	0	0
Priests	5.3	0
Lawyers	5.3	0
Judges	2.6	0
Agriculture	0	0
Blue-Collar Workers	0	0
Businessmen, Managers	13.2	0
Liberal Professions	2.6	0
Public Sector	89.5	83.3
Age	47.8	44.2
Parliamentary Mandates	1.5	1.5
Newcomers	60.5	66.7
Incumbents	37.9	66.7
Exp Founders	10.3	0
Core group	13	33.3
Core group2	17.4	33.3
Local soviets	18.4	16.7
Communist Party Leadership	0	0
Council of Ministers	0	0
Supreme Soviet	0	0
Nomenklatura	21.1	16.7
Communist Party Member	34.2	16.7
Dissident	10.5	16.7
Parents Repressed	15.8	16.7

Annex Table 6.5.9. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2e (in per cent)

MPs as Political Party Leaders & Members of Citizens' Committees	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010
University Education	84.1	100
Law	21.6	16.7
Humanities & Social Sciences	45.9	5.6
TechNatMed	43.2	77.8
PhD	21.6	5.6
Women	0	0
Ethnic Minority	0	0
Teachers, Professors	23.3	0
Journalists, Writers	14	0
Political Party Employees	23.3	38.9
Civil Servants	0	0
Military	0	0
Priests	2.3	0
Lawyers	7	16.7
Judges, Prosecutors	0	0
Agriculture	14	0
Blue-Collar Workers	0	0
Businessmen, Managers	4.7	0
Liberal Professions	11.6	44.4
Public Sector	77.3	66.7
Age	47.3	41.7
Parliamentary Mandates	1.9	2.2
Newcomers	45.5	38.9
Incumbents	68.6	71.4
Exp Founders	37.1	42.9
Core group	63.2	54.5
Core group2	63.2	63.6
Local Soviets	9.1	0
Communist Party Leadership	0	0
Council of Ministers	0	0
Supreme Soviet	6.8	16.7
Nomenklatura	31.8	0
Communist Party Membership	34.1	22.2
Dissident	20.5	5.6
Parents Repressed	15.9	22.2

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 6.5.10. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 2f (in per cent)

MPs as Cabinet Mnisters & Members of Citizens' Committees	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010
University Education	100	No observations
Law	0	
Humanities & Social Sciences	100	
TechNatMed	0	
PhD	0	
Women	0	
Ethnic Minority	0	
Teachers, Professors	0	
Journalists, Writers	0	
Political Party Employees	0	
Civil Servants	100	
Military	0	
Priests	0	
Lawyers	0	
Judges, Prosecutors	0	
Agriculture	0	
Blue-Collar Workers	0	
Businessmen, Managers	0	
Liberal Professions	0	
Public Sector	100	
Age	51.2	
Parliamentary Mandates	2.2	
Newcomers	40	
Incumbents	50	
Exp Founders	100	
Core group	33.3	
Core group2	66.7	
Local Soviets	0	
Communist Party Leadership	0	
Council of Ministers	0	
Supreme Soviet	0	
Nomenklatura	20	
Communist Party Membership	20	
Dissident	0	
Parents Repressed	0	

Annex Table 6.5.11. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 3a (in per cent)

MPs as Local Politicians, Political Party Leaders & Cabinet Ministers	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010	Lithuania 1990-2012
University Education	100	100	100
Law Degree	29.4	17.6	0
Humanities & Social Sciences	17.6	23.5	60
TechNatMed	47.1	58.8	40
PhD	23.5	0	40
Women	0	5.9	0
Ethnic Minority	0	0	0
Teachers, Professors	23.5	0	0
Journalists, Writers	0	0	0
Political Party Employees	0	11.8	20
Civil Servants	76.5	47.1	20
Military	0	0	0
Priests	0	0	0
Lawyers	0	0	0
Judges, Prosecutors	0	0	0
Agriculture	0	0	0
Blue-Collar Workers	0	0	0
Managers, Businessmen	0	41.2	60
Liberal Professions	0	0	0
Public Sector	100	47.1	40
Age	43.4	44.5	48
Parliamentary Mandates	1.8	1.6	1.2
Newcomers	52.9	52.9	80
Incumbents	50	35.3	20
Experienced Founders	0	0	0
Core Group	26.7	5.9	0
Core Group 2	26.7	17.6	0
Local Soviets	29.4	0	20
Communist Party Leadership	5.9	5.9	0
Council of Ministers	29.4	0	0
Supreme Soviet	5.9	0	0
Nomenklatura	47.1	11.8	20
Communist Party Member	35.3	11.8	20
Dissident	0	0	0
Parents Repressed	0	0	0

Annex Table 6.5.12. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience: Type 3b (in per cent)

MPs as Local Politicians, Party Leaders & Members of Citizens' Committees	Estonia 1990-2011	Latvia 1990-2010
University Education	88.2	1 observation only
Law Degree	0	
Humanities & Social Sciences	20	
TechNatMed	80	
PhD	60	
Women	41.2	
Ethnic Minority	0	
Teachers, Professors	47.1	
Journalists, Writers	0	
Political Party Employees	5.9	
Civil Servants	0	
Military	0	
Priests	0	
Lawyers	0	
Judges, Prosecutors	0	
Agriculture	5.9	
Blue-Collar Workers	23.5	
Managers, Businessmen	11.8	
Liberal Professions	5.9	
Public Sector	94.1	
Age	50.5	
Parliamentary Mandates	1.7	
Newcomers	58.8	
Incumbents	60	
Experienced Founders	50	
Core group	50	
Core group2	66.7	
Local Soviets	11.8	
Communist Party Leadership Council of	0	
Ministers	0	
Supreme Soviet	5.9	
Nomenklatura	5.9	
Communist Party Member	35.3	
Dissident	17.6	
Parents Repressed	5.9	

Note: Percentages for law, humanities and social sciences, technical and natural sciences, medicine and PhD refer not to all MPs, but only to those who have university or comparable degrees.

Annex Table 7.1.1. Estonian Legislators with University Education (in per cent)

	Law N=84	Humanities & Social Sciences N=294	Technical and Natural Sciences N=311
Doctorate	9.5	20.7	22.5
Local Elective Background	56	57.8	59.5
Leading Party Position	39.3	26.2	25.7
Cabinet Minister	22.6	11.6	9.3
Congress of Estonia	16.7	22.4	19.6
No Political Experience	13.1	16.7	21.9
One Type of Experience	45.2	50	43.7
Two Types of Experience	30.0	31	25.7
Three Types of Experience	5.0	2.4	6.4
Female Gender	20.2	22.4	9.3
Teachers, Professors	15.5	19.4	15.8
Journalists, Writers	2.4	13.3	2.6
Political Party Employees	11.9	15	10.3
Civil Servants	36.9	26.5	28.9
Military	1.2	0	1.9
Clergy	0	3.4	0
Lawyers	20.2	0	0
Judges	4.8	0.3	0.6
Primary Sector	1.2	0	3.5
Managers, Businessmen	4.8	12.6	24.4
Liberal Professions	0	4.4	8.7
Public Sector	72.6	73.5	83.6
Age	44.9	46.4	49.3
Mean Number of Elections	1.63	1.65	1.57
Newcomers	60.7	58.5	63
Incumbents	39.7	37.9	37.9
Exp Founder	8.2	6.4	9.8
Core Group 1	21	17.8	18.5
Core Group 2	22.6	21.9	20.8
Ethnic Minority	8.3	7.1	10
Soviet Local Politics	16.7	10.9	17
Soviet Party Leader	2.4	4.4	2.9
Soviet Minister	0	4.4	1.6
Soviet Supreme Council	6	4.1	5.8
Soviet Nomenklatura	27.4	20.1	31.2
Soviet Communist Party	48.8	31.6	42.8
Dissident	1.2	6.1	1.9
Parents Repressed	7.1	8.2	8.0

Annex Table 7.1.2. Latvian Legislators with University Education (in per cent)

	Law N=101	Humanities & Social Sciences N=292	Technical and Natural Sciences N=400
Doctorate	16.8	11.6	13.3
Local Elective Background	34.7	22.3	31.3
Leading Party Position	31.7	21.6	23.5
Cabinet Minister	10.9	11	8.3
Citizens' Committee	4	5.1	5.3
No Political Experience	34.7	51.4	48.8
One Type of Experience	52.5	38	37
Two Types of Experience	9.9	8.9	11.5
Three Types of Experience	3	1.4	2.8
Female Gender	15.8	24.3	5.5
Teachers, Professors	22.8	24.3	17
Journalists, Writers	1	14.7	3
Political Party Employees	9.9	6.8	13.8
Civil Servants	23.8	25	13.8
Military	0	0	2.3
Clergy	0	2.7	0.3
Lawyers	20.8	0.7	0
Judges	10.9	1.4	0
Primary Sector	0	0.3	1.8
Managers, Businessmen	5.9	15.4	30
Liberal Professions	2	4.5	16.3
Public Sector	78.2	71.2	64
Age	44.1	47.0	47.4
Mean Number of Elections	1.72	1.54	1.61
Newcomers	60.4	64.7	65
Incumbents	44.3	37.3	41.8
Exp Founder	25.3	7.1	11.8
Core Group 1	25	18	21.2
Core Group 2	31.3	19.5	27.4
Ethnic Minority	16.8	15.4	22.8
Soviet Local Politics	11.9	2.7	7.5
Soviet Party Leader	1	5.1	8.8
Soviet Minister	1	3.8	2
Soviet Supreme Council	8.9	5.1	5.3
Soviet Nomenklatura	7.9	16.1	20.3
Soviet Communist Party	35.6	26	37.8
Dissident	5	4.5	1.3
Parents Repressed	17.8	5.5	7.5

Annex Table 7.1.3. Lithuanian MPs with University Education (in per cent)

	Law N=84	Humanities & Social Sciences N=434	Technical & Natural Sciences N=480
Doctorate	17.9	27.2	27.9
Local Elective Background	21.4	33.6	41.3
Leading Party Position	27.4	27.2	25.8
Cabinet Minister	6	3	2.3
No Political Experience	60.7	48.8	40.6
One Type of Experience	23.8	39.2	50
Two Types of Experience	15.5	11.3	9
Three Types of Experience	0	0.7	0.4
Female Gender	15.5	23.7	10.2
Teachers, Professors	22.6	28.1	21
Journalists, Writers	2.4	8.1	1.9
Political Party Employees	10.7	15.2	12.5
Civil Servants	17.9	15.9	16
Military	0	0	0
Clergy	0	0.2	0
Lawyers	21.4	0.5	0
Judges	16.7	0	0
Primary Sector	0	0.2	0.6
Managers, Businessmen	6	25.3	27.3
Liberal Professions	2.4	5.1	20
Public Sector	77.4	68.9	72.5
Age	46.6	48.8	50.1
Mean Number of Elections	1.64	1.80	1.67
Newcomers	63.1	56.5	60.4
Incumbents	38.8	41.3	37
Exp Founder	9	9.1	7.2
Core Group 1	22.4	23.6	20.1
Core Group 2	27.6	26.9	25.4
Ethnic Minority	8.3	7.4	7.9
Soviet Local Politics	11.9	13.6	14.8
Soviet Party Leader	6	13.8	8.5
Soviet Minister	8.3	2.3	2.7
Soviet Supreme Council	8.3	4.1	2.5
Soviet Nomenklatura	23.8	22.4	20.6
Soviet Communist Party	34.5	27.6	26.9
Dissident	0	4.8	5.2
Parents Repressed	4.8	8.8	10

Annex Table 8.1. Electoral Volatility in Estonia (per cent), by Political Party Families

	1990-92	1992-95	1995-99	1999-03	2003-07	2007-11	
Communists	6.7	0	0	0	0	0	
Social Dem.	3.3	6	10.9	10.9	4	8.9	
Greens	4.7	1	0	0	5.9	5.9	
Agrarians	13.3	0	6.9	6	7	0	
Left Liberals	1.6	39.6	28.7	0	1	3	
Right Liberals	1	17.8	6	6	11.9	2	
Conservatives	28.7	15.8	4.9	16.9	15.9	4	
Extreme Right	17.8	17.8	0	0	0	0	
Ethnic Minority	6.7	5.9	0	5.9	0	0	
Other	3.5	7.9	0	0	0	0	
No Party	7.6	0	0	0	0	0	
Liberals	5.7	0	0	0	0	0	
Christian Dem.	5.7	0	0	0	0	0	
Popular Front	1.6	14.9	---	---	---	---	
SUM	97.9	126.7	57.4	45.7	45.7	23.8	Average
VOLATILITY	49	63.4	28.7	22.9	22.9	11.9	33.1

Annex Table 8.2. Electoral Volatility in Latvia (per cent), by Political Party Families

	1990-93	1993-95	1995-98	1998-02	2002-06	2006-10	
Communists	21.9	2	5	0	0	0	
Social Dem.	13	7	24	5	2	6	
Agrarians	12	4	16	12	6	4	
Left Liberals	5	13	18	0	0	0	
Conservatives	15	7	33	12	4	8	
Extreme Right	6	24	30	0	0	8	
Ethnic Minority	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Christian Dem.	6	6	8	2	0	0	
Liberals	36	19	4	21	0	0	
Other	5.9	0	0	0	0	0	
Popular Front	65.2	---	---	---	---	---	
SUM	186	75	138	52	12	26	Average
VOLATILITY	93	37.5	69	26	6	13	40.8

Annex Table 8.3. Electoral Volatility in Lithuania (per cent), by Political Party Families

	1990-92	1992-96	1996-00	2000-04	2004-08	2008-12	
Communists	4.5	0	0	0	0	0	
Social Dem.	57.4	39.9	16.5	19.8	3.5	8.9	
Agrarians	0	0.7	2.1	4.3	5	1.4	
Left Liberals	0	0	19.9	12.1	7.1	0.7	
Conservatives	0	51.1	44	10.6	14.9	8.9	
Extreme Right	2.8	1.3	0.1	1.4	0	0	
Ethnic Minority	2.8	2.1	0.7	0	0.7	3.7	
Other/Independents	6.4	1.3	1.6	35.5	7.1	4.1	
Liberals	1.4	9.5	14.6	12.7	0	5.6	
Christian Dem.	7.8	4.6	8.1	4.3	0	0	
Popular Front	74.2	21.3	---	---	---	---	
SUM	157.3	131.8	107.6	100.7	38.3	33.3	Average
VOLATILITY	78.7	65.9	53.8	50.4	19.2	16.7	47.5

Zusammenfassung

Transformation parlamentarischer Eliten: Rekrutierung und Karrieren von Abgeordneten in Estland, Lettland und Litauen, 1990-2012

Die klassischen Elitentheorien (Pareto and Mosca) und die meisten heutigen Arbeiten über politische Eliten (Higley und Lengyel 2000; Best und Cotta 2000; Best und Higley 2010) verbinden den Wechsel und die Stabilität des politischen Regimes mit dem Wechsel vom Personal in den formalen Institutionen der Politik (Elitenzirkulation). Nach der Theorie der Konkurrenzdemokratie (Schumpeter 1979; Sartori 1987) gelten die politischen Eliten als maßgebliche Akteure in modernen Demokratien. Die Literatur unterscheidet zwischen der Elitenzirkulation auf individueller Ebene und der strukturellen Zirkulation auf der Ebene der sozialen/politischen Profile (Lasswell, Lerner und Rothwell 1952; Keller 1991). Während die Zirkulation der sozialen/politischen Profilen immer eine individuelle Zirkulation mit sich bringt, trifft das Gegenteil nicht notwendig zu: Die individuelle Zirkulation bedingt nicht automatisch eine strukturelle Zirkulation.

Die vorliegende Dissertation über die baltischen parlamentarischen Eliten untersucht auf der Basis der 21 zwischen 1990 und 2012 gewählten Nationalparlamente von Estland, Lettland und Litauen sowohl Prozesse der individuellen als auch der strukturellen Elitenzirkulation. Die individuelle Elitenzirkulation variiert in den baltischen Staaten in ihrem Ausmaß und ihrer Häufigkeit, obgleich sich Art und Weise des Elitenwechsels nicht unterscheiden. Die Variation erklärt sich vor allem durch die Volatilität auf der Angebotsseite und die Pfad-Abhängigkeit (die Länge des sowjetischen Regimes). Die strukturelle Eltenzirkulation lässt in vielerlei Hinsicht eine Transformation der sozialen und politischen Profile von Abgeordneten in Estland, Lettland und Litauen erkennen, wenngleich einzelne Befunde auf eine Kontinuität (Elitenreproduktion) hindeuten.

Die Transformation der politischen Eliten ist im Baltikum durch die Abfolge zweier Generationen von Parlamentariern charakterisiert: Auf die Transitionseliten während der frühen Demokratisierungsphase in den 1990er Jahren folgten die Post-Transitionseliten. Diese beiden Abgeordentengenerationen unterscheiden sich nicht nur hinsichtich ihrer vorparlamentarischen demokratischen politischen Erfahrung (besonders in Bezug auf Positionen in der Lokalpolitik und Führungfunktionen in der

Partei), sondern auch in ihrem beruflichen Hintergrund (sinkender Anteil von Lehrern und Professoren bei gleichzeitig wachsender Präsenz von Managern und Geschäftsleuten) und bezüglich des Geschlechts (stärkere Repräsentation von Frauen). Parteipolitischen findet die Unterscheidung der beiden Elitengenerationen ihren Ausdruck in dem Wettbewerb zwischen den traditionellen Parteien und neuen politischen Kräften (mit oftmals anti-elitärer Rhetorik), in deren Fraktionen zum Beispiel Manager und Geschäftsleute überproportional vertreten sind.

Ungeachtet der fortbestehenden Volatilität der Angebotsseite lassen die Befunde Tendenzen einer politischen Professionalisierung der Parlamentarier in Estland, Lettland und Litauen erkennen. Die Turnover-Raten sind in jedem der drei Länder schon mindestens einmal auf die Werte der etablierten westlichen Demokratien gesunken, wenngleich sie auf diesem niedrigen Niveau nicht verblieben. Gestiegen ist in den letzten Legislaturperioden zugleich der Anteil erfahrener Abgeordneter (in Estland und Lettland auf etwa ein Viertel der Parlamentarier, in Litauen sogar auf mehr als vierzig Prozent). Dieser kann als Indikator für eine parlamentarische Institutionalisierung im Sinne Polsbys (1968) verstanden werden und erleichtert zudem die parlamentarische Sozialisation neuer Repräsentationseliten.

Wichtigster Prädiktor für die Dauer der parlamentarischen Karrieren baltischer Abgeordneter ist der Wechsel der politischen Partei, was die strategische Funktion des *party switching* unterstreicht und eine Teilerklärung für die volatilen Angebotsstrukturen bietet. Einen positiven Einfluss auf die Verbleibsdauer im Nationalparlament haben auch eine Mitgliedschaft in Bürgerkomitee und ein rechtswissenschaftlicher Universitätsabschluss. Obwohl ethnische Minderheiten ebenso wie Frauen in den Parlamenten unterrepräsentiert sind, verfügen die gewählten Abgeordneten aus diesen Gruppen über gute Chancen, länger im Parlament zu verbleiben. Unter den Berufsgruppen gilt dies in Estland vor allem für Lehrer/Professoren, in Lettland für Beamte im gehobenen Verwaltungsdienst und in Litauen für Abgeordnete, die zuvor bei Parteien oder Interessengruppen beschäftigt waren. Auch Parlamentarier, deren Eltern politische Verfolgung in der sowjetischen Zeit erfahren haben, weisen eine überproportionale Mandatsdauer auf, während für ehemalige Mitglieder der sowjetischen Nomenklatur zumindest in Lettland und Litauen das Gegenteil gilt.

Die Dissertation ist die erste vergleichende Längsschnittstudie über die parlamentarischen Eliten in allen drei baltischen Ländern. Sie stellt einen wichtigen

Beitrag zur Erforschung der baltischen Eliten dar, der auf einem eigenständig konstruierten Längsschnittdatensatz mit den beruflichen und politischen Biografien sämtlicher Abgeordneter der baltischen Staaten zwischen 1990 und 2012 beruht. Der innerbaltische Vergleich und die Einbettung der baltischen Fälle in eine ost- und westeuropäische Perspektive geben wichtige Aufschlüsse über Ausmaß und Determinanten der strukturellen und individuellen Zirkulation nach Regimewechseln. Von den empirischen Befunden wie von der theoretisch fundierten Analyse gehen Impulse sowohl für die Eliten- als auch für die Forschung zur osteuropäischen Transformation aus.

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